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In January 2018, a spontaneous march of young men from the region of Waziristan descended upon the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, dramatically exploding the myths about the so-called war on terror in the "tribal" border zone with Afghanistan. This organic mobilisation became the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), a civil rights uprising embodying the repressed rage of a generation of Pashtun youth that had come of age in the shadow of violence propagated by the unholy nexus of US drones, the Taliban and Pakistan's security establishment. In this commentary, the PTM's emergence as a response to the brutalisation of Pashtun society on what remains a colonial frontier hundreds of years since the British conquest is counterposed to a right-wing populist upsurge led by current Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, whose primary constituency of support is a myopic middle-class strata in metropolitan areas. This confrontation between left and right populisms reveals growing social polarisation under the backdrop of rapid demographic change in a rentier state dominated by an all-powerful military establishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how counterterrorism targeting terrorist leaders affects terrorist attacks. This effect is theoretically ambiguous and depends on whether terrorist groups are modeled as unitary actors or not. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) "hitting" and "missing" terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone "hit" on their leader compared with after a "miss." This increase is statistically significant for 3 out of 6 months after a hit, when it ranges between 47.7% and 70.3%. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups and leaders, and the impact of drone hits on the type of attack, terrorist group infighting, and splintering, suggest that principal-agent problems—(new) terrorist leaders struggling to control and discipline their operatives—account for these results better than alternative theoretical explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phrase of "the Global War on Terror" was adopted by the media. It was announced that Washington Administration would utilize all its resources to uproot terrorism and will punish all those who are responsible for the 9/11 tragedy. Both Islamic Jihadists and two Bush administrations have deployed spectacles of terror to promote their political agendas; that both deploy Manichean discourses of good and evil which themselves fit into dominant media codes of popular culture; and that both deploy fundamentalist and absolutist discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite labels like ‘failed state’ or ‘hub of terror’, Pakistan remains a somehow ‘normal’ postcolonial country. While many problems are shared by such nations, Pakistan’s complex journey into the future needs to be better understood. Among specific problems, militancy and terrorism have been mainly presented as resulting from interventions by external actors, blaming others. However, failures in internal management and (mis)-adventurous foreign policies have also led to turmoil, disrupting domestic economic development and slowing the pace of democratisation.Assessing the scope for future developments in Pakistan, this article argues that presently Pakistan’s power elites are still not fully ready to admit having learnt from the country’s past mistakes, repeating the same to secure proclaimed public interests, at the cost of killing many of their own citizens. Yet, while the overall picture remains one of precarity, there is also considerable progress. The final analysis explores how this precarious re-balancing has been achieved and is being maintained, and what this means for the future of Pakistan and South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores why Pakistan does not have a counterterrorism strategy as of March 2015. It looks on the two reasons that explain the country's inability to counter the ongoing violence, which are counterterrorism effort has been an ad hoc commitment, and the crafting of a scientifically structured counter narrative involves specialized skills that are neither available nor find cultural amenability for assimilation. Also discussed is the phenomenology of terrorism in the country

Since Charles Tilly's (1985) articulation of stage-wise development of modern European state through war making, a large body of scholarship has attempted to elaborate on a similar process in developing world (Rasler and Thompson 1985, 1989; Mann 1988; Kirby and Ward 1991; Jagger 1992; Stubbs 1999; Bates, 2001). This scholarship demonstrates affirmative positive connections between war making and state building in developing countries. Another offshoot of this scholarship goes to the extent of claiming that the absence (of threat) of war or inter-national rivalry might lead to a relatively weak state (Desch 1996; Herbst 2000; Lustick 1997). The primary argument of this approach--the bellicist approach--is that warfare stimulates state building: the centralization of state power, the building of institutional capacity, and the generation of resources. However, a number of scholars have also critiqued the approach, especially in the context of Latin America that is rife with wars and internal revolts, that Tilly's model does not re-produce itself in developing countries (Lopez-Alves 2000, Centeno 2002). In this theoretical and empirical context, we study the case of Pakistan, which we believe exhibits obvious connection between war making and state-building. We argue the conventional wars did produce stimulus for state building, but that the unconventional wars did not. The latter put the state astride a vicious cycle of only war making, which it is feared might end up in state failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The major threat Pakistan today faces is militant extremism. Militant extremism has serious repercussions particularly for Pakistani society and state and generally for global security. Religious militancy at present poses a potential threat to security of Pakistan. Militant groups both local (Taliban) and foreign (Al-Qaeda) have spread to the settled areas of Pakistan. Different sectarian groups have now become a part of their network. These groups with their mutual understanding have been initiating various acts of religious terrorism. These militants have created fear amongst people through initiating indiscriminate suicide attacks leading to the killings of innocent individuals. The political, economic and social conditions of Pakistan have further fueled religious extremism in Pakistani society. The aim of the study is to delineate the emergence of sectarianism more forcefully during General Zia-Ul-Haq's era and increase in the rate of sectarian violence after 9/11 incidents throughout Pakistan; suggest various strategies to counter the menace of sectarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Islamic extremists in Pakistan. It relates the support among members of the Pathan ethnic group living in the frontier region to the Tehriq-e-Taleban Pakistan (TTP), the leading Islamic radical group in Pakistan. Information is presented on the terror attacks staged by the TTP against the Pakistani Army from 2007-2009. It explores how the Pakistani government and the international community should respond to the violent conflict being waged by the TTP.

The article discusses Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), an Islamist terrorist organization established in the Punjab region of Pakistan. The article compares LeT to the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, noting that both organizations grew in a local-to-global pattern, and examines the creation of the LeT by Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. The author discusses support which the LeT, which aims to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule, has received from the Pakistani military and examines the activities of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), LeT's charity. The author says that LeT is central in a hub of Pakistani militant groups including Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI). The author concludes that the U.S. should disaggregate the organization.

Despite an air of Western triumphalism over bin Laden's killing, Pakistan remains a major hub of international terrorism, especially for groups plotting attacks against Western countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays, Pakistan is passing through a very critical phase of its history where it is facing a number of problems amongst which the most crucial and devastating is fundamentalism which has led to militancy and violence in the society. Fundamentalism has further brought radicalization, divisions and cracks in an already fragmented society. If the present situation is left unchecked, it has the potential to completely destabilize the country. This paper attempts to analyze how fundamentalism has taken roots and also how it has continuously been growing in the recent history of Pakistan. The paper further looks into the affects of fundamentalism on the society as a whole. Needless to say that this situation has put the security of this country at stake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the emergence of the Lal Masjid as a militant entity, whose ramifications extend much further than the establishment of a hardliner resistance movement in the capital city of Pakistan .A chronological account is given of the entrenchment of this entity in the Pakistani militant paradigm, while the aftereffects of this phenomenon in reference to suicide terrorism and the parting of ways between the Jihadis and the establishment are contextualized. A comprehension of the evolution of this phenomenon is a vital aid to any research into the gravity of the geopolitical situation about Terrorism in Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can Pakistan find a way out of violent instability? How severe are the problems of this strategically crucial country, and how much of a threat do they pose beyond Pakistan's borders? Has Pakistan become an ungovernable failed state? Hilary Synnott draws on his experience of Pakistan to argue that any strategy for addressing the country's problems requires a nuanced understanding of its turbulent history, the failings of successive governments and the weaknesses of core institutions. He sheds light on the role of Pakistan's army and its intelligence service in the power-play of domestic politics, and looks at how the army has used religion and the issue of Kashmir to maintain its own influence, often with disastrous consequences for the security of Pakistan and the wider world. Synnott rigorously analyses developments in Pakistan's volatile tribal regions, little understood in the West despite their profound implications for regional and international security, and examines the role of past events - especially since 11 September 2001 - in generating the animosity that many Pakistanis feel towards the West today. Where does Pakistan go from here? Emphasising that there are no easy answers, Synnott explores how concerned outsiders might finally succeed in building durable relationships with Pakistan, and help to stabilise a country that has struggled with disordered politics and chronic insecurity since independence in 1947. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an exploration into the political environment of Pakistan in the early 21st century, particularly highlighting its significance as a locus of the U.S. War on Terror. Paradoxical contrasts within the nation are described, describing both its role as a center for Islamic jihadist terrorism and as a victim of terrorist actions against the state's government and civilian population. An overview of the nation's political history since the 1980s is given regarding these elements.

Pakistan almost uniquely is both a major victim of terrorism and a major sponsor of terrorism. It has been the scene of horrific acts of terrorist violence, including the murder of Benazir Bhutto, and it has been one of the most prolific state sponsors of terror aimed at advancing its national security interests. Over the course of the past three decades, Pakistan's army has built a complex network of relationships with numerous jihadist terror groups, including the Taliban, and with terrorists like Osama bin Laden. Fear of India is the driving force behind the army's pursuit of these relationships. For the next American president, there is no issue or country more critical to get right, which means developing a policy that will move Pakistan away from being a hothouse of terror. Engaging Kashmir should be part of that new approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2007, Pakistan experienced one of the most violent and eventful years in its history. The year included the dismissal and reinstatement of the Supreme Court chief justice, the Red Mosque siege and consequent killings, farcical presidential elections, intensified violence in tribal areas that spread to other regions of the country, the imposition of emergency rule and suspension of the Constitution, and the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]