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Guns that are used in crime and recovered by the police typically have changed hands often since first retail sale and are quite old. While there is an extensive literature on “time to crime” for guns, defined as the elapsed time from first retail sale to known use in a crime, there is little information available on the duration of the “last link”—the elapsed time from the transaction that actually provided the offender with the gun in question. In this article, we use data from the new Chicago Inmate Survey (CIS) to estimate the duration of the last link. The median is just 2 months. Many of the gun-involved respondents to the CIS (42%) did not have any gun 6 months prior to their arrest for the current crime. The CIS respondents were almost all barred from purchasing a gun from a gun store because of their prior criminal record—as a result, their guns were obtained by illegal transactions with friends, relatives, and the underground market. We conclude that more effective enforcement of the laws governing gun transactions may have a quick and pervasive effect on gun use in crime.

Some law enforcement officials and other observers have asserted that theft is the primary source of guns to crime. In fact, the role of theft in supplying the guns used in robbery, assault, and murder is unknown, and current evidence provides little guidance about whether an effective program to reduce gun theft would reduce gun violence. The current article analyzes publicly available national data on gun theft together with a unique data set for Chicago. The results tend to support a conclusion that stolen guns play only a minor role in crime. First, publicly available data are used to calculate that thefts are only about 1% of all gun transactions nationwide. Second, an analysis of original data from Chicago demonstrates that less than 3% of crime guns recovered by the police have been reported stolen to the Chicago Police Department (CPD). If a gun is reported stolen, there is a 20% chance that it will be recovered, usually in conjunction with an arrest for illegal carrying. Less than half of those picked up with a stolen gun have a criminal record that includes violent offenses. Third, results from surveys of convicted criminals, both nationally and in Chicago, suggest that it is rare for respondents to have stolen the gun used in their most recent crime. The data on which these results are based have various shortcomings. A research agenda is proposed that would provide more certainty about the role of theft.

Objectives. To investigate the validity of the apparent downward trend in the national case–fatality rate for gunshot wounds from assault. Methods. We reanalyzed the estimated annual number of nonfatal firearm injuries the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System reported from 2003 to 2012. We adjusted the estimates for discontinuities created by the substitution of 1 hospital for another in the sample and for a downward trend in the percentage of gunshot injuries classified as “unknown circumstance.” Firearm homicide data are from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System. Results. The unadjusted National Electronic Injury Surveillance System estimate increased by 49%, yielding a decline in the case–fatality rate from 25% to 18%. Our adjustments eliminated these trends; the case–fatality rate was 22% in both 2003 and 2012. Conclusions. With reasonable adjustments, the trend in nonfatal injuries from interpersonal firearms assault tracks the flat trend in firearms homicides, suggesting that there was no increase in firearms violence during this period. The case–fatality rate did not change, and trauma care improvements did not influence the firearms homicide trend.

Gun violence exacts a lethal toll on public health. This paper focuses on reducing access to firearms by dangerous offenders, contributing original empirical data on the gun transactions that arm offenders in Chicago. Conducted in the fall of 2013, analysis of an open-ended survey of 99 inmates of Cook County Jail focuses on a subset of violence-prone individuals with the goal of improving law enforcement actions. Among our principal findings: *Our respondents (adult offenders living in Chicago or nearby) obtain most of their guns from their social network of personal connections. Rarely is the proximate source either direct purchase from a gun store, or theft. *Only about 60% of guns in the possession of respondents were obtained by purchase or trade. Other common arrangements include sharing guns and holding guns for others. *About one in seven respondents report selling guns, but in only a few cases as a regular source of income. *Gangs continue to play some role in Chicago in organizing gun buys and in distributing guns to members as needed. *The Chicago Police Department has a considerable effect on the workings of the underground gun market through deterrence. Transactions with strangers and less-trusted associates are limited by concerns over arrest risk (if the buyer should happen to be an undercover officer or a snitch), and about being caught with a "dirty" gun (one that has been fired in a crime).

In this essay I provide an account of how research on gun violence has evolved over the last four decades, intertwined with personal observations and commentary on my contributions. It begins with a sketch of the twentieth century history of gun control in the United States. I then provide an account of why gun violence is worth studying, with a discussion of how and why the type of weapon used in crime matters, and assess the social costs of the widespread private ownership of firearms. I then detour into the methodological disputes over estimating basic facts relevant to understanding gun use and misuse. In Section IV, I focus on how gun availability influences the use of guns in crime and whether the incidence of misuse is influenced by the prevalence of gun ownership, regulations, and law enforcement. I go on to review evaluations of efforts to focus law enforcement directly at gun use in violent crime. Next I turn to the hottest topic of our day, the role of guns in self-defense and what migh...

Despite the long-term decline in the number of death sentences and the lack of executions, the cost of the death penalty in North Carolina remains high. To document this cost, the empirical analysis here focuses on a recent two-year period, comparing actual costs associated with capital proceedings, with likely costs in the absence of the death penalty. The conclusion: the state would have spent almost $11 million less each year on criminal justice activities (including appeals and imprisonment) if the death penalty had been abolished. Additional criminal justice resources would have been freed up and available to be redirected to other cases. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Gun violence in North American is the subject of much speculation and debate, often based on limited or incomplete empirical evidence. We summarize the regulatory frameworks in Mexico, the United States and Canada, and provide statistics on gun misuse in these countries. Based on our analysis of publicly available information on sources of crime guns, we conclude that while the United States is a major supplier of illegal handguns to Canada and illegal firearms of all types to Mexico, quantifying the extent of its role, particularly in Mexico, is difficult because of data limitations. Still more difficult is to project the consequences of an effective crackdown by US authorities. If the illicit supply from the USA dried up, the criminal gangs could turn to a variety of other sources that already appear to be playing some role. A complete analysis of these issues must await more complete disclosure by the authorities of data on gun sources and trafficking investigations.

Using administrative data on public school students in North Carolina, we find that sixth grade students attending middle schools are much more likely to be cited for discipline problems than those attending elementary school. That difference remains after adjusting for the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the students and their schools. Furthermore, the higher infraction rates recorded by sixth graders who are placed in middle school persist at least through ninth grade. An analysis of end-of-grade test scores provides complementary findings. A plausible explanation is that sixth graders are at an especially impressionable age; in middle school, the exposure to older peers and the relative freedom from supervision have deleterious consequences. These findings are relevant to the current debate over the best school configuration for incorporating the middle grades. Based on our results, we suggest that there is a strong argument for separating sixth graders from older adolescents. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

This paper provides an economic analysis of underground gun markets drawing on interviews with gang members, gun dealers, professional thieves, prostitutes, police, public school security guards and teens in the city of Chicago, complemented by results from government surveys of recent arrestees in 22 cities plus administrative data for suicides, homicides, robberies, arrests and confiscated crime guns. We find evidence of considerable frictions in the underground market for guns in Chicago. We argue that these frictions are due primarily to the fact that the underground gun market is both illegal and %u201Cthin%u201D -- the number of buyers, sellers and total transactions is small and relevant information is scarce. Gangs can help overcome these market frictions, but the gang%u2019s economic interests cause gang leaders to limit supply primarily to gang members, and even then transactions are usually loans or rentals with strings attached.

The case for focusing regulatory and enforcement efforts on the illegal supply of firearms to criminals rests on the belief that a supply-side approach has the potential to reduce the use of guns in violence. The case against this focus follows from the belief that guns in America are so readily available, and from such a variety of sources, that efforts to restrict the supply are futile. Individuals who are proscribed from buying guns legally (because of their criminal record or youth) tend to acquire firearms from "point" sources, such as illegal traffickers and scofflaw dealers, and "diffuse sources," including all sorts of informal transfers from the vast stock of weapons in private hands. Both are important. The mix within a jurisdiction appears to depend on the prevalence of gun ownership and the stringency of state regulations. A variety of promising supply-side measures are available, and some have been tried. Lessons have been learned-for example, that gun "buybacks" are ineffective-but for the m...

OBJECTIVES: This study examined errors in estimating household gun ownership that result from interviewing only 1 adult per household. METHODS: Data from 2 recent telephone surveys and a series of in-person surveys were used to compare reports of household gun ownership by husbands and wives. RESULTS: In the telephone surveys, the rate of household gun ownership reported by husbands exceeded wives' reports by an average of 12 percentage points; husbands' reports also implied 43.3 million more guns. The median "gender gap" in recent in-person surveys is 7 percentage points. CONCLUSIONS: Future research should focus on respondents' reports about personally owned guns.

New policy options are emerging in the debate regarding the regulation of firearms in the United States. These options include the treatment of firearms as consumer products, the design of which can be regulated for safety; denial of gun ownership to those convicted of misdemeanors; and strategies to curtail the illegal sale of guns. The public's opinion of these innovative gun-policy options has not been thoroughly assessed.We conducted two telephone surveys of 1200 adults each in the United States in 1996 and 1997-1998. Cognitive interviews and pretests were used in the development of the survey instruments. Potential participants were then contacted by random-digit dialing of telephone numbers.A majority of the respondents favored safety standards for new handguns. These standards included childproofing (favored by 88 percent of respondents), personalization (devices that permit firing only by an authorized person; 71 percent), magazine safeties (devices that prevent firing after the magazine or clip is removed; 82 percent), and loaded-chamber indicators (devices that show whether the handgun is loaded; 73 percent). There was strong support for policies prohibiting persons convicted of specific misdemeanors from purchasing a firearm. Support for such prohibitions was strongest for crimes involving violence or the illegal use of a firearm (83 to 95 percent) or substance abuse (71 to 92 percent). There was also widespread support for policies designed to reduce the illegal sale of guns, such as mandatory tamper-resistant serial numbers (90 percent), a limit of one handgun purchase per customer per month (81 percent), and mandatory registration of handguns (82 percent). Even among the subgroup of respondents who were gun owners, a majority were in favor of stricter gun regulations with regard to 20 of the 22 proposals covered in the poll.Strong public support, even among gun owners, for innovative strategies to regulate firearms suggests that these proposals warrant serious consideration by policy makers.

The number of civilian defensive gun uses (DGUs) against criminal attackers is regularly invoked in public policy debates as a benefit of widespread private ownership of firearms. Yet there is considerable uncertainty for the prevalence of civilian DGUs, with estimates ranging from 108,000 (using the National Crime Victimization Survey) to 2.5 million (using smaller telephone surveys) per year. In this paper we analyze the results of a new national random-digit-dial telephone survey to estimate the prevalence of DGU and then discuss the plausibility of the results in light of other well-known facts and possible sources of bias in survey data for sensitive behaviors. Because DGU is a relatively rare event by any measure, a small proportion of respondents who falsely report a gun use can produce substantial overestimates of the prevalence of DGU, even if every true defensive gun user conceals his or her use. We find that estimates from this new survey are apparently subject to a large positive bias, which calls into question the accuracy of DGU estimates based on data from general-population surveys. Our analysis also suggests that available survey data are not able to determine whether reported DGU incidents, even if true, add to or detract from public health and safety.

The epidemic of youth violence that began in the mid-1980s has been demographically concentrated among black male youths: the homicide-commission rate for this group increased by a factor of about 4.5. A number of patterns stand out: one of every four or five serious crimes of violence, and one of ten homicides, are committed by juveniles who are less than age eighteen; the proportion of arrests for violent crimes, however, that involved juveniles (20 percent) was about the same in 1994 as in 1965. A decline in the adolescent population has been balanced by an increase in rates of arrest. Youths kill more often than they are killed, and there is a great deal of crossover killing (in both directions) between adolescents and older people. The claim that the explosion in youth violence can be attributed to "superpredators," with each cohort having greater prevalence of such fiends than the last, does not accord well with available data. There is a clear indication of increased gun availability during the epi...

Gunfire from assaults, suicides, and unintentional shootings exacts an enormous burden on public health globally. The epidemiologic reviews in this special issue enhance our understanding of various forms of gun violence, inform interventions, and help chart directions for future research. The available science, however, is limited to answer many important questions necessary for mounting successful efforts to reduce gun violence. Certain data are lacking, and there are numerous analytical challenges to deriving unbiased estimates of policy impacts. Significant investments in research over the long term are warranted to answer questions central to successful prevention of gun violence.

On January 1, 1991, the federal excise tax on beer doubled, and the tax rates on wine and liquor increased as well. These changes are larger than the typical state-level changes that have been used to study the effect of price on alcohol abuse and its consequences. In this paper, we develop a method to estimate some important effects of those large 1991 changes, exploiting the interstate differences in alcohol consumption. We demonstrate that the relative importance of drinking in traffic fatalities is closely tied to per capita alcohol consumption across states. As a result, we expect that the proportional effects of the federal tax increase on traffic fatalities would be positively correlated with per capita consumption. We demonstrate that this is indeed the case, and infer estimates of the price elasticity and lives saved in each state. We repeat this exercise for other injury-fatality rates, and for nine categories of crime. For each outcome, the estimated effect of the tax increase is negatively related to average consumption, and that relationship is highly significant for the overall injury death rate, the violent crime rate, and the property crime rate. A conservative estimate is that the federal tax reduced injury deaths by 4.7%, or almost 7,000, in 1991.

The "core right" established in D.C. vs. Heller (2008) is to keep an operable handgun in the home for self-defense purposes. If the Court extends this right to cover state and local jurisdictions, the result is likely to include the elimination of the most stringent existing regulations - such as Chicago's handgun ban - and could also possibly ban regulations that place substantial restrictions or costs on handgun ownership. We find evidence in support of four conclusions: The effect of Heller may be to increase the prevalence of handgun ownership in jurisdictions that currently have restrictive laws; Given the best evidence on the consequences of increased prevalence of gun ownership, these jurisdictions will experience a greater burden of crime due to more lethal violence and an increased burglary rate; Nonetheless, a regime with greater scope for gun rights is not necessarily inferior - whether restrictive regulations would pass a cost benefit test may depend on whether we accept the Heller viewpoint that there is a legal entitlement to possess a handgun; In any event, the core right defined by Heller leaves room for some regulation that would reduce the negative externalities of gun ownership.

Over 30,000 deaths each year result from gunshot wounds. Two decades of systematic research on weapons and personal violence indicate a pervasive influence of weapon type on the patterns and outcomes of violent encounters. The likelihood that an assault will result in death depends (among other things) on the lethality of the weapon. The evidence that weapon lethality affects the likelihood of death in suicide is somewhat weaker. Assailants' weapon choice depends on a number of factors, including the relative vulnerability of the intended victim and the general availability of firearms. National Crime Survey data indicate that guns are used only about 80,000 times each year in self-defense.

Urban crime rates in the United States fell markedly during the 1990s and remain at historically low levels. The statistical evidence presented here indicates that that decline, like the crime surge that preceded it, has been largely uncorrelated with changes in socioeconomic conditions across cities. The ups and downs of crime have a considerable effect on residential location and property values. The police represent the largest public expenditure in city-level crime control efforts, and they are increasingly held accountable for reducing crime rates. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that an increase in police expenditures does pay off in the form of lower crime rates. This is an incomplete story, however. Assessments of police effectiveness typically neglect the considerable role of private and community-level protection and control efforts, not to mention the vital importance of (uncompensated) private inputs into police investigations. In areas with endemically high violence rates, the reluctance of witnesses to cooperate remains a serious problem.

Objective: To identify gender differences in violent deaths in terms of incidence, circumstances, and methods of death. Design: Analysis of surveillance data. Setting: North Carolina, a state of 8.6 million residents on the eastern seaboard of the US. Subjects: 1674 North Carolina residents who died from violence in the state during 2004. Methods: Information on violent deaths was collected by the North Carolina Violent Death Reporting System using data from death certificates, medical examiner reports, and law enforcement agency incidence reports. Results: Suicide and homicide rates were lower for females than males. For suicides, females were more likely than males to have a diagnosis of depression (55% v 36%), a current mental health problem (66% v 42%), or a history of suicide attempts (25% v 13%). Firearms were the sole method of suicide in 65% of males and 42% of females. Poisonings were more common in female than male suicides (37% v 12%). Male and female homicide victims were most likely to die from a handgun or a sharp instrument. Fifty seven percent of female homicides involved intimate partner violence, compared with 13% of male homicides. Among female homicides involving intimate partner violence, 78% occurred in the woman’s home. White females had a higher rate of suicide than African-American females, but African-American females had a higher rate of homicide than white females. Conclusions: The incidence, circumstances, and methods of fatal violence differ greatly between females and males. These differences should be taken into account in the development of violence prevention efforts.

Objective: To determine the retailer and community level factors associated with frequent and disproportionate sales of handguns that are later used in violent and firearm related crimes (VFC handguns). Design: Cross sectional. The authors used California records to identify all handguns sold by study subjects during 1996–2000 and federal gun tracing records to determine which of these guns had been recovered by a police agency in the US or elsewhere and traced by 30 September 2003. Subjects and setting: The 421 licensed gun retailers in California selling at least 100 handguns annually during 1996–2000. Main outcome measure: The number of VFC handguns per 1000 gun years of exposure. Differences are expressed as incidence rate ratios (RR) with 95% confidence intervals (CI). Results: Subjects accounted for 11.7% of California retailers with handgun sales, 81.5% of handgun sales, and 85.5% of VFC handguns. Among subjects, the 3426 VFC handguns accounted for 48.0% of all traced handguns and 65.0% of those linked to a specified crime. The median VFC handgun trace rate was 0.5/1000 gun years (range 0–8.8). In multivariate analysis, this rate increased substantially for each single-point increase in the percentage of proposed sales that were denied because the purchasers were prohibited from owning guns (RR 1.43; 95% CI 1.32 to 1.56), and was increased for pawnbrokers (RR 1.26; 95% CI 1.02 to 1.55). Community level crime rates and sociodemographics had little predictive value. Conclusions: Risk factors, largely determined at the retailer level, exist for frequent and disproportionate sales of handguns that are later used in violent and firearm related crimes. Screening to identify high risk retailers could be undertaken with data that are already available.

ContextHomicide prevention strategies can be either targeted toward high-risk groups or addressed to the population at large. One high-risk group of particular interest is adults with a criminal record. But the prevalence of a criminal record among homicide offenders has not been reliably quantified, nor has the prevalence of criminal record in the general population.ObjectiveTo determine what portion of the homicide problem would be addressed by interventions linked to arrest or conviction.Design, Setting, and ParticipantsA case-control analysis was performed using a comprehensive data set of all arrests and felony convictions in Illinois for 1990-2001. Cases were defined as Illinois residents aged 18 to 64 years who were arrested for homicide in 2001. Controls were all other Illinois residents aged 18 to 64 years in 2001. Illinois criminal and juvenile record information for cases and controls was compiled for 1990-2000. Five definitions of previous record were considered (arrest, arrest for a violent crime, 5 or more arrests with at least 1 for a violent crime, felony conviction, and violent-felony conviction), each measured for 1990-2000 and for 1996-2000.Main Outcome MeasureThe population-attributable risk: the portion of homicide offenses that would be eliminated by a hypothetical intervention that reduced the offending risk of individuals with a record to the offending risk of those who lack a record.ResultsFor 1990-2000, 42.6% of 884 cases had at least 1 felony conviction compared with 3.9% of nearly 7.9 million controls, for a population-attributable risk of 40.3% (95% CI, 37.0%-43.8%); among cases, 71.6% had experienced any arrest from 1990-2000 compared with 18.2% of controls, for a population-attributable risk of 65.3% (95% CI, 61.6%-68.8%). For 1996-2000, the population-attributable risk among individuals with a felony conviction or any arrest was 31.0% (95% CI, 27.9%-34.2%) and 58.5% (95% CI, 54.9%-62.1%), respectively.ConclusionsInterventions after arrest or conviction, such as supervised release, imprisonment, correctional programs, or bans on firearm possession, are targeted toward a group that has relatively high incidence of lethal violence, but they leave a large portion of the problem untouched.

The proposition that widespread gun ownership serves as a deterrent to residential burglary is widely touted by advocates, but the evidence is weak, consisting of anecdotes, interviews with burglars, casual comparisons with other countries, and the like. A more systematic exploration requires data on local rates of gun ownership and of residential burglary, and such data have only recently become available. In this paper we exploit a new well-validated proxy for local gun-ownership prevalence -- the proportion of suicides that involve firearms -- together with newly available geo-coded data from the National Crime Victimization Survey, to produce the first systematic estimates of the net effects of gun prevalence on residential burglary patterns. The importance of such empirical work stems in part from the fact that theoretical considerations do not provide much guidance in predicting the net effects of widespread gun ownership. Guns in the home may pose a threat to burglars, but also serve as an inducement, since guns are particularly valuable loot. Other things equal, a gun-rich community provides more lucrative burglary opportunities than one where guns are more sparse. The new empirical results reported here provide no support for a net deterrent effect from widespread gun ownership. Rather, our analysis concludes that residential burglary rates tend to increase with community gun prevalence.

The epidemic of youth violence in the United States peaked in 1993 and has been followed by a rapid, sustained drop. We assess two types of explanation for this drop-those that focus on "cohort" effects (including the effects of abortion legalization) and those that focus on "period" effects (including the effects of the changing crack-cocaine trade). We are able to reject the cohort-type explanations yet also find contradictions with an account based on the dynamics of crack markets. The "way out" of this epidemic has not been the same as the "way in." The relative importance in homicide of youths, racial minorities, and guns, all of which increased greatly during the epidemic, has remained high during the drop. Arrest patterns tell a somewhat different story, in part because of changing police practice with respect to aggravated assault. Finally, we demonstrate that the rise and fall of youth violence has been narrowly confined with respect to race, sex, and age, but not geography. Given the volatility ...

ContextIn February 1994, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act established a nationwide requirement that licensed firearms dealers observe a waiting period and initiate a background check for handgun sales. The effects of this act have not been analyzed.ObjectiveTo determine whether implementation of the Brady Act was associated with reductions in homicide and suicide rates.Design and SettingAnalysis of vital statistics data in the United States for 1985 through 1997 from the National Center for Health Statistics.Main Outcome MeasuresTotal and firearm homicide and suicide rates per 100,000 adults (≥21 years and ≥55 years) and proportion of homicides and suicides resulting from firearms were calculated by state and year. Controlling for population age, race, poverty and income levels, urban residence, and alcohol consumption, the 32 "treatment" states directly affected by the Brady Act requirements were compared with the 18 "control" states and the District of Columbia, which had equivalent legislation already in place.ResultsChanges in rates of homicide and suicide for treatment and control states were not significantly different, except for firearm suicides among persons aged 55 years or older (−0.92 per 100,000; 95% confidence interval [CI], −1.43 to −0.42). This reduction in suicides for persons aged 55 years or older was much stronger in states that had instituted both waiting periods and background checks (−1.03 per 100,000; 95% CI, −1.58 to −0.47) than in states that only changed background check requirements (−0.17 per 100,000; 95% CI, −1.09 to 0.75).ConclusionsBased on the assumption that the greatest reductions in fatal violence would be within states that were required to institute waiting periods and background checks, implementation of the Brady Act appears to have been associated with reductions in the firearm suicide rate for persons aged 55 years or older but not with reductions in homicide rates or overall suicide rates. However, the pattern of implementation of the Brady Act does not permit a reliable analysis of a potential effect of reductions in the flow of guns from treatment-state gun dealers into secondary markets.

ContextThe cost of treating gunshot injuries imposes a financial burden on society. Estimates of such costs are relevant to evaluation of gun violence reduction programs and may help guide reimbursement policies.ObjectivesTo develop reliable US estimates of the medical costs of treating gunshot injuries and to present national estimates for the sources of payment for treating these injuries.Design and SettingCost analysis using E-coded discharge data from hospitals in Maryland for 1994-1995 and New York for 1994 and from emergency departments in South Carolina for 1997. Other sources of data included the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System for 1994 incidence of nonfatal gun injuries, the National Spinal Cord Injury Statistical Center database for 1988-1992 estimates of lifetime medical costs of gun injuries, and the 1994 Vital Statistics census for incidence of fatal gun injuries.Main Outcome MeasuresEstimated national acute-care and follow-up treatment costs and payment sources for gunshot injuries.ResultsAt a mean medical cost per injury of about $17,000, the 134,445 (95% confidence interval [CI], 109,465-159,425) gunshot injuries in the United States in 1994 produced $2.3 billion (95% CI, $2.1 billion–$2.5 billion) in lifetime medical costs (in 1994 dollars, using a 3% real discount rate), of which $1.1 billion (49%) was paid by US taxpayers. Gunshot injuries due to assaults accounted for 74% of total costs.ConclusionsGunshot injury costs represent a substantial burden to the medical care system. Nearly half this cost is borne by US taxpayers.

This article presents an estimate of the benefits of reducing crime using the contingent-valuation (CV) method. We focus on gun violence, a crime of growing policy concern in America. Our data come from a national survey in which we ask respondents referendum-type questions that elicit their willingness-to-pay (WTP) to reduce gun violence by 30%. We estimate that the public's WTP to reduce gun assaults by 30% equals $24.5 billion, or around $1.2 million per injury. Our estimate implies a statistical value of life that is quite consistent with those derived from other methods.

Gun violence imposes significant costs on children, families, and American society as a whole. But these costs can be difficult to quantify, as much of the burden of gun violence results from intangible concerns about injury and death. This article explores several methods for estimating the costs of gun violence. One method is to assess how much Americans would be willing to pay to reduce the risk of gun violence. The authors use this "willingness-to-pay" framework to estimate the total costs of gun violence. Their approach yields the following lessons: Although gun violence has a disproportionate impact on the poor, it imposes costs on the entire socioeconomic spectrum through increased taxes, decreased property values, limits on choices of where to live and visit, and safety concerns. Most of the costs of gun violence--especially violence against children--result from concerns about safety. These are not captured by the traditional public health approach to estimating costs, which focuses on medical expenses and lost earnings. When people in a national survey were asked about their willingness to pay for reductions in gun violence, their answers suggested that the costs of gun violence are approximately $100 billion per year, of which at least $15 billion is directly attributable to gun violence against youth. The authors note that in light of the substantial costs of gun violence, even modestly effective regulatory and other interventions may generate benefits to society that exceed costs.

Handguns, like cars, are durable, dangerous commodities, long prevalent in American households, with millions sold new every year. But unlike cars, handguns are the subject of an acrimonious national debate concerning appropriate restrictions on commerce, ownership, and use. The principal animus for this debate is the link between handguns and crime; they are, after all, the principal tool in lethal assaults, but for many people they are also a valued tool for self-defense against violent predators. The potential for both good and ill underlies the apparently conflicting trends in the policy arena: While in recent years a number of states have eased restrictions on carrying concealed guns, the federal government and some states have taken steps to regulate handgun sales more closely and crack down on illicit gun trafficking. Yet both trends arguably fit the overarching objective, broadly supported by the American public, 1 of preserving legitimate uses while suppressing

Three to five million handguns change hands each year. Almost half the states—including 64 percent of the population—require that buyers be screened by the police, with the objective of preventing certain groups of po tentially dangerous people—felons, fugitives, ex-mental pa tients, drug addicts, and so forth—from obtaining handguns. These state systems operate within the federal framework created by the Gun Control Act of 1968, which requires that most all interstate transactions in firearms be handled by federally licensed dealers or manufacturers. The states' main problems are (1) weak federal regulation of licensees, (2) incomplete state criminal history files, and (3) the difficulty of regulating hand-to-hand transactions in used handguns. States that wish to increase the effectiveness of their screen ing systems will probably have to assume responsibility for regulating retail dealers and will have to institute civil liability for dealers and individual gun owners, together with a more comprehensive registration system, to make the screening system more difficult to circumvent.

Social scientists have started to find answers to some of the questions raised in the ongoing debate over gun control. The basic factual issue in this debate concerns the effect of gun availability on the distribution, seriousness, and number of violent crimes. Some evidence is available on each of these dimensions of the violent crime problem. The distribution of violent crimes among different types of victims is governed in part by the "vulnerability pattern" in weapon choice. The seriousness of robbery and assault incidents is influenced by weapon type, as indicated by the objective dangerousness and instrumental violence pattern. A reduc tion in gun availability would cause some weapon substitution and probably little change in overall robbery and assault rates—but the homicide rate would be reduced.

The spectacular increases in violent crime that began in the mid-1960s continue, and Americans are currently being murdered, robbed, and raped at historically unprecedented rates. Firearms are used in a minority of violent crimes but are of special concern because more than 60 percent of the most serious crimes-criminal homicides-are committed with firearms. This essay presents a variety of evidence to the effect that the widespread availability of firearms contributes to the criminal homicide rate and influences violent crime patterns in several other respects as well. A gun is usually superior to other weapons readily available for use in violent crime; even in the hands of a weak and unskilled assailant, a gun poses a credible threat and can be used to kill quickly, from a distance, and in a relatively "impersonal" fashion. Guns are particularly valuable against relatively invulnerable targets. Hence, gun availability facilitates robbery of commercial places and lethal assaults on people who would ordi...

Summary Prices of alcoholic beverages in the U.S. have declined sharply over the last two decades relative to the overall rate of price inflation, in part because federal alcohol excise taxes have not been increased since 1951. There is strong evidence that an increase in alcohol taxes would reduce the prevalence of chronic heavy drinking; this evidence, summarized here, is based on an analysis of the effect of changes in state liquor taxes rates on cirrhosis mortality. Thus alcohol taxation is an effective public health policy investment. Alcohol taxes are also fairly well targeted, in the sense that a large fraction of tax revenues are collected from those whose alcohol consumption level places them at risk for health problems and other alcohol-related problems.

Calculations of this sort are a familiar feature of the gun control literature. The numbers are meant to suggest the futility of regulating firearms commerce as a method of reducing gun-related crime, and also to demonstrate that the vast majority of firearms are put to wholesome (or at least legal) uses: stringent regulation Itthus" imposes costs on the many law-abiding gun owners in order to inhibit the violence-prone few. But such calculations are profoundly misleading. Bruce-Briggs is comparing a stock (140 million guns) with a flow (350,000 gun crimes in one year). This comparison is analogous to comparing the number of deaths due to heart disease in one year (0.6 million) with the size of the population (225 million) and concluding that there is a very small probability of dying from heart disease (on the order of one in 400). Some simple calculations, guided by an intertemporal model, give a more accurate picture. I limit my analysis to handguns, which are used in the vast majority of gun crimes, and begin by answering the following question: How many crimes will ultimately be committed utilizing one of the 1.8 million handguns sold new in 1977? Combining the homicide number (in Table 1) with the national victim survey results for rape, robbery, and assault yields a total of 565,000 handgun crimes. Thus, there was about one handgun crime committed for every three handguns sold in

A major issue in the gun control policy debate concerns the feasibility of reducing the harmful consequences of gun availability without serious infringement on legitimate uses. For example, most states have adopted much more stringent regulation for concealed weapons than for possession under other circumstances, because of legislators' belief that carrying concealed weapons contributes a great deal to the violent crime problem but very little to the average gun owners' utility. A second example of the balance between utility and harm are federal and state laws that prohibit young people and those with felony records from owning guns. These laws spring from the belief that such people constitute only a small fraction of the population but commit a disproportionately large fraction of the violent crimes.' Similarly, the campaign to ban the "Saturday Night Special" is based upon the belief2 that the small, cheap handguns which are frequently used in crime are of little value to noncriminals. Therefore, proponents contend, a ban on such guns would have considerable benefit with little cost. This article summarizes the policy debate regarding Saturday Night Specials, and evalu