Search

Ming China, having just endured a century of Mongol rule, sought to avert further occupations by a people or state from Inner Asia. Court policy was, therefore, generally based on restricting relations with foreigners, particularly those from across the northern and northwestern borders. Fear of future invasions conditioned the Ming's attitudes and policies toward Central and Inner Asia. The court was determined to reinstate the Chinese world order so as to maintain control over the conduct of foreign relations. Yet the economic benefits to be garnered from dealings with the peoples north of China could not be discounted. Merchants and some officials who profited from trade naturally attempted to support an increase in commerce. When court restrictions on commerce persisted, these merchants and officials even evaded the regulations and continued to trade with the peoples and tribes across the borders. The Yung-lo emperor (r. 1403–24), however, often sided with the advocates of trade and increased contact with Inner Asia. His reign nonetheless was unique, and his policies were exceptions. Unlike the other Ming emperors, he actively encouraged an expansion of commerce and attempted to augment the number of embassies arriving in China. His usurpation of the throne and the ensuing questions about his legitimacy may have inspired him to seek such a flow of foreign emissaries, for, in the Confucian view, a good emperor naturally attracted the so-called barbarians to “come and be transformed” (lai-hua) – that is, to acknowledge the superiority of Chinese civilization by becoming increasingly sinicized. The more embassies, the more legitimate the Yung-lo emperor would appear to his own people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Okuma's innovation: the Yokohama Specie Bank, or Shokin, 1879–1881 As more paper money was added to that already in circulation, serious depreciation continued. Depreciation against silver, the Japanese standard, which had been on average 3.3 per cent and 9.9 per cent in 1877 and 1878 respectively, reached 26.1 per cent in March 1879. Although the financial authorities were alarmed, their energies were otherwise occupied with political conflicts. In 1878 in the wake of the assassination of Toshimichi Okubo, the most distinguished Meiji leader in the government, serious disagreement arose among the dajokan members and Shigenobu Okuma became a target. In order to disconcert his opponents, and allow himself a breathing space, Okuma resolved to make major recommendations. First he suggested that Japan should issue abroad national bonds for ¥50 million, or some £5 million, the proceeds of which would be used to redeem the paper money. This proposal was greeted by a storm of protest and Okuma conceded defeat in the spring of 1880. Horatio Nelson Lay's unscrupulous behaviour was indeed still vividly remembered by the oligarchs. Okuma, in a tight corner, had only one choice left. He suggested the establishment of a Specie Bank. Japanese merchants, centred around Yokohama, had also been lobbying for this. Okuma invited the merchants to set up a Specie Bank conjointly with the Finance Ministry and a prospectus was prepared. It was submitted to the chief minister of the dajokan in November 1879 and authorised without delay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction From about 1780, The Netherlands dropped back from a leading position in trade and banking to a rank more befitting its size, content to follow international developments rather than steering them. For long, this downgrading was hidden and softened by the riches accumulated during the Golden Age, which ensured Amsterdam a continuing position in international finance. The character and importance of that position changed irrevocably as well, however. In 1834 the government of the United States moved their European account from W. & J. Willink of Amsterdam to Rothschild in London (Chapman 1984, p. 21). From the end of the 1840s Hope & Co.'s unique hold over Russian government issues slipped (Platt 1984, pp. 70–2). Around 1850 several big German–Jewish bankers shut their Amsterdam branches, sealing the city's slide to second rank. The adaptation to changed economic circumstances proved long and painful. Industrialisation and corporate joint-stock banking both came late in the nineteenth century, inspiring many observers to suggest a negative link between the two, blaming conservative bankers and wary investors for the prolonged economic decline. If that suggestion fails to stand up to scrutiny, it still leaves to be explained what actually happened in Dutch banking during the nineteenth century. The themes dominating this period may be summed up as the evolution towards a national economy in tandem with a financial system centred on Amsterdam, and the slow emancipation of banking from trade and other activities. Only the convergence of these developments in the decade after 1860 created the opportunities for the first joint-stock banks. As an important proxy to the first two factors the currency vicissitudes will be treated first. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction In the course of the seventeenth century, Dutch finance became intricately connected to the world economic system. Its development was bolstered by favourable developments in international trade, which allowed the Dutch to exploit their geographic position and their harbours to the full, and by an economic boom which lasted long enough for considerable capital accumulation. The political and social structures were well suited to the preservation of wealth and allowed for high propensities to save. The accumulated funds in The Netherlands are estimated to have grown enormously since approximately 1500, even during the less favourable eighteenth century. Van Zanden calculated for Holland alone a rise in capital wealth from ten to twelve million guilders around 1500 to approximately 1,750 million guilders around 1790 (Van Zanden 1993, p. 23). In the beginning, the swell of capital was mainly diverted to domestic investments and trade. Increasingly, the Dutch funds came to be invested in public loans and foreign assets. The demand by public authorities, in particular for government loans, had increased considerably (cf. previous chapter). But during the eighteenth century, foreign governments came to attract Dutch capital too, specifically for the underwriting of warfare loans. As such, the Amsterdam capital market served to link varied networks of funds and fortunes, both of domestic and of foreign origin. The development was the more remarkable as the Dutch financial institutions did not excel in innovation. On the contrary, the establishment remained basically oriented towards the past. Several Italian cities and also the English state, in the meantime, moved ahead of the Dutch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]