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In contemporary Western society, many adults use praise to boost children's self-esteem. Accordingly, they might praise those who seem to need it the most: children with low self-esteem. In this article, we review research showing that certain types of praise can backfire, especially in children with low self-esteem. Adults are inclined to give children with low self-esteem person praise (e.g., “You're smart!”) and inflated praise (e.g., “That's incredibly beautiful!”). Paradoxically, such praise can lower these children's motivation and feelings of self-worth in the face of setbacks (e.g., when they struggle or fail). Lowered feelings of self-worth, in turn, might invite more person praise and inflated praise from adults, creating a self-sustaining downward spiral. We propose a transactional model to shed light on this apparent praise paradox, and we describe the model's implications for theory and research.

If your self-worth depends on success, you may be in for a fall. To feel good about yourself, think less about you and more about others

We examine recent evidence on the consequences of selfishness and otherishness for psychological well-being, physical health, and relationships. In the first sections, we consider recent evidence regarding the costs and benefits of giving time, money, and support to others and the costs and benefits of taking or receiving those things from others. Then, because the behaviors of giving and taking can be motivated either by selfish or otherish concerns, we next consider the costs and benefits of the motivation underlying giving and taking. We also examine why and for whom selfishness and otherishness have consequences for psychological well-being, physical health, and relationships. We focus on mechanisms identified in research, including intrapsychic mechanisms such as positive and negative affect, self-esteem and self-efficacy, a sense of meaning and purpose in life, and a sense of connectedness to or isolation from others, as well as interpersonal processes such as reciprocation of support and responsiveness.

The self-esteem movement has been around since the 1970s, and may have influenced how much value people place on self-esteem. We predicted a negative relationship between age and the amount of value placed on self-esteem boosts. We also investigated the correlates of liking versus wanting self-esteem boosts (and other pleasant rewards) on depression. A nationally representative sample of American adults (N = 867) indicated how much they liked and wanted several pleasant rewards (i.e., sex, food, alcohol, money, friendship, self-esteem boost). They also completed a standardized measure of depressive symptoms. As expected, there was a negative relationship between age and valuing self-esteem boosts, sex, and alcohol. People with depressive symptoms wanted self-esteem boosts, even though they did not like them very much. Similar effects were obtained for depressive symptoms and alcohol and friendship. This is the first research to show that self-esteem boosts are more valued among a nationally representative sample of younger American adults. It also is the first research to explore the association between depression and the motivation to boost self-esteem. People with depressive symptoms want self-esteem, and may pursue it, but this pursuit may feel unrewarding because they do not derive pleasure from it.

Many people ascribe great value to self-esteem, but how much value? Do people value self-esteem more than other pleasant activities, such as eating sweets and having sex? Two studies of college students (Study 1: N=130; Study 2: N=152) showed that people valued boosts to their self-esteem more than they valued eating a favorite food and engaging in a favorite sexual activity. Study 2 also showed that people valued self-esteem more than they valued drinking alcohol, receiving a paycheck, and seeing a best friend. Both studies found that people who highly valued self-esteem engaged in laboratory tasks to boost their self-esteem. Finally, personality variables interacted with these value ratings. Entitled people thought they were more deserving of all pleasant rewards, even though they did not like them all that much (both studies), and people who highly value self-esteem pursued potentially maladaptive self-image goals, presumably to elevate their self-esteem (Study 2).

Interpersonal dynamics of self-esteem are explored. The author proposes that the desire to be seen as having positive qualities and avoid being seen as having dreaded qualities paradoxically leads to lowered self-esteem and lowered regard from others through its adverse effects on interpersonal relationships. The author also argues that the human capacity to transcend concerns with the images others hold of oneself, through caring about the well-being of other people, paradoxically leads to higher self-esteem and regard from others through its salutary effects on relationships. Data from two recent studies demonstrate these paradoxical effects and prompt questions about the nature of persons and situations, research methods, and the union between personality and social psychology. Accordingly, the author reflects more broadly on how people create their social situations, which in turn create the self, and what that means about the methods scholars use to understand social behavior.

People often adopt self-image goals to increase others' regard for them and perhaps their own self-esteem. But do these impression management goals achieve their intended result in close relationships? And do they endure over time? We suggest that self-image goals predict decreased self-esteem and close others' regard for the self through decreased responsiveness to others. In contrast, compassionate goals, which reflect a genuine concern for others' well-being, predict increased self-esteem and others' regard through increased responsiveness. We tested these hypotheses in a longitudinal study of college roommates followed across a semester. Path analyses supported both predictions, suggesting a paradox for interpersonal goals in close relationships: explicit attempts to increase close others' regard for the self backfire and damage self-esteem, but having goals to meet others' needs result in others' positive regard and promote self-esteem. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

People often try to manage the impressions others have of them so others will have high regard for them. What are the consequences of chronically having self-image goals in ongoing relationships? A program of research examining the effects of self-image goals and contrasting them with compassionate goals focused on supporting others is described. Results from two longitudinal studies indicated that self-image goals have negative effects on relationships, and paradoxically decrease the regard others have for the self, self-esteem, and mental health. In contrast, compassionate goals focused on promoting the well-being of others have positive effects on relationships, and paradoxically increase others’ regard, self-esteem and mental health. Discussion considers why self-image goals persist if they have clear negative consequences, and why people do not shift to more constructive compassionate goals in light of their benefits.

Incremental theorists, who believe intelligence can improve, may be more resilient to failure than entity theorists, who believe intelligence is fixed. Three studies explored whether incremental theory reduces self-handicapping and self-esteem vulnerability in students who do and do not invest their self-worth in academics. In Studies 1 and 2, contingent incremental students self-handicapped by choosing to listen to performance-impairing music and by avoiding practice before a difficult task. In Study 3, contingent incremental students who could not self-handicap reported greater ability attributions and lower self-esteem following failure. These studies suggest that when self-worth is contingent on academics, incremental theorists remain concerned about their self-worth and self-handicap to protect their self-esteem from the ego-threat associated with failure.

The present research examined effects of receiving negative interpersonal feedback on state self-esteem, affect, and goal pursuit as a function of trait self-esteem and contingencies of self-worth. Two same-sex participants interacted with each other and then received negative feedback, ostensibly from the other participant, or no feedback, regarding their likeability. Participants then reported their state self-esteem, affect, and self-presentation goals—how they wanted to be perceived by others at the moment. Among participants who received negative feedback, those who more strongly based their self-worth on others' approval experienced lower state self-esteem, positive affect, and greater negative affect than those whose self-worth was less contingent on others' approval. Participants with low self-esteem showed greater desire to appear physically attractive to others the more they based self-worth on others' approval and received negative feedback. In contrast, participants with high self-esteem showe...

Two studies examine the effects of failure on explicit and implicit self-esteem, affect, and self-presentation goals as a function of people's trait self-esteem and academic contingency of self-worth. Study 1 shows that participants with low self-esteem (LSE) who receive failure feedback experience lower state self-esteem, less positive affect, and less desire to be perceived as competent the more they base self-worth on academics. In contrast, participants with high self-esteem (HSE) who strongly base self-worth on academics show a slight boost in state self-esteem and desire to be perceived as competent following failure. Study 2 shows that following failure, academically contingent LSE participants downplay the importance of appearing competent to others and associate themselves with failure on an implicit level. Taken together, these findings suggest that academically contingent HSE people show resilience following failure, whereas academically contingent LSE people experience negative outcomes and disengage from the pursuit of competence self-presentation goals.

Successful self-regulation is defined as the willingness to exert effort toward one's most important goals, while taking setbacks and failures as opportunities to learn, identify weaknesses and address them, and develop new strategies toward achieving those goals. Contingencies of self-worth can facilitate self-regulation because people are highly motivated to succeed and avoid failure in domains of contingency. However, because boosts in self-esteem are pleasurable and drops in self-esteem are painful, protection, maintenance, and enhancement of self-esteem can become the overriding goal. Several pitfalls for self-regulation can result, especially when tasks are difficult and failure is likely. In this article, we describe a program of research examining these self-regulation pitfalls associated with contingent self-worth and suggest that learning orientations, particularly the willingness to embrace failure for the learning it affords, foster successful self-regulation even in people with highly contingent self-esteem.

The relationship between contingencies of self–worth and vulnerability to depressive symptoms was investigated in a longitudinal sample of 629 freshmen over the first semester of college. Higher levels of external contingencies of self–worth, in a composite measure of four external contingencies of self–worth (approval from others, appearance, competition, academics), predicted increases in depressive symptoms over the first semester of college, even controlling for initial level of depressive symptoms, social desirability, gender, and race. Internal contingencies of self–worth (God's love, virtue) were not associated with the level of depressive symptoms. We conclude that external contingencies of self–worth may contribute to vulnerability to depressive symptoms.

This study examines the interactive effects of self-esteem, contingencies of self-worth, and ego threat on supportiveness and liking. Targets high or low in self-esteem and academic contingency receive failure test feedback or no evaluative feedback. Then, targets interact with another participant who discloses a personal problem; afterward, both participants complete questionnaires assessing targets’ supportiveness and liking. High self-esteem, highly contingent targets feel less supportive and like partners less after interacting under threat than under no threat. Partners, in turn, perceive these targets to be less supportive and less likeable. Low self-esteem, highly contingent targets show the reverse pattern, although these findings do not reach statistical significance. Further analyses reveal that the interpersonal effects of ego threat were caused by threats in a specific domain of contingency (e.g., academics) rather than being a contingent person in general or having external or internal contingent self-worth. Implications for self-esteem and interpersonal processes are discussed.

We argue that the importance of self-esteem lies in what people believe they need to be or do to have worth as a person. These contingencies of self-worth are both sources of motivation and areas of psychological vulnerability. In domains of contingent self-worth, people pursue self-esteem by attempting to validate their abilities and qualities. This pursuit of self-esteem, we argue, has costs to learning, relationships, autonomy, self-regulation, and mental and physical health. We suggest alternatives to this costly pursuit of self-esteem.

The unique effects of level of self-esteem, narcissism, and contingencies of self-worth assessed prior to college on alcohol use during the freshman year were examined in a longitudinal study of 620 college students. Narcissism predicted alcohol use, but level of self-esteem did not. Basing self-worth on appearance predicted more alcohol use, whereas the virtue, God's love, and academic competence contingencies predicted less alcohol use, independent of other personality measures and joining a sorority or a fraternity. Further, the virtue and academic competence contingencies were associated with decreases in alcohol use from the 1st to the 2nd semester.

The present study examined the relationship between investment in gender ideals and well-being and the role of external contingencies of self-worth in a longitudinal survey of 677 college freshmen. We propose a model of how investment in gender ideals affects external contingencies and the consequences for self-esteem, depression, and symptoms of disordered eating. Specifically, we find that the negative relationship between investment in gender ideals and well-being is mediated through externally contingent self-worth. The model showed a good fit for the overall sample. Comparative model testing revealed a good fit for men and women as well as White Americans, Asian Americans, and African Americans.

The commentaries on J. Crocker and L. E. Park’s (2004) review suggested that Crocker and Park exaggerated the costs of pursuing self-esteem (K. M. Sheldon, 2004), that it is impossible not to pursue self-esteem (T. Pyszczynski & C. Cox, 2004), and that it is possible to pursue self-esteem in healthy ways, reaping the benefits without the costs (D. L. DuBois & B. R. Flay, 2004). In addressing the comments, the authors first clarify (a) what it means to pursue self-esteem, (b) the connection between having and pursuing self-esteem, and (c) what it means to let go of the pursuit of self-esteem. They then highlight points of overall agreement and disagreement between their view and those expressed in the commentaries and, finally, end with a discussion of future research directions to address the areas of disagreement and to shed further light onto the costs and benefits of pursuing self-esteem.

Researchers have recently questioned the benefits associated with having high self-esteem. The authors propose that the importance of self-esteem lies more in how people strive for it rather than whether it is high or low. They argue that in domains in which their self-worth is invested, people adopt the goal to validate their abilities and qualities, and hence their self-worth. When people have self-validation goals, they react to threats in these domains in ways that undermine learning; relatedness; autonomy and self-regulation; and over time, mental and physical health. The short-term emotional benefits of pursuing self-esteem are often outweighed by long-term costs. Previous research on self-esteem is reinterpreted in terms of self-esteem striving. Cultural roots of the pursuit of self-esteem are considered. Finally, the alternatives to pursuing self-esteem, and ways of avoiding its costs, are discussed.

In spite of impressive empirical evidence consistent with aspects of terror management theory (TMT) reviewed by T. Pyszczynski, J. Greenberg, S. Solomon, J. Arndt, and J. Schimel (2004), several fundamental assumptions of the theory remain untested or lack support. Specifically, Pyszczynski et al. (2004) have not demonstrated that (a) people need self-esteem, (b) pursuing self-esteem is an effective means for reducing anxiety, (c) pursuing self-esteem helps people achieve their important goals, (d) having or pursuing self-esteem is the only way to deal with anxiety to achieve important goals, or (e) death is the real issue driving the pursuit of self-esteem. The authors suggest there is a different paradigm for thinking about death, one in which awareness of one's mortality serves as a precious reminder of the limited time one has to accomplish one's most important goals. All of these questions can be addressed with empirical research.

The Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale assesses 7 sources of self-esteem in college students: academics, appearance, approval from others, competition, family support, God's love, and virtue. In confirmatory factor analyses on data from 1,418 college students, a 7-factor model fit to the data acceptably well and significantly better than several plausible alternative models. The subscales all have high internal consistency, test-retest reliability, are distinct from other personality measures, and have a simplex structure arrayed on a continuum from external to internal sources of self-esteem. Contingencies of self-worth assessed prior to college predicted how students spent their time during their 1st year of college.

James (1890/1950) argued that self-esteem fluctuates around a typical level in response to successes and failures in domains on which self-worth is staked. In a test of James’s hypothesis, 32 students applying to graduate school completed a measure of contingencies of self-worth, and then for 2 months reported global self-esteem twice a week and any day they heard from a graduate program. As predicted, participants who were higher in basing their self-esteem on academic competence showed greater increases in self-esteem on acceptance days and greater decreases in self-esteem on rejection days than participants low in this contingency of self-worth. Daily affect was significantly related to daily self-esteem, but this association was stronger for students who based their self-esteem on academic competence, suggesting that affect and self-esteem are more strongly related when events are relevant to one’s contingencies of self-worth. Implications for research on stability of self-esteem are considered.

Contingencies of self-worth represent the domains in which success or failure leads to increases or decreases in self-esteem, respectively. Because people seek to protect, maintain, and enhance their self-esteem, contingencies of self-worth serve an important self-regulatory role; people seek out situations and engage in activities that provide opportunities for them to achieve success and avoid failure in domains on which their self-worth is staked. These contingencies also constitute an important psychological vulnerability, however. Successes and failures lead to greater increases and decreases in self-esteem when they occur in domains of contingency. These fluctuations of self-esteem, in turn, are associated with increases in depressive symptoms. Thus, the pursuit of self-esteem, while guiding much of our behavior, comes at considerable cost.

These meta-analyses examine race differences in self-esteem among 712 datapoints. Blacks scored higher than Whites on self-esteem measures (d = 0.19), but Whites scored higher than other racial minority groups, including Hispanics (d = -0.09), Asians (d = -0.30), and American Indians (d = -0.21). Most of these differences were smallest in childhood and grew larger with age. Blacks' self-esteem increased over time relative to Whites', with the Black advantage not appearing until the 1980s. Black and Hispanic samples scored higher on measures without an academic self-esteem subscale. Relative to Whites, minority males had lower self-esteem than did minority females, and Black and Hispanic self-esteem was higher in groups with high socioeconomic status. The results are most consistent with a cultural interpretation of racial differences in self-esteem.

Research on self-esteem has focused almost exclusively on level of trait self-esteem to the neglect of other potentially more important aspects such as the contingencies on which self-esteem is based. Over a century ago, W. James (1890) argued that self-esteem rises and falls around its typical level in response to successes and failures in domains on which one has staked self-worth. We present a model of global self-esteem that builds on James' insights and emphasizes contingencies of self-worth. This model can help to (a) point the way to understanding how self-esteem is implicated in affect, cognition, and self-regulation of behavior; (b) suggest how and when self-esteem is implicated in social problems; (c) resolve debates about the nature and functioning of self-esteem; (d) resolve paradoxes in related literatures, such as why people who are stigmatized do not necessarily have low self-esteem and why self-esteem does not decline with age; and (e) suggest how self-esteem is causally related to depression. In addition, this perspective raises questions about how contingencies of self-worth are acquired and how they change, whether they are primarily a resource or a vulnerability, and whether some people have noncontingent self-esteem.

Upward comparison with members of an in-group can be both enhancing and threatening to self-esteem (Brewer & Weber, 1994). According to Tesser's (1986, 1988) self-evaluation maintenance model (SEM), the superior performance of in-group members should be threatening when comparisons are made on ability domains that are relevant to self-esteem. We argue that such comparisons will instead be enhancing if the superior other's performance challenges negative ability stereotypes about the group. In a laboratory experimental study, 60 African American female participants were given feedback on a bogus IQ test under conditions designed to increase the salience of negative stereotypes. Participants were then exposed to either upward or downward social comparison information about the performance of a White or African American female confederate. A contrast effect was observed when the confederate was White such that participants reported higher state self-esteem in the downward social comparison condition than in the upward social comparison condition. When the confederate was African American, an assimilation effect was observed such that participants reported higher state self-esteem in the upward social comparison condition than in the downward social comparison condition. These results do not appear consistent with SEM and indicate that people are at times encouraged when close others outperform them on important tasks.

Many classic analyses of stigmatization assume that negative images and stereotypes are internalized, resulting in stable low self-esteem in the stigmatized across many situations. I argue here that the self-esteem of the stigmatized is constructed in the situation and depends on both the collective representations, or shared meanings, that people bring with them to the situation and features of the situation that make those collective representations relevant or irrelevant when evaluating the self. Thus, self-esteem in the stigmatized may be higher, lower, or the same as self-esteem in the nonstigmatized, and it may change from situation to situation if the collective representations that are relevant in those situations differ. Previous research consistent with this perspective is reviewed and implications of this analysis for the study of social stigma, and group differences more generally, are considered.

Research and theory combine to suggest that the relationship between religious belief and psychological well-being should be more positive among Black than among White individuals. Further, this relationship should be mediated by social psychological aspects of religion that have positive implications for well-being, such as self-enhancing religious attributions and a positive social identity associated with one's religious affiliation. These predictions were examined in a sample of 66 Black and 59 White university students. Religious belief salience and psychological well-being were moderately positively correlated, but only among Black subjects. The relationship between religious belief and well-being was partially mediated by attributions to God that enhance life meaning and positive social identification resulting from one's religious affiliation, again only among Black subjects. Implications of these results for the self-maintenance of Black college students are discussed.

In this chapter, we examine how the self both creates and results from experience—both its high points and low points. At a metatheoretical level, we consider how social and personality psychologists typically conceive of and study the self, drawing on the topic of self-esteem to illustrate typical views of the self as dispositional characteristics of persons, the product of situations, or the interaction between them. This person × situation framework has stimulated a great deal of research and had considerable heuristic value for social and personality psychologists who study the self and identity. However, because it views both the person and the situation as static rather than the result of dynamic processes, it fails to account for how people and situations mutually create each other in a process that unfolds over time. Through dynamic processes of reciprocal influence between persons and situations, self and identity can change surprisingly rapidly—change sustained by the situations people create for themselves over time. We consider methodological approaches in personality and social psychology to test these dynamic models of self and identity.

A total of 91 Black, 96 White, and 35 Asian college students completed the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES), as well as measures of psychological well-being (personal self-esteem, life satisfaction, depression, and hopelessness). Correlations between the Public and Private subscales of the CSES were near zero for Blacks, moderate for Whites, and strong for Asians. The membership and private subscales of the general CSES were related to psychological well-being, even when the effects of personal self-esteem on well-being were partialed out. However, when the three groups were examined separately, the relation of CSE to well-being with personal self-esteem partialed out was nonsignificant for Whites, small for Blacks, and moderate to strong for Asians. General and race-specific CSE were correlated for all three groups, although the correlations were strongest for Asians. Implications for symbolic interactionist views of the self-concept, for formulations of mental health, and for methodological issues concerning the CSES are discussed.

It is proposed that one strategy by which people may protect or enhance their self-concept following failure is remembering negative information about other people, even when those others are hypothetical and the negative behaviors of the others are distinct from the failure feedback one has received. Forty male and female undergraduates participated in a study in which their self-esteem was measured, and they then received either success or failure feedback on a social sensitivity test (cf. Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). As part of a second, ostensibly unrelated study, subjects listened to sentences describing positive and negative behaviors of others. Subjects who were high in self-esteem recalled three times as many negative behaviors of others following failure than following success. Moderate and low self-esteem subjects did not show this pattern. The results are discussed in terms of various theoretical explanations of the differences in self-serving behaviors of high and low self-esteem individuals.

Two experiments investigated the hypothesis that the stigmatized can protect their self-esteem by attributing negative feedback to prejudice. Fifty-nine women participated in the 1st experiment. Women who received negative feedback from a prejudiced evaluator attributed the feedback to his prejudice and reported less depressed affect than women who received negative feedback from a nonprejudiced evaluator. In the 2nd experiment, 38 Black and 45 White students received interpersonal feedback from a White evaluator, who cither could see them or could not. Compared with Whites, Blacks were more likely to attribute negative feedback to prejudice than positive feedback and were more likely to attribute both types of feedback to prejudice when they could be seen by the other student. Being seen by the evaluator buffered the self-esteem of Blacks from negative feedback but hurt the self-esteem of Blacks who received positive feedback.

Laboratory experiments and surveys show that self-objectification increases body shame, disrupts attention, and negatively predicts well-being. Using experience sampling methodology, the authors investigated self-objectification in the daily lives of 49 female college students. Building on the predictions of objectification theory, they examined associations between internalizing an observer's perspective on the self and psychological well-being, and examined the moderating roles of trait self-esteem and appearance-contingent self-worth. Within-person increases in self-objectification predicted decreased well-being, but this association was moderated by trait self-esteem and trait appearance-contingent self-worth; high self-esteem, highly appearance-contingent participants reported increased well-being when they self-objectified. Furthermore, perceived unattractiveness partially mediated the main effect and the three-way interaction: high self-esteem, highly contingent participants experienced smaller drops in well-being when they self-objectified, in part because they felt less unattractive. These results suggest that in daily life, some women receive a boost from self-objectification, although most women experience decreases in well-being when self-objectifying.

An experiment examined the buffering effects of a learning orientation following failure in a domain of contingent self-worth. Participants' academic contingencies of self-worth (CSW) and priming with theories of intelligence interacted to affect vulnerability of self-esteem to failure. Participants who had high academic CSW and were primed with an entity theory of intelligence experienced lower self-esteem and higher negative affect following failure than following success on an academic test, but these effects were eliminated when participants with high academic CSW were primed with an incremental theory of intelligence. This study shows that endorsing a learning orientation is an effective way to minimize threat to self-esteem among students whose self-worth is highly contingent on academics and may allow them to persist in the face of challenges and to learn from failure.

Previous research on attachment theory has focused on mean differences in level of self-esteem among people with different attachment styles. The present study examines the associations between attachment styles and different bases of self-esteem, or contingencies of self-worth, among a sample of 795 college students. Results showed that attachment security was related to basing self-worth on family support. Both the preoccupied attachment style and fearful attachment style were related to basing selfworth on physical attractiveness. The dismissing attachment style was related to basing self-worth less on others’ approval, family support, and God’s love.

The unique effects of level of self-esteem and contingencies of self-worth assessed prior to college on academic, social, and financial problems experienced during the freshman year were examined in a longitudinal study of 642 college students. Low self-esteem predicted social problems, even controlling for demographic and personality variables (neuroticism, agreeableness, and social desirability), but did not predict academic or financial problems with other variables controlled. Academic competence contingency predicted academic and financial problems and appearance contingency predicted financial problems, even after controlling for relevant personality variables. We conclude that contingencies of self-worth uniquely contribute to academic and financial difficulties experienced by college freshmen beyond level of self-esteem and other personality variables. Low self-esteem, on the other hand, appears to uniquely contribute to later social difficulties.

Self-esteem refers to a global judgment of the worth or value of the self. Self-esteem is strongly related to the subjective quality of life, and to motivational orientations such as self-enhancement and self-protection. However, self-esteem is linked only weakly to behavior and objective outcomes such as school achievement, physical attractiveness, and popularity with peers. Several issues in the literature on self-esteem are considered, including whether self-esteem is a state or a trait, is primarily affective or cognitive, what it is based on, whether high self-esteem is defensive or genuine, and whether there is a universal need to have high self-esteem.

Publisher Summary Being overweight is often a cause of embarrassment and at times extreme emotional distress. Compared to other stigmatized individuals, who are not held personally responsible for the condition, overweight people who are mostly considered responsible for their condition are openly subjected to prejudice and dislike. It should, however, be noted that some overweight people are vulnerable to these negative feelings while some are not, and this completely depends upon individual differences and specific contexts. In studying individual vulnerability factors, it is seen that for overweight people, repeated failures in attempts of dieting and disliking other obese individuals may transcend into self-dislike. This chapter also illustrates that conservative ideological belief, like the Protestant work ethics, may also bring about negative thoughts in overweight people. Though most of the studies on overweight stigma have been conducted on women, the fact that men too face this condition cannot be ruled out. Understanding and comparison of various vulnerability factors, however, determine that people who feel overweight may not be passive victims of stigma but active people working hard to get the feel-good factor.

The self-serving bias refers to the tendency of people to interpret and explain outcomes in ways that have favorable implications for the self. The term bias often implies distorted or inaccurate perception that can be shown to be erroneous according to some objective standard. But according to the Random House College Dictionary (1975), a bias is also “a tendency or inclination of outlook; a subjective point of view” (p. 131). Similarly, the Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1976) defines a bias as “an inclination of temperament or outlook; esp. a highly personal and unreasoned distortion of judgment” (p. 106). In this chapter, we regard self-serving biases as judgments or interpretations of oneself, one’s behavior, and the behavior of others in ways that are favorable to the self, without requiring that such judgments be accurate according to some objective standard. We also begin with no assumptions that biases necessarily reflect motivated distortions in reasoning, rather than normal cognitive processes.

In two studies, we explored the effects of trait self-esteem and threats to the self-concept on evaluations of others. In Study 1, subjects high, moderate, and low in self-esteem received either success, failure, or no feedback on a test and later evaluated three pairs of targets: in-groups and out-groups based on a minimal intergroup manipulation, those who scored above average and those who scored below average on the test, and themselves and the average college student. Study 2 explored the effects of self-esteem and threat on in-group favoritism in a real-world setting, campus sororities. Together, the results of these studies indicate that individuals high in self-esteem, but not those low in self-esteem, respond to threats to the self-concept by derogating out-groups relative to the in-group when the group boundaries have evaluative implications.

Previous studies indicate that people who are low in self-esteem are more prejudiced (i.e., more negative about outgroups) than people who are high in self esteem. It is not clear from this research, however, whether low self-esteem individuals derogate outgroups relative to the ingroup (i.e., whether they show ingroup favoritism or ethnocentrism). In an experiment using the minimal intergroup situation paradigm, it was found that both high and low self-esteem subjects show ingroup favoritism, although low self-esteem subjects rated both the ingroup and the outgroup more negatively than did high self-esteem subjects. There was no evidence for greater ingroup favoritism among low self-esteem subjects. The results are discussed in terms of the distinction between prejudice and ethnocentrism and the self-enhancing functions of ingroup favoritism.

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that members of negatively stereotyped groups psychologically disengage their self-esteem from feedback received in stereotype-relevant domains. In both experiments, African American and European American college students received performance feedback on a bogus intelligence test and completed measures of self-esteem. In Experiment 1, European American students had higher self-esteem after success than after failure, whereas African American students had similar levels of self-esteem regardless of feedback. Whether the test had been described as racially biased or culturally fair had no effect. Experiment 2 examined the extent to which lesser responsivity among African Americans is the result of chronic disengagement from intelligence tests or situational disengagement initiated by priming racial stereotypes. Results indicate that both chronic disengagement and racial priming engender less responsivity to negative performance feedback among African American, but not European American, students. Performance expectancies, self-evaluations, and beliefs about test bias are discussed as possible mediators of this relationship.

Self-esteem is vulnerable when failure occurs in the domain where people base their self-worth (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). We tested whether learning orientations can reduce the vulnerability of self-esteem associated with contingent self-worth and encourage persistence following failure. Our past research (Niiya, Crocker, & Bartmess, 2004) indicated that people who base their self-worth on academics maintain their self-esteem following failure when they are primed with an incremental theory of intelligence. Our present study extends these findings by (a) examining whether mastery goals (Elliot & Church, 1997) can also buffer self-esteem from failure, (b) using a different manipulation of success and failure, (c) using a different task, and (d) including a measure of persistence. We found that college students who based their self-esteem on academic competence reported lower self-esteem following failure than following success when they had low mastery goals, but the effect of success and failure was eliminated when students had high mastery goals. Moreover, high mastery students showed greater persistence following failure than low mastery students. The study provided converging evidence that learning orientations buffer self-esteem from failure.

Americans are deeply engaged in the pursuit of self-esteem, attempting to satisfy contingencies or criteria for what makes a person worthwhile. In this article, I examine the costs of this pursuit of self-esteem for the self, in terms of competence, relatedness, and mental health, and for others. I hypothesize that external contingencies of self-worth require validation from others and are unreliable as a basis of self-esteem, and hence are associated with greater costs. Data from a longitudinal study of an ethnically diverse sample of 642 college freshman support the view that contingencies of self-worth shape how students spend their time, and the prediction that external contingencies of self-worth, especially appearance, have high costs for stress, aggression, drug and alcohol use, and symptoms of disordered eating. The pursuit of self-esteem has become a central preoccupation in our society. Self-help books advise us how to achieve high self-esteem, child rearing guides tell us how to raise children with high self-esteem, schools devote aspects of their curriculum to raising children’s self-esteem, and most people organize their lives, in part, around seeking out or avoiding activities, situations, and people to protect, maintain, and enhance their self-esteem (Miller, 2001). In this article, I consider the costs of this pursuit. I have four goals: first, to consider what previous research