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This paper shows how the homo oeconomicus has evolved from utility at work to consumption and then to the mystification of profit in a context of financialization and long-term crisis. Thus, a semantic slippage occurs, which distorts the achievements of capitalism, such as individualism and self-interest, for a libertarian belief -alien to liberalism, to Bentham's utilitarianism and marginalism- in which it is not possible to define social utility, nor the connection between the "rationality" of individual decisions and social choices. Usefulness is confused with profit in the primacy of today's business mentality and is often reflected in individual behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the encyclicals Fides et Ratio (1998) and Lumen Fidei (2013), the mysteries appear as key elements when analysing the relationship between faith and reason. Fides et Ratio deals with the mysteries as a formal category (without forgetting the content); in Lumen Fidei it is the content of the mysteries that is important. In the article, first of all, the basic texts of the two encyclicals on mystery are presented. It then examines the relationship betwen mysteries and rationality. Negative theology and its expression in paradoxes are also considered. The incarnate mystery and liturgical celebration of mysteries are the final points of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article aims to show that at the heart of the issue about the interactions between science and religion lies a question of rationality, as Joseph Ratzinger has shown, and that the problem between science and religion can be resolved by clarifying the object and meaning of both. To do this, I will begin by stating the epistemological situation of science and religion after modernity. Next, I will explain the three interaction paradigms: proposed by Barbour, Gould, and Peacocke. I will also show how Ratzinger's proposal could complement, integrate or correct those proposals which would seem partial under the paradigm of rationality. I seek to show that a reading of Rateinger's thought allows us to explain the problem of science and religion in terms that go beyond the dialogic perspective, to pose them existentially and vitally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to give a meaning to the post-capitalism signifier. For this, we have carried out a conceptual analysis of the literature on the subject in the main languages during the last three decades from the "signifiers" approach. Subsequently, we have carried out a deconstruction of the meaning of capitalism signifier to construct a plural and coherent meaning of post-capitalism, with which to then turn to empirical reality in search of its praxis. From this we have concluded that post-capitalism is a set of forms of organization of socioeconomic systems that are subsequent and alternative to capitalism. These forms are characterized by the non-preeminence of the free market as a resource allocation mechanism, or by the non-preeminence of private property as an instrument for the accumulation of wealth, or by the non-preeminence of selfish rationality as a criterion for making economic decisions, or by a combination of these traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting from the hypothesis that the Law is a rational product and understandable since the reason’s imperatives, the present work gets the learnings from the classic or Aristotelian-Thomistic realism to devise a functional classification of the different forms of legal knowledge: a) rational evidence, b) tecnical knowledge, c) scientific knowledge and d) philosophical knowledge. Well, beyond the theoretical opportunity of this division, the study defends that the legal wisdom is a prudential art, which be materialized case to case in the light of the just (quod ipsam res iustam). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present as a philosophical category, expresses a behavioral character, which is assumed as an attitude (ethos) towards a digital world. This "ethos" configures a relationship between the human and the machine, builds bridges of opening (apertûs) that consolidates units of existential possibility through practices that manifest, not a digitization, but a digitiza-tion, that is, a praxis particular and unique that, in the digital framework, intends to intentionally understand the existential field of the human being in digital logics. This digitaliza-tion as a practice configures "the present" that in the digital framework constitutes a rationality, a kind of capacity that human beings have to analyze through a mental exercise the existential reality of themselves and of your environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Justicia (0124-7441) is the property of Universidad Simon Bolivar and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

La democracia deliberativa supone, de algún modo, que la deliberación aportará mayor racionalidad y legitimidad a las decisiones colectivas que la mera agregación de votos. Sin embargo, algunas condiciones que caracterizan a la racionalidad pueden ser lógicamente incompatibles. Este trabajo expone algunas limitaciones encontradas a partir de distintos modelos de agregación de argumentos, a la vez que plantea algunos medios para atenuarlas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this critical notice I introduce the recent contributions made by Wedgwood and Kiesewetter to the discussion over the normativity of rationality and reconstruct their arguments in order to confront one another. My conclusion is that neither of both proposals, rationality as responding to evidences or as minimizer of expected failure, are fully satisfactory in explaining the guiding role of rationality in deliberation or its crucial role in many practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The frame problem (Mc Carthy & Hayes, 1969) arose within the field of Artificial Intelligence research, more precisely within the calculation of situations, as the problem about how to represent, in the most succinct way possible, the fact that in a particular situation most properties of objects remain the same or are not disturbed by the performance of a particular action. Despite its logical origin, it did not take long for this problem to be addressed by several philosophers becoming the subject of major discussions that still surround the frame problem. One of the key difficulties that this problem tries to solve is the so-called difficulty of the vastness of the information: it would seem impossible to analyze each of the pieces of information from a vast set of information and evaluate, in each case, if it is or not relevant to carry out the task in question. Of course, exploring a vast amount of information with very limited cognitive and temporal resources is one of the main computational limitations that the frame problem must overcome. Currently, the resolution of the frame problem has awakened a renewed interest in recent years, and its resolution has been taken up again. Proof of this is Fodor's (2000) treatment of the frame problem by criticizing some current strategies for its solution, such as the use of heuristics. The use of heuristics as strategies to explain cognitive processes is a subject of great relevance at present and especially of great interest in the area of psychology. Generally, the heuristics understood, prima facie, as practical rules that, with little information, offer reasonable solutions to problems or questions would solve the computational limitations of the frame problem by providing the computational processing sought. It must be considered that, as the difficulty of the vastness of information reflects, the determination of relevance is not computationally easy since it is necessary to evaluate large amounts of information and that is why the use of heuristics would appear as the main candidate to limit the computational load in the determination of relevance. The problem is that there are two research programs that work on heuristics: the Heuristics and Biases program and the Heuristics Fast and Frugal program. In literature of the area, the rivalry between these programs with respect to the methodology and way of working is often highlighted, but also in terms of the scope and limits of the rationality that each of these programs postulates. More particularly, both programs have faced a great debate about human rationality, postulating different conceptions of rationality. Taking into account that it has been proposed to interpret the frame problem as a problem of rationality, the general objective of this paper is to investigate how the frame problem relates to such a debate on rationality; more specifically, it will be questioned which of these conceptions of rationality would be better articulated with the fundamental phenomenon of the frame problem First, in this work we will analyze, the standard conception of rationality, considering some o the main criticisms that it has faced. These objections will allow us to introduce later the ecological conception of rationality postulated by the program of Fast and Frugal Heuristics. Finally, it will be evaluated which of these two concepts would be more linked to the fundamental phenomenon of the frame problem, in order to finally present the conclusions. We argue that the fundamental phenomenon of the frame problem is better articulated to an optimistic view of human rationality and it would be closer to the concept of ecological rationality proposed by the Heuristic Fast and Frugal program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern concept of reason called one of the fundamental tenets of Christianity into question: the universal value of the salvation brought to all humanity by Jesus. From a modern point of view, it is not possible for a historic and contingent event, such as the death of Jesus, to bear universal meaning for men of all times. In this article I aim to show how René Girard's anthropological hypothesis offers an alternative answer to the seemingly impossible universale concretum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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María Zambrano's philosophy is on the rise. Hence the multiplicity of approaches to her proposal that, in general, highlight a new form of rationality as her main contribution: poetic reason. However, poetic reason is no more than a fruit, of which it is necessary to find the root. What is the profound experience that does give unity to the philosophical thinking of Zambrano and does enable poetic reason? The answer to this question reveals two findings. The first is the affirmation that the Christian and specifically Catholic experience is the underlying element that unifies Zambrano's thought, not only as it can be present in any cultural product originated in a Christian context, but as a necessary configurator of her experience of reality and of her expression. The second refers to the possibility of a philosophy in contact with Christian revelation. Zambrano's is an example of philosophy exercised by a Christian who has found in her faith what is necessary for her reason to grow and expand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The university teaching of theology, which was historically considered as the highest discipline, is often times deemed a problem. It seems that one of the principal causes of this state of affairs is the conflict, conceived by some thinkers, between reason and authority. Pope Benedict XVI offers both a diagnosis and a remedy to the «crisis of university» by developing the idea of «extended rationality». Through this idea, secular universities could, without compromising its demand of rationality, provide room for theology, even though it does not adopt the way theology is imparted in confessional universities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the cognitive science of religion has allowed the development of evolutionary debunking arguments, which seek to challenge not only rationality but the truth of theism. Since there are two ways of conceiving epistemic rationality and justification, viz., the internalist and the externalist, one may wonder ¿how such arguments affect theism? The purpose of this article is to answer this question through a reconstruction and evaluation of three evolutionary debunking arguments against the rationality of theism that Dennett would hold. I will argue that only one of the three Dennett’s evolutionary debunking arguments is possibly valid. I will also show that the argument of cognitive bias is probably successful in undermining both the internalist and externalist justification of theism, under certain conditions. Finally, I will show that this arguments can be indirectly disproved from evolutionary argument against naturalism developped by Plantinga, argument to which one can counterpose logical defeater argument against the reformed epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Las reflexiones nietzscheanas sobre la razón y la sensibilidad como grandes fuerzas en tensión, la sensibilidad como liberadora de la existencia y la embriaguez cómo estado creativo por excelencia se presentan en este artículo mostrando como interpretar es un acto vital; así como lo es el crear para Nietzsche. De esta manera, un investigador gana una posición en el mundo y trasciende en la medida en que no solo se comprende a sí mismo, ni a una obra aislada y particular, sino al hombre en general. La creencia en el poder del hombre y la naturaleza: la unión de estas fuerzas para sentir la vida y mostrar lo bello del ser humano así como sus contradicciones, es el poder que la estética nietzscheana da al hombre frente a los ideales que lo alejan de la vida misma y no le permiten la posesión de la tierra. Es la liberación de todos los instintos para acabar con los ideales de la religión que es nociva para la vida. Aspecto enunciado ya por Habermas, en las formas de existir, de sujetos diferentes, que expresan una respuesta estéticamente fundada a la pregunta por la existencia.Nietzsche builds up a reflection about reason and senses as strong forces on tension. Where the senses release human existence and drunkenness is the creative state for excellence. In this paper are shown the reflection and the interpretation acts, as a vital phenomenon created by Nietzsche himself. For this reason, an interpreter reaches a position in the world and transcends when there is not just an understanding of him or herself, of an art work, but also an interpretation of the human being in general. There is a believe on the power of man and nature, their union in order to life, that can show the beauty, the ugliness, and the contradictions of human being; this power is given to mankind on Nietzsche’s special way of seeing art, and goes in the opposite way than ideas does; since they move men further away from life itself. Nietzsche faces religion hatred with senses release. This aspect is included in the question about existence in Habermas works as well.

This paper considers arguments in the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre (circa 1215-1229) concerning the nature of reason in its directive function of human action and the presence of rationality in the universe as a whole. From acritical-exegetic perspective, this study examines the synergy of Hellenistic sources with Roman legal teachings and developments of the Augustinian tradition that William of Auxerre questions calls into question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article revolves around the identification of the alleged dangers that the weighting procedure would entail and if indeed these hazards are due to weighting own or if instead derived from the intentions of the legal operator. This problem reflects the central question of this article: are the dangers of internal weighting structure or rather external to it? The thesis will be developed in subsequent is that the dangers of weighting are external to it and depend on the subjectivity of the legal operator, in some cases, not looking necessarily direct their argument towards a correction of justice, but interests or personal circumstances. The article will address therefore the main criticisms of the weighting procedure as rational interpretation of rules as a matter of principle, that is, fundamental rights and collective goods. To the extent that critical approaches are addressed, it will provide an answer to them to assess whether indeed it right in questioning the rationality of the weighting procedure as rational application of standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of personal dignity was widely developed in the late Middle Ages. The labour of the authors of the Modern Age consisted in making this legacy more operative. Dignity came with the notion of person who is a being of a rational nature characterized by its incommunicability and dignity. The nominalists (Duns, Ockham, Gerson, Conrado or Biel) made, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a rather abusive use of the person in law and in comparison with them, Aquino appears to be less 'personalistic'. It turns out that Thomas Aquinas had a superior jurisprudential training to those of these other authors and did not consider it appropriate to solve a problem by claiming the qualitas personalis when that subject could be decided with the instruments of the law. In addition (and this would be a valuable clarification) he does not regard the person -with his consciousness and awareness- as an isolated being, but rather describes both realities as Cum alio scientia: man is formed in his own being and there is cum Aliis. In any case, the notion of the human being with the equal dignity inherent to every rational being is already fully present in Aquino. But it is present in the way that we could call 'jurisprudential', in the way of the most classic jurists. Surely D. Alvaro d'Ors would agree very much with this way of presenting personality in law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationality, along with the Enlightenment, became the standard of the development of Western civilization, a paradigm provoking the evolution of modernity. The nineteenth and twentieth century attacked this rationalistic model in philosophy, sociology, the sciences, and the arts to the point that its weakness destroyed its own foundations. Surrealism, which erupted in the art world in the 1920s, was a part of those critics, but not at a rational level but through poetic freedom as an artistic movement that sought to subvert rationality through irrational expression and by defending the ethics of the moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, it is given a review of the study of social norms as one of the mechanisms that are present in the action of individuals and their relation to the theme of rationality. The need to get away from the functionalist explanations and attend microfoundations seeking explanations from an intentional approach arises. First, the externalist version of rational choice for the study of social norms is discussed. Then it gives a general tour through the sociology to identify the main criticisms of this version of rational choice. Finally, it opens a space to the internist version of rational choice to see what does it has to say on the subject, particularly from the perspective of Jon Elster. It is assumed in the conclusions that the two proposals of rational choice are complementary to approach the phenomenon of social norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationality appears to have some intimate relation with normativity: exactly what relation is in dispute. John Broome devotes a chapter of his recent book to rebutting the view that rationality has 'true normativity', which he equates with the kind of normativity that I call directivity. In particular, he offers a number of arguments against derivative accounts of the normativity of rationality. In this paper I defend my instrumentalist account from those arguments. In so doing I bring into view the grounds of a live positive defence of rationality's servanthood to directivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we address the Normative Question with respect to rationality. We draw an analogy with the epistemic domain and argue that the normativity of rationality has to be understood in terms of its characteristic achievement, that is, in terms of how the subject responds to reasons. Rational requirements reflect a particular way in which a rational subject adjusts her attitudes and thus provide a subject adequately engaged in this task of adjustment with genuine independent reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is in broad agreement with Broome in that we ought to dispose of Humeanism about practical reason. Still, there remains some disagreement with Broome about the big picture. The aim of this short paper is to try and locate the most important sources of this disagreement, namely differences in how we conceive of the mind, reason and rationality and the relations between these. It also presents some the consequences of the big picture disagreement, in particular about how to conceive of the correctness of enkratic reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the many important contributions of John Broome's Rationality Through Reasoning is an account of what reasoning is and what makes reasoning correct. Here we raise some problems for both of these accounts and recommend an alternative approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows: (i) the capabilities approach as a real freedom perspective through the connections with the ethics of Aristotle and through its eleutheronomic foundation in Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx; (ii) the contributions of the impartial spectator as open impartiality to the idea of justice; and (iii) a broader conception of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper, I develop and defend an "identity premise" response to Paul Boghossian's argument from inference. According to this argument, externalism about mental content is incompatible with a substantial notion of self-knowledge because it happens to be incompatible with the claim that we can know a priori the logical properties of our thoughts. Here, I defend the identity premise response against four different criticisms, and to do so, I sketch the general lines for a picture on inference- engaging and rational explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article discusses the political philosophies of French theorist Raymond Boudon, with a particular emphasis on his theories regarding human rationality. The author comments on the relationships drawn between individualism, rationality, and rational choice. He also describes the evolution of human morality as well as the development of moderate political theory, according to Boudon. A comparative analysis of Boudon's theories related to cognitive and axiological rationalities is also presented.

We examine how Frege's contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a" vs. “a=b" would fare in the special case where ‘a' and ‘b' are complex mental representations, and ‘a' stands for an introspected ‘I'-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts": they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a" form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let alone a priori true. This further reinforces Glezakos's objections against the set-up of Frege's puzzle, while also raising what we think is an acute problem for Fregeans, insofar as I-thought (and indexical thinking more generally), understood in their way, turns out to be incompatible with some basic features of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents some objections to Burge's theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for his beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject's rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article discusses the history of human emotions in decision making, with a particular focus on the early 20th century through the early 21st century. The author comments on the role of sociologist Georg Simmel in the incorporation of emotions in historical and sociological research, which is referred to as the emotional turn. She also considers the impact of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, on the relationship between historiography and emotion. The concepts of modernity and rationality in this context are also explored.

I examine the view, put forward by Gregory Currie and collaborators, that delusions are not beliefs because delusional subjects break constitutive norms of believing. This hinges on two different types of commitment: one about how delusional patients are (how they behave, reason etc.) and one about the constitutive norms of belief. I focus on the latter, and suggest that some of the norms that Currie cites as constitutive (namely "upstream" ones) should not be considered such. Only downstream norms should be taken to be constitutive. But some delusional patients appear to break these too, so an anti-doxastic position is still tenable, but of a different form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marcus's view of belief is applied to the debate that centers on the question, "Are delusions beliefs?" Two consequences of this are that i) the question, "Are delusions beliefs?" needs rephrasing and ii) the answer is, "No, some delusional patients do not believe what they prima facie seem to believe". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En este artículo se propone un teorema para mostrar bajo qué condiciones las empresas que maximizan la tasa de ganancia obtienen mayor ganancia que aquellas que maximizan la masa. A diferencia del lema 2, propuesto por Noriega (1998), se asume que el trabajo destinado a la organización es no gratuito. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article assumes a conceptual link exists between morality and rationality and attempts to show this link in the context of a critical dialogue with utilitarianism and by showing how rational egoism is self-contradictory. The main question is if such a thing would allow us to simultaneously demonstrate the rationality and the morality of cooperation and solidarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]