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Resume Cet article examine comment les agences europeennes qui relevent de l’Espace de liberte, de securite et de justice rendent compte de leurs activites. Il montre tout d’abord que leur redevabilite porte sur trois objets : leurs finances, la politique dont elle ont la charge et les enjeux techniques relatifs a leur activite. Il souligne qu’elles sont passees d’une redevabilite de type intergouvernemental, surtout a destination du Conseil et des Etats membres, a une redevabilite de type « communautaire », surtout a destination des institutions de l’Union et en particulier du Parlement europeen.

Thanks to the EU citizenship and other EU principles, citizens of the EU member-states may have access to the public services of a member-state they are not citizen of. This access is called transnational access. Taking the example of the transnational access to social security rights, this chapter shows that, to ensure its implementation, the EU created obligations of cooperation between the member-states and backed them by dense and complex cooperation mechanisms including support bodies; hence the expression of ‘administrative machineries’ to qualify these elements. The chapter discusses the scope of the legal obligations of cooperation, together with the frameworks and forms according to which cooperation has to be fulfilled to concretely grant these transnational accesses.

Institutional pressure caused by public sector reform leads to strategic reactions from semi-autonomous agencies. Agencies in the Netherlands and France only complied with a selection of imposed reforms. Other rules were manipulated, not complied with, or compromises were made. The degree of compliance with reforms is not only dependent on structural aspects, but also on resources and power distributions between the actors. A comparison is made between the introduction of the Dutch Kaderwet ZBO and the French Révision Générale des Politiques Publiques. These agency reforms are contested between ministries, rather than between agency and parent ministry alone. Parent ministries tend to side with their agencies in both countries. In the Netherlands, power-related issues were most debated, whereas in France money-related issues caused most disagreement. Points for practitioners Reforms targeted at agencies are likely to meet resistance if agencies do not agree with the proposed rules, especially if they alter existing power relations. Some agencies possess certain resources which they can apply strategically to offer resistance to reforms. Parent ministries tend to side with agencies in their sector and try to protect them from other ministries.

Les autorites europeennes de surveillance ont ete creees pour renforcer le controle des activites financieres dans l’Union europeenne. Ce sont les premieres autorites de regulation europeennes dotees de pouvoirs juridiques contraignants. Leur rang europeen, leurs pouvoirs et leur place au sein du Systeme europeen de surveillance financiere posent toutefois des questions particulieres quant aux modalites et a l’etendue de leur independance. Si le legislateur y a fait face en les dotant de garanties indeniables, la portee de certaines solutions et les preoccupations liees a certaines limites font l’objet du present travail.

Cet article a pour but d’analyser comment est menee la revision generale des politiques publiques en abordant successivement son objet, ses methodes et sa redevabilite. Il avance l’hypothese suivante : plus qu’un processus d’economies, la revision est un processus de reforme et de modernisation de l’administration. Il indique egalement en quoi elle se veut et est plus efficace que les experiences de reforme anterieures mais aussi en quoi elle accuse certaines limites en matiere de methode et de redevabilite.