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Loss-aversion is a type of conservative mindset that can negatively impact performance. In this study, we systematically surveyed a pool of golfers. We then analyzed, in detail, the relationships among participants' attributes and the degree of loss-aversion. Based on these findings, we propose developing effective campaigns to help individuals or teams overcome their loss-aversion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: We have previously presented two educational interventions aimed to diminish causal illusions and promote critical thinking. In both cases, these interventions reduced causal illusions developed in response to active contingency learning tasks, in which participants were able to decide whether to introduce the potential cause in each of the learning trials. The reduction of causal judgments appeared to be influenced by differences in the frequency with which the participants decided to apply the potential cause, hence indicating that the intervention affected their information sampling strategies. Objective: In the present study, we investigated whether one of these interventions also reduces causal illusions when covariation information is acquired passively. Method: Forty-one psychology undergraduates received our debiasing intervention, while 31 students were assigned to a control condition. All participants completed a passive contingency learning task. Results: We found weaker causal illusions in students that participated in the debiasing intervention, compared to the control group. Conclusion: The intervention affects not only the way the participants look for new evidence, but also the way they interpret given information. Teaching implications: Our data extending previous results regarding evidence-based educational interventions aimed to promote critical thinking to situations in which we act as mere observers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines the viewpoints and opposing perspectives in the scientific discourse on the issue of the impact of psychological factors on the working environment. The analysis of the literature proves that the efficiency of work performance and decision making in organizations also depends on psychological factors. The main goal of the paper is to explore whether psychological factors, cognitive biases and cognitive dissonance affect work performance and decision making․ Understanding the impact of psychological factors on the working environment is important for organizations and decision-making processes, as based on the results, innovative solutions may be applied for better management and HR policies. Methodological instruments are based on a survey and Pearson chi-square analysis. This empirical study presents survey results among 100 participants. According to the results, 83% of respondents think that the most effective managers/employees are calm and balanced people (phlegmatic). Cognitive biases and dissonance hinder work performance, although sometimes people do not realize it. Based on the situations that were frequent among participants, the most frequent cognitive biases are choice-supportive bias, groupthink, authority bias, ostrich effect, IKEA effect, optimism bias, confirmation bias, anchoring bias, etc. However, 90% do nothing to overcome cognitive biases, as many of them do not realize that they have biases. Similarly, 75% mentioned that they have experienced cognitive dissonance in their behavior, but they do nothing to overcome it. The study empirically and theoretically validates that cognitive biases and dissonance can affect decision-making, communications and interactions with other people. The results of the Pearson chi-square analysis showed that mainly phlegmatic people have experienced the influence of cognitive biases and cognitive dissonance on their work experience. Additionally, mainly choleric and phlegmatic people try to overcome cognitive biases, while sanguine people try to do something to overcome cognitive dissonance. The analysis may be useful for organizations, managers, and workers to understand the hindering factors that may affect decision making and work performance. Additionally, the paper recommends using innovative methods of group decision making, developing critical and innovative thinking skills among employees, adjusting HR policies, applying innovative forms and styles of leadership and participative management, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This position paper delves into the complex interplay between proactive cyber defense mechanisms and inherent human susceptibilities. The researchers posit that as cyber systems advance in technical robustness, malicious entities progressively exploit human psychological tendencies and behavioral inconsistencies to circumvent security measures. These exploitations are not merely opportunistic but are strategic, leveraging a profound comprehension of human cognitive biases to undermine security infrastructures. The researchers argue for broadening the intellectual horizon in this domain, underscoring the imperative for a multidisciplinary methodology that amalgamates the empirical acumen of psychology, sociology, and computer science. The article asserts that the fortification of cyber defenses is contingent upon the comprehensive integration of human vulnerability assessments within cybersecurity frameworks. This position paper calls for an augmentation of scholarly research at the nexus of offensive cybersecurity and human factors, formulating defense mechanisms centered around the human element and promulgating inclusive cybersecurity policies that harmonize human and technological considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although generic masculine forms supposedly include everyone, they seem to evoke masculine representations to the exclusion of other genders (Stahlberg & Sczesny, 2001). Gender-inclusive alternatives may yield more inclusive representations, but this has not been investigated extensively. The current study focused on German and contrasts generic masculine forms (Politiker, politicians) with the gender star (Politiker*innen, politicians [m/f/d]) in order to assess whether they differ in the mental availability of nonmasculine exemplars. The findings suggest that linguistic form matters, as more female exemplars were listed when participants were exposed to the gender star, although very few other nonmasculine exemplars were mentioned. Furthermore, female participants listed more nonmasculine exemplars than male participants, but, as the sample was skewed (more female than male participants), this result is tentative. Thus, the gender star leads to more inclusive mental representations, but other factors likely also play a role in determining the prominence of nonmasculine exemplars.

Previous research indicates that economic scarcity affects people's judgments, decisions, and cognition in a variety of contexts, and with various consequences. We hypothesized that scarcity could sometimes reduce cognitive biases. Specifically, it could reduce the causal illusion, a cognitive bias that is at the heart of superstitions and irrational thoughts, and consists of believing that two events are causally connected when they are not. In three experiments, participants played the role of doctors deciding whether to administer a drug to a series of patients. The drug was ineffective, because the percentage of patients recovering was identical regardless of whether they took the drug. We manipulated the budget available to buy the drugs, tough all participants had enough for all their patients. Even so, participants in the scarce group reduced the use of the drug and showed a lower causal illusion than participants in the wealthy group. Experiments 2 and 3 added a phase in which the budget changed. Participants who transitioned from scarcity to wealth exhibited a reduced use of resources and a lower causal illusion, whereas participants transitioning from wealth to scarcity were unaffected by their previous history.

PurposeCould the curse of knowledge influence how antagonized we are towards political outgroups? Do we assume others know what we know but still disagree with us? This research investigates how the curse of knowledge may affect us politically, i.e., be a cause of political polarization.BackgroundResearch on the curse of knowledge has shown that even when people are incentivized to act as if others do not know what they know, they are still influenced by the knowledge they have.MethodsThis study consists of five studies consisting of both experimental and non-experimental and within- and between-subjects survey designs. Each study collected samples of 152–1,048.ResultsPartisans on both sides overestimate the extent to which stories from their news sources were familiar to contrapartisans. Introducing novel, unknown facts to support their political opinion made participants rate political outgroup members more negatively. In an experimental design, there was no difference in judging an opponent who did not know the same issue-relevant facts and someone who did know the same facts. However, when asked to compare those who know to those who do not, participants judged those who do not know more favorably, and their ratings of all issue-opponents were closer to those issue-opponents who shared the same knowledge. In a debiasing experiment, those who received an epistemological treatment judged someone who disagreed more favorably.ConclusionThis research provides evidence that the curse of knowledge may be a contributing cause of affective political polarization.

IntroductionPsychotic disorders such schizophrenia and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are neurodevelopmental disorders with social cognitive deficits. Specifically, biased interpretation of social information can result in interpersonal difficulties. Cognitive biases are prevalent in psychosis, but no previous study has investigated whether the type and severity of cognitive biases differ between subjects experiencing first-episode psychosis (FEP) with (FEP-ADHD+) and without ADHD (FEP-ADHD−).MethodsA total of 121 FEP outpatients at the Early Intervention Service of Reus were screened for childhood ADHD through the Diagnostic Interview for ADHD (DIVA). Cognitive biases were assessed by the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQp). CBQp scores of FEPs groups were compared with those of healthy controls (HCs) with an analysis of covariance. Spearman correlation analysis explored associations between CBQp scores and psychopathology.ResultsThirty-one FEPs met the criteria for childhood ADHD and reported significantly more cognitive bias [median (interquartile range): 47 (38–56)] than FEP-ADHD− [42 (37–48)] and HCs [38 (35.5–43)]. CBQp scores did not differ between FEP-ADHD-and HCs when adjusted for age and sex. After controlling for clinical differences, Intentionalising (F = 20.97; p

The old parts of the political economy reveal that leading figures such as Ibn Khaldun, Weber, Bacon, Hobbes, and Smith were not apostles of pure economic rationality and a materialistic mindset. While most of these thinkers plausibly endorsed "rationality" in the context of social and cultural realities, they were also aware of the systematic irrationality of cognitive biases that were later "discovered" by contemporary behavioral economists. We are trying to answer the question, "Is there a discrepancy or non-complacency in rationality understanding of economic decisions based on differing needs of economic agents from a religious perspective?". So, based on assumptions that religion, economics, and psychology are affecting each other, it is argued that a well-defined hypothesis and assumptions on the relationship between psychology and economic behaviors need to be cleared in at least three aspects: first, "identifying key factors that influence mood"; second "exploring the relationship between behavior, faith, and psychology"; and third "considering the possible effects of psychology, faith, and behaviors of different groups of people on economic decisions.” A set of reasonable suggestions for policymakers is going to be produced in this direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid advances of science and technology have provided a large part of the world with all conceivable needs and comfort. However, this welfare comes with serious threats to the planet and many of its inhabitants. An enormous amount of scientific evidence points at global warming, mass destruction of bio-diversity, scarce resources, health risks, and pollution all over the world. These facts are generally acknowledged nowadays, not only by scientists, but also by the majority of politicians and citizens. Nevertheless, this understanding has caused insufficient changes in our decision making and behavior to preserve our natural resources and to prevent upcoming (natural) disasters. In the present study, we try to explain how systematic tendencies or distortions in human judgment and decision-making, known as “cognitive biases,” contribute to this situation. A large body of literature shows how cognitive biases affect the outcome of our deliberations. In natural and primordial situations, they may lead to quick, practical, and satisfying decisions, but these decisions may be poor and risky in a broad range of modern, complex, and long-term challenges, like climate change or pandemic prevention. We first briefly present the social-psychological characteristics that are inherent to (or typical for) most sustainability issues. These are: experiential vagueness, long-term effects, complexity and uncertainty, threat of the status quo, threat of social status, personal vs. community interest, and group pressure. For each of these characteristics, we describe how this relates to cognitive biases, from a neuro-evolutionary point of view, and how these evolved biases may affect sustainable choices or behaviors of people. Finally, based on this knowledge, we describe influence techniques (interventions, nudges, incentives) to mitigate or capitalize on these biases in order to foster more sustainable choices and behaviors.

Humans tend to systematically underestimate exponential growth and perceive it in linear terms, which can have severe consequences in a variety of fields. Recent studies attempted to examine the origins of this bias and to mitigate it by using the logarithmic vs. the linear scale in graphical representations. However, they yielded conflicting results as to which scale induces more perceptual errors. In the current study, in an experiment with a short educational intervention, we further examine the factors modulating the exponential bias in graphs and suggest a theoretical explanation for our findings. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that each of the scales can induce misperceptions in a particular context. In addition to this, we explore the effect of mathematical education by testing two groups of participants (with a background in humanities vs. formal sciences). The results of this study confirm that when used in an inadequate context, these scales can have a dramatic effect on the interpretation of visualizations representing exponential growth. In particular, while the log scale leads to more errors in graph description tasks, the linear scale misleads people when they have to make predictions on the future trajectory of exponential growth. The second part of the study revealed that the difficulties with both scales can be reduced by means of a short educational intervention. Importantly, while no difference between participants groups was observed prior to the intervention, participants with a better mathematical education showed a stronger learning effect at posttest. The findings of this study are discussed in light of a dual-process model.

Previous research suggests that people may develop stronger causal illusions when the existence of a causal relationship is consistent with their prior beliefs. In the present study, we hypothesized that prior pseudoscientific beliefs will influence judgments about the effectiveness of both alternative medicine and scientific medicine. Participants (N = 98) were exposed to an adaptation of the standard causal illusion task in which they had to judge whether two fictitious treatments, one described as conventional medicine and the other as alternative medicine, could heal the crises caused by two different syndromes. Since both treatments were completely ineffective, those believing that any of the two medicines worked were exhibiting a causal illusion. Participants also responded to the Pseudoscience Endorsement Scale (PES) and some questions about trust in alternative therapies that were taken from the Survey on the Social Perception of Science and Technology conducted by FECYT. The results replicated the causal illusion effect and extended them by revealing an interaction between the prior pseudoscientific beliefs and the scientific/pseudoscientific status of the fictitious treatment. Individuals reporting stronger pseudoscientific beliefs were more vulnerable to the illusion in both scenarios, whereas participants with low adherence to pseudoscientific beliefs seemed to be more resistant to the illusion in the alternative medicine scenario.

BackgroundImpulsivity has been defined as a tendency to respond with little forethought, often with disregard to the negative consequences to the impulsive individual or others. Problem gambling patients are characterized with impulse control and absent inhibition control, a tendency to react to stimuli in a rapid and unplanned fashion without complete processing of information.MethodBased on the information processing theory and the dual-systems model of self-control, 208 moderate-risk gambling were investigated by questionnaire to explore the moderating effect of self-control in the process of cognitive bias and cognitive style affecting the gambling impulse of moderate-risk gambling.ConclusionUsing hierarchical regression analysis, it is found that: (a) The gambling impulse of male moderate-risk gambling was stronger than female moderate-risk gambling. (b) Self-control negatively predicted trait impulsivity, and the stronger the individual self-control, the lower the level of trait impulsivity. (c) Cognitive bias positively predicted trait impulsivity, and high cognitive bias induced high-level trait impulsivity. Self-control played a moderating role between cognitive bias and trait impulsivity. (d) Compared with field-independent gambling, field-dependent gambling were more likely to have impulsive thoughts of gambling activities. Self-control played a moderating role between cognitive style and trait impulsivity.

ObjectsThis study aimed to elucidate the effect of cognitive bias modification on depression.MethodsThis research included 10 randomized studies searching four major databases: PubMed, Embase, PsycINFO, and Cochrane Library, with a total sample size of 467. Moreover, they were examined for quality and possible publication bias.ResultsCognitive bias modification (CBM) had statistically significant results, g = −0.64, 95% CI = [−0.97–0.32]. The interpretation of cognitive bias modification shows the highest effect size, g = −1.45, 95% CI = [−2.05–0.88]. When the training place is located in the laboratory, the training effect is significant, g = −1.11, 95% CI = [−1.62–0.61]. The difference is statistically significant when the training environment was changed to home, g = −0.28, 95% CI = [−0.51–0.05]. CBM has a statistical effect on moderate-to-severe depression, g = −0.70, 95% CI = [−1.04–0.36].ConclusionWe found that CBM had a moderate therapeutic effect on depression, whether the setting was at home or in the lab. Especially when the interpretation of cognitive bias modification (CBM-I) was used, we got the highest effect value. Furthermore, CBM has a statistical effect on moderate-to-severe depression.

Background: Cognitive biases are popular topics in psychology and marketing, as they refer to systematic cognitive tendencies in human thinking that deviate from logical and rational reasoning. The framing effect (FE) and the decoy effect (DE) are examples of cognitive biases that can influence decision making and consumer preferences. The FE involves how options are presented, while the DE involves the addition of a third option that influences the choice between the other two options. Methods: We investigated the interaction between the FE and the DE in the case of both incongruent (ID) and congruent (CD) decoys in a sample of undergraduates (n = 471). The study had a two (positive vs. negative valence) × three (original, congruent decoy, incongruent decoy) within-subject design. Results: The ID option reduces the FE in both positive- and negative-framed conditions compared to the controls, while adding the CD option increases the FE only in the positive-framed condition. Additionally, the inclusion of the CD option enhances the level of decision confidence, whereas no significant differences were found in the ID condition. Conclusions: Our findings gave new insights into the interplay between two of the most frequent cognitive biases.

Cognitive demands placed on university students are high and so is the prevalence of insomnia in this population. Neurocognitive functions, such as delayed recall, working memory, and flexibility are often impaired in patients with insomnia disorder. Therefore, this study investigates the development of neuropsychological functioning in students with insomnia symptoms over the course of a sleep training. In this pilot-study 54 university students with symptoms of insomnia were included and randomly assigned to a group intervention with cognitive behavioural therapy and hypnotherapy (n = 35) and a waiting-list control condition (n = 19). Sleep quality and objective measures of neurocognitive performance (attention, inhibition, flexibility, memory, and working memory) were assessed before and after the training or a waiting period of 6 weeks. Both the intervention condition and the waiting-list control condition improved with regards to sleep quality, sleep duration, sleep efficiency, and measures of higher cognitive functions. In addition, students in the intervention condition reported less subjective daytime impairments when compared to the waiting-list control condition. The subgroup of students with short sleep duration benefitted significantly from the intervention in flexibility and working memory tasks. In line with previous studies, improved sleep was associated with improved neuropsychological functioning. The additional improvements observed in students with short sleep duration indicate an association between insomnia severity and neuropsychological improvement.

Dissatisfaction with facial appearance is one of the strongest contributors to body image disturbance among young Chinese females and leads to a series of psychological and behavioral disorders. By conducting behavioral and ERP experiments, this study illustrates how young females in China with facial dissatisfaction process different levels of facial attractiveness. Experiments 1 and 2 are behavioral experiments in which the dot-probe paradigm was used to explore the participant’s attentional bias to facial attractiveness. The results showed that regardless of whether the face image was presented above or below the threshold, young females with facial dissatisfaction exhibited attentional orientation toward lowly attractive faces and attentional avoidance to both lowly and highly attractive faces, while the control group showed difficulty in attentional disengagement from highly attractive faces. In experiment 3, the learning-recognition task was used to examine mnemonic bias toward facial attractiveness among females with facial dissatisfaction, and EEG data were also recorded during the encoding and retrieval phases. The study found that young females with facial dissatisfaction exhibited a mnemonic preference for lowly attractive images at both the encoding and retrieving stages, with higher P1, N170, P2, and N300 induced by lowly attractive faces, while the control group preferred highly attractive faces. In conclusion, young females with facial dissatisfaction tend to exhibit attentional orientation and mnemonic bias toward lowly attractive faces.

Past research has consistently shown that carbon footprint estimates of a set of conventional and more environmentally friendly items in combination tend to be lower than estimates of the conventional items alone. This ‘negative footprint illusion’ is a benchmark for the study of how cognitive heuristics and biases underpin environmentally significant behavior. However, for this to be a useful paradigm, the findings must also be reliable and valid, and an understanding of how methodological details such as response time pressure influence the illusion is necessary. Past research has cast some doubt as to whether the illusion is obtained when responses are made on a ratio/quantitative scale and when a within-participants design is used. Moreover, in past research on the negative footprint illusion, participants have had essentially as much time as they liked to make the estimates. It is yet unknown how time pressure influences the effect. This paper reports an experiment that found the effect when participants were asked to estimate the items’ emissions in kilograms CO2 (a ratio scale) under high and under low time pressure, using a within-participants design. Thus, the negative footprint illusion seems to be a reliable and valid phenomenon that generalizes across methodological considerations and is not an artifact of specific details in the experimental setup.

One of the most robust effects in cognitive psychology is anchoring, in which judgments show a bias toward previously viewed values. However, in what is essentially the same task as used in anchoring research, a perceptual illusion demonstrates the opposite effect of repulsion. Here, we united these two literatures, testing in two experiments with adults (total N = 200) whether prior comparative decisions bias cognitive and perceptual judgments in opposing directions or whether anchoring and repulsion are two domain-general biases whose co-occurrence has so far gone undetected. We found that in both perceptual and cognitive tasks, anchoring and repulsion co-occur. Further, the direction of the bias depends on the comparison value: Distant values attract judgments, whereas nearby values repulse judgments. Because none of the leading theories for either effect account for both biases, theoretical integration is needed. As a starting point, we describe one such joint theory based on sampling models of cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Nabo is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Previous studies reported that consumers choose a higher number of options in subtractive framing (-OF), which delete the unnecessary options from the full model with all options chosen than in additive framing (+OF), which adds options to a simple base model. The purposes of this study are to examine the effect of age on option framing and the differences of product type on the option framing effect using two product scenarios (travel package and medical examination). Participants were 40 younger and 40 older adults. We measured the number of options chosen, total price, choice difficulty, and choice satisfaction. In addition, cognitive functions (coding, symbol search, digit span, arithmetic, and information) were assessed. Results revealed that older and younger adults chose more options in the -OF condition for both the scenarios. For the medical examination, older adults chose more options than did the younger adults in both -OF and +OF conditions. Developmental shift in goals and motivation related to life-span may explain the differences between the age differences.

The Internet plays a crucial part in the adolescent life. However, as a product of modernization, the Internet has brought a lifestyle different from that of our parents who tend to regard excessive exposure to the Internet as a manifestation of the adolescent Internet addiction. The cognitive bias against the Internet seem to have been arisen among the parents. Under the theoretical framework of self-efficacy and empathy, this study adopts PLS-SEM to analyze the contributing factors of the adolescent Internet addiction from the perspective of self-affirmation consciousness of parents. The result demonstrates that self-affirmation consciousness has a significant positive effect on the empathy process; the empathy process and self-affirmation have a significant positive effect on cognitive bias; and the empathy process acts as a mediator between self-affirmation and cognitive bias. To sum up, through the investigation of the causes of adolescent Internet addiction, this study explores the formation process of parents’ cognitive bias toward the Internet under the influence of self-affirmation consciousness, verifying the practical effects of empathy in the process of promoting rational thinking of parents toward the Internet and adolescent Internet use, and at the same time promoting the harmonious development of parent–child relationships to a certain extent.

The current study extends existing research on human error by investigating human error in complex, dynamic, and uncertain microworlds. The main goal was to develop a taxonomy of errors for such situations. Several tasks with differing characteristics and demands on the problem solver were used: the simulation of a chocolate producing company (CHOCO FINE), the simulation of a tribe of semi-nomads in the Sahel zone (MORO), and the simulation of wildfires engaging fire-fighting units (WINFIRE). Observing participants and teams working on these simulations, we refer to specific cases and describe 24 errors related to the steps of human problem solving and dynamic decision making. A theory is then presented which attempts to explain the causes of these errors occurring in microworld contexts. Whereas most existing theories focus on cognitive explanations, the theory presented explains human error as a result of the interaction of emotions, motivations, and cognition. The current study not only extends the taxonomy and list of human errors, but especially addresses the lack of theoretical explanations in the literature on human error. The findings provide a starting point for further theory development and empirical testing and could be applied in training programs; hopefully contributing to sensitivity and awareness of the demands of complex, dynamic, and uncertain problems, and ultimately contributing to fewer human errors.

IntroductionMetacognitive training (MCT) is a group program for improving cognitive bias in patients with schizophrenia. MCT has a reported positive effect on psychiatric symptoms and cognitive bias in patients with schizophrenia, but the effect of the intervention on patients with schizophrenia in the early recovery stage during hospitalization is not comprehensible. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the efficacy of MCT in the early recovery stage of patients with schizophrenia in a Japanese emergency psychiatric ward.MethodThis unblinded, pilot randomized controlled trial recruited 24 patients with schizophrenia aged 20–65 years. Patients were randomly divided into two groups: occupational therapy (OT) + MCT group and OT-only group. Using the two-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), changes in cognitive function, psychiatric symptoms, cognitive insight, and intrinsic motivation were compared between those at baseline and post-intervention and between the two groups. Furthermore, patient readmission during the year after discharge was compared between the groups.ResultsThe final analysis included eight patients in each group, owing to the withdrawal of some patients from the study. The two-way repeated-measures analysis of variance revealed significant differences in cognitive function in several domains within subjects. However, no significant differences between subjects were observed. Psychiatric symptoms showed significant within-subject improvement, and interaction was found for general psychopathology (p = 0.03). The variable of cognitive insight and self-reflectiveness was significantly different between subjects (p = 0.03). There was no significant difference in intrinsic motivation. Readmission within a year was significantly lower in the OT + MCT group than in the OT-only group (2 [25%] vs. 6 [75%]; p = 0.046).ConclusionIn a Japanese emergency psychiatric ward, this pilot randomized controlled study was the first attempt to investigate the efficacy of MCT in patients with schizophrenia suggesting that MCT may be effective in preventing psychiatric symptoms, poor self-reflectiveness, and readmissions.The study was registered in the University Hospital Medical Information Network Clinical Trials Registry (UMIN-CTR; UMIN000034106).

Mortgage decisions have important consequences for consumers, lenders, and the state of the economy more generally. Mortgage decisions are also prototypical of consumer financial choices that involve a stream of expenditures and consumption occurring across time. The authors use heterogeneity in time preferences for both immediate (present bias) and long-term outcomes to explain a sequence of mortgage decisions, including mortgage choice and the decision to abandon a mortgage. The authors employ an analytic model and a survey of mortgaged households augmented by zip code–level house price and foreclosure data. The model suggests and data confirm that consumers with greater present bias and long-term discounting tend to choose mortgages that minimize up-front costs. However, greater present bias decreases homeowners’ willingness to abandon a mortgage, locking them into the contract. Long-term patience increases mortgage abandonment. This reversal across mortgage decisions is difficult for alternative accounts to explain. These results suggest that a two-parameter model of time preferences is helpful for understanding how homeowners make mortgage decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numeric ratings for products can be presented using a bigger-is-better format (1 = bad, 5 = good) or a smaller-is-better format with reversed rating poles (1 = good, 5 = bad). Seven experiments document how implicit memory for the bigger-is-better format—where larger numbers typically connote something is better—can systematically bias consumers’ judgments without their awareness. This rating polarity effect is the result of proactive interference from culturally determined numerical associations in implicit memory and results in consumer judgments that are less sensitive to differences in numeric ratings. This is an implicit bias that manifests even when people are mindful and focused on the task and across a range of judgment types (auction bids, visual perception, purchase intent, willingness to pay). Implicating the role of reliance on implicit memory in this interference effect, the rating polarity effect is moderated by (1) cultural norms that define the implicit numerical association, (2) construal mindsets that encourage reliance on implicit memory, and (3) individual propensity to rely on implicit memory. This research identifies a new form of proactive interference for numerical associations, demonstrates how reliance on implicit memory can interfere with explicit memory, and shows how to attenuate such interference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dealmakers tend to neglect uncertainty when making acquisition decisions, rushing into deals that eventually fail to deliver the anticipated synergies. Cause for this uncertainty neglect can be found in behavioral biases that cloud executive decision making. Acquirers should more often use minority stakes as a toehold to test full acquisitions and to guard themselves against the negative effects of uncertainty. An extended valuation toolkit that requires more managerial attention to uncertainty and behavioral pitfalls can help executives to better identify and value the benefits of minority stake strategies as an alternative to controlling acquisitions in uncertain situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the consensus that climate change will have huge consequences not just for the planet but also on corporate operations, businesses continue to fail to adjust their strategic decision-making processes to become more sustainable. One of the silent culprits behind climate change inertia lies in the cognitive biases at play in corporate decision making. This article builds on existing strategic decision-making models to explain how biases prevent managers from accurately identifying the moral dimensions of climate change. It also presents a broad range of practical interventions for how this constraint can be overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue explores the impacts of behavioral strategy on management practice. Behavioral strategy can best contribute to management practice by shifting its focus from individual decision biases to the design of behaviorally informed decision processes at the level of the firm. This introduction identifies three types of organizational decision processes, shows how they interact with individual and group biases, and proposes a model showing how managers can design and deploy these processes to shape the strategy of the firm. It then introduces the articles in this special issue and discusses their contributions to the future of behavioral strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces strategists to the Mindspace framework and explores its applications in strategic contexts. This framework consists of nine effective behavioral interventions that are grounded in public policy applications, and it focuses on how changing the context can be more effective than attempts to de-bias decision makers. Behavioral changes are likely when we follow rather than fight human nature. Better decisions can be achieved by engineering choice contexts to "engage a bias" to overcome a more damaging bias. This article illustrates how to engineer strategic contexts through two case studies and outlines directions and challenges when applying Mindspace to strategic decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The limited number of effective medical interventions to combat Covid-19 to date has resulted in government institutions focusing on preventive behaviours believed to minimize virus transmission. The Indonesian government has launched a ‘new normal’ campaign whereby outdoor activities are restricted by various health protocols established by health authorities, such as wearing a mask, habitual hand washing and social distancing. However, these protocols have not been implemented with a thorough understanding of human behaviour. The result is numerous violations of the protocol, which subsequently lead to the persistence of Covid-19 cases in Indonesia. Behavioural science as an approach can provide important insights regarding the systematic errors of thought that contribute to non-compliance with Covid-19 health signs. This article will elaborate on the different types of systematic errors, known as cognitive biases, that plays a role in Covid-19 protocol compliance and suggest the corresponding solutions deemed most effective to overcome these obstacles. Understanding of the dynamics paired with the application of behaviourally informed strategies will hence contribute to the attempt to flatten the Covid-19 curve.

Visual inspections have been typically used in condition assessment of infrastructure. However, they are based on human judgment and their interpretation of data can differ from acquired results. In psychology, this difference is called cognitive bias which directly affects Structural Health Monitoring (SHM)-based decision making. Besides, the confusion between condition state and safety of a bridge is another example of cognitive bias in bridge monitoring. Therefore, integrated computer-based approaches as powerful tools can be significantly applied in SHM systems. This paper explores the relationship between the use of advanced computational intelligence and the development of SHM solutions through conducting an infrastructure monitoring methodology. Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based algorithms, i.e., Artificial Neural Network (ANN), hybrid ANN-based Imperial Competitive Algorithm, and hybrid ANN-based Genetic Algorithm, are developed for damage assessment using a lab-scale composite bridge deck structure. Based on the comparison of the results, the employed evolutionary algorithms could improve the prediction error of the pre-developed network by enhancing the learning procedure of the ANN.

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The most effective charities are hundreds of times more effective than typical charities, yet few donors prioritize effectiveness. Why is that? How might we increase the effectiveness of charitable giving? We review the motivational and epistemic causes of (in)effective giving. Many donors view charitable giving as a matter of personal preference, which favors decisions based on emotional appeal rather than effectiveness. In addition, while many donors are motivated to give effectively, they often have misconceptions and cognitive biases that reduce effective giving. Nearly all research on charitable giving interventions focuses on increasing donation amounts. However, to increase societal benefit, donation effectiveness is likely to be more important. This underscores the need for research on strategies to encourage effective giving. Effective altruism is a philosophy and social movement that advocates using the most effective, evidence-based strategies to benefit others. Here we focus on charitable giving, a domain in which ordinary people can have a large impact. Most behavioral research on charitable giving focuses on donation amounts, but the impact of giving depends more on the effectiveness of the charities people support than on how much they give. We review recent research on the factors that promote (in)effective giving. There are motivational and epistemic obstacles to effective giving: People are often drawn to less effective charities, and to the extent that people want to give effectively, they typically do not know how to do it. We discuss strategies to encourage effective giving. Several strategies are feasible and warrant further research, as the potential social benefits are large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within just 7 years, behavioral decision research in psychology underwent a dramatic change: In 1967, Peterson and Beach (1967) reviewed more than 160 experiments concerned with people's statistical intuitions. Invoking the metaphor of the mind as an intuitive statistician, they concluded that "probability theory and statistics can be used as the basis for psychological models that integrate and account for human performance in a wide range of inferential tasks" (p. 29). Yet in a 1974 Science article, Tversky and Kahneman rejected this conclusion, arguing that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simple judgmental operations" (p. 1124). With that, they introduced the heuristics-and-biases research program, which has profoundly altered how psychology, and the behavioral sciences more generally, view the mind's competences and rationality. How was this radical transformation possible? We examine a previously neglected driver: The heuristics-and-biases program established an experimental protocol in behavioral decision research that relied on described scenarios rather than learning and experience. We demonstrate this shift with an analysis of 604 experiments, which shows that the descriptive protocol has dominated post-1974 research. Specifically, we examine two lines of research addressed in the intuitive-statistician program (Bayesian reasoning and judgments of compound events) and two lines of research spurred by the heuristics-and-biases program (framing and anchoring and adjustment). We conclude that the focus on description at the expense of learning has profoundly shaped the influential view of the error-proneness of human cognition. Public Significance Statement: Sound statistical intuitions are essential for navigating an uncertain world. The intuitive-statistician program of the 1960s concluded that probability theory and statistics can be used as the basis for psychological models of judgment. In contrast, research starting in the 1970s—spearheaded by the heuristics-and-biases program—has concluded that people lack the correct mental software for many important judgmental tasks. Our systematic review of experimental methods shows that the source of these conflicting conclusions may be traceable to a methodological shift triggered by the heuristics-and-biases program, which largely removed learning from judgment tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Attrition in obesity treatment is perhaps the greatest impediment to success. • Cognitive barriers decrease treatment engagement and cause attrition. • Anthropomorphisms may help clients understand and combat cognitive barriers. • The "Stymie Beasts" offer a compelling way to conceptualize cognitive barriers. This paper focuses on one of the most significant barriers, especially for teenagers and their families, to the effectiveness of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for weight management: high rates of attrition. Cognitive barriers contribute to attrition and to decreasing commitment to full engagement in the process (deliberate practice). Excuses capture the essence of one type of those cognitive barriers. Excuses are defined as shifts in attribution from self-focused causes of struggles to achieve goals to more externally-focused causes—resulting in decreasing full engagement. Those excuses (shifts in attribution) do not just happen. People make decisions to implement those shifts away from personal responsibility. Ten cognitive biases lie at the heart of such problematic delusional decision making. This paper identifies seven excuses created by that biased decision making as anthropomorphisms called Stymie Beasts. Such unique simply worded visually distinctive creatures may help improve recall and focus on these powerful antagonists to successful weight control. Then, the use of two CBT techniques, Therapeutic Understanding of Science (TUS) and Rational Emotive Therapy (RET), illustrated with examples for all seven Stymie Beasts, shows how CBT may prevent and dismantle those Beasts (excuses). Ideas for future research using randomized controlled trials to test these notions are also presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study was to introduce a modified version of the covariation detection task to the meta-reasoning framework. This task has been used to assess scientific reasoning through the evaluation of fictitious experiment outcomes and hypothesis testing. The traditional covariation detection task was modified to include only the magnitude versus ratio-bias. The participants' task was to evaluate the effectiveness of an experimental manipulation in a series of fictitious experiments. Experiment 1 (N = 61) consisted of twenty covariation detection tasks. In half of the tasks, normative and heuristic responses were congruent, and for the other half they were incongruent. Experiment 2 (N = 48) had the same experimental design, however, the fictitious data was modified to increase the relative strength of the normative response. After each trial participants provided a judgment of confidence. Results confirmed that the main manipulation of congruence was successful. Participants were more accurate, faster and more confident in the congruent condition. The manipulation from Experiment 2 had a larger impact on response times than on confidence judgments and accuracy. Correct responses were faster in Experiment 2 when compared to Experiment 1, with higher confidence for correct congruent responses. Analyses by response type revealed large individual differences in the relative strength of the processes which generate normative and biased responses. Participants were faster and more confident when rationalizing in favour of their dominant response while they were slower and less confident when decoupling from that dominant response. The covariation detection task provides new valuable insight into metareasoning processes.