Search

In January 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin completely rewrote the terms of debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by proposing a 'Global Protection System' to defend against limited missile [...]

In most Cold War-style analyses of deterrence, leaders are assumed to be rational and willing to engage in cost-benefit calculations when making policy decisions. Yet, the assumption of rationality tends to obscure various factors that may be unique to the context and challenger, including idiosyncratic leadership beliefs that can be decisive in determining whether deterrence threats ’work.’ This article outlines a methodology for tailoring deterrence policies to specific antagonists and contexts, to ’get inside’ the decision-making process of the challenger, and to ascertain as far as possible the basis for its decision-making with regard to a specific context and flashpoint. The primary areas of interest in this framework are characteristics of: the pertinent leaderships/countries, their motivations, goals, and determination, the nature of decision-making, the object of the friction (the ’stakes’ involved), the regional political/security context, and the sources of power available to the participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the function of deterrence, decision making in government and political structure.