The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction.

In most Cold War-style analyses of deterrence, leaders are assumed to be rational and willing to engage in cost-benefit calculations when making policy decisions. Yet, the assumption of rationality tends to obscure various factors that may be unique to the context and challenger, including idiosyncratic leadership beliefs that can be decisive in determining whether deterrence threats ’work.’ This article outlines a methodology for tailoring deterrence policies to specific antagonists and contexts, to ’get inside’ the decision-making process of the challenger, and to ascertain as far as possible the basis for its decision-making with regard to a specific context and flashpoint. The primary areas of interest in this framework are characteristics of: the pertinent leaderships/countries, their motivations, goals, and determination, the nature of decision-making, the object of the friction (the ’stakes’ involved), the regional political/security context, and the sources of power available to the participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]