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Scholars argue that nonviolence is likelier to cause political change in comparison to other strategies, including violence. This study identifies issues throughout this literature ranging from coding procedures, observational sampling, to interpretations of phenomena. If unarmed violence, reactive violence, and omitted cases are analyzed, nonviolent success rates are worse than formerly considered. Inclusion of 19th century (1800–99) cases and previously unanalyzed cases from the 20th century reveals that nonviolent campaigns experienced a 48% rate of success, whereas campaigns that adopted unarmed violence were 61% successful, campaigns utilizing reactive unarmed violence were 60% successful, and 30% of fully violent campaigns were successful. Nonviolence is not a causal determinant of political change, but rather, its implementation falls short of a probabilistic coin toss. There is reason to presume this literature is biased toward elite interests in similar ways to how scientific inquiry on dietary and substance guidelines has historically been skewed by corporatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article maps the landscape of think tanks in Iceland. It shows that think tanks are very few and insignificant in Icelandic policymaking. In the literature, the growth of think tanks in European countries with corporatist pasts has been linked to a change to a more pluralist system of interest representation. The case of Iceland lends support to this claim. In contrast to Scandinavia, corporatism remains entrenched in Iceland. But although there is a very limited market for local think tanks in Iceland, it is nevertheless recognized by political actors that touting policy advice offered by prestigious (international) think tanks can bring political benefits. This is also demonstrated in the article, showing that the influence of think tanks transcends at times national borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1945 and 2010 three main types of corporatism were discussed in the political science literature: the 'classic' and 'lean' corporatism that existed in the West European countries and the 'illusory' corporatism that dominated in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. The aim of the paper is to examine whether a new version of corporatism, which I call 'patronage' corporatism, emerged in Hungary and Poland during the first term of the governments formed by populist political parties (in Hungary between 2010 and 2014 and in Poland between 2015 and 2019). In patronage corporatism the authorities autonomously conduct heterodox economic policy. They enter into alliances only with ideologically close trade unions. While their cronies legitimize authorities' decisions at the governmental level vis-à-vis the citizens and at the international level, the government fulfils some of their socio-economic and organizational demands. Furthermore, the government cooperates with its allies to destroy other trade unions that are perceived as hostile towards the authorities. The paper shows that the capture of power by populist parties in Hungary and Poland led to the development of patronage corporatism in these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporatism is being reinvented in current theories about global democracy. As I see it, corporatism can be regarded as a practical way out of democracy's intensity problem: whether those more involved in an issue should have greater say. By the same token, corporatism can be perceived as a response to the all-affected principle: whether those especially affected by a decision should have more influence. In nation-states, corporatism was to a large extent dismantled during the 1980s. In world politics, by contrast, NGOs are now called upon to play an important role in not only articulating intense and affected interests but also, in so doing, realizing a global democracy. The weakness of this argument is that today's NGOs do not reflect the will of most people--as national organizations once managed to do--and, consequently, cannot fulfill the integrative and representative function associated with this form of interest politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Documenting how the Japanese state responded to increasing social discontent during initiation of unpopular welfare reforms, this study examines the factors that hindered the political empowerment of civil society despite the timely introduction of participatory policymaking institutions. The Japanese government opted in the early 2000s to introduce a participatory method to initiate the unpopular pension reform. Deliberation councils were established to encourage open discussions among government policymakers and committee members, including citizen representatives. The final outcomes of the deliberations, however, were mostly about parametric adjustments and did not adequately consider the urgent demand of the general public. The participatory measure did not significantly improve the public's trust in the pension programs, but it did justify the government's reform initiatives. The welfare bureaucracy that set the goal, defined the scope of the agenda, and steered the discussions toward technical issues structurally restricted the voices of the citizen members in the deliberation councils. The lack of citizen advocacy groups, which could otherwise have effectively supported the citizen members on the committee, contributed to the limited roles and influences of the citizens. It is argued that the traditional conservative corporatism of Japan was reinforced during this time period, despite the introduction of the idea of participatory governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers in the field of housing studies only seldom employ a ‘politics perspective’, analysing the political games and processes of housing provision and the political institutions of relevance to these processes. Instead political aspects are largely discussed either in terms of structural and cultural conditions and constraints on the macro level (‘Structure’ in the title), or as rather descriptive narratives about specific governments, elite actors and institutions, without the theoretical linkage necessary to draw more general conclusions (‘Thatcher’ in the title). This article introduces and develops some basic theoretical elements of a research agenda within housing studies exploring political actors (in a wide sense) and institutions, and allowing middle-range theorising and generalisation. It is discussed how such a perspective can be applied to the field of housing with its political specificities, in particular the central role of markets. Some earlier research of relevance to housing politics is reviewed, and ways forward are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Second Constitutionalist Period which was declared at the end of the efforts of the Committee of Union and Progress is one of the turning points of pre Republican political life in Turkey. When analyzed to the early Republican implementations, it can be argued that the ideals of the former period were put into practice. The leaders of the early Republican period as developing and growing organization in the Committee of the Progress and Union adapted the solidarist perspective rather than the fascist one as the subtopics of corporatism. In the study, the ultimate aim is to draw the general framework of the corporatism, fascism, and solidarism and then the impacts of The Committee of Union and Progress, the political movements in the pre Republican period, on the Republican period will be mentioned as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a research project which examines the role of interest groups in Swedish national politics. The project discusses how the interest group system functions after the acknowledgement of de-corporativization in the country. It collects data before and after the decline of corporatism in 1977 and 2011 and compares the country's interest group population with other political systems. In addition, the article discusses the importance of the project to the understanding of Swedish democracy.

Katzenstein's contribution to European political theory continues to resonate – even though the shift in scholarly work has moved in new directions, and the capacity for ‘flexible adaptation’ is under duress. When questions of power in the global system arise, the approach can account for issue-areas unanticipated by the author when the theoretical framework was introduced. Small States in World Markets still maintains a position on our reading lists, as a baseline for theory integrating comparative and international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article investigates how the concept of corporatism has played a significant role in the field of political science. The challenge of formulating a precise definition for the various forms of corporatism and its application within the context of various geographies is assessed. The relevance of the corporate state in an era of increasing globalization, interdependence, and transitions to democracy is questioned. The origins of the corporative model and its roots in Latin America field work are discussed. The decline in the popularity of corporatism as an approach in political sociology during the 1980s and 1990s is recounted.

This article argues that after the Golden Age of capitalism, corporatist methods of policy-making have come to depend on specific modes of party competition. In contrast to previous studies of corporatism, which have argued that corporatism depends on strong social democratic parties, this article suggests that the competition between well-defined left-wing and right-wing ‘blocs’ has become detrimental to corporatism. In countries with mixed governments or traditions of power-sharing, on the other hand, corporatism thrives. These conclusions are based on a comparison of four traditionally corporatist countries – Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland – from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On he occasion of the 25th birthday of Mancur Olson's "The Rise and Decline of Nations" (RDN), this article reviews the political science debate over Mancur Olson's theory on distributional coalitions. In RDN, Olson blamed societal organizations for the (above all: economic) decline of developed societies. This idea ran counter to the perspective of the debate on corporation that reached its peak when RDN was published. I show in detail that, as a general theory, RDN did not succeed. As a heuristic, in contrast, the RD N perspective gained enormous ground among political scientists in the last years. The discussion leads to the question of why, contrary to Olson's projection, liberalization politics became possible in the last 25 years. The article finishes by identifying questions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article brings together two research traditions: social movement theory and theories of corporate social responsibility. The study is an attempt to widen the perspective on the relationship between a business/business sector and its external stakeholders in order to include social movements. We depart from a three-part model of political opportunity structures, including state, cultural and economic opportunity structures, in order to illustrate our model, the article is centered on the case of the Swedish animal rights movements' political pressure on domestic fur-farming. The animal rights movement has had considerable success by engaging with a relatively open cultural opportunity structure, winning a framing war in regard to the moral issues raised. Despite the fur industry's attempts to counter-mobilize, the animal rights movement has found a hearing in formal political channels and has achieved considerable success. However, since the movement is faced with an economic opportunity structure that is not vulnerable to the demands of stakeholders, and where there is great inconsistency between the interests of the industry and the demands of the stakeholders, it is not surprising that the farmers have been non-compliant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the corporatist principle of singularity and on how the independent labor movement sought to challenge it in Taiwan. It explains how Taiwan's state corporatism crumbled in the process of democratization. It argues that democratization enabled the labor movement to achieve a strategic political alignment with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party. It also discusses the Faces of Taiwan's state corporatism under the Kuomintang.

Although the concept of ‘neo-corporatism’ has been around for 30 years, it has many different meanings. Nonetheless, evaluations of the level of corporatism in different countries turn out to be remarkably similar despite differences in the theoretical meaning of ‘corporatism’. That the Scandinavian countries are among the most corporatist countries and the United States the least is thus shared conventional wisdom among different corporatist schools. The conventional wisdom and its underlying conceptual pragmatism are challenged in this research. Empirically, it is demonstrated that the level of corporatism in the United States comes close to the level in Denmark if the Scandinavian ‘boards and commissions’ variant of the concept of ‘corporatism’ is applied. It can even be argued that the pattern of interest groups’ participation in boards and commissions in the United States is more in line with the corporatist idea that interest group involvement varies with the saliency of issues of the boards and commissions to interest group than it is the case in Denmark. The empirical findings of the study conflict with deeply rooted perceptions of the presence of corporatism in the United States and Scandinavia. How to make sense of similar levels of ‘Scandinavian’ corporatism in the United States and Denmark is discussed in the conclusion of the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article analyzes the shift from corporatist to liberal economic policy regimes in Zimbabwe that led to the crisis of the late 1990s. It outlines the rationale for both regimes, the reasons for their introduction and major achievements and failures, and how they contributed to the subsequent adoption of the dysfunctional policies of the late 1990s. It argues that the failures of both these regimes were avoidable, and the outcome of "political" rather than economic variables. It concludes by calling for economic policies that take more account of their political implications, and of the need to strengthen state capacity in weak states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporatism has been an influential doctrine in the Slovenian polity since its beginning. After the onset of democratization in the early 1990s, its influence remains strong. Forms of corporatism are embodied in the National Council as the second chamber of parliament, in the chamber system, the system of social partnership and the RTVS (Public Television of Slovenia) Council. It is also present in certain socio-political priorities such as a higher value being placed on partnership over competition, on fairness over human rights, on community over individualism. Social pluralism has always been a part of Slovenian public life. Political pluralism emerged at the end of the 19th century and was never fully developed. There has always been a strong inclination in the political life of Slovenia to organize around interest groups and editorial boards of various publications, a tendency that reveals a plurality of voices but a general unwillingness to fight for political power. It could also be concluded that the development of pluralism in Slovenia relies heavily on corporatism because of the general lack of liberal foundations. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We investigate whether “corporatist” wage setting and policy making institutions negatively affect a) the slope of the growth path of the economy, by yielding decisions that resist the introduction of technological progress; b) the position of the growth path, through higher transaction costs involved in the policy decision making process. The estimates reveal: a) a negative partial correlation between corporatism and growth; b) a robust correlation between growth, union pervasiveness and other policy regressors; c) no significant correlation between corporatism and output level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article begins with a historical account of the various styles of governance in The Netherlands from the post–war period to date. That overview reveals the persistence of an underlying more traditional form of governance, that is, the tradition of consensual corporatism. Although conventionally believed to be an invention of the Catholic Church and subsequent political theorists, the present twentieth and twenty–first–century historical review of this corporatist style of governance leads to the conclusion that its historical roots are, instead, the age–old Dutch state traditions of tolerance, pragmatism and consensus. It looks as though the worn–out clichés of ‘images of the Dutch’ are indeed the fundamentally underlying core–concepts behind the Dutch style of governance. The ruling, merchant, partrician families of the Dutch Republic, in order to defend their international trade interests, in the midst of somewhat dogmatic Protestant preachers, were pragmatically tolerant of deviant ideas and groups and thus were able to reach a feasible compromise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the extensive literature on corporatism since the 1970s and considered its applicability in the contemporary period. Brief history of corporatism; Problems of application; Concept of corporatism; Conclusion.

To what extent are variations in public attitudes and outcomes of social/economic policies caused by institutions like consociational democracy, corporatism and regimes of veto players? In dealing with this question, this paper starts from a critical review of Arend Lijphart’s argument in Patterns of Democracy that consensus democracies are better, kinder and gentler democracies. I agree that consociational democracy, corporatism, and regimes with veto players have different effects on attitudes and policy outcomes – even after controlling for effects of political power distribution, as well as domestic and international contexts of policymaking. However, consociational democracy is not a ‘better, gentler and kinder’ democracy, though neither is it worse than majoritarian democracy in governing societies. Corporatism is efficient in reducing unemployment and inflation, and in expanding public receipts and the reach of the welfare state. Finally, regimes of veto players constrain expansion of public receipts. This analysis is based on data covering 22 OECD countries, 1971–1996. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has proven difficult to determine the direction in which corporatism is moving. This discussion is marred by two shortcomings: A bias towards the macro-level and the lack of a clear distinction between the stages of the policy process. Trying to remedy these shortcomings, this paper follows the development of corporatism over the twenty years since 1980 and uses this material to illuminate the causes of the development of corporatism. The analysis consists of a comparative study of seven Danish policy areas. By focusing on the meso-level within one country we gain the methodological advantage of being able to hold constant a number of variables at the macro-level which are difficult to control for in cross-national analyses. We are thus in a position to illuminate the explanatory value of a number of commonly advanced explanations of corporatism: partisan influences; state traditions; and policy specific factors. These explanations are all found wanting. The paper concludes by suggesting an alternative explanation more consistent with the Danish data, namely that corporatism be studied from a perspective placing politicians and agency at center stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the political theories of corporatism, neo-liberalism and pluralism, and on comparative empirical research in Brussels, Germany, Sweden and the UK, this article conceptualises the nature of Europeanised medicines regulation. It argues that a marketisation of regulation has been established in the European Union as a result of competition between national regulatory agencies for ‘regulatory business’ from the pharmaceutical industry. In the pharmaceuticals sector the Europeanised regulatory state is a product of three key factors: (a) the European Commission's commitment to an ‘efficiency’ regime which would meet the political objectives of a single European market and the commercial agendas of transnational pharmaceutical companies, (b) the endemic corporate bias associated with medicines regulation in the most influential member states, and (c) the considerable success of neo-liberal politics across a number of major member states, including Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the assumptions in the Western literature on corporatism, the specifics of tripartite arrangements and asks why formal inclusion in East and West leads to different outcomes. Details on the tripartite experiences in Eastern Europe; Nature of the East European Tripartism.

Examines the problems that arise from confusions in terminologies significant to the political culture of Netherlands. Concept of `verzuiling,' the Dutch term for consociationalism; European perspective between the Dutch situation and the case in Belgium; Distinction between consociation, pillarisation and corporatism in the Netherlands.

Surveys empirical research conducted in the 1990s on the influence of organized interests in the Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Emergence, development and present state of Scandinavian corporatism; Impact of corporatism outside the traditional areas of the labor market.

Shows the significance of the comparison of the welfare state to a corporation in contemporary political theory. Definition of a corporation; Meaning of the question of the nature of the welfare state; Conclusions given by philosopher F.W. Maitland to the question of the nature of the welfare state.

The article discusses the central attributes on the concept of globalization in relation to social sciences and politics. It mentions the two definitions of globalization as the intensification of internal relations and processes of world-wide reach and as a supranational worldwide integration of economies through financial flows, trade, and communication networks. Analysts say that globalization is related to the social importance in the society. However, it argues that globalization strengthens the state but weakens liberal democracy. It is inferred that the welfare state institutions in developed countries must be preserved with the help of increasing corporatism.

This article focuses on the relationship between fascism and the state in Great Britain from 1917-1927. Wherever fascism made its appearance in the inter-war years it displayed a remarkable talent for mobilising the resources of the state in its support. Fascists adopted the radical right's vision of a true Conservatism with enthusiasm, and tariff reform, a united Empire and patriotic nationalism served as the basis of fascist ideology throughout the inter-war years. It is hardly surprising, then, that the radical right had close associations with British fascism more or less from the beginning. Some degree of collaboration also appears to have existed between the Fascisti and the Economic League. Ultimately, collusion on the scale that existed between 1919 and 1926 became unnecessary because the state's defensive apparatus was fully secured.

The fundamental reason for corporatism's persistence in political science debates is its failure to respond to the demands of political theory and present a convincing ideal-type to capture the relationship between interest groups and the state. Corporatist writers have misused ideal-types and the most refined example to date of the corporatist ideal-type (Cawson's) is structurally flawed. There are more profound problems than this, however, in the construction of a corporatist ideal-type because of the nature of the dynamics at the heart of the corporatist process: political exchange [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporatism having become a less useful label for describing entire political systems, corporatist scholars have emphasized the importance of meso-level corporatism, using dairying as the classic example. Analysis of the American dairy industry does not support the claim that there is 'no corporatism in the United State' but it suggests why meso-corporatist enclaves in a macro-pluralist system are liable to be ephemeral. What sets the American dairy industry apart from its European and Canadian counterparts is that the meso-corporatist institutional arrangement were undermined by the emergence of large regional cooperatives in the 1960s and as a result present dairy policy-making has reverted once more to a pluralist paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the concept of corporatism. Possibility that there might be trends towards a downgrading of liberal democratic and pluralist forms of political representation in advanced industrial societies; Discussion of the key actors in the process of making public policy and its implementation; Failure of corporatists to specify whose interests were served by the development of incorporation, tripartism and intermediation.

Comments on the article written by Andrew Cox about corporatism. Distinction between state and societal variants of corporatism; Relevance of pluralism and corporatism in the interest politics of advanced capitalist democracies; Differences in the views of democratic theorists over whether democracy is an institutional arrangement or a set of values.

This article identifies two dimensions which distinguish corooratism, espiecially as defined by Philippe Schmitter, from pluralism. Noting that most discussions of corporatism have emphasized one dimension and neglected the second, the article seeks to determine, empirically, whether the two dimensions are as closely associated as the concept suggests. The finding, for the cases studied, is that they are inversely rather than positively correlated. The search for an explanation of why this might be the case leads to two conclusions. First, that the management of labour-capital conflict in advanced capitalist countries has relied less on inter-group and group-state interaction than corporatist theory would suggest. Second, that Schmitter's conceptualization of corporatism is seriously flawed and that other corporatist writers avoid these flaws only at the cost of drastically reducing the concept's distinctiveness from pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses Goldthorpe's (1984) interpretation of corporatism and dualism as divergent tendencies of capitalism. In contrast, it is proposed that both are patterns of political economy representing partial solutions to the common problems of advanced capitalist democracies, primarily the damage caused by the business cycle to both capital and labour. The two patterns are not incompatible and may coexist, as in the case of Israel, with the consequence that the working class is weakened. Corporatism and dualism are two patterns of the transformation of class conflict into forms of politically controlled conflict that must be analysed in an historical perspective. The theoretical concepts central to both approaches are briefly summarised, and various concepts shared by them are explored. The Israeli case is discussed, anal it is argued that in the Israeli pattern the original economic class conflict is transferred to the political arena and transformed into national conflict between Israeli and Arab workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]