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This paper deals with the ontological foundations of the Soviet interpretation of dialectical materialism (Diamat) as exemplified by one of its “founding fathers,” Abram Deborin, in his works of the late 1920s. It has been claimed that the “ontologizing” tendency in Soviet philosophy is due to the influence of Friedrich Engels and his ideas pertaining to the dialectics of nature. However, a more plausible interpretation is that the ontologism of Soviet philosophy is connected with the rejection of the Kantian Copernican turn in philosophy and the idea of the primacy of gnoseology it implies. In this article, I argue in favor of the latter thesis. Ontologism, i.e., the tendency to give priority in philosophy to questions concerning Being, and anti-Kantianism are but two sides of the same coin.

Semyon Frank (1877–1950) opposed the Neo-Kantian School and admitted the real existence of the objects of cognition. He treated ontologism as essential to the entire movement of Russian religious philosophy. For Frank, one can only know about something thanks to the absolute, which exists prior to the knowing subject. Ontologism, affirming the priority of being over cognition, has a great significance not only for metaphysics and epistemology, but also for the philosophy of religion. In particular, Frank taught that the most privileged mode of cognition of God is intuition, an immediate experience of God or faith (the so-called living knowledge). Intuition is at the heart of the ontological proof, which can be found in St. Anselm, Descartes, and Frank himself. Frank dedicated a number of articles to this topic: “K istorii ontologicheskogo dokazatel’stva” (“On the History of the Ontological Proof,” 1915), “Ontologicheskoe dokazatel’stvo bytiya Boga” (“Ontological Proof of the Existence of God,” 1930), as well as texts recently discovered at the Bakhmeteff Archive, including “Dokazatel’stvo bytiya Boga” (“Proof of the Existence of God”). In this way, Russian ontologism leads to a new interpretation of the traditional ontological proof, one which acknowledges the existence of God, not on the basis of arguments resting on His definition, but on the basis of the intuitive recognition of His being.

The paper focuses on ontology and epistemology of the founder of Da-sein analysis Ludwig Binswanger. There are two conceptions which contributed immensely to the Binswanger's analysis: Heidegger's understanding of human being as disclosedness of being; and the philosophy of dialogue, as far as it is orientated to consider the true being, not as a self-closed and self-isolated the Self (Ego), but the transcendentally-immanent being of “We”, to which Simon Frank's ontology also belongs. It is analyzed how Binswanger transforms Heideggerian set on Da-sein as “always mine” to acknowledge the dual being of We or love as the basic anthropological phenomenon. Concerning Frank, the comparative analysis finds its foundation in Binswanger's own multiple admissions of his solidarity with Frank that have been uttered by him in his memories, correspondence, and the book “Basic Forms and the Knowledge of Human Presence”. It is examined the common positions of Binswanger's and Frank's ontology that come from the common set on “ontologism”, which conditions the possibility of notional (conceptual) knowledge with the immediate knowledge of absolute being, founded on belonging of the subject to this being. It is analyzed specifics of Binswangerian ontologism, expressed in his understanding of the being of We or love as a coincidence of being and knowledge. The paper analyses the motives of love as absolute being, mystical images and concepts, used by Binswanger. All these images and concepts he borrows directly from Neo-Platonism, German mystics, and Frank's works. The paper also traces a number of parallels between Binswanger's and Frank's theories of knowledge. By this, we mean two orders of knowledge: the notional knowledge and the knowledge of Da-sein as the metalogical foundation of the former. The paper's conclusions deal with the analyis of antinomies in Binswanger's conception. The conception, on the one hand, tends to narrow of differences between the being We with Absolute being, knowledge of Da-sein as love with mystical knowledge of the Absolute, as on the other hand, it is an effort to think about being of We as a merely human being.

The topic of this article is the convergence of the fundamental theoretical intuitions of two independent currents of Christian philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Italian Catholic spiritualism and the internally diversified current of the Russian religious philosophical Renaissance proved to be convergent in their ontological realism based on the metaphysics of cognition. This consonance undermines the stereotype about the total difference between the Russian Orthodox and the Western Catholic mentality. The article tries to show that these two denominations both drew inspiration from the Patristic heritage and that, contrary to all appearances, Russian religious philosophy owes much to the Augustinian tradition. The paper reminds the discovery of this convergence made by Vladimir Ern, and discusses certain elements of the teachings of Vladimir Solovyev and Evgenii Troubetzkoy in comparison with the basic philosophical intuitions of the Italian philosopher Antonio Rosmini.

This paper focuses on the theoretical philosophy of Bukharin as developed in his book Filosofskie arabeski (Philosophical Arabesques). I analyze three concepts—perception, being, and dialectics—and show that and how they deviate from the meaning that they commonly have among other Russian Marxists. In this work, Bukharin drafts a theory that can be interpreted as a “relational ontology,” since it focuses on the relations between entities and since these relations are considered to be more fundamental than the entities themselves and provide epistemic access to reality. My examination of Bukharin’s theoretical views shows that he continues Lenin’s tradition of materialist and dialectical thought. That is why, in spite of his innovative approach to some key problems of theoretical philosophy, Bukharin did not go far enough in his studies. His theoretical position appears to be an integral part of his political engagement.

Shpet’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology has caused puzzlement because of the lack of clarity with which he treats the transcendental turn in Appearance and Sense (1914). I suggest that we find a more comprehensive discussion on the topic in Shpet’s 1917 article, “Wisdom or Reason?” There, Shpet reacts to Husserl’s treatment of a cluster of problems related to the latter’s transition to transcendental idealism. I read “Wisdom or Reason?” not only in relation to Husserl’s Logos article of 1911, but also to his 1907 lecture series “The Idea of Phenomenology.” My analysis of Shpet’s phenomenology reveals that he followed through with the transcendental turn, although his philosophy developed in a direction different from Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Shpet postulates a collective consciousness, in which meaning-constitution takes place, and discovers the “word” as the foundation for any cognition. Shpet’s phenomenology remains ontological, as he considers language or culture as the “form of being” in which human beings live. In “Wisdom or Reason?,” Shpet argues that we can have direct knowledge of this meaningful reality: being is not “represented” but “presented” in a word. A certain compatibility thus exists between Shpet’s phenomenology of cultural reality and Husserl’s search for the absolute validity of knowledge.

Adolf Reinach began his education in phenomenology with the teachings of Theodor Lipps before encountering Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations in 1902. What attracted Reinach to the Logical Investigations was the philosophical realism he saw accompanying Husserl’s criticism of psychologism and discussions of the formal structures of meaning therein. However, shortly after Reinach and a number of the Munich Circle members began studying with him in Gottingen, it became clear that the position Husserl espoused was shifting into transcendental idealism. Reinach maintained a theoretical independence from Husserl while embarking on the richest kind of dialogue with his revolutionary texts and teachings. By bringing out the strengths of some of Husserl’s ideas and finding ways to repair the weaknesses of others, Reinach discovered new applications for the realism he found so attractive and significant in the Logical Investigations. I argue that this was how Reinach’s response to Husserl took shape and grew, and set the foundation for the version of phenomenology that Reinach would continue to build upon with his own students until he left for the battlefield of World War I. This article sets forth and explores Reinach’s realist response to Husserl by focusing on his expansion of the a priori, and his ontological work on essence and states of affairs – including his original contributions to jurisprudence.

The article discusses the problem of the foundation of the development and evaluation of ontological (aprioristic) proof of Divine existence in some traditions in the philosophy of the 19th century such as Ontologism and Neo-Scholasticism. The history of the development of this argument in the tradition of the Middle Ages and Early Modern period illustrates that at its foundation is the belief in the possibility of direct (obvious, evidential) apprehension of certain metaphysical principles that relate to the Divine existence, and their formal (aprioristic) demonstration. Thus, the difference in meaning of the possibility of explicating these principles (and recognition or non-recognition of this epistemological possibility) founded differences in evaluation of ontological proof. It has been shown that scholasticism, in the end, rejected this opportunity and was highly critical and negatively interpretated this kind of proof, while some modern thinkers have recognized this opportunity and included this proof in their philosophical theology (Descartes, Leibniz and other). We analyzed the teaching of A. Rosmini, V. Gioberti, and С. Ubags, that returned to the ontological proof, based on the Modern European philosophy, and they considered ontological proof as the basis of all philosophical and theological thinking. The Neo-Scholastic and Neo-Thomism traditions were then studied: Th.-М. Zigliara, J. Kleitgen, G. Sanseverino, and J. Franzelin who argued against the ontological proof and proposed epistemic arguments related to the non-evidentialistic interpretation of knowledge and the disclosure of internal mediating mechanisms of cognitive activity. In conclusion, despite the predominantly metaphysical and theological basis of the discussion, it took place within the framework of the discussion of epistemic models, and this is important for the history of the theory of knowledge and history of the formation of Neo-Thomism, which (through F. Brentano, a witness of these discussions) is associated with several schools of contemporary philosophy.

The focus of this study was to study the "Tasawuf Discourse in the West by focusing on Martin Lings' s suicidal thoughts". After studying and analyzing Martin Lings's thinking, as outlined above, it is possible to draw some of the following conclusions: 1). In Ibn `Arabī's view there is one; the form of God is nature and nature is God. There is nothing in existence except God, everything other than God, none in itself, it is merely a manifestation of God's existence, nature is God's reflection, existence is a loan originating with God. God and nature are one but different. The concept of Wahdāt al-Wujūd is emphasized on both sides as tasybih and also tanzih. God is seen from the side of nature, then He is identical with nature, but from the perspective of God, He is different from nature at all, because He is an infinite substance beyond the physical realm. "Huwa La Huwa" ("She and not him"). This unity and purity are the principles of coincidentiaoppositorum in the ontologism of the Unity (az-zahīr) and the Bathin (al-bathīn), between the Awwal (al-awwāl) and the Last (al-akhīr), between the One (al -wahīd) and the Many (al-kasīr) and between inequality (tanzīh) and similarity (tasybīh). The transcendent God (munazzah) is seen in terms of His substance, the hidden and the one. But when viewed in the name of His name, the immanent God (musyabbah), the one and the hidden one reveals Himself by His name. 2). The doctrine of al-wujdd al-wujūd according to Martin Lings is a belief that believes that there is only Wujūd Hakiki. The true wujūd belongs to God alone, whereas He is called the wujūd of illusion. God blesses every one of His creations that look different or plural.

This essay asserts that the intellectual and moral attitude that legitimates, justifies and ennobles violence derives from the fact that the evolution of modern philosophical history has be...

Theories that posit metaphysical structure are able to do much work in philosophy. Some, however, find the notion of ‘metaphysical structure’ unintelligible. In this paper, I argue that their charge of unintelligibility fails. There is nothing distinctively problematic about the notion. At best, their charge of unintelligibility is a mere reiteration of previous complaints made toward similar notions. In developing their charge, I clarify several important concepts, including primitiveness, intelligibility, and the Armstrong-inspired “ontologism” view of the world. I argue that, ultimately, their charge is best understood as an objection whose central premise is that the notion of ‘structure’ runs contrary to an important presupposition of contemporary metaphysics. But that central premise is, on closer inspection, implausible. I respond to the objection by identifying three popular metaphysical theories that violate the alleged presupposition but are still generally regarded as intelligible. The objection thus fails to show that a theory that posits metaphysical structure is unintelligible.

The purpose of the article is to examine the philosophical views of K. E. Tsiolkovsky in the context of his technocratic and research aspirations, as well as to understand his place in Russian and world thought. The article uses such methods of scientific research as the comparative method, the retrospective method, and the hermeneutical method. The author claims that, according to K. E. Tsiolkovsky, the main features of the Cosmos (the Universe) are its wholeness and animateness. The Russian thinker inherits, in some sense, the Russian philosophy of Unity-of-All and translates it into the plane of knowledge of the infinite Universe, infinite matter. Within the concept of «spiritualized Cosmos», the Russian thinker offers a panpsychistic understanding of life. The author of the article concludes that by declaring himself a materialist, K. E. Tsiolkovsky greatly expands the scope of this worldview. He repeats the favorite idea of Russian ontologism: a person is attached to Being, which the thinker equated with the Cosmos, not «in parts», i. e. with scientific, analytical methods, but totally, i. e. the whole person joins the whole world.

En la década de 1920, Emmanuel Levinas fue cautivado por la nueva comprensión de la existencia del ontologismo heideggeriano en su lucha contra la filosofía neokantiana de Ernst Cassirer. Sin embargo, esta fascinación inicial declinó tras el ascenso del nazismo al poder y la adhesión de Heidegger al nuevo régimen nacionalsocialista. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar el desplazamiento dramático de Levinas desde su temprana atracción por la hermenéutica existencial hasta su posterior alejamiento crítico. In the 1920s, Emmanuel Levinas was captivated by the new understanding of the existence of the Heideggerian ontologism in his struggle against the Ernst Cassirer´s Neo-Kantian philosophy. However, this initial fascination vanished after Nazism´s rise to power and Heidegger’s adherence to the new National Socialist Regime. The present article aims to analyze the dramatic displacement of Levinas from his early attraction by existential hermeneutics until his later critical separation. Fil: Ríos Flores, Pablo Facundo. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina

THE PROSPECT OF DIALOGICAL MEDIATION IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN HUSSERLIANS AND DERRIDEANS It is perhaps no accident that at the precise juncture of Speech and Phenomena where Derrida characterizes the "move" that is to be problematized in his reading of Husserl, a move with "the starting point to be found in the precomprehension of the sense of a word, the privilege of the question, `what is . '?," Heidegger is mentioned.1 Specifically, Heidegger's "meditation" on the historical configuration of the reversals of naive ontology by classical metaphysics and ontology is mentioned, and mentioned in terms of one of its "most enduring themes" (SP, p. 26), which, for Derrida, is the continuance of metaphysics through (and perhaps in spite of) these reversals. Despite Derrida's apparent approbation of the Heideggerian meditation, Heidegger's evocation at this critical juncture in Derrida's reading of Husserl is accompanied by the following somewhat cryptic remark: "it only by a superficial reading of Heidegger's texts that one could conclude that these texts themselves fall under these, Heidegger's, own objections" (ibid.). Indeed, while Derrida thinks, "without being able to go into it . . . that no one before has better escaped them," he nevertheless cautions that "this does not mean, of course, that one often escapes them afterwards" (ibid.). One cannot help wondering with respect to the meaning of this cryptic text of Derrida's whether Heidegger's complicated and seemingly ambivalent relationship to Husserl's phenomenology, to this phenomenology's "breakthrough discovery," looms on the horizon, not so much as context but as pretext, for Derrida's own complicated and seemingly ambivalent relationship to Husserl's phenomenology. Indeed, to the extent that it could be maintained that Heidegger's question asks not simply about the Being of entities (beings), but about the meaning of the Being of entities, about the possibility of encountering both entities and their Being in the mode of phenomena, it would appear that, however critical the stance of his thinking may appear with respect to the actuality of phenomenology as a movement, the specter of phenomenology's possibility, of its Husserlian possibility, must remain as the pretext for Heidegger's question. Likewise, then, for Derrida, to the extent that his reading of Husserl, of the tradition, addresses the issue of the meaning of a sign in general, the issue of significative "showing" as such, it would appear that, again, however critical his reading of Husserl on signs and showing, of Husserl's signs and showing, the specter of phenomenology, in the guise not only of its Husserlian possibility but of its putative encounter by Heidegger as an actuality in need of renewed possibilizing, must remain as the pretext for Derrida's reading. Be this as it may, my concern in what follows will not be to pursue the pretext or pretexts for Derrida's reading of Husserl; nor, for that matter, to pursue the pretext(s) for a Husserlian response to Derrida's reading of Husserl. I am interested in something that is, perhaps, rather different. To wit, my concern is something like this: why do able readers of the same texts and insightful thinkers of the same issues or matters themselves seem to come to such very different conclusions regarding both what these texts say and how these matters appear? More specifically, why do Husserl's texts appear for some readers to be spellbound by the equation of Being with presence, of signification with non-indicative simple meaning, with the result that these texts appear hell-bent on explaining the constitution of the terms of these equations by always framing them within the finite subjective genesis of an ideality that is yielded by the iterative/repetitive passage to a limit? And why for others does such a reading itself appear spellbound by an ontologization of a nuance, a nuance whose essence legislates against the very terms of these equations as well as against their putative constitutive genesis? …

a «mitigated» type represented, in particular, by professor G.C. Ubaghs who was in point offact condemned because of a philosophical theory, that of ontologism. However the doctrinal préoccupations of the Faculty were also turned towards major ecclesiastical events : the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, in 1854, the scope of the Syllabus errorum in 1864 and the préparations for the Vatican Council. In the meantime the spirit of «modernity» was at work in the philological exegesis of prof essors J.Th. Beelen and A. Van Hoonacker and in the historical work ofE. Reusens and B. Jungmann., Thils Gustave. La Faculté de théologie de Louvain (1834-1889). À propos d'un livre récent. In: Revue théologique de Louvain, 26ᵉ année, fasc. 1, 1995. pp. 55-61.

En el presente artículo se pretende mostrar la importante función que Suárez tiene reservada a los entes de razón: el aseguramiento de la validez científica. Al respecto resulta fundamental caer en la cuenta de la diferencia entre la quimera y el resto de los entes de razón: negación, relación de razón y privación. Con ello Suárez ha asentado las bases de la manera propiamente barroca de entender el mundo: una realidad extramental para cuyo conocimiento científico requerimos de la introducción del artificio, del ente de razón; aunque Suárez tiene aún en mente el modelo de ciencia aristotélica, basado en la relación de universalidad, lo que le hace despreciar los entes de razón matemáticos. En todo caso, creemos que los entes de razón ayudan a comprender la singularidad de la metafísica barroca respecto al ontologismo posterior. Nos situamos así, críticamente, frente a las interpretaciones marcadamente ontologistas de la metafísica de Suárez., In this paper I shall show the relevant role which the beings of reason play in Suarez´s philosophy, namely, the role of being the guarantee of the scientific validity. For this thesis it is basic to discover the difference between the chimera and other beings of reason: the negation, the relation of the reason and privation. In this way, Suarez sets the basis of the properly baroque way of understanding the world as an extra-mental reality which is only cognoscible through the artful device of the being of reason. Suarez conceives the science from the Aristotelean perspective, that is why he does not appreciate the mathematical beings of reason. Nevertheless, we do believe that the notion of being of reason is helpful in the comprehension of the singularity of the baroque metaphysics in comparison to the posterior ontologism. We enter, therefore, in discussion with the marked tendency to interpret the metaphysics of Suarez in a ontological way.

Of all the aspects of Derrida’s thought, his interpretation of Husserl has occasioned the most debate.1 Although all of Derrida’s critics start out wanting to understand him—none, for instance, claim to do anything as extraordinary as “deconstruction”—none adhere to one of the most basic hermeneutical rules: reconstruct the context. Because critics neglect the context, some charge Derrida with interpreting Husserlian phenomenology merely as ontologism and intuitionism, in a word, as Platonism.2 They do this despite the fact that Derrida has repeatedly stated his allegiance to transcendental philosophy.3 Others charge him with failing “to recognize the subtleties of Husserl’s account of the interplay of presence and absence, of immanence and transcendence, of filled and empty intention,”4 even though Derrida appropriates precisely these subtleties to criticize the so-called “metaphysics of presence” he nevertheless finds in Husserl. The one-sidedness of such charges is startling. Perhaps however the critics’ negligence can be excused; to assemble all the parts of the Derridean context is an immense task. Roughly the context can be divided into two parts, and even these two do not exhaust it.

The greatly increased interest in Orestes A. Brownson will probably restore him to his real importance in the history of Catholicism in the United States. Classifying him as a philosopher has caused him to be seriously neglected, because Catholic philosophers in the United States, since the revival of the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, have been very contemptuous of American philosophers. As a matter of fact, in his own day, before the Thomist revival, his ontologism bewildered even his admirers. Significantly, Brownson did not call himself a “philosopher” but a “publicist” — a very much neglected title in the United States.

Pre-Soviet Russian philosophy had very little epistemological tradition of its own. “In Russian philosophy — so far as one can judge from its century and a half of development — there are certain specific characteristics which in general relegate theory of knowledge to a secondary place. With the exception of a small group of orthodox Kantians, Russian philosophers have tended in the solution of epistemological problems to ontologism, i.e. the recognition that cognition is not the primary and defining principle in man. ... we may say briefly that Russian ontologism expresses not the priority of ‘reality’ to knowledge, but the inclusion of knowledge in our relationship to the world, our ‘activity’ in it.”1 It was with the 1917 Revolution and the consequent shake-up in Russian society that the problem of knowledge came to Russia. It came as a part of ‘dialectical materialism’, a philosophic aggregate composed of selected passages from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin.2