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Peter van Inwagen proposes a criterion of philosophical success. He takes it to support an extremely pessimistic view about philosophy. He thinks that all philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions fail, including the argument from evil. I'm more optimistic on both counts. I'll identify problems with van Inwagen's criterion and propose an alternative. I'll then explore the differing implications of our criteria. On my view, philosophical arguments can succeed and the argument from evil isn't obviously a failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an overview of a study which explores the embedded elements in the research process including epistemology, methodology, and method. The researcher reflects on methodology to confront a general sense of uncertainty beyond gathering of data in the context where philosophy gets worked out in action. The author has adopted a research-criterion approach to implement a creative discovery of knowledge and to situate technical details into a larger cultural or political context.

In this paper, I offer an examination of the two existing criteria of change, one indicated, implicitly, by Aristotle and the other proposed, quite formally, by Russell. Both criteria engender problems. While the Aristotelian criterion is both too narrow and too broad, as it includes bogus changes and excludes subjectless changes, the Russellian criterion avoids the distinction between genuine changes and bogus changes completely. The aim of the paper is to address these problems and to show how these two existing criteria of change can be made to deal with the problems through revision and integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the conserved quantity theory of causation, which intends to examine causal processes and interactions regarding conserved quantities. It explains that, to be successful, the theory must distinguish between causal processes and interactions. Moreover, the success of the theory is possible if there is satisfaction of two criteria, which include avoidance of circularity and redundancy of conserved quantities. It mentions that causal processes are distinct from pseudo-processes such as shadows and spots of light, which unhold causal influence from one place to another. It says that conserved quantities are significant, because when a quantity is topically conserved, it creates a clear sense to depict quantities across time.

Russell's version of the multiple-relation theory from the Theory of Knowledge manuscript is presented and defended against some objections. A new problem, related to defining truth via correspondence, is reconstructed from Russell's remarks and what we know of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's theory. In the end, understanding this objection in terms of correspondence helps to link Russell's multiple-relation theory to his later views on propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a discussion which seeks to determine if the simplicity of the nature and content of theories constitute as evidence of the truth of such. The discussion is based on R. Swinburne's thoughts on the topic. It is inferred that Swinburne expounds on empirical adequacy which may point out that one theory is more likely to be true than the other; the criteria, content, and competitiveness of theories are also considered, as implied by the author. Examples of competing theories are also provided in the article.

The article provides a discussion of the issue of scientific progress as one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. The importance of scientific progress is also conveyed in the article through the work of the science historian, George Sarton. It is mentioned that foundationalism and coherentism are two main theories in the epistemology of justification that have had their influences in the debates on scientific progress. The two theories are defined and are given illustrations regarding the methods of coherentism and foundationalism.

The article explores the importance of criterion on best explanation (BE) style arguments in establishing realism on theoretical entities. About two options of BE style arguments were cited it include metaphysical criterion, a criterion for what exists, and epistemological criterion, a criterion for what one should believe. Furthermore, these criteria were observed to be an argument for scientific realism, since it seems that one can rule out from the start that it is an epistemic criterion.

The article discusses the implication of semantic position, which is an evaluative stance with respect to how someone's reasoning ought to be appraised and what criterion of argument-goodness ought to be applied. It cites a case of a boy who was confused of the two ants and mistakenly recognizes that the two ants are the same. Thus, the error of which a confused person is guilty is not the error of believing something false de re. However, philosopher Hartry Field's theory change and the indeterminancy of reference recommends a supervaluational approach to the problem of confusion. However, the author believes that the confused sentences of a confused person can be usefully evaluated as True of False because such sentences do not fit the world tightly enough to be evaluated.

What is the point of developing an epistemology for a topic—for example, morality? When is it appropriate to develop the epistemology of a topic? For many topics—for example, the topic of socks—we see no need to develop a special epistemology. Under what conditions, then, does a topic deserve its own epistemology? I seek to answer these questions in this article. I provide a criterion for deciding when we are warranted in developing an epistemological theory for a topic. I briefly apply this criterion to moral epistemology and argue that some approaches to moral epistemology should be abandoned. I also argue that we can develop an epistemology for a topic without committing ourselves to a specific substantive theory of justification, such as reliabilism or coherentism, if we work within a suitably neutral framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are several interpretations of the Keynes's economical theory which corrival about what is the truly insight of this theory. Even the mathematical or logical models of this theory do not coincide in some essential aspects. The proposal of this work is that a structuralist reconstruction of the Keynes's theory, because of its emphasis on the T-theoretical terms, can be a help for the clarification of the identity of the said theory. Then, on the basis of an analysis about the criterions for the T-theoretical terms, and about some structuralist reconstructions of the Keynesian theory, I suggest here which Keynes-theoretical terms can give us an important part of the identity of that theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents guidelines for philosophy teachers in grading students' essays according to a rubric. Statement of the criteria on which a grade will be based for any number of parts of a project, activity, or written assignment; Content and style; Argument, understanding, analysis, synthesis, and creation; Clarity and organization.

Defends a particular criterion for actual change. Reasons for the need to have a criterion of actual change; Central difficulties with a criterion for change; Distinction between Cambridge and Oxford changes; Contrast between virtual and actual change; Causal antecedents and consequences of actual changes.

The article focuses on the problem of the criterion in philosophical discourse. The author remarks that an epistemologist who offers a strong convincing argument the conclusion of which is an analysis of justification has achieved one of the central goals of epistemology. Epistemology in its traditional form would be alive and well in spite of the fact that there is no way to justify claims to the effect that one is justified in believing an analysis of justification. The author states that his argument does not assume that any defense of a definition of justification must ultimately appeal to that definition.