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In our societally extractive age, sport science risks being swept up in the intensifying desire to commodify the experiences of those that scientists proclaim to study. Coupled with the techno-digital revolution, this stems from a vertical (onto)logic that frames the sporting landscape as a static space filled with discrete objects waiting for us to capture, analyse, re-present and sell on as knowledge. Not only does this commodification degrade primary experience in the false hope of epistemological objectivity, it reinforces the unidirectionality of extractivism by setting inquirer apart from, and above of, inquiry. Here, we advocate for a different, more sentient logic grounded in the relationality of gifting as understood in indigenous philosophies. This foregrounds an ecological orientation to scholarship that sets out neither to objectify or describe that which is of concern, but to correspond with its becoming. On this, there are three threads we cast forward. First, in a corresponsive sport science, inhabitants are not objects of analysis, but lines in-becoming, who in answering to others, form knots in a meshwork. These knots constitute communal places in which inhabitants have joined with the differentiating coming-into-being of others. Second, knowledge is not authoritatively (re)cognitive, but humbly ecological; not produced vertically through imposition, but grown longitudinally in responsively moving from place to place. Third, research does not follow a vertically extractive (onto)logic, but is a practice of participant observation. This perspective appreciates that we, sport scientists, are also lines in-becoming that form parts of the knots in which we seek to know. In coda, our thesis is not a call for more qualitative or applied research in the sport sciences. It is a call to response-ably open up to that which sparks our curiosity, answering to what is shared with care, sensitivity and sincerity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Probabilistic information is used increasingly, from medical research to weather forecasting. The relationship between probability and causality requires an acceptable philosophical account. Social work, which contributes to healthy wellbeing, increasingly uses language of probabilistic causal relationships between harms and subsequent limitations to healthy functioning. This paper explores causal understandings of probabilistic knowledge using concepts of the theologian, Thomas Aquinas. Social welfare terminology regarding risk (such as factors that are 'causative of' child abuse) is explored using epistemological concepts from scholastic philosophy. Aquinas' anthropological concepts related to modern 'risk science' and his concepts of rationality, harm and prudence are applied to contemporary social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Object" is one of the most important concepts in Kant's philosophy. I argue that Kant's concept of an object involves a hitherto neglected distinction, between what I call the "quantificational" concept of an object (q‐object) and what I call the "representational" concept of an object (r‐object). I examine the relation between these two concepts and argue that there is a close connection, even in the case of q‐objects we cannot sensibly intuit (negative noumena) and the r‐objects of non‐sensible intuition (positive noumena). Even in the non‐sensible case, our only way of representing a concept as having non‐sensible instances (q‐objects) is by conceiving of a kind of intellect that would intuit those objects. We cannot know that such intuition or such objects are possible, but it is only by thinking of such intuition that we can think of such objects as instances of concepts (e.g., the concept "negative noumena"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antonio Ramos Díaz has recently given an extensive critique of what I have called the "storage problem" for materialism about the human mind. I respond to Díaz, showing that his critique fails. First, I rehearse the storage problem, explaining what claims it does and does not involve. I then consider Díaz's "strong" and "weak" interpretations of my argument, explaining why I do not subscribe to the strong version, which misinterprets my position, especially concerning the meaning of the term "concrete." His weak version of my argument is closer to what I intend, but Díaz's own unpacking of this interpretation also commits me to claims I do not, for very good reasons, accept. Díaz does not, in the end, show the storage problem to be--as he thinks--an unsound way of arguing for dualism. Getting concepts into a purely material human intellect still looks like the metaphysical equivalent of fitting a square peg into a round hole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti-intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains unscathed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the connection of skill to knowledge, virtue and intelligent action which are central themes of philosophical inquiry. Topics discussed include the dependence of knowledge on skill, the connection between knowledge and skill in the history of philosophy, theory of the nature of skill, skills as a kind of disposition to know and distinction between skill and virtue.

The article aims to show how intellectualists can resist objections by contesting the idea that practical knowledge is difficult to transmit via testimony. It outlines examples which suggest that the practical knowledge attributed by knowledge-how-to ascriptions is difficult to relay through testimony. The difference between practical knowledge and knowledge-that is explained.

Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular action is intelligent depends, in part, on whether it was produced by an exercise of skill. These claims promote a picture of intelligence that is in tension with a strongly intellectualist picture, though they are not in tension with a number of prominent claims recently made by intellectualists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author analyzes the different ways in which one can speak of an end of philosophy. The author shows the way in which the continuation of philosophy in our days is only achieved by overcoming sophistry and skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Open-mindedness is widely valued as an important intellectual virtue. Definitional debates about open-mindedness have focused on whether open-minded believers must possess a particular first-order attitude toward their beliefs or a second-order attitude toward themselves as believers, taking it for granted that open-mindedness is motivated by the pursuit of propositional knowledge. In this article, Rebecca Taylor develops an alternative to knowledge-centered accounts of open-mindedness. Drawing on recent work in epistemology that reclaims understanding as a primary epistemic good, Taylor argues for an expanded account of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue motivated by the pursuit of both knowledge and understanding. Incorporating understanding allows for a more robust account of open-mindedness that better accommodates common usage, avoids common criticisms, and better explains the widespread acceptance of open-mindedness as an important intellectual virtue. Taylor also identifies the connections between open-mindedness and several other intellectual virtues, including intellectual humility, intellectual courage, and intellectual diligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Habermasian concept of 'interest' has had a profound effect on the characterization of scientific disciplines. Going beyond issues unrelated to the theory itself, intra-theoretical interest characterizes the specific ways of approaching any science-related discipline, defining research topics and methodologies. This approach was developed by Jürgen Habermas in relation to empirical-analytical sciences, historical-hermeneutics sciences, and critical sciences; however, he did not make any specific references to health sciences. This article aims to contribute to shaping a general epistemological framework for health sciences, as well as its specific implications for the medical and nursing areas, via an analysis of the basic knowledge interests developed by Habermas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critical reconstruction of Luciano Floridi's view of librarianship as "stewardship of a semantic environment," a view that is at odds with the dominant tradition in which library and information science (LIS) is understood as social epistemology. Floridi's work helps to explain the normative dimensions of librarianship in ways that epistemology does not, and his Philosophy of Information frames librarians' traditional stewardship role in terms appropriate for our growing involvement in the management and preservation of information through its entire life cycle. Floridi's work also helps illuminate what is coming to be called "knowledge as a commons." Librarianship is concerned with maintaining and enhancing information environments over time, environments that include the behavior of the people who create and use them. The integrity of these environments makes possible the epistemic projects of faculty, students, and other researchers, but librarianship is not, itself, epistemological. Floridi's ecological reframing of philosophy of information and information ethics, bridging the dichotomy between information and user, has a variety of implications for information literacy education and other academic library services in higher education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The metaparadigm concept of person as a core emphasis for nursing theorizing has attracted considerable attention in western literature, but has received less attention in the context of eastern philosophical contexts. In this philosophical inquiry, we sought to clarify the concept of what it is to be a human being according to ideas deriving from Islamic tradition, drawing on concept analysis as general approach to advance an understanding of how nursing within an Islamic context might operationalize metaparadigm conceptualization. Specifically, we considered person as human being on the basis of its definition, attributes/characteristics and boundaries to explore the anatomy of the concept in this context. Our analysis revealed that Islamic thought is relevant to two distinct understandings of the holistic concept of human being. Reciprocal interaction worldview organizes the dimensions of being human (cognitive, emotion, social and spiritual) into a whole. Simultaneous action worldview emphasizes that the human is a coherent and unified creature in harmony with the universe. In Islamic thought, these two worldviews are integrated and operate concurrently. Nurse-patient interactions arising from an integrated perspective that aligns both of these worldviews will allow for informed applications of knowledge to practice and enhanced patient care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses several arguments that support the theory of constrastivism. He examines how such arguments were challenged in different ways through published criticisms of constrastivism and outlines its theoretical advantages. However, the author asserts that despite the theoretical benefits of the theory, there are compelling reasons that made it false.

This article traces the evolution of a single concept--Anschauung--in Nietzsche's thinking. It shows that Nietzsche relies to a great extent in his early epistemology on Schopenhauer's romantic notion of Anschauung as a way of apprehending timeless and universal ideas. After The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche begins to use the term to designate the mental process of transference by which stimulation becomes a choate representation. In a third phase of development, Nietzsche abandons any positive use of the term and employs anschauung instead as a sarcastic watchword for essentialist epistemologies generally. Although it has been nearly ignored in anglophone literature, the changing context of its employment is an essential aspect of Nietzsche's development as a thinker. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard's explanation of understanding's value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard's is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state - whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever - by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflection and reflective practice are popular concepts in the health professions that have yet to be rigorously addressed in audiology literature. In this article, a select summary of the theoretical bases of reflection and reflective practice are presented, highlighted with practical examples. The potential for reflection and reflective practice to benefit audiology education and practice is discussed. A nondichotomous approach to including a reflective epistemology of practice in audiology is recommended. Also highlighted are the centrality of experience to knowledge development and attention to reflection-in-action as a way of being professional practitioners. Also, critical reflection is identified as crucial to uncovering assumptions that underlie our practices and challenging oppressive discourses and systems, toward moving the profession forward in a spirit of optimized patient/client care. Although this article is conceptually focused and not a broad literature review, some early research in audiology related to this topic is reviewed briefly and practical approaches to fostering reflective practice also are considered. Reflection and reflective practice offer generative possibilities for the rigorous development of knowledge based in practice and experience, crucial to balancing other practice approaches such as evidence-based practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses on epistemology. It states that the greatest challenge to epistemology comes from the rapid development of humanitarian knowledge and from the need to take a new look at the integrity of science as such and in this connection the acute issue of the so called turn towards language and accordingly of the mediators on any cognition, including semiotic and symbolic systems of various kinds. The problems emerged in the realm of humanitarian knowledge before acquiring a more general status and eventually stimulating the creation of corresponding categories thus enriching the arsenal of conceptual means of epistemology.

NAIRN S. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 6-17 A critical realist approach to knowledge: implications for evidence-based practice in and beyond nursing This paper will identify some of the key conceptual tools of a critical realist approach to knowledge. I will then apply these principles to some of the competing epistemologies that are prevalent within nursing. There are broadly two approaches which are sometimes distinct from each other and sometimes inter-related. On one side, there is the view that all healthcare interventions should be judged on the principles of randomised controlled trials and the other is a preoccupation with language in which healthcare interventions are subjected to a discursive interrogation. These debates are configured through the idea of a hierarchy of knowledge that is accorded uncritical acceptance by some and virulent distaste by others. I will argue that the notion of hierarchy is problematic and is largely argued for in unproductive epistemological terms. What is required is a shift towards a theory that emphasises the contextual nature of the ways that knowledge is produced and disseminated. In other words, there is no single hierarchy of knowledge, but there are multiple hierarchies of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author comments on views given on his article on knowledge by acquaintance. The author says that the objectual knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance, where acquaintance needs an encounter in experience that allows for a good look at the thing. He also says that knowledge has a nature which partly involves knowledge by acquaintance.

Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge-how is non-propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory contradicts it. I show that they (and their interlocutors) misconstrue the distinction and Ryle's argument. Consequently, their objections fail. On my reading, Ryle's distinction pertains to, not knowledge, but an explanatory gap between explicit and implicit content, and his argument for it is sound. I defend the distinction's necessity in explaining human action and show that it propels a fruitful explanatory program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the two approaches to the paradox of knowability or the Church-Fitch argument, including denying that knowledge distributes over conjunction and moving to a typed logic. He argues that neither of the approaches works. He further argues that a Church-Fitch argument can be run with an assumption weaker than distribution of knowledge over conjunction. He adds that a modified Church-Fitch argument can be constructed in a typed logic.

This paper provides an overview of working definitions of knowledge, ignorance, information and uncertainty and summarises formalised philosophical and mathematical framework for their analyses. It provides a comparative examination of the generalised information theory and the generalised theory of uncertainty. It summarises foundational bases for assessing the reliability of knowledge constructed as a collective set of justified true beliefs. It discusses system complexity for ancestor simulation potentials. It offers value-driven communication means of knowledge and contrarian knowledge using memes and memetics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the concentration of social epistemology which includes knowledge, understanding and epistemic value. It states that the theory of knowledge is important because it offers a good explanation on the intuition. It mentions that there are two standard views of understanding which include the standard view within and outside epistemology.

The article focuses on the knowledge of counterfactuals of social epistemology. It states that its objective is to outline a picture of the average knowledge of counterfactuals and utilize it to bring up a problem for the conventional philosophical duality among a priori and a posteriori knowledge. It notes that the capability to judge counterfactuals registers all the cognitive capabilities to assess sentences.

Research has shown that increasing the number of turns that a route takes through the environment increases estimates of distance-the route angularity effect. This study tested implications of different memory-based explanations of the route angularity effect within a virtual setting. Participants maneuvered through virtual pathways of varying length that included zero, two, or seven turns. After each set of three paths, they estimated relative path lengths on an analog scale. Results demonstrated that both increasing memory load during navigation and making retrieval more difficult by interpolating another spatial task prior to estimation significantly increased the magnitude of route angularity effects. These results are consistent with the idea that the number of turns is categorically encoded and used as a memory heuristic when fine-grained memory for the route distance is degraded either at encoding or prior to retrieval. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t. Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at all. Instead, those arguments are built on an uncontroversial understanding of the idea that truth depends on the world. In the final section of the article, those arguments are extended to show that foreknowledge of an action does not threaten that action's freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on fallibilism, epistemic possibility and concessive knowledge attributions (CKA). The author mentions that if knowing requires believing on evidence that entails what is believed, then they have hardly any knowledge at all. It stresses that the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology is because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence seems not an option if they are to preserve the very strong appearance that they do know many things. It mentions how author Jason Stanley defended fallibilism against the Lewisian worry that openly fallibilistic speech is incoherent.

The central thesis of this essay is that the problem of psychology lies at the very heart of the difficulties associated with integrating human knowledge. The startling consequence of this insight is that it means the solution to psychology's epistemological woes opens up a new pathway for achieving unified knowledge. A brief overview of the fragmentation of knowledge will be offered and special attention will be paid to Wilson's (1998) proposal. The problem of psychology, Wilson's failure to address it, and the reasons why it is integral to any proposal for unifying knowledge will then be specified. The article concludes with an articulation of how the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System solves the problem of psychology, resolves many of the fundamental issues associated with integrating human knowledge, and is commensurate with the foremost concerns of natural scientists, social scientists, and humanists, allowing for objectivity, coherence, and pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The terrain of character-based or "responsibilist" virtue epistemology has evolved dramatically over the last decade—so much so that it is far from clear what, if anything, unifies the various views put forth in this area. In an attempt to bring some clarity to the overall thrust and structure of this movement, I develop a fourfold classification of character-based virtue epistemologies. I also offer a qualified assessment of each approach, defending a certain account of the probable future of this burgeoning subfield. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relation between knowledge and action. It suggests that the concept of knowledge is intimately intertwined with the rationality of action. It presents several scenarios that show the association of action to knowledge which include a girl who went to a wrong street because she does not know the direction and a prison guard who knows that someone is trying to escape but does not shoot. The authors also discuss the knowledge-action principle and the refined knowledge action principle by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath and propose their own reason-knowledge principle.

Abstract: Background: Much has been published related to the epistemology of Heideggerian hermeneutic research. We seek to reveal insights from our experience of enacting such research. Objective: To articulate the lived experience of ‘doing’ Heideggerian hermeneutic research. Design: The authors of this paper shared their experiences with the primary author towards articulating the process of ‘doing’ such research. Participants: The authors all have long experience with Heideggerian hermeneutic research and meet regularly at the Institute for Interpretive Phenomenology. They supervise student''s research and are mindful of the process of coming to understand how to work in a phenomenological/hermeneutic manner. Methods: First the section on philosophical underpinnings was written by the primary author and then shared with all authors. There was published data related to the experience of three of the participants already available. This provided a spring board to further conversations when the primary author visited America, able to engage in daily conversations with three of the co-authors. In the spirit of phenomenology this paper represents a process of reading, talking, writing, talking, reading, re-writing, re-talking and so forth. Results: The process of doing hermeneutic phenomenology is represented as a journey of ‘thinking’ in which researchers are caught up in a cycle of reading-writing-dialogue- which spirals onwards. Through such disciplined and committed engagement insights ‘come’. The researcher is always open to questions, and to following a felt-sense of what needs to happen next. However, it is not a process of ‘do whatever you like’ but rather a very attentive attunement to ‘thinking’ and listening to how the texts speak. Conclusion: This paper argues that alongside a disciplined understanding of the methodology, both researcher and reader need to share a commitment to ‘thinking’ which is willing to question, and open to trusting the resonance of understanding that ‘comes’ without expecting answers that are declared ‘truth’ for all time. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as the most promising classical invariantist solution to the puzzle, namely, that beliefs about the outcomes of fair lotteries do not qualify as knowledge because they are too lucky to do so (or, relatedly, because they do not satisfy a safety condition on knowledge), while other beliefs based on potentially weaker inductive grounds are not too lucky (or, relatedly, because they are safe). A case is presented that shows that this solution to the puzzle is actually not viable. It is argued that there is no obvious alternative solution in sight and that therefore the puzzle still awaits a classical invariantist solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the attempt of Donald Davidson that explains knowledge of meaning in terms of truth conditions. The author argues that Davidson's two main rationales presented in his works were unsuccessful. He resumes that the task of doing the details of the story has a constructive part, where propositions are used as theoretical constructs and subject those theories to empirical test, and a foundational part where propositions are being explained.

Russell's version of the multiple-relation theory from the Theory of Knowledge manuscript is presented and defended against some objections. A new problem, related to defining truth via correspondence, is reconstructed from Russell's remarks and what we know of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's theory. In the end, understanding this objection in terms of correspondence helps to link Russell's multiple-relation theory to his later views on propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important issue for information ethics is how much control people should have over the dissemination of information that they have created. Since intellectual property policies have an impact on our welfare primarily because they have a huge impact on our ability to acquire knowledge, there is an important role for epistemology in resolving this issue. This paper discusses the various ways in which intellectual property policies can have an impact on knowledge acquisition both positively and negatively. In particular, it looks at how intellectual property policies can affect the amount of information that people create, the quality of that information, the accessibility of that information, the diversity of that information, and the locatability of that information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History of mathematics occupies itself describing processes of growth and development, whereas philosophy of mathematics is concerned with questions of justification. Both play an essential role within the educational context. But there is a problem because genuine historical studies necessitate ever greater particularity whereas mathematics and philosophy require generality and abstraction. The paper offers some methodological reflections about these matters together with two case studies from nineteenth century history of arithmetic and integration theory, respectively, which try to strike a balance between the directly opposed requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has recently been argued that any epistemological theory that allows for what is called basic knowledge, viz., knowledge that an agent acquires from a certain source, even if he fails to know that the source is reliable, falls victim to what is known as the problem of easy knowledge. The idea is that for such theories bootstrapping and closure allow us far too easily to acquire knowledge (justification) that seems unlikely under the envisaged circumstances. In this paper, I begin by highlighting the distinction between the (epistemic) legitimacy and dialectical effectiveness of such inferences. After evaluating some of the well-known solutions to this problem, I offer a mixed view of the legitimacy of easy knowledge inferences while trying to provide novel explanations as to how contrary intuitions arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Winfield's explication of Hegel's theory of mind, especially Hegel's theory of intelligence, is, he suggests, important for solving three problems that continue to haunt contemporary work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology: 1) A problem concerning the acquisition of language and its place in an account of consciousness, 2) A problem concerning the objectivity of representations, and 3) A problem concerning the grounds of knowing. I think Winfleld is correct in identifying all three problems as having their source in Kantian philosophy. I examine these three problems more carefully through a critical lens aimed at recent work by John McDowell and Robert Brandom. Both philosophers claim certain Hegelian influences. I argue that, in crucial ways, both Brandom and McDowell have each inherited the problems Hegel sought to solve and that are so clearly articulated in Winfleld's essay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I start from Phillips' discussion of Rhees's dissatisfaction with the idea of a language-game. Then, from a rereading of Moore, I go on to exemplify interconnected uses of the expressions “language-game,”“recurrent procedure,”“world-picture,”“formal procedure,”“agreement in judgment,”“genre picture” and “form of life.” The discussion is related to sense perception, our knowledge of time and space, and the picture-theory. These topics connect with Wittgenstein's earlier treatment of the will – which changed markedly later. The subtext (in footnotes) confronts (i) the sceptical methods of Descartes and Hume with the grammatical methods of Leibniz, Kant and Wittgenstein, and (ii) the realism of Leibniz and the Tractatus with the transcendental idealism of Kant. My conclusion is that, although the method of Wittgenstein's later work remains in a sense grammatical, (i) in its new form it can free us from the conviction that the intellect can and must resolve one way or the other the conflicts that arise in the course of the latter confrontation, and that (ii), although release from such a conviction is to be seen as the aim of philosophical discourse in general, it allows philosophy to retain its overriding significance. A positive element in that lies in the respect the method demands for that in a human life which is transcendental to the activity of scientific theorising: respect, therefore, for the unique perspective of the individual historical agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In almost all epistemologies, intuition is one of the most discussed issues with regard to its value. Intuition, in its most general meaning, is a 'direct comprehension'. What brings intuition to that disputatious point is this statement of 'direct'. Statement of 'direct' is while sometimes used as a contrary to the rational and empirical knowledge, sometimes used -as if in Avicenna- in the meaning of velocity and reliability of rational and empirical knowledge. In the former, because either rational knowledge or empirical knowledge is not relied, intuition is put forward or it's advocated that those which are difficult to obtain by means of reason and senses can be obtain only by means of intuition that is thought as a new source of knowledge. In the latter, intuition is not a source of knowledge and takes place in the group of empirical knowledge. The artical is about the analysis of these subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is cognitively more valuable than mere true belief. If an account of the nature of knowledge is unable to solve the value problem for knowledge, this provides a pro tanto reason to reject that account. Recent literature argues that process reliabilism is unable to solve the value problem because it succumbs to an objection known as the swamping objection. Virtue reliabilism (i.e., agent reliabilism), on the other hand, is able to solve the value problem because it can avoid the swamping objection. I argue that virtue reliabilism escapes the swamping objection only by employing what I call an entailment strategy. Furthermore, since an entailment strategy is open to the process reliabilist (in two different forms), I argue that the process reliabilist is also able to escape the swamping objection and thereby solve the value problem for knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an analysis of language variation and change in a socially stratified corpus of Glaswegian collected in 1997. Eight consonantal variables in read and spontaneous speech from 32 speakers were analysed separately and then together using multivariate analysis. Our results show that middle-class speakers, with weaker network ties and more opportunities for mobility and contact with English English speakers, are maintaining traditional Scottish features. Working-class adolescents, with more limited mobility and belonging to close-knit networks, are changing their vernacular by using ‘non-local’ features such as TH-fronting and reducing expected Scottish features such as postvocalic /r/. We argue that local context is the key to understanding the findings. Mobility and network structures are involved, but must be taken in conjunction with the recent history of structural changes to Glasgow and the resulting construction of local class-based language ideologies which continue to be relevant in the city today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explanation can be given for the relevance of literature to Bourdieu's theoretical work? In order to explain this choice of object, in the first part of this article I consider the national and international context within which Bourdieu's theory has been built. In the French intellectual space literature was a central theoretical object. In the international context, the attention paid to literature was justified by the importance given to the symbolic phenomena in the main contemporary theoretical traditions. In order to appreciate the singularity and difficulty of Bourdieu's theoretical acquisition, I try to reconstruct the problems that he attempted to resolve, the theoretical possibilities with regard to which his hypotheses were defined, and the position that he held in his field of production at the time in which they were formulated. In Bourdieu's thought, this conjunctural dimension does not imply that a theory is particularized or relativized. So he presented his theoretical frameworks on literature as a model applying to any kind of cultural products. In the second part of my paper I intend to test these claims by examining under what conditions and to what extent his ‘Principles of a science of works’ have been considered transposable to other national contexts and/or to new objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the theory of virtue in epistemology. The theory of virtue in epistemology is examined through the presentation of cases, whose core idea is that the nature of knowledge is best understood by reflecting on its role in intellectual practice. The intellectual practice is defined as any normatively structured way of finding things, resolving problems and answering questions.

The author presents an analysis of historicism versus positivism in the realm of the social universe. The issue is whether to present the operative dynamics of the social universe scientifically or historically. It is posited that there can be no middle ground between historicism and positivism. There can be no easy answers and the philosophical issue can be debated endlessly. Instead of attempting to resolve the issue, it is suggested that attention be directed instead to epistemology for answers.

This article discusses the role of knowledge in people's lives. Knowledge is simply a normal true belief, a belief that can be explained. The normal way of explaining knowledge is based on the concept of how familiar the person can justify it. The author further suggests that a person must explore his attitudes towards explanation and its explanatory value thereon.