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This paper examines the idea of objective phenomenology, or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn't require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are objective. I also argue that structural facts about experience, despite being objective, nevertheless still give rise to an explanatory gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain‐general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength has been largely overlooked in favor of mental states' type, representational contents, domain‐specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper explores anew the question of Husserl's metaphysics by contrasting H. Philipse and D. Zahavi's respective position on the matter. I argue that these positions fall victim to opposing exegetical pitfalls. On the one hand, while I concur with Philipse's general characterisation of Husserl as an ontological phenomenalist, I disagree that this implies Husserl was a subjective idealist similar to Berkeley. On the other hand, while Zahavi's correlationist interpretation of Husserl avoids this subjective idealist interpretation, I argue that it inadvertently succumbs to the realist alternative that construes the world as existing independently from subjectivity. The way out of this dilemma is to interpret Husserl as an experiential monist, where the phenomenal stream (Erlebnisstrom) is taken to be ontologically primary, by virtue of its antecedence over the subject-object or mind-world dichotomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a weak phenomenal holism (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, phenomenal consciousness has been restricted to the realm of perceptual and otherwise sensory experiences. If there is a kind of phenomenology altogether unlike sensory phenomenology, then this was a mistake, and requires an accounting. I argue such cognitive phenomenology exists by appealing to a phenomenal contrast case that relies on meaningful and relatively meaningless dialogue. I explain why previous phenomenal contrast arguments are less likely to be effective on even neutral parties to the debate: these arguments rely on a 'hard-to-understand' sentence, which may elicit sensory crutches that one focuses on, thereby obscuring cognitive phenomenology. I argue for a positive characterization of the phenomenal contrast in terms of seeming to be aware of abstract relations that obtain between different contributions in a dialogue. This paves the way for arguing that what it's like to entertain a cognitive content that p differs from that of q in their cognitive phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this contribution, the author presents a refoundation of transcendental phenomenology in terms of “generative phenomenology”. Four perspectives for entering this “generative phenomenology” are outlined – respectively through a consideration of being in phenomenology, creativity, ontogenesis and a reinterpretation of the very concept of the “transcendental” through a descent beneath the phenomenal sphere. This last perspective is developed in more detail and implements a methodological way, a way through the transcendental logic and a way through the structures of transcendentality (which are made explicit in the “generative matrix of the meaningformation” [Sinnbildung]). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Logos: A Journal, of Religion, Philosophy Comparative Cultural Studies & Art (08687692) is the property of Logos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper aims to develop a concept of matter as something both knowable and relevant for the empirical test of our knowledge statements. In light of the debate between logical empiricism and phenomenology, the paper discusses the forms of realism and theory of experience revolving around the observable/unobservable and visible/invisible distinctions. On this basis, a notion of matter is outlined that is based on the concept of forceful quality, rather than on givenness. Finally, it is shown that the concept of forceful quality can be a good candidate for solving the paradox of categorization, by moving beyond the solutions proposed so far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been suggested in the philosophy of mind that, contrasting with pure physical states, conscious states are those in which there is something that is like to be. Conscious states have a phenomenology. Assuming an intuitive distinction between sensory and cognitive conscious experiences, over the last years a debate has been established around the question about the phenomenal nature of our cognitive states, especially, our own thoughts. This has been called the cognitive phenomenology debate. A proper examination of the debate cannot be separated from a critical analysis of the ways in which we draw conclusions about the phenomenal components of our conscious lives. This paper examines some of the most fundamental problems deriving from the two main argumentative strategies used in the debate, namely, introspective reports and phenomenal contrasts. After analyzing how these strategies might support certain positions within the debate, the article explores how some aspects of the phenomenology of mathematical reasoning could enlighten the discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the so-called 'artifactual theory' of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is to reconstruct Husserl’s two-pronged approach of sensory givenness. On the one hand, the phenomenological focus on intentional consciousness implies a virulent criticism of the positivistic myth of the sensory given. On the other hand, there is also a positive appeal to sensory givenness in phenomenology, without which phenomenology would not be worthy of its name and would, ultimately, be nothing other than a form of neo-Kantianism. In the context of transcendental genetic phenomenology, Husserl manages to rehabilitate sensory givenness in a reduced, viz. demythologized form. This reconstruction of Husserl’s ambivalent reference to the given can help phenomenology defend itself against some actual trends, which tend to reduce it to phenomenalism or to conceptualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Husserl already noticed, artworks themselves have a phenomenological character. This means, however, that to experience artworks as phenomena no "epoché" and no "phenomenological reduction" is necessary. The leading question of my essay is whether, and possibly how, this observation can be methodologically generalized for understanding phenomena. I discuss if, and possibly how, a phenomenological reflection on art allows and even demands a general conception of phenomenology that nevertheless does not confuse artworks with phenomena in general. My intention is to show that and how phenomenality can be clarified with reference to its spatial character. Accordingly, works of architecture that are artworks will play a decisive role in my argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent empirical studies raise significant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that share the phenomenology of intuitions to argue that this reply fails. Furthermore, it shows how empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to reconstruct some important themes and conceptual motives that mark the continuity between Kant's transcendental philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology. They are divided into dozen headings in order to support more analytical approach. These include: the difference between phenomenology and phenomenalism, the status of the thing in itself and the transcendental object, the faculty of intuition, Kant's refutation of idealism in relation to Husserl's lifeworld, the role of imagination, the time-consciousness and others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article forms part of a series of reflections rooted in the experience of movement in the practice of dance. The proposal is to think of the body as a place of expression using key concepts of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy to discuss the expressive body from the perspective of its gesturality and its relationship with the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the responses to the comments and questions on his book "Phenomenology and Intercultural Understanding: Toward a New Cultural Flesh". The author's philosophical apprenticeship was bilingual and pluricultural and learned the Chinese philosophy. The author also discusses the concept mutual identity and the issue of personal identity.

Can mathematics contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena? One way to try to answer this question is by getting involved in the recent philosophical dispute about the existence of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. If there is such a thing, given the relation between explanation and understanding, we can say that there is an affirmative answer to our question. But what if we do not agree that mathematics can play an explanatory role in science? Can we still consider that the above question can have an affirmative answer? My main aim here is to give an account that takes mathematics, in some of the cases discussed in the literature, as contributing to our understanding of physical phenomena despite not being explanatory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How is performing with responsive technology in a mixed work experienced by performers, and how may the notion of embodied cognition further our understanding of this interaction? These questions are addressed here analysing accounts from singers performing the author’s mixed work Metamorphoses (2015). Combining semi-structured interviews and inspiration from Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, questions concerning the ‘self’ when listening, singing, moving and relating to fellow musicians, as well as the relationship towards the computer, are explored. The results include a notion of the computer as neither separated nor detached but both, and highlight the importance of the situation, including not only the here and now but also social and cultural dimensions. The discussion emphasises the role of sensorimotor interaction and bodily experience in human meaning-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called "phenomenology" in the context of sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in sport-related research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three types of misuse - the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance (phenomenalism), and with empirical research oriented towards objects in the world. Conclusions: Many of the discussed authors try to take over the epistemological validity of phenomenology for their research, which itself is not phenomenological, and it seems that this is because they are lacking such a methodological foundation. We believe that an authentically phenomenological analysis of sport is possible, but it must respect the basic distinctions that differentiate phenomenology from other styles of thinking.

The main goals of this paper are two. First, it articulates what kinds of knowing pure knowing (liang zhi) is in its narrow sense (approval and disproval) (1) pure knowing as the capacity of moral judgment; (2) pure knowing (of Heavenly principle) as moral knowledge and standard. Besides, it analyses pure knowing’s different features through a phenomenological description. All these aspects of pure knowing are tied by moral feeling. Second, this paper addresses two sets of theoretical problems that have been raised in Confucian discourse with respect to pure knowing and Heavenly principle, primarily those that render Wang’s notion of pure knowing to be static recognition toward particular moral issues, or immediate response, which reading cannot really admit the possibilities of extension, reflection, moral cultivation, and reform of institution; and those that understand pure knowing to be merely abstract without concrete content, such as merely being a metaphysical substance. When properly understood, that is, from the perspective of moral emotions, Wang Yangming’s account of pure knowing provides for the possibilities of enhancement and cultivation, while insisting that the content of pure knowing is always accessible to us. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Phenomenal character (or feel) is the what-it's-likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R's neurological correlate. The ontology explains why we have asymmetric epistemic access to phenomenal characters: the ontological ground for the subjective or first-personal stance is different from the ontological ground for the objective or third-personal stance. I end by situating my account in debates about physicalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay on the intellectualism about know-how and the phenomenon of gradability is presented. It responds to "The Argument from Gradability" by defending and motivating a particular diagnosis of gradability. It argues that the phenomenon should be discounted as a superficial linguistic phenomenon, which can be explained in a way compatible with the absoluteness of the state. It discusses the distinction between two types of gradability which are the quantitative and qualitative gradability.

This is the first part of a study on the classification of phenomena. It starts by addressing the status of classification schemes among knowledge organization systems (KOSs), as some features of them have been overlooked in recent reviews of KOS types. It then considers the different dimensions implied in a KOS, which include: the observed phenomena, the cultural and disciplinary perspective under which they are treated, the features of documents carrying such treatment, the collections of such documents as managed in libraries, archives or museums, the information needs prompting to search and use these collections and the people experiencing such different information needs. Until now, most library classification schemes have given priority to the perspective dimension as they first list disciplines. However, an increasing number of voices are now considering the possibility of classification schemes giving priority to phenomena as advocated in the León Manifesto. Although these schemes first list phenomena as their main classes, they can as well express perspective or the other relevant dimensions that occur in a classified item. The independence of a phenomenon-based classification from the institutional divisions into disciplines contributes to giving knowledge organization a more proactive and influential role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some philosophers have suggested that certain shifts in perceptual organization are counterexamples to representationalism about phenomenal character. Representationalism about phenomenal character is, roughly, the view that there can be no difference in the phenomenal character of experience without a difference in the representational content of experience. In this paper, I examine three of these alleged counterexamples: the dot array (Peacocke 1983), the intersecting lines (Speaks 2010), and the 3 X 3 grid (Nickel 2007). I identify the two features of their phenomenology that call for explanation: grouping and prominence. I then argue that representationalists can adequately account for both of these features. I also critique some previous treatments of grouping and prominence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay on the medium as measurement that links the relationship of microcosmic human experience with the macroworld is presented. It offers a history of human relationship with the world and examines the concept of media archaeology within the present space and outside the phenomenality domain by discussing global warming. The author relates the way phenomenon can validate the weather events experienced by humans that are simulated by computers as probable future scenarios.

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it's like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one's perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use 'proposition' broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2014, I published an article on the Felix Experimental Group, its medium Kai Mügge (KM), and my involvement in following the development of the phenomena reported around KM (Nahm 2014). In that article, I showed convincingly (in my opinion) that KM had cheated in the past, in particular with regard to producing a red "spirit" light with a magician's LED device, and with regard to producing (self-luminous) ectoplasm with the help of Halloween spider web while pretending to be in a trance. Recent developments and publications render it recommendable to summarize a few aspects of the aftermath of that previous publication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that phenomenal judgments are in general less reliable than perceptual judgments. This paper distinguishes two versions of this unreliability thesis. The process unreliability thesis says that unreliability in phenomenal judgments is due to faulty domain-specific mechanisms involved in producing these judgments, whereas the statistical unreliability thesis says that it is simply a matter of higher numbers of errors. Against the process unreliability thesis, I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgments can be accounted for by domain-general factors: attention, working memory limits, and conceptualization. As these factors are shared with the production of perceptual judgments, errors in phenomenal judgments are not due to faulty domain-specific processes. Furthermore, this account defends phenomenal judgments against general scepticism by providing criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Movies have a striking aesthetic power: they can draw us in and induce a peculiar mode of involvement in their images – theyabsorbus. While absorbed in a movie, we lose track both of the passage of time and of the fact that we are sitting in a dark room with other people watching the play of light upon a screen. What is the source of the power of movies? Noël Carroll, who cites Maurice Merleau-Ponty as an influence on his account of the power of movies, agrees with Merleau-Ponty that our perceptual experience of movies draws on many of the capacities at work in our perceptual experience of everyday situations. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception shows that Carroll’s emphasis on intellectual inference and the entertaining of unasserted thoughts is a distortion of the phenomenology of cinematic absorption. According to Merleau-Ponty, such intellectual operations come into play in cases of breakdown but should not be read back into the primary absorbed experience as being implicitly operative all along. After presenting and criticizing Carroll’s view, I interpret and expand upon Merleau-Ponty’s position, showing that his version of the analogy between cinematic perception and everyday perception is more convincing than Carroll’s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Max Scheler never published a theory of art, but his aesthetics, like the rest of his thought, occupies an intriguing position that links early phenomenology, Catholic personalist thought, and philosophical anthropology. His metaphysics of the person and theory of value, when combined with his account of the lived-body and of our access to other minds through love, translates into a powerful, humanistic theory of art. This article elaborates what Scheler's aesthetics would look like had he developed it and applied it to film. Film offers an intimate access to the lives, bodies, and minds of others that is particularly well-suited to Scheler's idea that art reveals the moral personality- the ordo amoris or "order of love"-that makes up the value-essence of the person. The person's unique and highest possibilities for acting, feeling, and valuing are the contents of their spiritual essence and these, often thought obscure and inaccessible, are made present in film. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent architecture, design has prioritised an engagement with time through its creation of temporary and highly flexible structures. There has, however, been less focus on how the design of buildings might impact the experience of time of the people who inhabit them. Here the distinguished author and emeritus professor Juhani Pallasmaa, who is renowned for his writings on the phenomenology of architecture, provides a reminder of the importance of what it means to 'dwell in time'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of the heart is one of the most basic notions in ordinary language. It is central to Heidegger's notion of thought that he relates to the primordial word Gedanc as underlying attunement that issues forth in emotional phenomena. He plays with all the etymological cognates of that word to zero in on the phenomena involved. The key experience of Erstaunen that grounds the first beginning of philosophy is paralleled by Erschrecken that grounds Heidegger's 'second beginning' and plays counterpoint with the first. Along with Befindlichkeit as one's basic attunement, these are key phenomena that belong to the heart, not to 'intellect' or 'will.' Thinking in terms of the intellect is das rechnende Denken¸ thinking in terms of the heart, besinnliche Nachdenken. It is the latter that provides the 'poetic-intellectual' experience for both the arts and philosophy in which such 'world space' is created that even the ordinary appears extraordinary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the domain-specificity of creativity represents one of the key questions in creativity research. This article contributes to the discussion by applying insights fromnew phenomenology, which is a phenomenological movement from Germany initiated by philosopher Hermann Schmitz. The findings of new phenomenology suggest that creativity is a domain-specific ability with three domains differentiated on the uppermost level: first, the domain of corporeal creativity, which has the task of presenting atmospheres; second, the domain of hermeneutic creativity, which is characterized by dealing with situations; and third, the domain of analytical creativity, which refers to dealing with constellations. These domains can be differentiated further still such that a high consistency of phenomenological approaches with other findings with regard to the question of the domain-specificity of creativity emerges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people's understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test folk understandings of both subjective experience and experiencers. My findings (1) reveal limitations in experimental approaches using “artificial experiencers” like robots, (2) indicate that the standard philosophical conception of subjective experience in terms of qualia is distinct from that of the folk, and (3) show that folk intuitions do support a conception of qualia that departs from the philosophical conception in that it is physical rather than metaphysical. These findings have implications for the “hard problem” of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to contemporary debates about the geographies of gendered fear of crime by examining the way in which a group of young women negotiate fear of crime in public space by creating affective distance between themselves and the approaching menace of fear. These distances are presented here as lacunae that young women construct in order to promote feelings of safety in public spaces. Bringing Sara Ahmed’s work on the circulation of affect and Jacques Derrida’s notion of erasure (or sous-rature) into a dialogue with each other, and building on a Heideggerian phenomenological understanding of fear as dynamic, this paper argues that constructing lacunae enables young women to undo the approach of signifiers of fear in public space, which in turn enables them to contest dominant discourses of the gendered nature of fear of crime. Such erasure also has implications for the politics of safe-keeping. This paper complicates conventional understandings of safe-keeping by highlighting how, in the pursuit of safety, erasures based on classed, raced, or gendered ‘othering’ manifest themselves and it highlights the importance, not only of attending to silences and absences used to promote feelings of safety, but also to the politics of these in the pursuit of safe-keeping. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Wittgenstein's use of the word 'phenomenology' to describe his own work in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript has occasioned much puzzlement and confusion. This paper seeks to shed light on what Wittgenstein meant by the word through a close analysis of key passages in those two works. I argue against both the view of Nicholas Gier that Wittgenstein held 'grammatical' phenomenological remarks to be synthetic a priori and that expressed by Moritz Schlick that Wittgenstein held grammar to be tautological. I also take issue with the claim by Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ought to be regarded as a work of phenomenology. Wittgenstein's adoption of a variant of Husserlian phenomenology, I argue, lasted no more than a few months, from February to October 1929, during which he conceived of phenomenology as something that sought to establish what one might call 'analytic a posteriori' truths through something like the Husserlian method of 'bracketing'. By the end of 1929, 1 claim, he had abandoned that in favour of the view expressed in the slogan 'phenomenology is grammar', where 'grammar' is not confined to the tautological, but is rather intimately linked to Wittgenstein's notion of 'the understanding that consists in seeing connections'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution looks at the phenomenological thread that holds together Lindahl's argument and traces its origin back to Husserl. It asks whether the reliance on the structures of collective intentionality is a necessary component to legal phenomenology and whether it puts Lindahl at odds with other phenomenological approaches such as Marion's. It also asks whether the notion of 'a-legality' can sustain its position as a third value vis-à-vis the code difference of the legal system, in other words whether it can play the role of a 'rejection value', or whether it is instead committed sooner or later to collapse into the negative pole of the legal/illegal coding of the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called "phenomenology" in the context of sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in the sportrelated research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three types of misuse - the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance (phenomenalism), and with empirical research oriented towards objects in the world. Conclusions: Many of the discussed authors try to take over the epistemological validity of phenomenology for their research, which itself is not phenomenological, and it seems that this is because they lack such a methodological foundation. The authors believe that an authentically phenomenological analysis of sport is possible, but it must respect the fundamental distinctions that differentiate phenomenology from other styles of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to phenomenal conservatism, seemings can provide prima facie justification for beliefs. In order to fully assess phenomenal conservatism, it is important to understand the nature of seemings. Two views are that (SG) seemings are a sui generis propositional attitude, and that (D2B) seemings are nothing over and above dispositions to believe. Proponents of (SG) reject (D2B) in large part by providing four distinct objections against (D2B). First, seemings have a distinctive phenomenology, but dispositions to believe do not. Second, seemings can provide a non-trivial explanation for dispositions to believe, which wouldn't be possible if seemings were dispositions to believe. Third, there are some dispositions to believe that are not seemings. Fourth, there are instances of seemings which are not dispositions to believe. I consider and reject each of these objections. The first and third objections rely on a misunderstanding of (D2B). The second objection fails because there are contexts in which an appeal to a previously unknown identity can provide an interesting explanation. The fourth objection overlooks the possibility of finkish and masked dispositions, phenomena which are widely accepted in the dispositions literature. I conclude that (D2B) escapes these common objections unscathed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if $$S$$ has a perceptual experience that $$p$$ , then $$S$$ has immediate prima facie evidential justification for the belief that $$p$$ in virtue of the experience's phenomenology. The benefits of PDE are that it (a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justification that allows most of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justified, and (b) accommodates two important internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition. However, in the face of a specific version of the Sellarsian dilemma, PDE is ad hoc. PDE needs to explain what is so distinct about perceptual experience that enables it to fulfill its evidential role without being itself in need of justification. I argue that neither an experience's presentational phenomenology, nor its phenomenal forcefulness can be used to answer this question, and that prospects look dim for any other phenomenalist account. The subjective distinctness of perceptual experience might instead just stem from a higher-order belief that the experience is a perceptual one, but this will only serve to strengthen the case for externalism: externalism is better suited to provide an account of how we attain justified higher-order beliefs and can use this account to accommodate the Blindsight Intuition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham's arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content/fixer of truth conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attention influences the character of conscious perceptual experience in intricate and surprising ways, including our experience of contrast, space, and time. These patterns of influence have been argued to cause trouble for the attractive thesis that differences in the character of conscious experience flow from differences in what we represent (Block ). I present a novel theory of the functional role of attention that has the resources for a systematic representationalist account of these phenomena. On the erotetic theory of attention, we bring an interest to the task of perception, captured as a question we seek to answer. Questions, as understood here, are contents that cognitive systems can represent rather than sentences. We process perceptual input as a putative answer to our question in a way that is modulated by attentional focus; attentional focus aims to pick out something that matches what our question is 'about.' In certain cases, this yields a form of predictive coding: if the contribution of focus matches what our question is about, we take it to select one of the possible answers we are entertaining, even though our perceptual input by itself does not supply a full answer. The proposed account also provides a new account of the phenomenology of salience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Ethnologica Croatica is the property of Studia Ethnologica Croatica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article seeks to reposition two philosophies central to qualitative research: hermeneutics and phenomenology from their current location in the interpretive traditions to one closer to the critical and radical traditions we believe are more congruent. We hope to show that these philosophies are most productive for qualitative research when considered as “grafted,” such as in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. By deepening two of these philosophies’ central constructs, intentionality and linguisticality, we not only make their ungrafting improbable, but also show the centrality of this hyphenated philosophy to qualitative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]