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Supplemental material file: online appendix We show that negative interest rate policy (NIRP) has expansionary effects on credit supply through a portfolio rebalancing channel. By shifting down and flattening the yield curve, NIRP differs from rate cuts just above the zero-lower-bound and has effects similar to QE. For identification, we exploit ECB’s NIRP and the Italian credit register and, for external validity, European and U.S. datasets. NIRP affects more banks with higher ex-ante liquid assets, including net interbank positions. More exposed banks reduce liquid assets, expand credit supply, especially to financially-constrained firms, and cut loan rates, inducing firms to increase investment and the wage bill. This project received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) grant and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).

We analyze how the Lehman and sovereign crises affect cross-border interbank liquidity, exploiting euro-area proprietary interbank data, crisis and monetary shocks, and loan terms to the same borrower during the same day by domestic versus foreign lenders. Crisis shocks reduce the supply of cross-border liquidity, with stronger volume than pricing effects. On the extensive margin, results suggest that the cross-border credit crunch is independent of borrower quality, while—on the intensive margin—riskier borrower banks suffer more. Moreover, the cross-border liquidity crunch is substantially stronger for term loans, and weaker for foreign lender banks that have a subsidiary in the same country than the borrower. Finally, nonstandard monetary policy improves interbank liquidity, but without fostering strong re-integration of cross-border interbank markets. José-Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from project ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

We show that lender of the last resort (LOLR) policy contributes to higher bank interconnectedness and systemic risk. Using novel micro-level data, we analyze the haircut gap channel of LOLR – the difference between the private market and central bank haircuts. LOLR increases interconnectedness by incentivizing banks to pledge higher haircut gap bonds, especially issued by similar banks and by systemically important banks. LOLR also exacerbates cross-pledging of bank bonds. Higher haircut gaps only incentivize banks, not other intermediaries without LOLR access, to increase bank bond holdings. Finally, LOLR revives bank bond issuance associated with higher haircut gaps.

We identify the impact of short-term interest rates on credit risk-taking in the short and long run by analyzing a comprehensive credit register from Spain, a country where for the last twenty years monetary policy was mostly decided abroad. Duration analyses show that lower overnight rates prior to loan origination lead banks to lend more to borrowers with a worse credit history and to grant more loans with a higher per-period probability of default. Lower overnight rates during the life of the loan reduce this probability. Bank, borrower and market characteristics determine the impact of overnight rates on credit risk-taking.

We show that negative interest rate policy (NIRP) has expansionary effects on bank credit supply-and the real economy-through a portfolio rebalancing channel, and that, by shifting down and flattening the yield curve, NIRP differs from rate cuts just above the zero lower bound. For identification, we exploit ECB's NIRP and matched administrative datasets-including the credit register-from Italy, severely hit by the Eurozone crisis. NIRP affects banks with higher ex-ante net short-term interbank positions or, more broadly, more liquid balance-sheets. NIRP-affected banks rebalance their portfolios from liquid assets to lending, especially to ex-ante riskier and smaller firms-without higher ex-post delinquencies-and cut loan rates (even to the same firm), inducing sizable firm-level real effects. By contrast, there is no evidence of a retail deposits channel associated with NIRP.

We analyze whether the global financial cycle (GFC) affects local credit supply and the real effects, and whether local unconventional policies can attenuate such spillovers. For identification, we exploit GFC shocks, differential bank reliance on global funding, local central bank interventions in FX derivatives, and three matched administrative registers in Brazil: the register of foreign credit flows to domestic banks, the credit register, and the matched employer-employee register. We show that after the announcement of US Quantitative Easing tapering by Bernanke in May 2013, which is associated with massive FX depreciation and increased volatility, domestic banks with larger foreign liabilities reduce the supply of credit to firms, in turn reducing employment. However, these negative effects are attenuated after the Central Bank of Brazil announces a large intervention in the FX derivatives market, which consists in supplying insurance against FX risks â?? hedger of last resort. In addition to these two subsequent shocks, we also analyze a panel over 2008-2015. Banks with larger foreign liabilities cut credit supply after US Dollar appreciation or after an increase of FX volatility (even for US FX changes with EMs excluding Brazil). Moreover, the FX effects on credit supply and real effects are mitigated after the FX intervention of the central bank, thereby confirming that the policy of hedger of last resort has been effective in decreasing local economy spillovers to global financial conditions. Our results have important implications for international macro-finance models and policy.

We analyze the effects of monetary policy on nonbank and bank credit supply to firms and households, in particular the associated real effects and the distribution of risk. For identification, we use exhaustive loan-level data since the 1990s and Gertler-Karadi (2015) monetary policy shocks. First, different from the literature showing that low monetary policy rates increase risk-taking in bank loans, we find that higher monetary policy rates lead to an expansion of credit supply and more risk-taking by nonbank lenders. During monetary contractions, credit supply for corporates, mortgages, and consumers shifts from regulated banks to less regulated, more fragile nonbanks. Moreover, this shift is more pronounced for ex-ante riskier borrowers. Second, nonbanks reduce the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary policy at the loan-level. However, this reduction varies substantially by borrower type. Total credit and real effects are largely neutralized in consumer loans and the associated consumption, but not in corporate loans and investment.

We analyse the impact of standard and non-standard monetary policy on bank profitability. We use both proprietary and commercial data on individual euro area bank balance-sheets and market prices. Our results show that a monetary policy easing – a decrease in short-term interest rates and/or a flattening of the yield curve – is not associated with lower bank profits once we control for the endogeneity of the policy measures to expected macroeconomic and financial conditions. Accommodative monetary conditions asymmetrically affect the main components of bank profitability, with a positive impact on loan loss provisions and non-interest income offsetting the negative one on net interest income. A protracted period of low monetary rates has a negative effect on profits that, however, only materializes after a long time period and is counterbalanced by improved macroeconomic conditions. Monetary policy easing surprises during the low interest rate period improve bank stock prices and CDS. L.P. acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness [Grant ECO2015-68136-P] and FEDER, UE and from the European Research Council Grant [project 648398].

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk‐taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two‐stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time‐varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long‐term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects. Peydró acknowledges the financial support from project ECO2012-32434 of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.

The eurozone economic activity and banking sector have shown substantial fragility over the last years with remarkable country heterogeneity. Using detailed data on lending conditions and standards, we analyse – along several key dimensions of heterogeneity – how financial fragility has affected the transmission mechanism of the single eurozone monetary policy. The analysis shows that the monetary transmission mechanism is time-varying and influenced by the financial fragility of the sovereigns, banks, firms and households. The impact of monetary policy on aggregate output is stronger during the financial crisis, especially in countries facing increased sovereign financial distress. This amplification mechanism, moreover, operates through the credit channel, both the bank lending and the non-financial borrower balance-sheet channels. Our results suggest that the bank-lending channel has been to a large extent neutralized by the ECB non-standard monetary policy interventions, but the policy framework until the end of 2011 was insufficient to overcome credit availability problems stemming from deteriorated firm net worth and risk conditions, especially for small firms in countries under stress. — Matteo Ciccarelli, Angela Maddaloni and Jose-Luis Peydro

Monetary policy transmission may be impaired if banks rebalance their portfolios towards securities to e.g. risk-shift or hoard liquidity. We identify the bank lending and risk-taking channels by exploiting â?? Italian's unique â?? credit and security registers. In crisis times, with higher ECB liquidity, less capitalized banks react by increasing securities over credit supply, inducing worse firm-level real effects. However, they buy securities with lower yields and haircuts, thus reaching-for-safety and liquidity. Differently, in pre-crisis time, securities do not crowd-out credit supply. The substitution from lending to securities in crisis times helps less capitalized banks to repair their balance-sheets and then restart credit supply with a one year-lag.

Recent studies of monetary policy in developing countries document a weak bank lending channel based on aggregate data. In this paper, we bring new evidence using Uganda's supervisory credit register, with microdata on loan applications, volumes and rates, coupled with unanticipated variation in monetary policy. We show that a monetary contraction reduces bank credit supply---increasing loan application rejections and tightening loan volume and rates---especially for banks with more leverage and sovereign debt exposure. There are associated spillovers on inflation and economic activity---including construction permits and trade---and even social unrest.

We analyze the effects of macroprudential policies on local bank credit cycles and interactions with international financial conditions. For identification, we exploit the comprehensive credit register containing all bank loans to individuals in Romania, a small open economy subject to external shocks, and the period 2004-2012, which covers a full boom-bust credit cycle when a wide range of macroprudential measures were deployed. Although household leverage is known to be a key driver of financial crises, to our knowledge this is the first paper that employs a household credit register to study leverage and macroprudential policies over a full economic cycle. Our results show that tighter macroprudential conditions are associated with a significant decline in household credit, with substantially stronger effects for FX loans than for local currency loans. The effects on FX loans are higher for: (i) ex-ante riskier borrowers proxied by higher debt-service-to-income ratios and (ii) banks with greater exposure to foreign funding. Moreover, tighter macroprudential policy has stronger dampening effects on FX lending when global risk appetite is high and foreign monetary policy is expansionary. Finally, quantitative effects are in general larger for borrower rather than lender macroprudential policies. Overall, the results suggest that macroprudential policies are effective in mitigating bank risk-taking in household lending over the local bank credit and global financial cycles, and therefore have important implications for policy and bank risk management.

Monetary policy transmission may be impaired if banks rebalance their portfolios toward securities. We identify the bank lending and risk-taking channels of monetary policy by exploiting—Italy's unique—credit and security registers. In crisis times, with higher central bank liquidity, less capitalized banks react by increasing securities over credit supply, inducing worse firm-level real effects. However, they buy securities with lower yields and haircuts. Unlike in crisis times, in precrisis times, securities do not crowd out credit supply. The substitution from lending to securities in crisis times helps less capitalized banks repair their balance sheets and restart credit supply with a one-year lag. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 re-search and innovation program (grant agreement no. 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grants ECO2012-32434 and ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).

This paper examines the impact of monetary conditions on the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the Czech Republic by analysing the comprehensive credit register of the Czech National Bank. Our duration analysis indicates that expansionary monetary conditions promote risk-taking among banks. At the same time, a lower interest rate during the life of a loan reduces its riskiness. While seeking to assess the association between banks’ appetite for risk and the short-term interest rate we answer a set of questions related to the difference between higher liquidity versus credit risk and the effect of the policy rate conditioned on bank and borrower characteristics. This work was supported by the Czech national Bank (Research Project No. C4/2009) and the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic projects GA CR No. 14-02108S and No. P402/12/G097).

This paper identifies the international credit channel of monetary policy by analyzing the universe of corporate loans in Mexico, matched with firm and bank balance-sheet data, and by exploiting foreign monetary policy shocks, given the large presence of European and U.S. banks in Mexico. The paper finds that a softening of foreign monetary policy increases the supply of credit of foreign banks to Mexican firms. Each regional policy shock affects supply via their respective banks (for example, U.K. monetary policy affects credit supply in Mexico via U.K. banks), in turn implying strong real effects, with substantially larger elasticities from monetary rates than quantitative easing. Moreover, low foreign monetary policy rates and expansive quantitative easing increase disproportionally more the supply of credit to borrowers with higher ex ante loan rates -- reach-for-yield -- and with substantially higher ex post loan defaults, thus suggesting an international risk-taking channel of monetary policy. All in all, the results suggest that foreign quantitative easing increases risk-taking in emerging markets more than it improves the real outcomes of firms.

The transmission of monetary policy to credit aggregates and the real economy can be impaired by weaknesses in the contracting environment, shallow financial markets, and a concentrated banking system. We empirically assess the bank lending channel in Uganda during 2010–2014 using a supervisory dataset of loan applications and granted loans. Our analysis focuses on a short period during which the policy rate rose by 1,000 basis points and then came down by 1,200 basis points. We find that an increase in interest rates reduces the supply of bank credit both on the extensive and intensive margins, and there is significant pass-through to retail lending rates. We document a strong bank balance sheet channel, as the lending behavior of banks with high capital and liquidity is different from that of banks with low capital and liquidity. Finally, we show the impact of monetary policy on real activity across districts depends on banking sector conditions. Overall, our results indicate significant real effects of the bank lending channel in developing countries.

To identify the credit channel we disentangle loan supply and demand shocks by using the answers from the confidential Euro area Bank Lending Survey and the U.S. Senior Loan Officer Survey. Embedding this information within a VAR model, we find that: (1) The credit channel of monetary policy is operational through the balancesheets of both banks and non-financial borrowers, and for business, mortgage, and consumer loans. (2) The impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP growth is higher through loan supply than through loan demand, whereas the latter affects more inflation. (3) The bank lending channel is stronger than the balance-sheet channel for firms, whereas the latter is stronger for households. (4) During the recent financial crisis, bank capital and liquidity problems had a strong negative impact on GDP growth by reducing loan supply to businesses. At the same time, the current expansionary monetary policy stance has reduced output decline in the Euro area.

We analyze the impact of financial crises and monetary policy on the supply of wholesale funding liquidity, and also on the compositional supply effects through cross-border and relationship lending. For empirical identification, we draw on the proprietary bank-to-bank European interbank dataset extracted from Target2 and also exploit the Lehman and sovereign crisis shocks as well as the main Eurosystem non-standard monetary policy measures. The robust results imply that the crisis shocks lead to worse access, volumes and spreads (in both the overnight and longer-term maturities). The quantitative impact on interbank access and volume is stronger than on spreads. Liquidity supply restrictions are exacerbated for cross-border lending after the Lehman failure; for banks headquartered in periphery countries, the impact is quantitatively stronger in the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the interbank market – unlike other credit markets – allows to exploit the price dispersion from different lenders on identical credit contracts, i.e. overnight uncollateralized loans in the same morning for the same borrower. This price dispersion increases massively with the crisis, and even more for riskier borrowers. Cross-border and previous relationship lenders charge higher prices for identical contracts in the crisis. Importantly, this price dispersion substantially decreases when the Eurosystem promises unlimited access to liquidity at a fixed price in October 2008 and announces the 3-year LTRO in December 2011, with economically stronger effects for borrowers in weaker countries.

Credit supply and demand changes are mostly unobserved, thus identifying completely the transmission of monetary policy through the credit channel is unfeasible. Bank lending surveys by central banks, however, contain reliable quarterly information on changes in loan conditions due to bank, firm and household balance sheet strength and on changes in loan demand. Using the U.S. and the unique Euro area surveys, we find that the credit channel amplifies a monetary policy shock on GDP and prices, through the balance-sheets of households, firms and banks. For corporate loans, amplification is highest through the bank lending and the borrower's balance sheet channel; for households, demand is the strongest channel.

We analyse the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking and pricing. Bolivia provides us with an excellent experimental setting to identify this impact. Its small economy is not synchronized with the US economy but its banking system is almost fully dollarized. Consequently the US federal funds rate is the appropriate measure of monetary policy. We study the impact of the federal funds rate on the riskiness and pricing of new bank loans granted in Bolivia between 1999 and 2003, a period of significant variation in the federal funds rate. We find robust evidence that a decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan origination raises the monthly probability of default on individual bank loans. We also find that initiating loans with a subprime credit rating or loans to riskier borrowers with current or past non-performance become more likely when the federal funds rate is low. However, loan spreads do not increase, seemingly even decrease, in changes in the probability of default. Hence banks do not seem to price the additional risk taken. Furthermore, banks with more liquid assets and less funds from foreign financial institutions take more risk when the federal funds rate is low, and reduce loan spreads more despite the additional risk they seemingly take.

We show that negative monetary policy rates induce systemic banks to reach‐for‐yield. For identification, we exploit the introduction of negative deposit rates by the European Central Bank in June 2014 and a novel securities register for the 26 largest euro area banking groups. Banks with more customer deposits are negatively affected by negative rates, as they do not pass negative rates to retail customers, in turn investing more in securities, especially in those yielding higher returns. Effects are stronger for less capitalized banks, private‐sector (financial and nonfinancial) securities and dollar‐denominated securities. Affected banks also take higher risk in loans. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the PGC2018‐102133‐B‐I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) grant and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV‐2015‐0563). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, or the Eurosystem.

Includes supplementary data: online appending Recent studies of monetary policy in developing countries document a weak bank lending channel based on aggregate data. In this paper, we bring new evidence using Uganda's supervisory credit register, with microdata on loan applications, volumes and rates, coupled with unanticipated variation in monetary policy. We show that a monetary contraction reduces bank credit supply—increasing loan application rejections and tightening loan volume and rates—especially for banks with more leverage and sovereign debt exposure. There are associated spillovers on inflation and economic activity—including construction permits and trade—and even social unrest. José-Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from project ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).