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What concepts do people use to construct narratives about how to get ahead in contemporary society? To what extent do these narratives reflect distinctive constellations of beliefs? What are these constellations and is their usage contingent on social position? With these questions in mind, we used the qualitative data associated with the American Voices Project to systematically explore and map constellations of beliefs. Adopting a natural language analysis, we identify linguistic patterns that signal the relative importance of different get-ahead outlooks as cultural frames. These outlooks include not only traditional meritocratic factors, but also a range of nonmeritocratic influences, including nonrational factors such as luck and religion. Our analysis identifies three distinctive versions of meritocracy--frustrated, complex, and detached--in how people describe their life trajectories. Our findings suggest that the idea of meritocracy hides meaningful variations and nuances in the ways people construct visions of what meritocracy means and how it is constituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus of properties, the tychic, alert an agent to occasions on which the external world cooperates with or frustrates their goal-achievement. An agent's sphere of competence is the set of goals that it is possible for them to reliably achieve. Luck concerns occasions on which there is a mismatch between attempt and result; in bad luck the external world thwarts goal-achievement within the agent's sphere of competence, in good luck the external world assists goal-achievement beyond the agent's sphere of competence. Fateful events are those where, more passively, the agent finds the external world achieving or frustrating their goals. Fortune concerns the contraction and expansion of the agent's sphere of competence. Eight reasons are given for accepting the account; its theoretical virtues and various things it explains. Lastly, three objections are answered; that the tychic properties relate to well-being rather than agency, that there are alternative theories of fortune available in the contemporary literature, that the account draws arbitrary distinctions between synonyms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly supposed that one can build Aristotle's account of luck (τύχη) and good fortune (εὐτυχία) from Ph. II 4–6 and Eth. Eud. VIII 2. Indeed, in these texts, he is concerned with providing a general account of each. There has, however, been some dispute on the relationship between the texts. Some argue that the two accounts conflict, and the notion of τύχη or εὐτυχία we find in the Ph. is not the one that Aristotle has in mind in Eth. Eud. Others argue that there are two notions of "luck" in Eth. Eud.: one that fits with the account in the Ph. and another that is more stable. Almost no one argues that εὐτυχία in Eth. Eud. VIII 2 is a subspecies of τύχη. I will argue that Aristotle does indeed have two notions of εὐτυχία, a narrow and a broad one. But I show that the distinction is set aside in Eth. Eud. VIII 2 where Aristotle only discusses εὐτυχία as a subspecies of τύχη. We see this especially if we compare the account in Eth. Eud. with what Aristotle says about εὐτυχία in his other ethical treatises. The upshot is that there is a narrower focus in Eth. Eud. than in the other treatises when it comes to εὐτυχία. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of tyche (τύχη), a Greek term that can be alternatively translated as luck, fortune, or fate. The paper disentangles various threads of argument in the primary sources to argue for a realist understanding of what we moderns call "luck." In short, it contends that Aristotle's account of these issues is mostly correct and merits close attention when canvassing recent philosophical debates about luckology. Aristotle argues that science pertains to the general rule; it is not about the particular. Particular events have contingent content that exceeds the scope of science. Even if we could predict all future events with ultimate accuracy, we would still be left wondering why good or bad things happen to specific people. Although luck is not a scientific category, it has an existential reality that leaves momentous events open to metaphysical and even religious interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critique of the current version of Derk Pereboom's "disappearing agent argument" against event-causal libertarianism. Special attention is paid to a notion that does a lot of work in his argument—that of settling which decision occurs (of the various decisions it is open to the agent to make at the time). It is argued that Pereboom's disappearing agent argument fails to show that event-causal libertarians lack the resources to accommodate agents' having freedom-level control over what they decide. The connection between the disappearing agent argument and the problem of present luck is explored, as is the connection between settling which decision one makes and luck. Pereboom's disappearing agent argument also is distinguished from another argument with the same name that targets intentional action itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the illusion of control by proxy in games of chance - an attempt to exert control by assigning it to others who are perceived as more capable, communable or luckier. Following up on research by Wohl & Enzle, who showed participants' preference to ask lucky others to play a lottery instead of doing it themselves, we included proxies with positive and negative qualities in the domains of agency and communion, as well good and bad luck. In three experiments (total N = 249) we tested participants' choices between these proxies and a random number generator in a task consisting of obtaining lottery numbers. We obtained consistent preventative illusions of control (i.e. avoidance of proxies with strictly negative qualities, as well as proxies with positive communion but negative agency), however we observed indifference between proxies with positive qualities and random number generators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between meaning in life and luck? One popular view within the literature is that resultant luck vitiates meaning; that if the relevant state-of-affairs is primarily the result of luck, chance, or happenstance, rather than the person's actions, then no meaning is conferred. Call this the anti-luck constraint. In this article it is argued that we should reject the anti-luck constraint. Two types of cases, often cited as examples in favour of the anti-luck constraint, are examined: the lucky idiot and the incompetent villain. Such lives, it is contended, can be meaningful even when the relevant states-of-affairs are primarily the product of resultant luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research suggests that targeted promotions have positive effects on targeted customers and negative effects on untargeted customers. However, the advent of market transparency increases the likelihood of untargeted customers' negative reactions reaching targeted customers. We examine this issue with four online experiments and find that for promotions targeted on infrequent customers, exposure (vs. no exposure) to negative word‐of‐mouth (WOM) from untargeted frequent customers does not affect targeted infrequent customers' current purchase intentions, but does reduce their intentions to remain with the marketer. Furthermore, we identify two moderators, such that when managers mention luck in the promotion delivery stage and when managers respond to negative online word‐of mouth (eWOM) from untargeted frequent customers and mention promotions targeted on frequent customers, they mitigate this negative effect. Our findings offer a new direction for the undesired effect of targeted promotions and identify the possibility that WOM diffusion reduces targeted customers' retention. We also provide valuable managerial insights on how to mitigate the negative effects of targeted promotions by framing the promotion as a result of luck, and by responding to and mentioning promotions targeted on frequent customers to negative eWOM from untargeted customers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How performance is perceived and attributed has important implications for strategizing. Much research in the cognitive and social sciences suggests that people tend to mistake luck for skill in evaluations and ignore how future performances regress to the mean. We argue that these systematic mistakes can be translated into an alternative source of profit: informed strategists can take advantage of others' misattributions of luck by exploiting the false expectations and mispricing in strategic factor markets. We also discuss the learning and interdependency barriers that protect, and thus predict the attractiveness of, a behavioral opportunity and suggest approaches to help overcome these behavioral barriers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the causes of prosperity? In addition to the division of labor, saving, capital accumulation, and good institutions, Adam Smith explains opulence through vanity and luck, two variables we tend to forget today. For Smith, wealth comes from our propensity to better our condition, combined with freedom and the security of the law. The propensity to better our condition is grounded in our vanity and can take the form of both parsimony and prodigality. The laws that guarantee freedom and security seem to be more of an accident of history than deliberate attempts to create prosperity. For Smith, vanity and accidents play a relevant role in economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A person naturally owns the fruits of their intellectual labour; so goes the labour argument for intellectual property (IP). But what should happen when a creator gets 'lucky'—such as the photographer who is in the right place at the right time or the scientist who accidentally discovers a new drug? IP law frequently awards ownership in such cases (what we call 'Lucky IP'). Some argue, however, that the creators in such cases do not labour sufficiently to deserve ownership, and that Lucky IP merely demonstrates that IP law is not truly concerned about labour at all. Drawing on the philosophical literature of moral luck, we argue that this analysis is misguided. Nearly all intellectual creations involve some measure of luck and, in most cases, the creators still labour sufficiently to become the natural owners of their creations. Lucky IP does not, therefore, undermine the labour theory of IP law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research presents three experiments that examine how natural "luck" (social and genetic luck) may affect lay intuitions toward desert‐based criminal punishment. Study 1 examined if intuitions surrounding desert‐based rewards in relation to good qualities/advantages ascribed to natural luck would extend to desert‐based punishments in relation to bad qualities/disadvantages ascribed to natural luck. Study 2 examined how both social and genetic luck affect support for desert‐based punishment across different criminal offenses and tests the relevance of immanent justice reasoning to such support. Study 3 examined whether findings in the prior studies are specific to desert‐based punishment and immanent justice reasoning, or if natural luck elicits broader punishment judgments and types of justice reasoning. Results showed that known intuitions surrounding desert‐based rewards do extend to desert‐based punishments in instances of natural luck. Immanent justice reasoning was strongly associated with support for desert‐based punishment in instances of both social and genetic luck. However, genetic luck, as compared to social luck, significantly increased support for desert‐based punishment, with imminent justice reasoning mediating this increased support. Implications are discussed in relation to capital sentencing and better understanding lay intuitions toward the punishment of criminal offenders who may have qualities ascribed to the "natural lottery." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Luck egalitarianism (LE, henceforth) is a fairly prominent theory of justice. While there are many versions of LE, they all agree that, at least to some extent, it is unjust for individuals to lose tire opportunity for welfare at least when that loss occurs through no fault of the individual's own. Many writers take LE to have direct political implications; they write as if tlie tin th of LE entails that resources should be taken from some - perhaps those who enjoy lots of unearned welfare - and delivered to those who suffer through no fault of their own. I argue that luck egalitarians should refocus tlieir thinking on what I call a "Systemic Model" of compensation. This model holds that (a) what matters most to offsetting bad brute luck is that individuals have opportunities to make up for losses of welfare and (b) political systems should be designed to prevent some individuals from capturing resources in a manner that frustrates the ability of others to offset their own losses due to unearned bad luck and (c) political systems should aim to maximize the opportunities individuals have to make up for tlieir own bad luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents (or, agent-involving events) cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy's decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or not: Maddy's reasons for getting beer in equipoise with her reasons to remain in her comfortable seat do not determine that she will get up or stay seated, so it seems beyond her control, hence lucky, that she gets up. In this paper I consider a sub-set of the luck objection called the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection, according to which indeterministic physical processes cause actions to occur or not, and agent's lack control over these indeterministic physical processes, so agent's lack control over, hence it is lucky, whether action occurs or not. After motivating the physical indeterminism luck objection, I consider responses from three recent event-causal libertarian models, and conclude that they fail to overcome the problem, though one promising avenue is opened up. This paper is divided into six parts. In Section One, I minimally define libertarian free will as accepting agential indeterminism, which is the conjunction of indeterminism and agential causation, where agential indeterminism occurs when an agent's reasons, efforts or character indeterministically cause actions. In Sections Two and Three I outline the physical indeterminism luck objection to libertarian free will, which states that sub-agential physical processes in the brain indeterministically cause actions to occur, and agents lack control over these indeterministic physical causes, so agent's lack control over whether their actions occur. If agent's lack control over whether actions occur, the occurrence of these actions is lucky, where this luck jeopardizes free will and moral responsibility. In Sections Four through Six I consider three recent libertarian responses to this objection—Mark Balaguer in Section Four, Chris Franklin in Section Five, and Robert Kane in Section Six. I conclude that none of these models satisfactorily overcomes the physical indeterminism luck objection, though one interpretation of Kane yields a promising avenue of reply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary authorities invoke luck to explain the arbitrariness of economic success, to emphasize our shared vulnerability to disaster, and to urge more generous policy, legislation, and governance. According to Robert Frank, Martha Nussbaum, and Ronald Dworkin, for example, extreme bad luck can befall individuals no matter what they know or do. By redefining luck as a psychological phenomenon (rather than as a constitutive principle of the world), this article challenges the contemporary consensus. My approach to luck arises out of my engagement with the political thought of Thucydides. Whereas influential interpreters present Thucydides as a witness to the crushing power of bad luck, and whereas they criticize Thucydides' Pericles for being insufficiently deferential to luck, I revisit and defend Pericles' skeptical and psychological approach to luck, and I argue that Thucydides shares this approach, at least in the main. The pathological intellectual and emotional responses to apparent good or bad luck diagnosed by Pericles in his final speech recur throughout the History and influence the evolution of the whole war. Going beyond Pericles, Thucydides shows that the appeal of luck arises out of a human need to explain, beautify, or lament what is merely natural necessity, haphazard coincidence, or awful suffering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the view of author and philosopher Robert L. Simon regarding the existence of chance and luck in the philosophy of games and sport. Evaluated is the victory of Australian skater Steven Bradbury for an unexpected gold medal during the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympic Games. The context of winning and losing in sport is explored.

This paper focuses on the role of culpability in determining the degree of liability to defensive harm, and asks whether there are any restrictions on when culpability is relevant to liability. A natural first suggestion is that it is only relevant (or at least is significantly enhanced) when combined with an actual threat of harm in the situation in which defensive harm becomes salient as a means of protection. The paper begins by considering the question of whether two people are equally liable to defensive harm in a situation if both culpably intend to harm another, but due to circumstances outside the control of the two people only one has a chance of succeeding in causing harm. I argue that there is no difference in liability between the two. I then turn to a kind of slippery slope challenge that accepting this conclusion would lead to a vast over-inclusiveness in those liable to defensive harm, and consider a recent attempt at meeting it that requires that a person's culpability can only affect liability if it concerns the very situation in which defensive harm is relevant. Finally, I put forward and assess a new way of meeting the challenge that appeals to a particular conception of culpability together with auxiliary theses concerning how culpability can decrease over time, among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a close reading of the Romani characters and their actions in five stories by Viennese Romani writer and activist Samuel Mago and in two stories by his brother, Hungarian award-winning journalist Károly Mágó, in their bilingual Romani and German collection glücksmacher – e baxt romani. Brief biographies and an outline of the history of Roma and antiziganism in Austria provide background to textual analysis that focuses on how characters in the stories engender baxt/"Glück," which means both happiness and luck. This dual meaning has inspired philosophical, psychological, economic, and anthropological studies, but literary scholars have rarely examined the concept in texts by Roma. For the protagonists in the brothers' stories, happiness and luck become based less on monetary fortunes than on other means to live and survive in dark times of persecution and discrimination. The characters' decisions unveil perceptions of baxt that rely largely on acquiring food, preserving and passing down family heirlooms, receiving an education, and freeing oneself and one's family from persecution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociology has been curiously silent about the concept of luck. The present article argues that this omission is, in fact, an oversight: An explicit and systematic engagement with luck provides a more accurate portrayal of the social world, opens potentially rich veins of empirical and theoretical inquiry, and offers a compelling alternative for challenging dominant meritocratic frames about inequality and the distribution of rewards. This article develops a framework for studying luck, first by proposing a working definition of luck, examining why sociology has ignored luck in the past, and making the case for the value of including luck in sociology's conceptual repertoire. The article then demonstrates the fertile research potential of studying luck by identifying a host of research questions and hypotheses pertaining to the social construction of luck, the real effects of luck, and theoretical interventions related to luck. It concludes by highlighting the distinctive contributions sociology can make to the growing interdisciplinary interest in this topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A popular account of luck, with a firm basis in common sense, holds that a necessary condition for an event to be lucky, is that it was suitably improbable. It has recently been proposed that this improbability condition is best understood in epistemic terms. Two different versions of this proposal have been advanced. According to my own proposal (Steglich-Petersen in Synthese 176(3):361–377, 2010), whether an event is lucky for some agent depends on whether the agent was in a position to know that the event would occur. And according to Stoutenburg (Episteme 12(3):319–334, 2015, Synthese, 1–15, 2018), whether an event is lucky for an agent depends on whether the event was guaranteed or certain to occur in light of the agent's evidence. In this paper, I argue that we should prefer the account in terms of knowledge over that in terms of evidential certainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper further investigates the Talent versus Luck (TvL) model described by [Pluchino et al. Talent versus luck: The role of randomness in success and failure, Adv. Complex Syst.21 (2018) 1850014] which models the relationship between 'talent' and 'luck' on the impact of an individuals career. It is shown that the model is very sensitive to both random sampling and the choice of value for the input parameters. Running the model repeatedly with the same set of input parameters gives a range of output values of over 50% of the mean value. The sensitivity of the inputs of the model is analyzed using a variance-based approach based upon generating Sobol sequences of quasi-random numbers. When using the model to look at the talent associated with an individual who has the maximum capital over a model run it has been shown that the choice for the standard deviation of the talent distribution contributes to 67% of the model variability. When investigating the maximum amount of capital returned by the model the probability of a lucky event at any given epoch has the largest impact on the model, almost three times more than any other individual parameter. Consequently, during the analysis of the model results one must keep in mind the impact that only small changes in the input parameters can have on the model output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Church in the World / Crkva u Svijetu is the property of University of Split, Catholic Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While wealth distribution in the world is highly skewed and heavy-tailed, human talent — as the majority of individual features — is normally distributed. In a recent computational study by Pluchino et al. [Talent vs luck: The role of randomness in success and failure, Adv. Complex Syst. 21(03–04) (2018) 1850014], it has been shown that the combined effects of both random external factors (lucky and unlucky events) and multiplicative dynamics in capital accumulation are able to clarify this apparent contradiction. We introduce here a simplified version (STvL) of the original Talent versus Luck (TvL) model, where only lucky events are present, and verify that its dynamical rules lead to the same very large wealth inequality. We also derive some analytical approximations aimed to capture the mechanism responsible for the creation of such wealth inequality from a Gaussian-distributed talent. Under these approximations, our analysis is able to reproduce quite well the results of the numerical simulations of the simplified model in special cases. On the other hand, it also shows that the complexity of the model lies in the fact that lucky events are transformed into an increase of capital with heterogeneous rates, which yields a nontrivial generalization of the role of multiplicative processes in generating wealth inequality, whose fully generic case is still not amenable to analytical computations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Kane's libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane's claim that there can be no contrastive explanation for self-forming actions is not an unwanted implication of his appeal to indeterminism, but is actually an implication of the fact that the agent's will is not yet appropriately structured. I then explain how this can assist Kane with the luck objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A modal analysis of luck, due to Duncan Pritchard, has become quite popular in recent years. There are many reasons to like Pritchard's analysis, but at least two compelling problems have been identified. So I propose an alternative analysis of luck based on the laws of statistical mechanics. The statistical analysis avoids the two problems facing Pritchard's analysis, and it has many other attractive features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject's evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck (EAL), which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL against Steglich-Petersen's arguments, clarify the view, and argue for the explanatory significance of EAL with respect to some core epistemological issues. My overall goal is to show that an epistemic probability account of luck rooted in the concepts of evidence and evidential support remains a viable and fruitful overall account of luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers think that part of what makes an event lucky concerns how probable that event is. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic probability account of luck successfully resists recent arguments that all theories of luck, including probability theories, are subject to counterexample (Hales in Noûs 50(3):490–508, 2016). I argue that an event is lucky if and only if it is significant and sufficiently improbable. An event is significant when, given some reflection, the subject would regard the event as significant, and the event's epistemic probability, determined by the subject's evidence, is the only kind of probability that directly bears on whether or not the event is lucky. I conclude with some lessons that are applicable to probability theorists of luck generally, including those defending non-epistemic probability theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Game theory is the study of tractable games which may be used to model more complex systems. Board games, video games and sports, however, are intractable by design, so "ludological" theories about these games as complex phenomena should be grounded in empiricism. A first "ludometric" concern is the empirical measurement of the amount of luck in various games. We argue against a narrow view of luck which includes only factors outside any player's control, and advocate for a holistic definition of luck as complementary to the variation in effective skill within a population of players. We introduce two metrics for luck in a game for a given population – one information theoretical, and one Bayesian, and discuss the estimation of these metrics using sparse, high-dimensional regression techniques. Finally, we apply these techniques to compare the amount of luck between various professional sports, between Chess and Go, and between two hobby board games: Race for the Galaxy and Seasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Turkish Research Institute / Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Arastirmalari Enstitüsü Dergisi is the property of Ataturk University Coordinatorship of Scientific Journals and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper is aimed to show how the libertarian conception of free choice is mistaken or misleading by focusing on Robert Kane's attempt to solve the problem of luck, which arguably constitutes the most serious challenge to libertarianism about free will. I will argue that either Kane's solution to the problem of luck falls into some inconsistency or he must introduce the requirement of contrastive explanation into his account of plural voluntary control. Either way, Kane fails to show how his emphasis on the requirement of plural voluntary control is made consistent with his unswerving commitment to the requirement of the libertarian free will for a metaphysical indeterminism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the effects of two different types of good and bad experiences on risk‐taking preferences: fortune and luck. We define fortune as a relatively stable positive or negative context within which choices are made and luck as a more unpredictable series of better or worse outcomes. With the use of a lottery‐based paradigm, fortune was operationalized as a preponderance of all‐gain or all‐loss two‐outcome option pairs within a larger set of mixed‐outcome control lotteries. Luck was operationalized as the experienced frequency of better versus worse outcomes when playing the lotteries. We predicted that fortune and luck would lead to opposite risk‐taking tendencies within control lotteries. An assimilation effect of fortune was predicted, with risk‐averse preferences for control lotteries when surrounded by good fortune and risk‐seeking preferences when surrounded by bad fortune. In contrast, we expected that high rates of success with good luck would lead to risk‐seeking preferences, whereas low rates of success with bad luck would yield risk‐averse preferences. Our predictions for fortune were confirmed; however, there was no evidence of any effect on risk taking based on experiencing good versus bad luck. Moreover, we observed a striking disconnect between impressions of the experience and risk‐taking behavior. Both identification and attributions of luck and fortune were highly correlated with the number of gain outcomes that participants experienced but were uncorrelated with risk taking. We review these surprising findings considering several prominent theories of risk‐taking behavior, particularly drawing attention to the differential roles of predecisional and postdecisional information in choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humanity has been fascinated by the pursuit of fortune since time immemorial, and many successful outcomes benefit from strokes of luck. But success is subject to complexity, uncertainty, and change — and at times becoming increasingly unequally distributed. This leads to tension and confusion over to what extent people actually get what they deserve (i.e. fairness/meritocracy). Moreover, in many fields, humans are overconfident and pervasively confuse luck for skill (I win, it is skill; I lose, it is bad luck). In some fields, there is too much risk-taking; in others, not enough. Where success derives in large part from luck — and especially where bailouts skew the incentives (heads, I win; tails, you lose) — it follows that luck is rewarded too much. This incentivizes a culture of gambling, while downplaying the importance of productive effort. And, short-term success is often rewarded, irrespective, and potentially at the detriment, of the long-term system fitness. However, much success is truly meritocratic, and the problem is to discern and reward based on merit. We call this the fair reward problem. To address this, we propose three different measures to assess merit: (i) raw outcome; (ii) risk-adjusted outcome, and (iii) prospective. We emphasize the need, in many cases, for the deductive prospective approach, which considers the potential of a system to adapt and mutate in novel futures. This is formalized within an evolutionary system, comprised of five processes, inter alia handling the exploration–exploitation trade-off. Several human endeavors — including finance, politics, and science — are analyzed through these lenses, and concrete solutions are proposed to support a prosperous and meritocratic society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Achievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently (and thus an achievement), only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make success likely, and that this is the reason why she acts that way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard's views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard's model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation's past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation's future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard's earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The set with the following members is inconsistent: F-Lesson: A person can be blameworthy for performing an action even though she cannot refrain from performing it. Equivalence: 'Ought not' is equivalent to 'impermissible.' OIC: 'Ought' implies 'can' and 'ought not' implies 'can refrain from.' BRI: Necessarily, one is morally blameworthy for doing something only if it is overall morally impermissible for one to do it. Since Equivalence seems unassailable, one can escape the inconsistency by renouncing any one of the other members. I first argue against BRI and then motivate a replacement for it that ties blameworthiness to belief in impermissibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At birth, everybody is assigned a fate that cannot be changed. In the Banat region, the belief in the powerful influence of the Fairy Godmothers on the new-born's destiny is still alive. This article aims at presenting the origins of the three fairies and the way in which good luck, health, beauty and fertility can be foretold in the Book of Fate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom encourages educators to cultivate student success by creating expectations among students, with the intention of boosting motivation and empowerment. If students feel that their learning is in their hands, they are more likely to fulfil the learning outcomes. But this paper argues that vulnerable or sensitive students are paradoxically disempowered when we insist that success is within their control, because the positive emphasis on willpower denies the agency of luck. The paper first examines the structure of success as defined in practice, by students meeting the learning outcomes. The paper then proposes a history of success, which reveals how much the theme of chance or luck lies at the philological heart of the concept. Matching this historical evidence, the student learning experience - and consequently the success within it - is shown to have ineradicable elements of chance and luck. Finally, the paper discusses how Monash honours the theme of empowerment for the sake of student success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nagel’s constitutive moral luck is one important type of moral luck, but discussions of it have tended to focus on temperament. Luck in how aware a person is of morally relevant aspects of her situation—awareness luck—though similar in some ways, also raises different issues. Luck in temperament impacts how difficult a person finds it to behave well, while awareness luck impacts whether she even recognizes that the situation is making a moral demand on her. For this reason, awareness luck raises some unique challenges for those who would deny the existence of moral luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A notorious objection to robust virtue epistemology-the view that an agent knows a proposition if and only if her cognitive success is because of her intellectual virtues-is that it fails to eliminate knowledge-undermining luck. Modest virtue epistemologists agree with robust virtue epistemologists that if someone knows, then her cognitive success must be because of her intellectual virtues, but they think that more is needed for knowledge. More specifically, they introduce independently motivated modal anti-luck principles in their accounts to amend the problem of eliminating luck-this makes their views instances of impure virtue epistemology. The aim of the paper is to argue, firstly, that such a move lacks adequate motivation; secondly, that the resulting impure accounts equally fail to handle knowledge-undermining luck. On a more positive note, these results bolster a more orthodox virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge that assigns a fundamental explanatory role to the notion of ability. In this sense, the paper also sketches an account of ability and a corresponding account of knowledge that explains how success from ability (of the right kind) is incompatible with success from luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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According to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck [e.g. Pritchard (2005)], an event is lucky just when that event occurs in the actual world but not in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the relevant conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world. This paper argues, with reference to a novel variety of counterexample, that it is a mistake to focus, when assessing a given event for luckiness, on events distributed over just the nearest possible worlds. More specifically, our objection to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck reveals that whether an event is lucky depends crucially on events distributed over all possible worlds- viz., across the modal universe. It is shown that an amended modal account of luck which respects this point has the additional virtue of avoiding a notable kind of counterexample to modal accounts of luck proposed by Lackey (2008). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops John Rawls's famous objection to the system of natural liberty as against the contemporary system of international trade. Even as "dynamic" policies have proven successful in several recent development success stories, the current system enforces a "static," laissez-faire system of comparative advantage that threatens to consign poorly-endowed countries to a low-productivity, low-income destiny in agriculture and raw materials. I discuss two very different fairness arguments in favor of allowing and encouraging "dynamic," pro-development polices: an argument from "structural equity" and an argument from "equity of fortune." I suggest that the former is of more central importance, and that the difference between the two kinds of fairness argument shows why Rawls's original objection to the (domestic) system of natural liberty does not imply "luck egalitarianism." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many theories of moral status that are intended to ground pro-choice views on abortion tie full moral status to advanced cognitive capabilities. Extant accounts of this kind are inconsistent with the intuition that the profoundly cognitively disabled have full moral status. This paper improves upon these extant accounts by combining an anti-luck condition with Steinbock's stratification of moral status into two levels. On the resulting view, a being has full moral status if and only if (1) she has moral status and (2) (a) has had advanced cognitive capacities, (b) has the potential to develop such capacities, or (c) would have had such capacities were it not for luck. I argue that modal accounts of luck provide a non-speciesist basis for attributing the lack of advanced cognitive capacities in humans to luck without doing the same for non-human animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to determine the relevance of an informational theory of knowledge to address recently discussed epistemic problems. I argue that Dretske’s classical approach is equivalent to the safety condition proposed by Pritchard to avoid epistemic luck. However, I claim that Pritchard’s condition has to be modified to avoid the so-called “generality problem” for reliabilism. I propose an alternative version of the requirement to deal with these problems and provide an equivalent informational condition. I conclude that this informational version is preferable since it reveals conceptual relationships between the constituents of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of studies have shown that preschoolers make inferences about potential informants based on the informants’ past behavior, selectively trusting an informant who has been helpful in the past, for example, over one who has been unhelpful. Here we used a hiding game to show that 4- and 5-year-olds’ selective trust can also be influenced by inferences they make about their own abilities. Children do not prefer a previously helpful informant over a previously unhelpful one when informant helpfulness is decoupled from children’s success in finding hidden objects (Studies 1 and 3). Indeed, children do not seem to track informant helpfulness when their success at finding hidden objects has never depended on it (Study 2). A single failure to find a hidden object when offered information by the unhelpful informant can, however, lead them to selectively trust the previously helpful one later (Study 4). Children’s selective trust is based not only on differences between informants but also on their sense of illusory control—their inferences about whether they need assistance from those informants in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]