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INFORMACIÓN, SUERTE EPISTÉMICA Y GENERALIDAD.
- Source :
-
Eidos . ene-jun2017, Issue 26, p326-354. 29p. - Publication Year :
- 2017
-
Abstract
- The aim of this paper is to determine the relevance of an informational theory of knowledge to address recently discussed epistemic problems. I argue that Dretske’s classical approach is equivalent to the safety condition proposed by Pritchard to avoid epistemic luck. However, I claim that Pritchard’s condition has to be modified to avoid the so-called “generality problem” for reliabilism. I propose an alternative version of the requirement to deal with these problems and provide an equivalent informational condition. I conclude that this informational version is preferable since it reveals conceptual relationships between the constituents of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- Spanish
- ISSN :
- 16928857
- Issue :
- 26
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Eidos
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 120399095