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Operating costs of merchant ships, related to fuel costs, has led the naval industry to search alternatives to the current technologies of propulsion power. A possibility is to employ nuclear reactors like the Russian KLT-40S, which is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) and has experience on civilian surface vessels. However, space and weight are critical factors in a nuclear propulsion project, in addition to operational safety and costs. This work aims at comparing molten salt reactors (MSR) with PWR for merchant ship propulsion. The present study develops a qualitative analysis on weight, volume, overnight costs, fuel costs and nuclear safety. This work compares the architecture and operational conditions of these two types of reactors. The result is that MSR may produce lower amounts of high-activity nuclear tailings and, if it adopts the 233U-thorium cycle, it may have lower risks of proliferating nuclear weapons. Besides proliferation issues, this 4th generation reactor may have lower weight, occupy less space, and achieve the same levels of safety with less investment. Thus, molten salt regenerative reactors using the 233U-thorium cycle are potential candidates for use in ship propulsion.

Despite the concept of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) being in the limelight of research and development effort within the shipping industry, there are still some existing research gaps. These pertain not only to technical solutions to be implemented but also to the issue of the impact of new technology on maritime safety. In an attempt to identify these gaps, we perform a literature review of the operational features of remotely-controlled merchant vessels. The framework is based on a safety control structure developed in accordance with the principles of System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The results indicate that most scholars focus on the high-end components of the system, while some organizational and human-oriented issues remain under-explored. These results can be found relevant by scholars and industry partners active in the domain of autonomous shipping.

Exact figures for the size of parliament's naval fleets are problematic, because there are a number of surviving sources which record the ships set out by parliament, and these do not always agree. The purpose of this appendix, therefore, is to summarise these sources and indicate the likely (but not definite) numbers of ships set forth by parliament during the period up to 1649. Where auxiliaries are mentioned here, this is because they are included in these sources – as discussed in Chapter 4, parliament mobilised many more auxiliaries than are listed here. Table 1 presents the minimum and maximum ranges indicated by the available sources for the summer guards, which were the largest concentration of ships. ‘Total’, in this table, is not the addition of the maximum or minimum for each category, but the range of totals indicated by the various sources. The printed lists (see Table 4, below) are also incorporated into this table, although they do not distinguish between summer and winter guards and therefore may, in some cases, represent the latter. Table 2 presents the numbers recorded in two manuscripts held at the British Library. The first, Add. MS 17,503, is entitled ‘A list of such Shipps and Frigotts of the Navy Royall as Also of such Marchant Shipps as were sett forth in the service of the King & Parliament in the Yeares 1642: 1643: 1644: 1645: 1646: and 1647’. This document distinguishes between summer and winter guards, and besides merchant ships serving with the fleet it specifies colliers’ ships and fire ships in 1643, as well as merchant ships ‘taken upp … for the Irish Coast’ in 1645, and merchant ships that ‘Capt[ain] Lewis Dick set out for Scotland’ in 1647. It further notes eight pinnaces employed for eight months, in 1642, which are included here, and the ‘Hire and fraight of Ten Packet Boates and Ketches’ in 1644, which are excluded. Finally, it records, for the winter guard in 1643, 1645, and 1646, ‘divers of the Marchant ships’, manned with 1,808, 840, and 456 men respectively. For each of these years the average number of men per merchant ship in the summer guard has been calculated from the available figures, resulting in estimates of eighteen, thirteen, and six ships, respectively (rounding down) for the winter guards.

Bu çalışma kapsamında ilk olarak okuyucuya genel bir bilgi sunmak için gemiye ve gemi siciline ilişkin genel hususlar anlatılmıştır. Çalışmanın asıl amacı ise gemi satış sözleşmesine ilişkin teori ve uygulamaya ilişkin bilgi vermektir. Bu bağlamda gemi satış sözleşmesinin tanımı, unsurları, hukuki niteliği, tarafların borçları ve bu hukuki işlemden kaynaklı ortaya çıkabilecek uyuşmazlıklar ve bu uyuşmazlıklara ilişkin çözüm önerilerini içermektedir., Within the scope of this study, the general issues related to the ship and the ship registry are explained to provide a general information to the reader. The main purpose of this study is to give information about theory and practice of ship sales contract. In this context, the definition of the ship sales contract, its elements, its legal nature, the debts of the parties and the disputes that may arise due to this legal transaction and the solutions to these disputes.

In the article it is told about one of the episodes World War II (1939 – 1945) – the loss of Australian cruiser HMAS «Sydney» in combat with the German raider HSK-8 «Kormoran», the picture of battle is restored, the effective forces and loss of sides are analyzed, is in detail described the raid «Kormoran» for the disturbance of British navigation, speaks out the version of the reason for sinking powerful warship, by the auxiliary cruiser, which was in the essence the armed merchant ship.

On June 28, 1915, the British consul general in Batavia, W.R.D. Beckett, received a telegram from Admiral Martyn Jerram in Singapore with the urgent news that the Maverick , an American-made steamship, was headed for the Dutch territory of Anjer (Anyer) near the Sunda Strait in west Java. The Maverick , Jerram believed, was loaded with arms and ammunition, which were intended for transshipment to India to fuel the revolutionary movement. Beckett immediately notified all of the British vice consuls in Dutch territory to keep a sharp eye out for the vessel or any information pertaining to it. The next day, he wrote a letter to the Dutch General Secretary in the East Indies, notifying him of the ship's expected arrival and adding that the ship had been chartered in San Francisco by a German and was owned by a German firm. Most important, he wrote, “she is believed to have on board large quantities of rifles and ammunition which she shipped from an American schooner off the coast of Mexico.” Beckett requested that the Dutch place a strict watch on its ports and asked authorities to keep him informed regarding its whereabouts. The Dutch authorities acted immediately on this threat. Governor General A.F.W. Idenburg and Vice Admiral F. Pinke were both concerned about the implications such a plan would have on Dutch neutrality if weapons of war were exchanged in its territories. Not only that, following on the heels of a May 31 letter from Beckett conveying a rumor that Germans in the East Indies were attempting to arm the German merchant ship Roon for an unspecified purpose, Idenburg could not completely dismiss the idea that the weapons supposedly aboard the Maverick were intended to arm Germans living in the colony for an eventual takeover of the Indies rather than for Indian revolutionaries. Idenburg and Pinke instructed authorities in all Dutch ports to keep a close eye on moored German ships and then sent Dutch ships out to search for the Maverick . After a series of misadventures, the Maverick did indeed end up in the Dutch East Indies port of Tanjung Priok, where it was detained for the duration of the war.

International audience; The juridical conflict concerning the merchant vessel De Vriendschap, boarded and inspected by the English in the spring of 1745, reflects the difficulty in respecting international treaties and the imperatives of war. After becoming a neutral power in the eighteenth century, the Dutch Republic tried to preserve its commercial shipping under the motto ‘free ship, free goods’, drawing on old treaties such as that concluded with England in 1674. The aim was to bag the freight and at the same time to prevent the nations at war from declaring the cargoes of Dutch merchants ‘bonne prise’. During the War of Austrian Succession, the situation in the Mediterranean deteriorated around 1744–1745, when the increasingly exasperated English seized neutral merchantmen carrying merchandise for France. Very different actors then intervened and imagined pragmatic solutions for complex tangles. A direct negotiation at the highest level led to the repudiation of the Admiralty of Port Mahon.

In May 1982, the British government requisitioned numerous private vessels, including the transatlantic liner the RMS Queen Elizabeth 2, for use during the Falklands (Malvinas) War. In taking up ships from trade, the rules contained in the 1907 Hague Convention VII relating to the conversion of merchant ships into warships afforded some guidance to Britain. This article reviews the development of the use made by governments of private ships during wartime, the need for Hague Convention VII, and the relevance of that Convention to the British requisition exercise undertaken in 1982.

This paper aims to analyze the stance of the Indian Supreme Court in relation to the established principles of International Law relating to diplomatic immunity in the Erica Lexie case. In this case, two Italian marines on detachment aboard a merchant ship killed 2 fishermen from India and were tried for murder. During the pendency of the case, they filed an application to be allowed to go home for one month and their application was supported by an affidavit from the Italian Ambassador. The Supreme Court allowed their application. Near the expiry of the time period so allowed, Italy refused to send them back to India. In response, The Supreme Court placed travel restrictions on the Ambassador holding that he had breached the affidavit and was liable for contempt of court. They held that the submission of the affidavit meant that the ambassador had waived his immunity and could be held in contempt. This is contrary to the principles established in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and practice of other states on the matter, but a finding in this regard can be said to have negatively influenced this concept in International Law. The principles of Diplomatic Immunity are firmly established and Indian Courts, holding contrary to them gives rise to a myriad of problems in an already sensitive concept that is primarily based on the principle of reciprocity.

This chapter explores the results at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, detailing a number of subsidiary arms negotiations at The Hague. The Admiralty sought limits on aerial bombardment, the use of naval mines, and the conversion of merchant ships to auxiliary cruisers, in each case raising questions of arms control. At the conference, the Foreign Office consciously sought to deflect questions of strategic interest, focusing upon humanitarian arguments to provide cover for ulterior motives. The chapter sets out the relative successes and failures of these initiatives while noting the inability of the Conference to resolve the overall question of the naval arms race.

This chapter details British preparations for the Second Hague Peace Conference, by first noting the shift in Britain’s strategic position since the 1890s, next highlighting the legal issues arising from the Russo-Japanese War, and then detailing the methodical Foreign Office preparations for the Hague Conference, both through diplomacy and inter-agency discussions. The government explored a wide range of ways in which law could affect armaments, and then set out concrete legal goals for the conference.

In September 1941 Lord Leathers, then Minister of War Transport, declared to the House of Lords: There is no need for me to stress to your Lordships how much of our food, our military equipment and our raw materials reaches us from overseas. In addition we have to maintain large and growing forces in distant parts of the world. All this depends on the Merchant Navy. Without the determination and courage of the merchant seamen, our armed forces could not keep the field nor could our people live. It is not an easy life sailing the seas in war-time conditions of blackout and convoy, but the men of the Merchant Navy do not ask for an easy life. They do their duty without fuss or display and no words of mine can indicate the debt of gratitude which we all owe to them.1

This chapter reviews the history of the so-called Golden Age of piracy, which lasted from ca. 1690 to 1730 and occurred primarily in the North Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Seas. Many pirates during this time had previously been commissioned as privateers or agents of national governments charged with attacking and plundering the merchant ships of enemy countries, thereby blurring the line between piracy and warfare. When hostilities ceased, however, many privateers continued their activities as outright pirates. An important lesson from the Golden Age is that national enforcement efforts seem to have been quite effective in ending the threat. We contend that this is because international trade at the time was monopolized by England and France, and so enforcement had more of the character of a private good than a public good. Also, accepted law enforcement practices at the time allowed harsher and speedier punishment of pirates as compared to today.

In the previous chapters, we described the space rocket engines, how they work, their role in past and current spaceflight and their limitations. We have also shown that the rocket is not the only propulsion type that could be employed in space. Among the types of space propulsion currently under investigation, one is particularly promising: the solar sail. This propulsion mode is not conceptually new, even though only recent technology gives it a good chance to make a quality jump in spaceflight. Its principles and how to efficiently use a sail vehicle could be understood better by reviewing what happened about four millennia ago on the seas and by referring to the progress of physics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Early pioneers of solar sailing conceived a space use of sails in the first half of the twentieth century, whereas the first technical publications and space designs began in the second half. But let us proceed in chronological order.

With the cataclysm in Europe showing no signs of ending in the three months widely forecast, and “utterly sick of the spiritless neutrality” of the Wilson administration, Roosevelt unfurled his fourth syndicated war series article, “An International Posse Comitatus,” which in “emphatic language” publicly recounted several themes he had already rehearsed in private conversations. 1 Up to this time, the Colonel declared in his article, he had been “reluctant in any way to criticize” the actions of Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan in foreign affairs. He had “faithfully,” and in some cases against his own “deep- rooted personal convictions,” sought to justify what had been done in Mexico and regarding the present world war. But the time had come when loyalty to the administration in foreign affairs meant “disloyalty to our own national self- interest and to our obligations toward humanity at large.”

This chapter deals with shell plating and framing. The shell plating forms the watertight skin of the ship and at the same time contributes to the longitudinal strength and resists vertical shear forces in merchant ship construction. Internal strengthening of the shell plating may be both transverse and longitudinal and is designed to prevent collapse of the plating under the various loads to which it is subject. The bottom and side shell plating consists of a series of flat and curved steel plates generally of greater length than breadth butt welded together. The side shell plating is maintained within 40% of the vessel's midship length and then tapers to the rule thickness at the ends. The thickness may be increased in regions where high vertical shear stresses occur, usually in way of transverse bulkheads in a vessel permitted to carry heavy cargoes with some holds empty.

The Round Table on "The Military Objective and the Principle of Distinction in the Law of Naval Warfare", held in November 1989 at Bochum, Federal Republic of Germany, had the benefit of an introductory report by Commander William Fenrick (Canada) covering the whole spectrum of targeting in naval warfare. The author's comment presented on that occasion focused mainly on the criteria determining whether an (enemy or neutral) merchant ship may be regarded as a legitimate military objective and attacked as such. His first comment concerns the question of law in relation to practice. The Commander's Handbook adds to the "war effort" criterion the further requirement that "compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the circumstances of specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment".Keywords: 1936 London protocol; enemy merchant vessels; legitimate military objective; naval warfare

Publisher Summary This chapter deals with shell plating and framing. The shell plating forms the watertight skin of the ship and at the same time contributes to the longitudinal strength and resists vertical shear forces in merchant ship construction. Internal strengthening of the shell plating may be both transverse and longitudinal and is designed to prevent collapse of the plating under the various loads to which it is subject. The bottom and side shell plating consists of a series of flat and curved steel plates generally of greater length than breadth butt welded together. The side shell plating is maintained within 40% of the vessel's midship length and then tapers to the rule thickness at the ends. The thickness may be increased in regions where high vertical shear stresses occur, usually in way of transverse bulkheads in a vessel permitted to carry heavy cargoes with some holds empty.

When the coup d’etat took place on 18 July word soon got about through the press and radio.1 Enrique and I didn’t know what to do because according to military instructions, which are read out to all soldiers, if something abnormal like that occurs you must rejoin your regiment as soon as possible. But I couldn’t go to Burgos because the trains were not running; we were completely cut off and couldn’t go anywhere. In that situation you were supposed to place yourself at the disposal of the nearest government authority, so Enrique and I went to report to the townhall of our commune at Santullano. ‘We are soldiers on leave.’ ‘Oh’, they said, ‘there’s nothing we can do about that, you’ll have to go to Trubia. You’ll find out there sure enough what to do.’

This paper is an excerpt from the manuscripts written by the two subcommittees, i.e., the Bioler Subcommittee and the Reciprocating Engine Subcommittee, of the Marine Engineering History Committee of the MESJ. The manuscript was completed after 10 years of hard work, but has not yet been published because of various adverse conditions. This paper is the first of the serial papers which will appear in this Journal twice a year to introduce the content of the manuscript to members of MESJ.The history of western style marine engineering and shipbuilding in Japan started in the last 15 years of the feudal Tokugawa Age, which was succeeded by the Meiji Era. The Tokugawa Government hired Dutch and French consultants, constructed Nagasaki and Yokosuka Shipyard by importing all tools and machineries from abroad, and constructed its navy. The Meiji Government that succeeded inherited nearly all of them, and eagerly constructed navy and mercantile marine under a new system. The first half of the Meiji Era, from 1868 to 1893, had seen a very rapid development of marine engineering and shipbuilding technology. After reviewing the preceding Tokugawa era, this paper describes the rise of western style shipping and shipbuilding in Japan in this period. Two tables on the propulsion machinery installed in home-made and imported new ships are given. The rapid progress is the result of the cooperative effort of the government and the industry.

Closed loop digital control of nuclear reactors is being performed at some U.S. national laboratories and some foreign countries. Within the next ten years, application to U.S. central station reactors is expected to become a standard feature. At present Babcock and Wilcox is designing a digital control system for a nuclear powered merchant ship. The plant control system is being designed using concepts of modern control theory. The control algorithms are being developed and tested by using a minicomputer as a prototype controller and interfacing it with a hybrid simulation that serves as the plant. This paper will present the prototype controller ign and its implementation on a minicomputer system.

In the four decades since the first microwave radar with a plan-position-indicator was installed in U.S.S. Semmes in the spring of 1941, marine radar has been praised as boon to reduced visibility navigation, cursed with the phrase “radar-assisted-collisions”, and now required for installation on most seagoing vessels. This paper presents a personalized perspective of how radar has been used by mariners since the first radars started appearing in quantity in the U.S. and British fleets in 1942. In World War II, at night when all ships were darkened, radar was the military vessel's primary sensor for detection of surface targets, station keeping information, for intercepting targets, for keeping merchant ship convoys in formation and for entering and leaving port in poor visibility. A generation of watch officers developed competence in the use of marine radar. After the war, merchant ships were equipped with radar with mixed results. A new generation of watch standers had to learn to use radar from experience. The development over the years of what is required to effectively use radar to maneuver and navigate a ship is explored. Examples of the use of radar for navigation and maneuvering are described. Development of computer based aids is briefly discussed.

This chapter discusses the incident related to the United States merchant ship, The City of Flint. On October 9, 1939 the ship, with a mixed cargo destined for British ports was captured by a German warship. With a German prize crew and under the German flag she was taken first to Tromso (Norway) and from there to Murmansk in the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities, however, interned the German prize crew, later releasing it, because the City of Flint had been unseaworthy and in need of machinery repairs when brought into port. The City of Flint incident again raised the question, which had first gained significance in World War I, of the circumstances under which prizes could be brought into neutral harbours and how they should be treated there. Art. 21 of the 1907 Hague Convention XIII provides that a prize may only be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions. It is questionable whether a neutral State, although under no obligation to admit prizes to its ports, may immediately intern the crew of a prize which has entered its harbour and then release the vessel to its original crew, or whether it may only resort to such measures when the prize commander has refused to leave.

The Atlantic ‘nature’ of the NATO Alliance has been talked about on many occasions, with speakers invoking in its support the very title of the Alliance, the US nuclear ‘umbrella’ over Europe, the role of US conventional in-place forces, the need for the protection of resupply and US reinforcement forces, the threat of the growth of the Soviet Navy, the need for political unity within the Alliance and a host of other good, and not so good, reasons. The Alliance, we are told, is held together not by string nor by political cohesion, but by water. And NATO navies try to determine their naval roles accordingly.

The Tudors shared the difficulty of being without standing armed forces, except for a number of small corps such as the Yeomen of the Guard, a body which was formed by Henry VII and reached a peak of six hundred men in 1513. They also had in common the recurring need to have armed forces at their disposal, either for the purposes of internal security — against rebellion or invasion — or for overseas expeditions. Two expedients were available to meet these requirements.

This chapter describes the concept of armed merchant ships. Merchant ship is a lawful aim in sea warfare and belligerents, depending on uninterrupted maritime transport for their existence, will try to protect such transport by any necessary means, including the arming of merchant ships. By simply being armed, a merchant ship is not transformed into an auxiliary cruiser; it retains prima facie its non-combatant status. Merchant ships had no legal duty to submit to visit and search by enemy warships because these are steps towards capture, and capture of enemy merchantmen is not a right but a hostile act. Until the end of the Napoleonic wars, merchantmen were primarily armed against pirates and privateers. Thereafter two developments converged, firstly, privatizing was abandoned and piracy suppressed. Secondly, the improvement in both offensive armament and defensive armor-plating gave surface warships such overwhelming military power that a rule could develop which protected merchant ships from attack without warning. As a result, the arming of merchant ships gradually fell into disuse without ever being formally abolished.

Anyone contemplating a voyage by sea may have good reason to prefer the vigorous view of the law stated in 1817 by Lord Stowell to the permissiveness recorded in 1984 by Professor O’Connell. There are today so many groups or gangs claiming political motives for the crimes they commit against inoffensive travellers that the exemption of insurgents from the penalties of piracy can only be deplored.

The ability to mount or defeat operations against the shore is one of the two main ways in which command is exercised and the sea used. This form of sea use suffers from the absence of a consistent vocabulary in maritime strategy. Competing words and definitions jostle with each other to attract support: amphibious warfare, combined operations, land-sea operations, the projection of power ashore, overseas raids and invasions, attacks on territory from the sea. These all have strengths and weaknesses, but none have won universal acclaim. Probably in this case, though, the consequence is not so bad as it is with ‘sea power’ or ‘the command of the sea’. Even though the name is in dispute, there is broad agreement about what it stands for. Like Shakespeare’s rose, it smells the same, more or less, whatever we call it.

The interdependence between the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy has roots embedded in history and merchant ships and merchant seamen have always been required, and have been available, in large numbers in times of war. So much so that the ability of the shipping industry to respond has been taken for granted and remains an assumption in the background of our strategic thinking. But at times throughout our history the importance of safe and secure sea communications to our country has been thrust into the foreground although, regrettably, it seems always to recede quickly again once hostilities are over. So it was in 1982 with the Falklands Operation Corporate when unexpectedly and at very short notice the two services were called upon to demonstrate their responsibilities and in so doing to emphasise yet again their interdependence. Therefore no apology seems needed, neither is it offered, for basing the following remarks on this latest ‘example’.

In earlier chapters various incidents were mentioned in which the use of limited naval force had a swift and obvious result. Barely four weeks were needed to demonstrate the failure of the Argentine Operation Rosario in 1982 (gunboat diplomacy is always accounted a failure if it leads to war); ten days to establish the success of Operation Urgent Fury against Grenada; less than 24 hours to register American acquiescence in Israeli action against the liberty in 1967.

The nature and extent of the jurisdiction of a state over foreign merchant ships in general have been discussed in Chapter II. A general survey of the practice of various states has been undertaken in Chapter I in order to ascertain whether there is any generally recognized rule of international law which warrants the extension of the immunities of military ships to government merchant ships. In the present chapter it is intended to spotlight the judicial decisions and state practice of a few countries and see how far the general principles discussed in Chapter II are applicable to government merchant ships.

Several uncertainties associated with predicting activity levels in water-cooled reactors are discussed in connection with development of the Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor (Maritime Pressurized Water Reactor). (T.R.H.)

The work on which Helmuth now embarked involved a major issue of principle. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 about the laws of war had been drawn up in days when wars were still thought of as things fought by rival armies, with civilian life remaining relatively unaffected. Once the object of war was extended beyond the defeat of the enemy army in the field to the destruction of its supplies and therefore to the continued capacity for resistance of its industrial machine and population, many of the rules became inadequate and a host of new situations arose for which no agreed rules existed. Air warfare, with its inability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, added a further complication. In this situation, and more particularly in Germany in 1939, the lawyers faced two alternatives.

A study of the dynamic behavior of the Merchant Ship Reactor Pressurized Water Loop was made using the Reactor Controls Analog Facility. Computer curves show the predicted response of the loop temperatures to normal load changes and component failure accidents. Except for complete flow stoppage, which was not investigated here, the safety system was shown to be adequate in curbing loop temperature excursions due to postulated accidents. (auth)

A control system for a pressurized-water reactor for use in a nuclear- powered merchant ship was studied by use of analog simulation techniques. The various components of the reactor and primary-coolant loop, including the boiler, were considered. Each simulated component was examined separately and then coupled into the system. With the existence of a large Doppler coefficient of reactivity, the average system temperature could not be maintained within the required limits without external control. Control of the reactor plant through use of a shim-rod mechanism was proposed. Two control schemes were considered. The first system involved control by means of a temperatureerror signal and a power-demand signal. The second consisted of a closed reactor-loop system. A power-error signal was generated by comparing reactor power with a signal proportional to steam flow plus the error in average system temperature and integral of this temperature error. The first system produced acceptable results for only speccific conditions. The closed-loop system satisfled the criteria for plant control; for this control system to be entirely acceptable, the maneuverability requirements must be made compatible with the allowable control- rod reactivity rates. The maximum rates needed for control under a given steam- load-demand change were established. (auth)

It has been shown in the previous chapter that the Constantinople Convention of 1888 was concluded in order to “complete” the legal regime that had prevailed in the Suez Canal from the beginning of its existence. The purpose of the Convention was to replace the usages that had gradually been introduced in the regime of the Canal by legal rules which would internationally guarantee a definitive and comprehensive system. It will be the object of the next section to describe the most salient features of this system.

The reciprocity and equality in negotiations which are indispensable between nations if compromises are to be reached to the advantage of both parties were markedly absent in the relations between the powers most concerned in the Spanish civil war. Germany and Italy were not willing to compromise in their declared intention of aiding Franco to win the war in Spain and pursued their own course of action while using the NIC to further their own ends. Britain and France, on the other hand, were in a difficult position because they invariably made the initial moves in securing the cooperation of Germany and Italy upon issues which could not be resolved in the Committee. This placed them in a weak bargaining position of which Germany and Italy were quick to take advantage. The latter quibbled as long as possible in the Committee and then only after diplomatic pressure was exercised tactfully in Rome and Berlin did they condescend to pass the necessary formal laws which were supposed to give effect to non-intervention while actually making no difference whatsoever to the amount of aid that continued to flow to Franco.

In spite of these two brilliant examples Drake had given to the contrary—the early years of the war were Drake’s—the advantages in sixteenth-century warfare were largely with the defensive: people were so much more at the mercy of wind and weather, of difficulties with regard to supply and man-power. Nothing brings this home more clearly than the two cases of the Armada offensive and our reply to it with the Lisbon expedition in 1589: the one a disaster, the other a fiasco. It was fortunate that underneath the many offences she had given Philip, the Queen’s mind, when it came to the point, was instinctively with the defensive.

The problem dealt with in this chapter is primarily the definition of the class of persons over whom a consular officer may exercise authority because they are seamen of his state.

JUST at the critical time when submarine wolf packs and magnetic mines were sinking Allied ships faster than they could be constructed, merchant ship strandings and collisions were reported to have been caused by the effect of degaussing coil fields on the magnetic compass. The installation of compass compensating coils permitted the immediate and satisfactory resumption of navigation by magnetic compass.