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In Islamic theology, it is accepted as an ethical principle that holds the person responsible for the consequences of their behavior. However, there are different opinions among the schools of theology regarding whether it is an attribute of the act and the factor that makes the act preferable. While Mu’tazilite scholars argued that human beings have created, active, and free will, Ash’arites centered on the absolute will of God and said that humans will be passive. Although the Māturīdīs, like the Ashʿarīs, accept that God’s will is involved in everything, they also state that humans will be active in the act. Scholars who argued that the will is an accident adopted the view that it is a faculty independent of the biological structure of the human being. However, modern science has revealed that the will is not independent of the biological structure of the human being, contrary to what theologians claim. Neurobiologists have stated that human behavior is largely caused by brain activity and that biological factors directly affect behavior. Hormones and genetic factors have been found to significantly affect human behavior. Empirical research has also revealed that human beings do not have a will independent of their physiological structure. In this context, examples of the neurobiological basis of human behavior are presented in our study, and a theological analysis is made of the deep debates on the nature of human behavior. Based on personality changes after frontal lobe damage, the relationship between neurobiology and willpower was established, and this relationship was elaborated with different examples. Brain tumors, nervous system disorders, and medications can lead to behavioral changes, and the biological basis of pedophilia, excessive sexual behavior, and aggressive attitudes has been discussed. Thus, it has been determined that the human will is a structure related to the brain and biological processes. Based on the information obtained, the theological perspective and neurobiology were compared, and it was determined that there was a difference between the theological view that human beings are always responsible for having a will and neurobiology. Despite the view that people’s actions are generally conscious choices and that they are responsible for their consequences, biological factors that determine human behavior should not be ignored. It has been suggested that neuroscience can better explain human behavior, and that responsibility for action should be reconsidered theologically along with biological reasons. Finally, the distinction between theology and law was emphasized, and it was stated that each individual should be subject to a unique theological evaluation and that the social order should be implemented in a balanced manner of theology and law. It is concluded that discussions on the relationship between theology and neurobiology will help us understand the complexity of human behavior in more depth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abū Bakr Ibn al-ꜥArabī, who is among the pioneer scholars raised by Andalusia, which has an important place in the history of Islamic thought, was also engaged in theology as well as tafsīr, hadīth and fiqh. In this study, which was written to point out the depth of the author, who stands out as a faqih and muhaddith, in the field of theology, his ideas about divine will were chosen as the subject. In this respect, his views on issues such as the antiquity of the divine will, its unity, its coexistence with the essence, its connection, its encompassing, the debates on whether to use the phrase “he wishes for sins”, and the determination of words synonymous with it and expressions that can or cannot be attributed to it are discussed. To maintain focus on a specific aspect of the subject in a more limited area, the issue of accident and fate, which has a close relationship with the divine will’s connection, has not been addressed. The views of the author have been determined from his works in which he expressed his opinion on the subject, especially the theological work called al-Mutawassiṭ fī l-iʿtiqād, and references have been made to the leading theologians of the sect in order to show where these views stand in the Ashꜥariyye sect to which he is a member, and also some evaluations have been made. In this way, efforts were made to enrich the study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bu çalışmada, Mu‘tezile, Eş‘ariyye ve Mâtürîdiyye mezheplerinin hikmet mefhumuna yaklaşımları ve bu yaklaşımların ilahî fiillerin kapsamını tespit için kullanma eğilimleri incelenmiştir. Hikmet, dinin gelişiyle Müslümanların anlam dünyasına girmiş bir mefhumdur. Bu mefhum, özgün bir disiplin olan Kelâm ilminde ilahî fiilleri çözümleme bağlamında kullanılmış, hatta ilahî fiillerin kapsamına ilişkin tartışmalarda başat rol üstlenmiştir. Bu kavramı her mezhep kendi teorik yaklaşımına uygun şekilde tanımlamayı tercih etmiştir. Mu‘tezile hikmetin şahitteki tecrübeden hareketle kula yönelik fayda bağlamında anlaşılması gerektiğini savunmuş ve hikmeti tespit edilemeyen fiillerin Allah’a nispet edilemeyeceğini iddia etmiştir. Bu yaklaşıma aksülamel olarak Eş‘arîler ilahî fillerdeki hikmeti, meydana gelen fiilin ilahî iradeye uygunluğu olarak kabul etmeyi tercih etmiş ve hikmetin rasyonel değerlendirmeye konu olmayacağını savunmuştur. Onların bu yaklaşımının temel nedeni ilahî fiillerin illet içermesi konusunda taşıdıkları kaygıdır. Ancak bu tutum hikmetin açıklanamaz bir olgu olarak kabul edilmesi nedeniyle anlamını yitirmesi sonucunu doğurmuştur. Mâtürîdîler ise bu iki teoriyi daha dengeli bir noktada buluşturmayı denemiş ve hikmeti övülmeye değer sonucu olan fiillerin sıfatı olarak kabul ederek hem aklı Mu‘tezile’nin aksine ilahî fiillere hâkim bir konuma yükseltmemiş hem de sınırlarını vurgulamak kaydıyla ilahî fiillerin kapsam ve anlamını tespit konusunda akla gereken önemi vermiştir.

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This article examines the approaches of the Muʿtazila, As̲h̲ʿariyya and Māturīdiyya sects to the concept of ḥikma (wisdom) and their tendency to use it to determine the scope of divine acts. Ḥikma is an intrinsic concept of the Muslim worldview since the advent of religion. This concept has been used in Kalām (Islamic theology) to analyze divine acts, and has played a leading role in discussions about the scope of it. Sects defined ḥikma in accordance with their theoretical approaches. The Muʿtazila defined it in terms of benefit to the man based on qiyās al-ghāʾib ʿalā al-shāhid and claimed that wisdomless acts could not be attributed to God. Contrarily, the As̲h̲ʿariyya defined ḥikma in the divine act as the conformity of the act to the irāda (divine will) and argued that ḥikma would not be subject to rational evaluation. The main reason behind this approach is the concern about the ʿilla (causation) of divine acts. This approach resulted in the loss of meaning of ḥikma as it was considered inexplicable. Māturīdiyya, on the other hand, tried to bring these two theories together at a more balanced point. They defined ḥikma as an attribute of acts with praiseworthy results. Contrary to Muʿtazila, this approach prevents reason to dominate over divine acts. On the other hand, contrary to As̲h̲ʿariyya, acknowledges its abilities in its proper limits to comprehend the scope and wisdom of divine acts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Makalede Hacı Hasanzâde’nin (öl. 911/1505-1506) Hâşiye ‘alâ mukaddimâti’l –erbaa adlı eseri değerlendirilecektir. Eserin ana konusu hüsün-kubuh ve insan fiilleridir. Hüsün-kubuh meselesi Tanrı, insan, fiil ve değerler alanıyla ilgilidir. İnsan fiilleri ise Tanrı-insan irtibatı ile bağlantılıdır. Tanrı, insan ve ahlâkî değerleri bir mesele olarak tartışmak, düşünce sisteminin tamamı ile yakından alakalıdır. Meseleler Eş‘arî-Mu‘tezile ve Mâtürîdî düşünce ekolleri çerçevesinde araştırılmaktadır. Ayrıca felsefe ekolünün bilimsel birikimi yeniden gözden geçirilmektedir. Ekollerin ortak ve ayrı yönleri vurgulanmaktadır. Eş‘arî ve Mâtürîdî öğretinin farklılıkları irdelenmektedir. Eş‘arî’de değerler özneye bağlıdır, görecelidir. Fiillerin hiçbirinde mutlak değişmez değerler yoktur. Fiiller bağlamlara göre değer kazanmaktadır. Bu nedenle değerlerin temel ölçütü değişmeyen din olmalıdır. Mâtürîdî ekolün içinde çeşitli akımlar olmasına rağmen çoğunluk Mu‘tezile ile birleşmektedir. Sayılan iki ekole göre değerler nesneldir. Özneden ve bağlamdan bağımsız değerler mevcuttur. Bunun anlamı dinden bağımsız bir takım değişmeyen değerleri kabul etmektir. İlke olarak Eş‘arîlerde fiillerin ontolojik yapısına insan etkide bulunamaz. Varoluşa Tanrı’dan başka tesir eden yoktur. Müteahhir Mâtürîdî düşünce ise özel dört önerme düzenleyerek Tanrı’nın yaratıcılığına halel getirmeden insanın kendi iradeli fiillerine etkide bulunabileceği bir alan açmaya çalışmıştır. Her şeye rağmen Hacı Hasanzâde’ye göre her iki ekol üst değerlerde birleşmektedir. Hacı Hasanzâde hüsün-kubuh konusunda açıkça bir pozisyon seçmemektedir. Daha çok ekollerin kendi içindeki tutarlılıklarını yorumlamakta ve aralarında karşılaştırmalar yapmaktadır. İnsan fiilleri bağlamında Mukâddimât-ı Erbaa kuramının öncüllerini tek tek incelemekte ve dayanaklarını sorgulamaktadır. Öncüllerden bir kısmının yetersiz ve gereksiz yönlerine işaret etmektedir. Hâşiye iradenin ontolojisine ayrı bir önem vermiştir. Diğer sorunlu meselelerde olduğu gibi bu konuyla ilgili de çeşitli ekollerin yaklaşımları ayrıntılı bir biçimde sunmuştur. Makalede kelâmî problemler bağlamında Hacı Hasanzâde’nin hâşiyesindeki araştırma yöntemi ve düşünce yapısı tetkik edilecektir. Bu tetkiki yaparken, hâşiyede sıklıkla kullanılan kaynakların sınırlarına riayet edilecektir. Hacı Hasanzâde’nin yaşadığı Fatih Sultan Mehmet döneminde kelam-felsefe-tasavvuf çekişmesinin, henüz canlılığını yitirmediği bilinmektedir. Bir yandan Tehâfütü’l-felâsife gibi felsefenin tutarsızlıkları bu dönemde yeniden gündeme taşınmakta, diğer yandan kelam-felsefe-tasavvuf ekolleri karşılaştırılmaktadır. Hâşiyede felsefe veya felâsife kelimeleri yerine bilinçli bir şekilde hükemâ özel adı tercih edilmektedir. Söz konusu tercih, belirli duyarlılıkların bir ürünü olarak gözükmektedir. Adlandırma tercihini kişisel eğilimlerle açıklamak eksiktir, dönemin şartları ile beraber düşünmek gerekmektedir. O dönem felsefe ile tasavvuf belirli yönlerden uyumlu hale getirilmiştir. Deyim yerindeyse felsefe-tasavvuf birleşerek kelam ilmine karşı gardını almıştır. Ancak Hacı Hasanzâde döneminde sistemlerin aralarındaki karşıtlıklar henüz tamamlanmış değildir, araştırma evresindedir. Her ne olursa olsun Hacı Hasanzâde’nin felsefe ve tasavvufa mesafeli durması felsefe birikimini göz ardı etmeye sebep olmamıştır. Felsefenin yaklaşımı, Hacı Hasanzâde’nin deyimiyle hükemâ ve mütekellim sistemleri beraberce tahlil edilmiştir. Hâşiyede tasavvuf yaklaşımına hiç yer verilmemiş olması dikkat çekmektedir. Tasavvufun kelam eleştirilerine ilgisiz kalmak kişisel eğilimlerle açıklanabilir ama dönem itibariyle açıklanamaz. Çünkü söz konusu dönemde kelam-felsefe yanına ilahiyat konularında üçüncü alternatif olarak tasavvuf ekolünün getirildiği bilinmektedir. Öncelikle Hacı Hasanzâde kelam-fıkıh çizgisine önem veren bir düşünce yapısına sahiptir. Hacı Hasanzâde haşiyedeki meselelerin kelam ağırlıklı olduğunu bilmekte ve bunu ifade etmektedir. Hâşiyede düşünce sistemleri karşılaştırılmış ama kelam sisteminin kendi içindeki Eş‘arî-Mâtürîdî-Mutezile ekollerine daha çok yoğunluk verilmiştir. Müteahhir veya İkinci klasik dönemde üretilen kaynaklardaki sorunlarla ilgilenilmiş ve çağdaşların açıklamaları eleştirilmiştir. Hacı Hasanzâde kelâm ekollerini açıktan benimsemek ve savunmak yerine onları değerlendirmektedir, kelâm-felsefe muhtevalı sorunlara karşı getirilen çözümleri, derinlemesine tahlil etmekte ve problemli noktalara işaret etmektedir.

Bu makalenin amacı kadere iman ve tevekkül ilişkisini kelâm ve tasavvuf disiplinleri açısından incelemektir. Tevekkül İslâm ahlâkında imanın olumlu özelliklerinden birisi olarak kabul edilir. İnsanın her şeye gücünün yetmediği gerçeğinden hareketle, insanın işinde bir başkasına dayanma ve güvenme ihtiyacı vardır. Dini açıdan bu varlık Tanrı’dır. Özellikle tasavvuf ilminde insan-Tanrı ilişkisi açısından tevekkül, kullukta önemli bir göstergedir. Bununla birlikte kavramın içeriği kelâmda kader inancıyla yakın ilişkilidir. Kadere iman ile kişinin sorumluluklarını taşıması ve üzerine düşeni yapması arasında ince bir çizgi vardır. Tasavvufî tevekkül anlayışında kulluğun zirve hâli olarak nitelenen iradeyi terk, teslimiyet ve tevekkül hâli, kelâmda her şeyin ilâhî kaderle olduğu inancıyla birleştiğinde, olumlu bir ahlâki tutum olan tevekkül, bir anda problemli bir olguya dönüşebilmektedir. Son iki asır İslâm toplumlarının geri kalmışlığında söz konusu problemin etkisi yadsınamaz. Ancak gerek tasavvuf gerekse Sünni kelâm literatüründe gelenekselleşmiş kadere imanın sağlıklı yorumu, insana ve topluma cesaret ve direnç veren bir tevekküle neden olabileceği de düşünülmelidir. Bu çalışmada kelâm ilminde irade, kudret, kazâ-kader inancı bakımından tevekkül kavramı ele alınmış ve kadere imanla tevekkülün olumlu ilişkisi sorgulanmıştır.

In the article, Ḥāccī Hasanzāda's (d. 911/1505-1506) work called Ĥāshiya 'alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba'a will be evaluated. The main subject of the work is goodness/ḥusun-badness/kubuḥ and human verbs. The problem of goodness-badness is related to the field of God, man, acts and values. Human actions are linked to God-human relationship. Discussing God, human and moral values as an issue is closely related to the entire thought system. The issues are explored within the framework of Ash'arī-Mu'tazila and Māturīdī schools of thought. In addition, the scientific accumulation of the philosophy school is reviewed. Common and separate aspects of schools are emphasized. The differences of Ash'arī and Māturīdī doctrines are examined. In Ash'arī, values are relative and they depend on the subject. None of the actions have absolute permanent values. Actions gain their values according to the context. Therefore, the basic criterion of values should be unchanging religion. Although there are various currents within the Māturīdī school, the majority unites with Mu'tazila. Values are objective according to these two schools. There are values that are independent of the subject and context. This means accepting a set of unchanging values independent of religion. In principle, the human being cannot influence the ontological structure of the actions in the Ash'arī's. There is no one who influences existence other than God. Late period Māturīdī thought tried to open up space where a man can influence his own volitional actions without prejudice to God's creativity by arranging four special propositions. Despite everything, according to Ḥāccī Hasanzāda, both schools are united at high values. Ḥāccī Hasanzāda does not explicitly choose a position on on the issue of goodness-badness. He mostly interprets the consistency within the schools and makes comparisons between them. In the context of human acts, he examines the premises of the Muqaddimāt al-Arba'a theory one by one and questions their basis. It points to the inadequate and unnecessary aspects of some of the premises. Ĥāshiya attached a special importance to the ontology of the will. As with other problematic issues, he presented in detail the approaches of various schools on this subject. In the article, the research method and thought structure in Ḥāccī Hasanzāda's work will be examined in the context of theological problems. While doing this examination, the limits of frequently used resources will be respected. It is known that the controversy of theology-philosophy-mysticism did not lose its vitality during the reign of Fatih Sultan Meḥmed, where Ḥāccī Hasanzād lived. On the one hand, the absurdities of philosophy such as Tahāfut al-falāsifah are updated again in this period, on the other hand, the schools of kalām-philosophy-sufism are compared. Instead of the words philosophy or al-falāsifah, the special name "al-Ḥukamā'" is preferred. This preference appears to be a product of certain sensitivities. It is incomplete to explain the naming preference with personal inclinations. It is necessary to consider together with the conditions of the period. At that time, philosophy and mysticism were harmonized in certain aspects. So to speak, philosophy-mysticism united and took its guard against the science of kalām. However, in the period of Ḥāccī Hasanzāda, the contrasts between the systems are not yet complete, they are in the research phase. Whatever the case, Ḥāccī Hasanzāda's distance from philosophy and mysticism did not cause him to ignore his philosophical accumulation. The approach of philosophy, in the words of Ḥāccī Hasanzāda, the systems of al-Ḥukamā'/ philosophers and mutakallim/ theologians were analyzed together. It is noteworthy that there is no place for the Sufism approach in the Ĥāshiya. Being indifferent to the theological criticisms of Sufism can be explained by personal tendencies, but cannot be explained in terms of the period. Because it is known that at that time, the school of mysticism was brought to theology as the third alternative to theology and philosophy. First of all, Ḥāccī Hasanzāda has a mindset that attaches importance to the line of kalām-fiqh. Ḥāccī Hasanzāda knows and expresses that the issues in Ĥāshiya are predominant in kalām. The thought systems were compared in the Ĥāshiya, but the Ash'arī-Mu'tazila and Māturīdī schools within the kalām system itself were given more intensity. The problems in the sources produced in the Muta'akhkhirīn or the Second classical period were dealt with and the descriptions of the contemporaries were criticized. Ḥāccī Hasanzāda evaluates the schools of kalām rather than adopting and defending them openly, analyzes in depth the solutions to problems involving theology and philosophy and points out the problematic points. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kur'an-ı Kerim’de şeytanın insan iradesi üzerinde etkili olduğuna ilişkin ifadeler bulunmaktadır. Birçok ayette şeytan ve taraftarlarının, insanoğlunun en büyük düşmanı olduğu hatırlatılmakta ve onların insanları saptırmak için kurduğu tuzaklardan söz edilmektedir. İnsanlardan ve cinlerden olan bu şeytanlara nispet edilen ifadeler, onların tuzaklarına karşı insanın çaresiz bir durumda olduğunu düşündürdüğü gibi insanın eylemlerinde tam bir hürriyete sahip olup olmadığı hususunda da bazı soru işaretlerine neden olmaktadır. Nitekim bu ayetlere ilişkin tefsir kaynaklarında, irade hürriyetine muhalif bazı yorumlara rastlanabilmektedir. Kur’an’daki bazı pasajlarda ise şeytanın kurduğu tuzakların zayıf ve aşılması mümkün bir yapıda olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Bu durum, konunun kelâmî açıdan değerlendirilmesini zaruri hale getirmektedir. Nitekim şeytanların, insan hürriyetini kısıtlamaya yönelik saptırma girişimleri, kelâm kaynaklarında “insanın özgürlüğü ve fiillerindeki sorumluluğu” konularıyla birlikte ele alınmış; insan fiilleri, iradenin fiillerdeki rolü ve irade hürriyeti bağlamında tartışılmıştır. Bu çalışmada şeytan ve taraftarlarına nispet edilen saptırma eylemlerinin, insan iradesini ne ölçüde etkilediği ve bu etkilenmenin özgür iradeye bir sınırlama getirip getirmediği hususları, ilgili kelâmî tartışmalarla birlikte ele alınacaktır.

These paper is dealt with and evaluated Abu Hanifa’s views on human freedom. Abu Hanifa’s influence on human freedom to the scholars who came after him was evaluated in the context of the Allah-human relaitionship. The examination of human freedom, which is difficult to explain and solve within the framework of the views of Abu Hanifa, will be an illuminating light on the issue. Human freedom is closely related to man and the will of Allah. Fort his reason, in order to achieve an explanatory conclusion on the subject, Allah and human aspects should be addressed together. The main question that arises is: In addition to the absolute will of Allah, whether man has freedom, if there is, what is the dimension of this will. In this context, the issue of human freedom was addressed through the title of divine will, human wiil, responsibility and whether it has an effect on human actions. Abu Hanifa’s views on human freedom are remarkable in terms of preserving the Ahl al-Sunnah and preveting deviant thoughts. Our research, which covers a descriptf study based on literatüre as a method; it is important for people to address the extent of responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been important debates among both Mutakadimin (early period) and Muteahir (late period) theologians on the subject of " voluntary acts of man", which is one of the most fundamental topics in the history of Kalam. In this context, some theologians responded negatively to this question in connection with their imagination of God, while others responded positively. The scholars in the first group said that God does not create human acts, while Among the scholars in the second group, two different approaches emerged: some of them argue that God is the only creator of human actions and therefore these acts cannot be compared to man. Although some of them are God, the creator of human actions, still these actions argued that it can be pet. The theologians, who are in this second group and arguing that although God creates human acts, human actions can be attributed to him, applied to the concept of "kasb" which is a Quran term. Esh'arî and Mâturidî made an effort to establish a relationship between human responsibility and human action with an interpretation related to the term "kasb" in question. In this study, the "kasb" theory of different sects will be discussed. It aims to reveal the method of relating the sects in question to human actions with human responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this essay is to examine the relationship between belief in predestination and trust in God in terms of the disciplines of kalām and mysticism. Tawakkul is regarded in Islamic ethics as one of the positive characteristics of faith. Considering that humans cannot be all-powerful, they need to depend on and trusting another. As to religion, the being described is God. Notably, in Sūfism, tawakkul is a significant indicator of worshipping with reference to the human-God relationship. Moreover, the content of the concept is closely associated with the tenet of predestination in kalām. There is a fine line between being responsible and fulfilling the tasks given and the belief in destiny. In the Sūfī understanding of tawakkul, relinquishing the will described as the final state of the worshipping and the state of submission to and trust in God, which is a positive attitude, when combined with the kalām belief that everything happens by a divine decree, can turn into a problematic phenomenon. The impact of the problem in question on the underdevelopment of the Islamic societies in the last two centuries. However, it should be kept in mind that a sound interpretation of the traditional perception of the belief in destiny in both Sūfism and Sunnī kalām literature may lead to a tawakkul understanding encouraging and strengthening the human and the society. In the present study, the concept of tawakkul has been discussed with regard to the doctrines of will, power (qudrah), preordination-destiny (qāzā-qadar) within kalām discipline, and the positive relation of tawakkul with the belief in destiny has been investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are statements in the Qur'an that Satan has an influence on human will. In many verses, it is recalled that the devil and his followers are the greatest enemy of mankind, and they set up traps to mislead humans. The expressions that are related to these satans from humans and demons make people think that they are desperate against their traps and cause some questions about whether human beings have full freedom in their actions. As a matter of fact, there are some interpretations in opposition to the freedom of will in the commentary sources regarding these verses. In some passages in the Qur'an it is emphasized that the traps set up by the devil are weak and can be overcome. This situation makes it necessary to evaluate the issue in terms of theology. As a matter of fact, the attempts of the devils to divert human freedom were handled along with the subjects of human freedom and responsibility in their actions in Kalam sources; and discussed in the light of human actions, the role of will in actions and freedom of will. In this study, how misguided actions of the devil and his followers affect the human will and whether this influence brings a limitation to the free will; will be discussed together with the relevant theological discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Allah’ın irâdesinin hangi fiillere taalluk ettiği konusu Kelam’da tartışma konularından birisidir. Bir yandan Allah’ın mutlak irâdesini savunan ve insanın irâdesini sınırlayan Eş’arî ve Maturidî doktrin, diğer yandan insanın irâde özgürlüğünü temellendirmek için Allah’ın irâdesini sadece iyi fiillerle sınırlı kabul eden ve kötü fiillerle birlikte tüm davranışları insana ait kabul eden Mutezilî ekol vardır. Kâdî Abdulcabbâr (v. 415/1024), insanın irâde ve davranış özgürlüğü için Allah’ın irâdesini sınırlı kabul edenlerin içerisinde yer almaktadır. O, Mutezilenin beş aslından birisi olan adalet ilkesi çerçevesinde, âdil olan Allah’tan şer ve zulüm gibi fiiller sâdır olamayacağını savunmuştur. Bu, Allah’ın sıfatlarına gölge düşürmez. Bilakis onun adaleti bu durumu gerektirir. Allah her türlü fiili yaratmaya kadir ise de, adaleti, rahmeti ve hikmeti gereği insana özgürlük alanı bırakır ve kendi irâdesini insanın irâdesinin başladığı yerle sınırlar