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The article analyzes Islam and Muslim-Western relations following the election of U.S. president Barack Obama. It discusses U.S. policies and those of Muslim countries, the possibility of Muslim reform, and prospects for future relations. The article explores reaction in Muslim countries to the election of Obama following the policies of the administration of former U.S. president George W. Bush and former British prime minister Tony Blair, particularly regarding the War on Terror, the supposed perception of Western crusades against Islam, and foreign policy. The author discusses a speech delivered by Obama in Cairo, Egypt, in 2009, and U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The author also discusses various Muslim attitudes toward the U.S.

The article looks at the cultural dimension of the fraught and conflictual relationship between the U.S. and many Muslims and Muslim countries as of 2011. The author identifies elements of American culture, including material acquisitiveness, individualism, and hedonism, which he says Muslims find contrary to Islamic values of thrift and self-restraint. He notes that U.S. analysts typically discount the cultural dimension of U.S.-Muslim relations and says this leads to erroneous interpretations of events, citing the scandal over U.S. soldiers' treatment of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison.

The article offers the author's views on U.S. President Barack Obama's foreign-policy strategy for Iran, in light of his Now-Ruz, or the Iranian New Year, message on March 21, 2009. The perception that Islamic countries are becoming more powerful than the United States and the concern of U.S. allies that President Obama is more interested in promoting relations with U.S foes than with the allies are discussed.

Strategic culture is an amalgam of a country's set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and narratives that shape its strategic decision-making process. This article evaluates Iran's evident pursuit of nuclear weapons in light of four key elements of its strategic culture as an attempt to ascertain Iran's goals for developing these weapons. These four elements include: (1) an all-encompassing conviction in Shia Islam as the bedrock of the regime's political legitimacy and the country's national identity; (2) a hypernationalistic belief in Iran's rightful place as the leader of the Islamic civilization and as a regional hegemon; (3) a pervasive sense of external and internal vulnerability; and (4) an ingrained perception that the U.S. desires to dominate and eventually destroy the Islamic civilization. The evaluation of these elements strongly augurs that a nuclear-armed Iran is not likely to employ these weapons offensively due to its fear of retaliation and the constraining interests within its regime's political structure. Rather, its drive toward a nuclear-weapons capability is to provide Iran with a defensive deterrent that will advance its desires for regional hegemony and mitigate its pervasive sense of insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 has drastically altered the strategic and security landscape in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. This article examines Iranian, Iraqi, and Saudi security perceptions of and policies towards their immediate shared region following the American invasion. It argues that despite other changes, their policies are still driven more by national interests and less by ideological orientations. The argument is three-fold. First, Iraq is likely to be a passive player in the emerging regional security system with a minimal role in shaping the regional security environment. Instead, developments in Baghdad are likely to be influenced by the cooperation/rivalry between other regional and international powers. Second, ideology remains an important determinant of the Iranian and Saudi foreign policies, but, contrary to much professional speculation, these policies are and will continue to be driven less by ideological orientations and more by realist national interests. Third, in the long run, however, deepening sectarian strife will further destabilize the region and threaten Western interests. Accordingly, the Persian Gulf policies of United States and other global actors should seek above all to contain sectarian division in Iraq and throughout the region. The most promising approach is inclusive, including an understanding between Washington and Tehran, as well as serious efforts to make peace with Israel, to enhance the prospects for regional stability and world peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the critical role that public diplomacy plays in improving the deteriorating image of the United States in the Muslim world. The authors argue that both public diplomacy and policies, including those on civil liberties, are vital to U.S. success in the war on terrorism and that the next U.S. president must designate this effort as a matter of highest national security importance. Many in the Muslim world believe that the war on terrorism is essentially a war on Islam; this view impedes the success of an effective foreign policy strategy. Previous efforts of public diplomacy have lacked funding, energy, focus, and an integrated strategy. The authors define six principles to improve America's security through winning the war of ideas, including addressing civil liberties concerns, and engaging diverse constituencies in the Muslim world. Finally, the authors describe ten public diplomacy initiatives to improve U.S-Muslim world relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the invasion of Iraq, al Qaeda has used "franchises" to expand its global reach. Al Qaeda offered these franchises very little, except its name, reputation, and ideology. Because of al Qaeda's minimal investment, destroying the franchise groups will accomplish very little against the mother organization. Instead, the United States should use al Qaeda's franchises as a vehicle to attack al Qaeda's name, reputation, and ideas. Al Qaeda's franchises are more prone to strategic mistakes than their namesake; those errors should be used as the cornerstone of a narrative to highlight al Qaeda's ideological failings. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been particularly mistake-prone. Three mistakes in particular offer opportunities to undermine al Qaeda's ideology: attacks against Muslim civilians, the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq, and infighting with other Iraqi insurgent groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines U.S. foreign relations with Islamic countries. During the Cold War, U.S. attention on Islamic countries was centered in the Middle East, as was that of the Soviet Union, and relations varied from country to country on ideological or practical grounds of realpolitik. The debate over U.S. foreign policy following the Cold War was altered by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which led to anti-Muslim sentiments in the U.S., and the identification of the terrorists as part of a broader Islamic political movement hostile to U.S. interests. This too has resulted in different policies towards different Islamic countries, with the U.S. allied with Pakistan at the same time it has occupied Afghanistan and Iraq. Islamic countries whose governments wish to cooperate with the U.S. face strongly adverse public opinion which views the U.S. as a hostile hegemonic power.

Encounters with the Islamic world date back to the beginning of the United States. Early cultural producers imagined what such encounters meant, relating them principally to U.S. domestic life and the quest for an imagined community and social harmony deployed in the service of bourgeois interests, not unlike today. An important example is Royall Tyler's The Algerine Captive (1797). The author excavates the discourse of race, empire, and civilization in Tyler's novel and dialectically links it to the culture of resistance produced by those "others" Tyler sought to exclude from the civilized community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the authors explore whether U.S. president Barack Obama's record on promoting international science fulfilled the promise of his early rhetoric. They cite a speech given by Obama at Cairo University in Egypt six months after his 2009 inauguration in which he spoke of promoting international science cooperation to create new jobs, meet global challenges, and as a basis for improving relations between the U.S. and Muslim-majority countries. Topics include a historical overview of U.S. science diplomacy and international development, the reduction of U.S. government research and development (R&D) budgets under the Obama Administration, and the authors' conclusion that Obama's initiative on international scientific collaboration remains a work in progress.

The article discusses the attempt by the U.S. government to improve its relationship with the Muslim world through science. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in an effort to expand the role of science in diplomacy and assess the potential for scientific partnerships with Muslim-majority countries, named three prominent U.S. scientists as special envoys. Secretary Clinton announced the envoys at a November 3, 2009 meeting in Morocco, which includes an Egyptian- and an Algerian-born scientist. Clinton's speech to the Forum for the Future, which is a group that fosters dialogue between industrialized nations and Muslim-majority countries, built upon a speech given by U.S. president Barack Obama at Cairo University in which he called for better relations with the Muslim world.