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This collection focuses on right-wing nationalism, populism, and religion, both theoretically and empirically, with an emphasis on the following countries: Australia, India, Italy, Turkey, and the USA. Although not the same thing, nationalism and populism are said to be closely linked. Nationalists, like populists, may claim that there is but one 'true religion' – that is, their own and their followers' – which helps focus their nationalist vision. They bring religion and culture into their arguments to encourage political changes in their favour. Nationalists may identify and target those they see as 'enemies of the people', said to be a serious threat to fulfilment of a nationalist future free from culturally 'alien' influences. While linking nationalism with religion is not new, what is more novel is the connecting of religion, nationalism, and populism. The contributions to this collection explore these issues theoretically, conceptually, and empirically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious populism features prominently in the global political landscape. This contribution focuses on this particular type of populism, and the political strategies employed by religious populist actors, with a focus on the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Although there is an established literature on religious populism, there are still dynamics that need to be studied further. How religious populists outflank their rivals, especially those with relatively conservative ideologies and understandings of nationalism, remains unanswered, for example. In this study, I investigate how the AKP, as a religious populist party, has competed with and distinguished itself from other mainstream and conservative Turkish political actors and movements, and their respective nationalist ideologies: (a) the secular political establishment, including the Kemalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party), (b) the tradition(s) the party was originally part of but is no longer viable, the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement, (c) other popular religious movements that have a claim to power (such as the Gülen, or Hizmet, movement), and finally (d) ultranationalist segments and parties such as the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party), each of which has their own interpretations of citizenship and nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aimed to analyze the ascension of Justice and Development Party—Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)—in Turkey and its political measures regarding both Islam and the country's Ottoman past, in order to comprehend the party's role in a potential shift of Turkish national identity and in Turkey's relationship with the Middle East. The article does this through a content analysis of decrees, laws, and other measures taken by the AKP that emphasizes its cultural and religious policies, as well as revisiting literature produced about the subject. Analyzing Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government during his time as Prime Minister (2003–2014), two noteworthy features come to light: its Islamic influence and its so‐called neo‐Ottomanist outlook. However, this article argues that besides an identity‐ and ideology‐based motivation, the AKP had pragmatic intentions in adopting such approaches, aiming to gather support both domestically and regionally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pro-Kurdish nationalist mobilization in Turkey was mostly built on the right to self-determination aligned with the Marxist-Leninist ideology for the insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the early 1980s and ethnic minority rights for the secular-leftist pro-Kurdish legal parties in the 1990s. The Turkish state mostly framed the legal and illegal pro-Kurdish mobilization as 'the enemy of the state' and 'the enemy of Islam' in its counter-insurgency efforts. However, in the 2000s, the PKK and the pro-Kurdish legal parties became more tolerant and inclusive toward Islamic Kurdish identity by mobilizing their sympathizers in events such as 'Civic Friday Prayers' and a 'Democratic Islamic Congress'. This move aimed to function as an antidote to the rising popularity of the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Kurdish Hizbullah in the early 2000s. In other words, Islam and pious Muslim identity has increasingly become contested among Turkish Islamists, Kurdish Islamists, and the secular Kurdish nationalists. This article seeks to unpack why, how, and under what conditions such competing actors and mechanisms shape the discursive and power relationships in the Kurdish-Turkish public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to shed light on the journey of the Hittite sun disk, a cult object from the Early Bronze Age, from the architectural, narrative and discursive boundaries of a public museum to the streets of contemporary Ankara. First, it explores the role that the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations played, through the invention of secular symbols, in (re)defining modern Turkish identity. Then it probes into the processes by which the sun disk became an increasingly popular and yet controversial political symbol. In doing so, the article examines how a state-sanctioned memory-making project heralded a 'clash of imaginations': conservative and Islamist versus secular-leftist urban identities, embodying conflicting visions of Ankara's past and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the relationship between Islam and nationalism by considering the role of the ulama in Turkey, housed within the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA). The ulama - religious scholars and experts of Islamic law - in Muslim majority contexts are typically closely linked with the state and play a key role in shaping the boundaries of Islam and of what is Islamically acceptable. However, this is also of consequence for the boundaries of the nation, since in Turkey Islam and nationalism has been intertwined, with Islam playing a central role in nation-building, as a basis of ethnic identity formation and a source of symbols and myths. This articles shows, firstly, that the PRA has acted as a carrier and preserver of Sunni (Hanefi) Muslim identity in continuity with the Ottoman ulama and, secondly, that it has delimited nation-building, by considering its approach to and interventions against Alevi identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite Turkey being a culturally heterogeneous country, the primordial narrative of current Turkish nationalism -- regardless whether arguing from secular or from Islamist angles -- does not allow for cultural diversity and plurality. This article challenges the holistic and exclusionary notion of culture that underlies present Turkish nationalism by shedding light on how the appropriation of multiple identities by second and third generation Germany-born women in Turkey is eluding ascriptions of identity divided among we/them lines. Against the backdrop of frameworks that describe identity as fluid, relational, multiple and imagined, the article will analyze the findings of an ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Istanbul in 2013. Rather than a holistic "either/or" dualism of belonging where social practices only take place in the container space, "as well as" transnational social practices in both countries are analyzed, among others, with respect to biographic memories and imaginations, communication and movements across borders and participation in the Gezi protests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the comparison between Turkish Islamic and secular thinking toward ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey. The authors made the comparison based on a comprehensive content analysis of secular press and Islamic along with other evidence such as opinion polls and political party reports. It also explores the contents of newspaper articles from 1996-2004, and from 2007-2010 with respects to several subjects such as conflict resolution and nationalism.

This article investigates Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri's Kurdish-Islamic revivalist project based on a close reading of his Mesnewi. This article primarily focuses on the fusion of the Sheikh's Islamic revivalism with his Kurdish nationalism in his poetic work. A close reading of the Mesnewi leaves no doubt that in the mind of his author both the future of Kurds and that of his revivalist project depended on the creation of an independent state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notwithstanding his enormous influence on the grassroots of the Turkish nationalist movement in its Islamic turn in the 1970s, Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi, a staunch nationalist and a pious Muslim at the same time, has remained an understudied intellectual. His oeuvre is left largely unexplored. He is either too simply associated with Türk-İslam Sentezi [Turkish-Islamic Synthesis] or treated as if the sole outcome of his intellectual labor was his three-volume Türk-İslam Ülküsü [Turkish-Islamic Ideal]. This article seeks to remedy this situation by studying critically his views on the particular issue of Turkish nationalism and Islam nexus based on his writings in their entirety. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

No abstract is available for this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper an attempt is made to reassess how and why the laic/Islamic dual opposition has come to be a decisive factor in the politics of Turkish capitalist modernity. The question as to whether this opposition may survive into the twenty-first century is briefly discussed. It is noted that in the aftermath of the prolonged confrontation between the emergent imagined community of the Gezi Revolt and the Islamist AKP government, a religiously neutral political identity came into sight in public life, which can be considered as the harbinger of a new kind of social individuality, one which is incommensurate with the laic/Islamic dual opposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the surge of neo-nationalism and conspiratorial thinking in tandem with the rise of the Turkish revisionist historiography highly critical of Turkish nationalism and its legacy in the 20th century in the 2000s. The paper also examines the demonization of these historiographical deviations by proponents of Kemalist nation-statism. Because these revisionists challenged nation-statist assumptions, such as the innocence of the Turkish nation and its self-victimization, their academic output was perceived as blasphemy against the common values of Turkish society, further fomenting neo-nationalist sentiment. Thus, the paper argues that the genesis of a revisionist historiography and the rising popularity of conspiracy theories among the public cannot be disassociated from each other.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of debates over the compatibility of Islam and democracy, their importance in the EL) candidate state of Turkey which has been led by the religious-based Justice and Development Party (JDP) since 2002, and the paucity of research examining liberal-democratic value change, we examine liberal-democratic value change and its sources in Turkey between 2000 and 2008. The results of our descriptive, factor, and multivariate analyses of European and World Values Survey data (2000, 2001, 2007, and 2008) indicate that despite Huntington's (1996) and Turkish secularists' pessimism, people in Turkey have not adopted more politically religious values during this time. However, personal expressions of religiosity are on the rise, and they are intertwined with politically religious values to some extent. People in Turkey have generally adopted less politically authoritarian values, but they are more supportive of military rule in 2008 than before the JDP came to power. Ethnic tolerance peaked in 2007 but declined below its 2001 level in 2008. While human development theory helps to explain these trends and values, the case of Turkey reveals that other, more political factors -such as nationalism -may counteract liberal-democratic value change. The results are suggestive of a political realignment in Turkey that transcends a secular-religious divide. They further suggest that Turkey is moving neither 'East' nor 'West'; rather, it is very much moving in its own direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study discusses the position of Alevi identity and Alevi community with regard to the Turkish national identity-building project. There was a partial compatibility between the Kemalist objective of laicization and nation building and the Alevi practice and understanding of a ‘local’ version of ‘Turkish Islam’. Besides these compatibilities, Alevis faced the challenges of nation-building and homogenization policies, which involved homogenization in ethnic, religious and sectarian domains. Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speaking ethnically Kurdish/Zaza Alevis of Eastern Anatolia had a different experience during the project of centralization and ethnic homogenization, in comparison to Turkish-speaking Turcoman Alevis. This different experience still is a source of division among Alevi communities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article probes the transformation of Kemalism to a xenophobic nation-statism with a strong anti-western animus diluting its self-styled westernism and elitism in response to the rise of the reformist-Islamist ruling JDP and its patchy liberal rhetoric and pro-EU stance. The article points to the novel qualities of the Kemalism of the 2000s but also attests to its inherent anti-elitist, anti-liberal and anti-intellectual nature that reigned in the 1930s given that the Kemalist project in the inter-war period involved the denunciation of the Ottoman establishment with its elite and intelligentsia and its replacement with an intelligentsia of its own that is acquainted with anti-liberalism, anti-cosmopolitism and also anti-intellectualism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the past decade scholarly consensus has moved away from viewing turmoil in Turkey as a product of religious–cultural incompatibility with modernization. Instead, scholars have shown that the rise of an Islamic elite has expanded democracy in Turkey, while often vexing the secularist elite. This article reviews the most important of the new scholarship, but criticizes it for inheriting the assumption that all events in Turkey somehow hinge upon Islamist–secularist antagonism. Alternatively, insights from sociology are employed to argue that domestic Turkish discord is intimately related to industrialization and democratization, and that excessive attention to supposedly religious conflict blinds much contemporary scholarship to the intolerant Sunni-Turkish nationalism cultivated by the Turkish state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Byron has been seen as central to a Romantic vision of the Levant, the struggle for Greek independence and an idealization of Greek male love. Yet not much sustained attention has been given to Byron’s same-sex experience with Muslims or to the Ottoman culture of his beloved Greek boys. Byron grasped opportunities for same-sex erotic experience that the Ottoman Empire offered; yet by helping to establish a homogeneous Greek Christian state, he helped magnify the power of the Orthodox clergy that still acts in Greece as a brake on homoeroticism. In helping to Europeanize the Greeks, he helped destroy aspects of the Islamic world that deeply appealed to him. Byron’s Orientalism made him a bridge-builder between East and West; today we should recognize both the patriarchal despotism and the sexual and cultural wealth of the Levant he celebrated and helped destroy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article questions the assumption that the increase in visibility of religion in mass-mediated content is indicative of greater impact of religion in the public and state sphere and of a process of de-secularization. It argues that expressions of Hinduism and Islam have become inseparable from secularist histories in the respective countries. The analysis emphasizes a necessary distinction between piety, public popular culture and political activism in the name of a national religious majority, and shows that in its appropriation and redefinition of secularism and employment of religious symbolism, Hindu nationalist mobilization and governance in India are related more closely to sacralization of secularism in historical Turkish nationalism than to the Islamic movement. In both countries, we can observe a retreat rather than a greater media presence of the pious and sacred in the face of neonationalism and commercialization, which in each case produces a democratically precarious public popular culture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since Turkey's application for membership of the European Union (EU) in 1987, the EU has itself been a structural component of Turkey's political transformation. The European impact intensified after Turkey was granted the status of an official candidate at the EU's Helsinki Summit in 1999. Since then, Turkey has issued a series of reform packages with the aim of starting accession negotiations, which began in October 2005. These reforms have initiated a democratic regime that is structurally different from its predecessors in terms of its definition of political community, national identity and the territorial structure of the state. Among many other aspects of the current political transformation such as the resolution of the Kurdish problem and administrative reform, this article concentrates on how the European impact, which I label Europeanisation, has influenced state-religion relations in Turkey. Europeanisation has three major mechanisms that influence actors, institutions, ideas and interests in varying ways: institutional compliance, changing opportunity structures, and the framing of domestic beliefs and expectations. The article concentrates on how these mechanisms operate in the creation of a new regulatory framework of religion in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although nationalists and Islamists are different groups and have different organizational structures, Islamic groups used to take nationalist stances on major political issues. However, the Islamic actors' policies of the 2000s have all but put paid to the historical harmony with nationalism. The Islamic bloc, having abandoned nationalism, emerged as an advocate of antinationalist policies. Inspired by Stathis N. Kalyvas, it is argued that the Islamic elites' strategy to avert the seculars' attacks of the late 1990s initiated a path-dependent course that in the end separated them from nationalism. Their new strategy denationalized the Islamic groups, yet its direct intention was to protect themselves against the seculars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout world it is possible to see various examples of the universal religions which have strong nationalistic echoes. We notice such examples particularly in Christian tradition. Anglican Church is an example of national and local adaptation of Christianity that has strong influence of English nationalism. It is known that there appeared some sectarian movements within Islamic tradition mainly due to various social and cultural backgrounds. In this context, it is noticeable particularly from late Ottoman period onwards Islamic understanding stressing Turkish culture and identity came into prominence in Anatolia, which is so-called "Turkish Islam" today. Popular ideology of Westernisation and nationalism of that time seemed quite influential in this understanding. After the collapse of the Empire, newly founded Republic carried out a policy concerning religion, mainly Islam, aiming to create an understanding of religion which is harmonious with the founding philosophy of the Republic, mainly Westernisation, nationalisation and secularism. That is why the State changed all present institutions concerning religion founding the new ones in accord to its policy, and tried to change traditional understanding of religion sometimes by force. However, the efforts forcing people to adapt the policy of religion have generally been unsuccessful. The characteristics of Islam have certainly played an important role in this. However, the period of multi-political parties has been a turning point since during this period the people have experienced a freedom in social and cultural context in some degree. During this period, it is noticeable that Islamic understanding with strong emphasis of Turkish culture and identity, so-called "Turkish Islam", has been adapted not only the religious institutions of the State but also by some religious communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout world it is possible to see various examples of the universal religions which have strong nationalistic echoes. We notice such examples particularly in Christian tradition. Anglican Church is an example of national and local adaptation of Christianity that has strong influence of English nationalism. It is known that there appeared some sectarian movements within Islamic tradition mainly due to various social and cultural backgrounds. In this context, it is noticeable particularly from late Ottoman period onwards Islamic understanding stressing Turkish culture and identity came into prominence in Anatolia, which is so-called "Turkish Islam" today. Popular ideology of Westernisation and nationalism of that time seemed quite influential in this understanding. After the collapse of the Empire, newly founded Republic carried out a policy concerning religion, mainly Islam, aiming to create an understanding of religion which is harmonious with the founding philosophy of the Republic, mainly Westernisation, nationalisation and secularism. That is why the State changed all present institutions concerning religion founding the new ones in accord to its policy, and tried to change traditional understanding of religion sometimes by force. However, the efforts forcing people to adapt the policy of religion have generally been unsuccessful. The characteristics of Islam have certainly played an important role in this. However, the period of multi-political parties has been a turning point since during this period the people have experienced a freedom in social and cultural context in some degree. During this period, it is noticeable that Islamic understanding with strong emphasis of Turkish culture and identity, so-called "Turkish Islam", has been adapted not only the religious institutions of the State but also by some religious communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The period between the publication of "Usul-i Mimari-i Osmani" (1873) which is the first architectural history of the Ottoman era and the formulation of the Turkish History Thesis in 1930's which indicates a radical break in historiography, constitute the early phase of the architectural history in Turkey. Considering the lack of an established tradition of architectural theory or art history, the pioneering role, in this early phase, was accomplished not by architects or art historians, but by a general cultural elite motivated mainly by the nationalist concerns. During this period, Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism appear to be the three main nationalist/protonationalist ideologies. Among these, Islamism hardly had any interest in architecture, nor architectural history. During the Tanzimat era in which Ottomanism appeared and had a considerable effect among the intellectuals, architectural history and Ottomanism came together only in the agendas of those who were already interested in the arts, archeology or conservation matters. However Turkism who introduced a new concept of identity had to construct its cultural basement. Therefore architectural history took an important position in their agenda and became a practical tool to illustrate the nation's glorious past. This study aims to discuss the impact of Turkism oriented nationalism on the architectural history through the examination of the activities of some nationalist, antiquarian and scientific societies and the works of some authors of the era. Conferences, free courses, excursions constitute the main activity areas of the nationalist societies. Preparation of the photography and drawing collections of the main buildings of the past were also part of their program. Important figures of the architectural historiography of the era such as Celal Esad, Kemaleddin, Mehmed Ziya, Halil Edhem or Hamdulah Subhi were among the members of these societies and took part in their activities by giving lectures, preparing reports, or publishing in their journals. Even though they were not nationalist in their explicit aims Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni and Bilgi Derneği were also among the societies whose interest area covers architectural history. However their activities were restricted with the publication of journals and the organization of some discussions forums on the subject. Antiquarian societies, -among them Istanbul Muhibleri Cemiyeti is the earliest and the most known one-, were also organizing conferences, but were mainly concerned with the conservation problems. However, Istanbul Muhibleri Cemiyeti's publications on the Bereketzade Fountain and the Yali of Köprülü were important works of the era whose texts and drawings were prepared by architects and western art historians. The texts produced in this era are mainly articles published in the journals or periodicals of popular character. Books usually written in foreign languages and pamphlets are also among the publication genres even though they are not abundant in number. Inventories and texts which treat architecture as a rhetorical tool, constitute the two main group of works of the era. Among the authors, Celal Esad can be defined as the most illustrious and the most "professional" one. A part from his numerous publications, he also taught architectural history at the Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi. Ahmed Refik was a historian with a colorful style in which he uses architecture as the décor of the past events. Hamdullah Subhi was an amateur of art/architectural history and the "national orator" who worked as an activist for raising awareness on the subject. He also taught art history at Darülfünun. Mübarek Galib was the director of cultural affairs in the early republic and his publications are examples of inventorial works. The nature of nationalism is characterized by a dual action: Deconstructing every kind of attachment produced in the pre-modern societies and the building up of new loyalty mechanism. This dual attitude can also be observed in the texts dealing with architectural history of the era. Consequently while a tendency aims to homogenize and standardize the subject of study, the other appears to underline the differences in order to formulate new forms of belonging. In this paper Celal Esad, Mübarek Galib, Ahmed Refik and Hamdullah Subhi are studied as examples of these two attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the debates on curbing Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey, the pro-Islamic approach puts emphasis on empowering the notion of 'Islamic brotherhood' between Turks and Kurds. The socio-economic approach, on the other hand, draws attention to improving the socio-economic status of the Kurds. By using World Values Survey data, this study tests these two distinct approaches. Logit estimates provide strong support for the socio-economic approach. Individuals with a better socio-economic status (i.e. higher level of education and income) are less likely to support Kurdish ethno-nationalist formations while religion-related factors do not have a significant impact. Some theoretical and policy implications are also provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reveals the pathologies of the Turkish republican project of laicism by focusing on the differences between the ideas of Ziya Gökalp and the leading architects of this project. Ziya Gökalp reasoned within the logic of the empire and envisioned a synthesis among Turkism, westernism and Islam. The logic of the republic à la Turca, on the other hand, was shaped by a radical break from Islam. The distaste that the architects of the republican laicist project had developed towards Islam became apparent during the years between 1920 and 1925. Accordingly, the republican project of laicism nurtured a highly visible control of the state over religion rather than a separation between the affairs of the state and religion. This article also discusses the possibilities of reforming the republican project of laicism that is congenial with democratization processes in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the interplay of religion and nationalism in Turkey in the post-1990 period and discusses the prospects and pitfalls of religious nationalist movement by focusing on Gulen's Turkish Muslimhood. It is believed that the instrumental relationship between Islam and nationalism in Turkey as exemplified in the modernist religious nationalism of Gulen will help reveal that Islam has always been an indispensable element of the discourse of nationalism in Turkey and will force us to rethink the role or religion in Turkish society and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how nationalist ideologies of Panturkism and Panislam, which together make Panturanism, influenced the foreign policies of the Ottoman Empire towards Russia in the early 20th century. It describes the rise of ethnic, religious, and national identities in the Ottoman empire, the Panturanist desire to reunite with Muslims and ethnic brethren in Russian Turkestan, and the factors leading to the decision to invade Turkestan. The author argues that nationalistic Panturanism was not a causative factor in geopolitical and military decisions in the Ottoman Empire.

The notion of enlightenment plays a crucial but increasingly contested role in the political intellectual discourse in the Republic of Turkey. The paper aims at reconstructing important elements of this discourse in the example of several representative texts and intends to demonstrate that the concept of enlightenment in Turkey while serving as the key element for modernity as defined in Kemalism continues to signify the Western 'Other', thus inherently diminishing the credibility of the argument by creating an orientalised and subaltern version of Turkey's 'own' history and tradition. The paper also tentatively investigates a 'de-orientalising' proposal of the historical process that may have caused the 'forgetting' of autochthonous traditions of enlightenment and the assimilation to the European strand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the view that the AKP is "an Islamist party" and "hardly a democratic opening". It puts forward the argument that the AKP's recent election victory represents a triumph over (1) inward-looking, anti-EU, ultra-Turkish nationalism, (2) unwarranted military interference in politics, (3) selfish Kemalist desires to protect their own privileged position, and 4) misguided secular fears of a secret Islamic agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the negotiation process for Turkey's accession to the EU, the author delves into the country's current situation and its condition as a bridge. She focuses on the question of Islam and modernity, taking as her point of departure the example of Kayseri, a city and region in Central Anatolia, which is dynamic and productive without having lost its cultural and religious values for this reason. Among these values, she highlights an obstacle which distances the country from an economic rapprochement with the EU, namely the role of women in the economy, although she underscores the idea that everything indicates that this necessary change could occur soon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Might Turkey be thought of as a model of democratic Government for the rest of the Islamic world? Can Turkey be a lighthouse of democracy in the Islamic world? The objective of this work is to try, to answer these questions, and for this it focuses on two interrelated factors, which the author believes to be fundamental, in order to try to understand Turkey's domestic policy: "nationalism" and "religion", two elements that have been the object of strong debate in Turkey at the turn of the century, in the framework of the two last elections, held in April 1999 and November 2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on anthropology of Turkey in the 1990s in terms of nationalism and architecture. Overview of the contemporary invigorated polarization of culture between Kemalists and Islamists; Factors that led to the perceived collapse of a singular discourse on Islamist authenticity; Discussion of partial assent to early republican architectural culture that reflects a plea for a contemporary politics of ambivalence.

Abstract: The production of space always has a political dimension, from the design of buildings to the way public places, their ritual use and their users condition the performance of identities within them. This paper is an exploration of urban design, space and political subjectivity in cities in Turkey, using Ankara and Istanbul to illustrate two different but complementary strategies animating cities in Turkey as Kemalist. Although the Ottoman urban heritage of the two cities is very different, their de-Ottomanization by the Turkish Republic has been pursued in a uniform manner. The paper argues that one recent aspect of urban politics, the formation of a Kurdish diaspora in cities in Turkey, is best understood not only in relation to the general nation-building project of the Turkish Republic but more particularly in this case through the built environment that provokes it. Here the built environment encompasses not only the physical design of new spaces, buildings, forms and objects but also the fashioning of space via nationalist practice, performance and symbols. In this way the paper seeks to partially politicize phenomenological approaches to the city by re-connecting inhabitants'' use and experience of space to State power as constituted through its orchestration of space. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article focuses on the experiences of Konca Kuris, a veiled Turkish activist, in order to explore the meaning of feminism and the construction of the feminist subject in the non-West. I specifically argue that feminist activism gains meaning in and through interactions among different groups of women and within larger historical discourses. Through a focused analysis of 20th-century Turkish political history, I unpack the multilayered formation and reception of Kuris's experiences with respect to the nationalist trajectory of secularization, interactions among local feminist groups, and the patriarchal Islamist elite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author focuses on the significance of Islam and Turanian in the context of nation building in Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan. He theorizes that Islam and Turanian are used for constructing and imagining both national and transnational concepts of identity. The author discusses translocality, defining it as a milieu in which forms of social life and political articulation related to the construction of the nation state are created. He discusses a number of topics including Uzbek-Turkish translocality, trade in Central Asia, language and culture, and Islam in the region.

Presents a study on the Focus of Supreme Loyalty (FSL) by examining the relations between nationalism, Islamism and globalization since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Discussion on the processes and concepts involved in FSL; Characteristics of FSL; Groups which benefit from the order of things created by globalization.

Focuses on the modernization in Turkey. Impact of Kurdish nationalism and Islamic reactionism to its modernization; Conclusion.

Focuses on the relationship between nationalism and Islam in turkey. Impact of the establishment of its Republic in the nineteen twenties; Conclusion.

Presents discussions on the history of nationalism in Turkey. Details on Islamic solidarity; Variants of political parties; Contributions of the Alevi population on Kemalism.