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Como devemos conduzir nossas investigações morais para decidir no que acreditar sobre questões morais? Como a plausibilidade de juízos, teorias e princípios morais deve ser avaliada? Como devemos tentar remover nossas dúvidas quando estamos incertos sobre o que é certo ou errado, bom ou mau, justo ou injusto? O método do equilíbrio reflexivo, desenvolvido por John Rawls em A Theory of Justice (1971) e desde então adotado por um crescente número de filósofos, é uma tentativa de responder a questões como essas. O equilíbrio reflexivo pode ser (e de fato foi) interpretado de vários modos, muitos dos quais completamente incompatíveis entre si, mas as duas visões mais representativas do método são os modelos coerentista e intuicionista. Neste artigo o meu objetivo é argumentar que nós deveríamos entender o equilíbrio reflexivo como um método intuicionista de investigação moral. Assim, eu comparo essas duas visões, como elas diferem no modo como concebem o funcionamento e os objetivos do método, para defender que a tradição coerentista de interpretação do método reduz a investigação moral a uma mera busca por coerência, com isso ignorando a função metodológica (e epistemológica) que intuições morais desempenham em nossas reflexões morais. Em contraste, a interpretação intuicionista oferece um modelo de investigação que integra intuição morais com a busca por coerência, explicando por que e como esses dois elementos funcionam em conjunto em nossas reflexões morais. A minha alegação é a de que apenas quando o equilíbrio reflexivo é interpretado de acordo com esse modelo intuicionista que ele pode ser visto em uso na prática reflexiva de filósofos morais reconhecidamente competentes, como John Rawls, Judith Jarvis Thomson e Peter Singer.

Part 1 explores David Hume’s and Francis Hutcheson’s criticisms of Clarkean ethical rationalism (CER). It also discusses modern criticisms of CER, and rational intuitionism more broadly, derived from Hutcheson and Hume, including: the fact/value distinction; moral ‘fetishism’; and, ‘queerness’Part 2 shows how CER can respond to Humean and Hutchesonian criticisms.Just as the Clarkeans have been associated with the secular legacy of Enlightenment rationalism, a thinned out conception of reason has been read back into CER.Factoring conscience and recta ratio (right reason) into CER contextualises the analogy between mathematics and morals, highlighting the distinction between ‘original obligations’ and ‘additional motivations’, and ‘tripartite’ conception of moral duty.In CER, the phrase ‘right in itself’ means ‘according to reason’ where reason is the law of divine and human nature. Consequently, the apparently circular claim ‘do what is right because it is right’ includes a normative role for God’s will and human affection.

This article addresses the philosophical foundations of human rights without recourse to religion or metaphysics. It begins with the requirements of a non-religious theory of human rights and then discusses Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach. Because her account relies on intuition to play a major role, this article compares two intuitionists, Johannes Morsink and David Little, whose works address the moral intuitionism of those who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as the foundations of human rights more generally. It argues that Little's rational intuitionism represents the best possible intuitionist defense of human rights, yet there are important questions of moral growth and attention to context it must answer going forward.

A close reading of Descartes’ works, particularly his Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, calls into question the common interpretation of Peirce’s ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ and ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ as being anti-Cartesian. In particular, Descartes’ conception of intuition differs from Peirce’s, and on one plausible reading of Descartes his intuitionism actually mirrors Peirce’s inferentialism in key respects. Given these similarities between Descartes and Peirce, the dogmatic status of the anti-Cartesian interpretation of Peirce becomes evident.

Abstract. Previous choice blindness studies showed that people sometimes fail to notice when their choice is changed. Subsequently, they are willing to provide reasons for the manipulated choice which is the opposite of the one they made just seconds ago. In the present study, participants first made binary judgments about the wrongness of described behaviors and then were shown an opposite answer during a second reading of some of the descriptions. Half of the participants saw the answer during the second presentation of the description and the other half saw it only after the presentation. Based on Haidt’s Social intuitionist model, we hypothesized that participants in the latter group would be less likely to reconcile their intuition with the presented answer and thus they would be more likely to reject it. However, we found no difference between the groups.

The article discusses the metaethical views of the philosophers associated with the Lvov-Warsaw School, namely Tadeusz Czeżowski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Marian Przełęcki, and Władysław Tatarkiewicz. The common feature of their views is the presence of axiological intuition, understood as direct cognition of values. The similarities as well as the differences between the views of the mentioned authors are listed. These analyses are preceded by conceptual distinctions between types of intuition and kinds of intuitionism.

The paper aim draws together two ideas that have figured in different strands of discussion in business ethics: the ideas of intuition and of reflection. They are considered in company with the third, complementary, idea of analysis. It is argued that the interplay amongst these is very important in business ethics. The relationship amongst the three ideas can be understood by reference to parts of modern cognitive psychology, including dual-process theory and the Social Intuitionist Model. Intuition can be misleading when based on fast and frugal heuristics, and reasoning needs social exchange if it is to support moral judgment effectively, but in the complex institutional environment of business, reflection and analysis can underpin social communication and feedback to develop sound intuition. Reflection and analysis are both more deliberate, systematic judgment processes than intuition, but are distinguished by the fact that reflection embraces hypothetical thinking and imagination, while analysis is careful, step-by-step reasoning. Examples of business ethics problems illustrate the need for both of these processes, and also suggest how they themselves can be enhanced in the same social exchange process that underpins the development of good intuition. Refereed/Peer-reviewed

What does current empirically informed moral psychology imply about the goals that can be realistically achieved in college-level applied ethics courses? This paper takes up this question from the vantage point of Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model of human moral judgment. I summarize Haidt’s model, and then consider a variety of pedagogical goals. I begin with two of the loftiest goals of ethics education, and argue that neither is within realistic reach if Haidt’s model is correct. I then look at three goals that can be achieved if his model is correct; but each of these goals, I argue, lacks significant value. I end by identifying three goals that are of significant value and also realistically attainable on Haidt’s model. These should be the focus of applied ethics pedagogy if Haidt’s model is correct.

I start with a brief look at what the classic British intuitionists (Ewing, Broad, Ross) had to say about the relation between judgment and emotion. I then look at some more recent work in the intuitionist tradition and try to develop a conception of moral emotion as a form of practical seeming, suggesting that some moral intuitions are exactly that sort of emotion. My general theme is that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake and that intuitionism can happily accommodate the results of recent work in empirical moral psychology.

It has been contended that it is unjustified to believe, as Weyl did, that formalism's victory against intuitionism entails a defeat of the phenomenological approach to mathematics. The reason for this contention, recently put forth by Paolo Mancosu and Thomas Ryckman, is that, unlike intuitionistic Anschauung, phenomenological intuition could ground classical mathematics. I argue that this indicates a misinterpretation of Weyl's view, for he did not take formalism to prevail over intuitionism with respect to grounding classical mathematics. I also point out that the contention is false: if intuitionism fails, in the way Weyl thought it did, i.e. with respect to supporting scientific objectivity, then one should also reject the phenomenological approach, in the same respect.

In this note I am reflecting on interrelations between three concepts of truth: (1) that employed by Hilbert arguing his formalist view on the nature of mathematics, (2) Freges idea of truth supported by mathematical intuition, and (3) known as Aristotelian correspondence idea of truth concerning any propositions not merely mathematical. Zadanie „ Wdrożenie platformy Open Journal System dla czasopisma „ Bulletin of the Section of Logic” finansowane w ramach umowy 948/P-DUN/2016 ze środków Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.

Recent studies concerning mathematical cognition show that we may find mathematical cognitive capacities in young infants and monkeys. They show that we possess an innate intuition of small natural integers around the age of six month. Yet, if we speak of intuitions, they are intuitions of what? So, the target of my study is to try to clarify the role intuitions play in mathematical cognition. My claim is that the results of these studies endorse a form of mathematical structuralism ; the actual world is mathematically structured.

Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient version, "Mencian Moral Modularity," which claims four innate modules, and "Social Intuitionist Modularity," which claims five innate modules. We compare these two moral modularity models, discuss whether the postulated modules are best conceived as perceptual/Fodorian or emotional/Darwinian, and consider whether assuming MMH true has any normative ethical consequences whatsoever. The discussion of MMH reconnects cognitive science with normative ethics in a way that involves the reassertion of the "is-ought" problem. We explain in a new way what this problem is and why it would not yield. The reason does not involve the logic of "ought," but rather the plasticity of human nature and the realistic options to "grow" and "do" human nature in multifarious legitimate ways.

This paper provides an analysis of the key term aidagara (‘betweenness’) in the philosophical ethics of Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960), in response to and in light of the recent movement in Japanese Buddhist studies known as ‘Critical Buddhism’. The Critical Buddhist call for a turn away from ‘topical’ or intuitionist thinking and towards (properly Buddhist) ‘critical’ thinking, while problematic in its bipolarity, raises the important issue of the place of ‘reason’ vs ‘intuition’ in Japanese Buddhist ethics. In this paper, a comparison of Watsuji's ‘ontological quest’ with that of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Watsuji's primary Western source and foil, is followed by an evaluation of a corresponding search for an ‘ontology of social existence’ undertaken by Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962). Ultimately, the philosophico-religious writings of Watsuji Tetsurō allow for the ‘return’ of aesthesis as a modality of social being that is truly dimensionalized, and thus falls prey neither to the verticality of topicalism no...

The literature on conscience in medicine has paid little attention to what is meant by the word 'conscience.' This article distinguishes between retrospective and prospective conscience, distinguishes synderesis from conscience, and argues against intuitionist views of conscience. Conscience is defined as having two interrelated parts: (1) a commitment to morality itself; to acting and choosing morally according to the best of one's ability, and (2) the activity of judging that an act one has done or about which one is deliberating would violate that commitment. Tolerance is defined as mutual respect for conscience. A set of boundary conditions for justifiable respect for conscientious objection in medicine is proposed.

I begin with an explication of "thought experiment". I then clarify the role that intuitions play in thought experiments by addressing two important issues: (1) the informativeness of thought experiments and (2) the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments in philosophy and the natural sciences. I defend a naturalistic account of intuitions that provides a plausible explanation of the informativeness of thought experiments, which, in turn, allows thought experiments to be reconstructed as arguments. I also specify criteria for distinguishing bad "intuition pumps" from legitimate thought experiments. These criteria help us to avoid being seduced by the dangerous suggestive power of misleading intuitions.

The social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and informed by prior reasoning. More generally, there is considerable evidence from outside the laboratory that people actively engage in reasoning when faced with real-world moral dilemmas. Together, these facts limit the strong claims of the social intuitionist model concerning the irrelevance of conscious deliberation.

After presenting the current version of principlism, in the process repudiating a widespread deductivist misinterpretation, a fundamental metaethical disagreement is developed by outlining the deductivistic critique of principlism. Once the grounds for this critique have been understood, the dispute between casuistry, deductivism and principlism can be restructured, and the model of "application" proven to be the central difference. In the concluding section it is argued that principlism is the most attractive position, if the perceptual model of weak intuitionism is made more explicit.

In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if the process is successful, be justified. Since the method of reflective equilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions, it does not constitute a form of intuitionism in any substantial sense. It may be classified as intuitionist only in the minimal sense of not reducing justification to a matter of inference relations alone., Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17 (2), ISSN:1386-2820, ISSN:1572-8447

Critique de la reference aux intuitions qui constitue une methode argumentative privilegiee dans le cadre de la philosophie analytique contemporaine. Mesurant le role de la linguistique de N. Chomsky et de S. Kripke dans l'essor de la methodologie intuitionniste, et examinant le contexte analytique d'une grammaire transformationnelle, l'A. compare l'utilisation des intuitions, des explications scientifiques et des generalisations dans le domaine du raisonnement logique (Frege, Russell) et du raisonnement scientifique (epistemologie naturalisee, Quine)

Presentation de l'ouvrage de L. Falkenstein consacre a l'intuitionnisme de Kant et proposant un commentaire de l'esthetique transcendantale de la «Critique de la raison pure». Examinant la conception kantienne de l'espace, du temps, de la sensibilite et de l'intuition, l'A. montre que Falkenstein rejette l'interpretation classique de la these de la synthese des representations et etablit une distinction entre synthese de la perception (dans l'intuition) et synthese de la recognition (dans le concept). Soulevant les problemes que pose la lecture de Falkenstein du point de vue de l'exegese kantienne de la localisation et de la distinction intuition/entendement, l'A. mesure les consequences de sa position sur les theses generales de Kant sur la temporalite des representations et l'inconnaissabilite

Kevin Mulligan has argued that intuitionism about values is a powerful tool to explain, among other things, “the distinction between what I ought to do and what I must do (practical necessity)” (Mulligan, Leben mit Gefuhlen: Emotionen, Werte und ihre Kritik, pp 141–164, 2009). The distinction concerns the difference between moral norms, conceived of as external reasons of acting, and personal norms, conceived of as internal reasons. The kind of intuition the argument relies on is affective and characterized in terms of “being struck by value”. One crucial assumption is that affectivity subsumes epistemic states (non-reactive knowledge) and motivational states (reactive emotions). Value feeling is presented as a kind of non-propositional knowledge that can and often does acquaint us with what we value most, with the inner norms or “vocations” that constitute the person we are. The aim of the present paper is to explore to what extent this specific view on personhood that links the knowledge-emotion-value relation of affectivity (KEV) to a personal property of inner normativity (IN) can modify or improve theories of so-called social persons or plural persons. In a first step, I will outline the criteria established for “plural persons” by their advocates. On the basis of these criteria, I will then discuss some reasons for the claim that “plural persons” do have inner norms of the kind mentioned before. In a third step, I intend to show how the KEVIN account interferes with some of the criteria for “plural persons”, mainly because of its emphasis on affective knowledge. I conclude that accepting KEVIN either leads to abandoning the claim that plural persons have inner norms or requires the criteria for plural persons to be modified.

The present chapter centers around the notion of intuition and how it functions in Husserl’s phenomenology on the one hand, and in Jaspers’s Psychopathology, on the other hand. Our line of reasoning challenges two widespread views. First, we argue that Husserl’s conception of an intentional analysis referring to a methodically “purified” human consciousness requires an account of what we call “rational hermeneutics,” as distinct from a more conventional individualizing and historicizing hermeneutics in the vein of Dilthey. The relating aspects are explained in terms of the inextricably interrelated notions of attitude, intuition and description (AID-Thesis). Our relating considerations address the overall effects of Husserl’s transcendental turn and result in specifying a complex notion of intuition. Secondly, we argue that Jaspers misconceived Husserl’s early phenomenology (“descriptive psychology”) and that, in general, it is short-sighted to exclusively focus on Husserl’s Logical Investigations as was usual among Jaspers scholars for a rather long period. Instead, we contend that understanding several basic conceptual and methodical commitments that are implied in Jaspers’s Psychopathology (e.g., his defense of a plurality of methods; the distinction between different types of intuition) considerably benefits from the complex notion of intuition which can be extracted from Husserl’s conception of transcendental phenomenology.

It is the purpose of this paper to offer an account of Mill’s metaethics, byexpanding on clues given recently by Dale Miller, and previously by JohnSkorupski, to the effect that, when it comes to the foundations of hisphilosophy, Mill might share more with the intuitionists than we areaccustomed to think. Common wisdom holds that Mill had no time forthe normativity of intuitions. I wish to dispute, or at least temper, thisdogma, by claiming that Mill’s attitude towards intuitions is far morecomplex and ambivalent than is generally thought. The investigation,then, centres on the question of whether, for Mill, intuitions carrynormative warrant: whether, in itself, the fact that a belief is intuitionalprovides reason to think that belief a warranted one. I argue that,according to Mill, our belief in the reliability of inductive moves andapparent memories, as well as the desirability of pleasure, is vindicated bysomething akin to intuition. Although his endorsement of the normativityof these intuitions might seem to be in tension with the arguments heoffers against the ‘intuitionist school’, this tension is only apparent.

The question is how it is possible for a priori intuition to be “of” objects that are not given a priori. Kant’ own solution to the puzzle... appeals to the idea that a priori intuition contains only the form of our sensibility. This evidently removes the causal dependence of intuition on the object. It is a nice question what is left of the characterization of intuition that gives rise to the puzzle. Kant’ solution seems to allow the phenome- nological presence of an object to be preserved, but it is a further question whether what one has is a representation of a physical object, not individually identified and not really present, or a representation of a mathematical object. The former is not ruled out by the a priori character of pure intuition, as the “presence” might be that characteristic of imagination rather han sense. In fact, a number of passages in Kant indicate that just that is his position. Kant’ puzzle may have force for us, but we are not likely to accept the position that pure intuition contains only the form of sensibility, a central part of Kant’ transcendental idealism, at least not as Kant understood it.

Recent Social Intuitionist work suggests that moral judgments are intuitive (not based on conscious deliberation or any significant chain of inference), and that the reasons we produce to explain or justify our judgments and actions are for the most part post hoc rationalizations rather than the actual source of those judgments. This is consistent with work on judgment and explanation in other domains, and it correctly challenges one-sidedly rationalistic accounts. We suggest that in fact reasoning has a great deal of influence on moral judgments and on intuitive judgments in general. This influence is not apparent from study of judgments simply in their immediate context, but it is crucial for the question of how cognition can help us avoid deleterious effects and enhance potentially beneficial effects of affect on judgment, action, and cognition itself. We begin with established work on several reactive strategies for cognitive control of affect (e.g., suppression, reappraisal), then give special attention to more complex sorts of conflict (“extended deliberation”) involving multiple interacting factors, both affective and reflective. These situations are especially difficult to study in a controlled way, but we propose some possible experimental approaches. We then review proactive strategies for control, including avoidance of temptation and mindfulness meditation (Froeliger et al., 2012, this issue). We give special attention to the role of slow or “cool” cognitive processes (e.g., deliberation, planning, and executive control) in the inculcation of long-term dispositions, traits, intuitions, skills, or habits. The latter are critical because they in turn give rise to a great many of our fast, intuitive judgments. The reasoning processes involved here are distinct from post hoc rationalizations and have a very real impact on countless intuitive judgments in concrete situations. This calls for a substantial enlargement of research on cognitive control, drawing on work in developmental psychology, automatization, educational theory, and other fields.

L'A. analyse le programme constructiviste dans la theorie de la cognition de l'espace de Berkeley, ainsi que sa theorie de la vision intuitionniste

In this article, we analyse data collected in an extensive study with 40 interviews and 1112 questionnaires, applied to teachers of all school levels. In order to treat the question about the role of intuition in ethical thought, we discuss data where teachers perspectives emphasise the intuitive and emotional components of professional ethics. Questionnaires data suggest that there are significant differences between teachers in the sense that the younger teachers in the profession, of feminine gender, and teachers of the youngest presents major indices of intuitionist perspective, in comparison with the other teachers. These data are crossed with interview data in order to a comprehensive interpretation., Dans ce texte on fait une analyse de données sur la pensée éthique des enseignants, recueillies dans le contexte d’une étude extensive réalisée avec 40 entretiens et avec 1112 questionnaires auprès d’enseignants de tous les niveaux d’enseignement. Pour approfondir la question sur le rôle da l’intuition dans la pensée éthique, sont discutés les donnés où les perspectives des enseignants emphatisent les composants intuitives et émotionnelles de l’éthique professionnelle. Les données des questionnaires révèlent des différences significatives entre les enseignants, car sont les plus jeunes dans la profession, les femmes et les enseignants des plus jeunes qui présentent des indices plus élevés d’une perspective intuitionniste, en comparaison avec les autres. Les données sont croisées avec les donnés des entretiens pour une compréhension interprétative., Neste texto é feita uma análise de dados sobre o pensamento ético-deontológico de professores, recolhidos num estudo extensivo realizado com entrevistas junto de 40 professores de todos os níveis de ensino e com 1112 questionários aplicados a educadores de infância e professores de todos os ciclos de ensino não superior. Para aprofundar a questão acerca do papel da intuição no pensamento ético, são realçados e discutidos os dados relativos às perspectivas dos professores que enfatizam as componentes intuitivas e emocionais da ética profissional. Os dados dos questionários apontam para diferenças significativas entre professores, no sentido de serem os professores dos mais novos (educadores e professores de 1ºciclo do ensino básico), do género feminino e mais jovens na profissão que apresentam maiores índices relativos a uma perspectiva intuicionista, por comparação com os restantes. Estes dados são cruzados com os dados das entrevistas com vista a uma compreensão interpretativa.

In the last two chapters I have given an account of the core theory of intuitionism (Chapter 1) and of different theories that are compatible with the core theory (Chapter 2). In doing so, I have shown that many common objections do not threaten the core theory of intuitionism, either because they are based on a wrong idea of what intuitionism is or because they are directed against specific versions of intuitionism and not against the core theory. In this chapter, I will return to the core theory as explained in Chapter 1 and discuss and reject the major objections that have been raised against it. These objections can be subsumed under the following headings. Intuitionism is dogmatic (section 2), it is simplistic and naive (section 3), and it presupposes an obscure faculty of intuition (section 4). I will consider these objections in detail.