Conscience, Normativity, and Rational Intuition

Part 1 explores David Hume’s and Francis Hutcheson’s criticisms of Clarkean ethical rationalism (CER). It also discusses modern criticisms of CER, and rational intuitionism more broadly, derived from Hutcheson and Hume, including: the fact/value distinction; moral ‘fetishism’; and, ‘queerness’Part 2 shows how CER can respond to Humean and Hutchesonian criticisms.Just as the Clarkeans have been associated with the secular legacy of Enlightenment rationalism, a thinned out conception of reason has been read back into CER.Factoring conscience and recta ratio (right reason) into CER contextualises the analogy between mathematics and morals, highlighting the distinction between ‘original obligations’ and ‘additional motivations’, and ‘tripartite’ conception of moral duty.In CER, the phrase ‘right in itself’ means ‘according to reason’ where reason is the law of divine and human nature. Consequently, the apparently circular claim ‘do what is right because it is right’ includes a normative role for God’s will and human affection.