Search

The article discusses various issues related to China's evaluation of adjustment to the U.S. security policy since September 11, 2001. China is watching the U.S. change of defense doctrine, especially regarding nuclear strategy. Currently China believes that the U.S. will continue its nuclear as well as conventional forces modernization, especially with precision attack capabilities, as a part of its Revolution in Military Affairs. Certainly, China is advancing its own modernization in nuclear weapons arsenal, information warfare commanding and the capability of precise delivery of its own munitions. China is determined to avoid a major confrontation, vis-a-vis Washington, at least in the next two decades and is trying to deepen the current Three-C's relationship with the United States.

Highlights China's position paper on the issue of international terrorism, released on September 25, 2001. Threat posed by terrorism to international peace and security; Opposition of the Chinese government to all forms of terrorism; Responsibilities and obligations of all States in their cooperation to fight international terrorism.

Existing scholarship has demonstrated that theorising about security is Eurocentric. This leaves us with a partial account of the concept of security, which is presented as universal. This in turn generates explanatory problems because we are only seeing part of the picture. Yet there have been few attempts to move beyond critiques of Eurocentrism to examine the concept of security 'elsewhere'. This paper takes China as its starting point, asking: what can looking at China tell us about security? In answering this question, the paper makes two contributions. First, it presents new empirical findings, building a conceptual history of security in China. Drawing on 140 key texts dating 1926–2022, the paper traces the emergence of the concept of security in China and its evolution through three explicit security concepts. Drawing on postcolonial insights it demonstrates that these concepts are hybrid, evolving out of multiple domestic and international influences. They have similarities as well as differences with the Eurocentric concept that dominates International Security Studies (ISS) and produce a discrete approach towards security that has been overlooked in a discipline that uses 'Europe to explain Asia'. Second, considering these insights, the paper demonstrates that the universal concept of security that underpins theorising in ISS is partial and misleading. Differences in security concepts matter for theorising security and for understanding security policy. Consequently, I argue that we need to provincialize the concept of security: a truly global security studies is of necessity a provincial one attuned to difference and similarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced with ongoing large-scale cyber espionage and the rising prominence of information operations targeting social media, the cyber conflict scholarship has entered into a renewed debate over how to characterise the role and place of cyberspace conflict in broader patterns of international security. In response to these empirical challenges, this paper argues that the current scholarship is limited because it uses the 'cyberspace domain' – a doctrinal concept originating in the U.S. military – as a conceptual foundation. This paper argues that the cyberspace domain should be replaced with a holistic conception of "information competition" of which there are three paradigms: cyberspace domain, mixed, and information. All states seek to intervene in the flow and storage of information across domestic and international contexts; information competition is better able to capture information-related interactions between states and observed empirical variation in how states approach information technology and conflict. For example, China and Russia centre 'information' as the core organising framework for their approach to information technology and conflict. This paper also demonstrates how an information competition framework better clarifies the role that the U.S. has played in shaping Russian and Chinese approaches to information competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research in security studies contends that information warfare (IW) is becoming a critical element in states' overall security strategies. Additionally, many researchers posit that artificial intelligence (AI) is quickly emerging as an important component of digital communications and states' military applications worldwide. However, less is known regarding how states are incorporating AI in their information warfare and influence operations (IWIO). Thus, given the growing importance of AI and IW in global security, this paper examines how the United States, China, and Russia are incorporating AI in their IWIO strategies and tactics. We find that the US, China, and Russia are utilizing AI in their IWIO approaches in significant ways depending on each state's overall IW strategy, with important implications for international security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The qualitative and quantitative balance in strategic nuclear capabilities between major global nuclear-armed states had been the subject of a longstanding international bilateral and multilateral treaty regime, which since the onset of the 21st century has undergone a process of continual degradation. With the gradual establishment of a more confrontational multipolar world order, the treaty regime as well as the guarantees it provided for international security have come into further peril. The present paper will examine the defining characteristics of the nuclear treaty regime, the factors leading to a point of balance in preceding decades between the nuclear superpowers of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and the transformational factors, which have destabilised the balance in contemporary times. Furthermore, the paper will extend the discussion on the future of nuclear arms control to the changing geopolitical landscape and the rise of new major global powers such as the People's Republic of China. Ultimately the paper, attempts to establish the framework of the future evolution of the nuclear arms debate and the possibilities of reaching a new point of stability and deterrence between the mentioned state actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is the only nuclear-armed country in the world that has an unconditional No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy. China's practice of this policy and its impact on international security have important implications for the international debate around NFU and inform other countries' potential consideration of NFU. Whether NFU policy could deliver the expected benefits of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, containing nuclear arms competition, and mitigating the risk of nuclear proliferation depends on the perceived credibility by other countries of such policy. This paper examines a number of internal challenges that may affect the perceived credibility of China's NFU policy. One of them is Chinese military strategists' expressed interest in threatening nuclear use in a conventional conflict under certain conditions through the so-called "lower the nuclear coercion threshold" operation. The others include the lack of institutional constraint in the Chinese system to ensure implementation of NFU and the growing ambiguities about the NFU policy's applicability in specific scenarios as a result of new technological development. The paper offers recommendations on how China can address these challenges and work with other countries to create the conditions for the international adoption of NFU, including how to address the concerns of nonnuclear weapons states about the conventional-level security consequences. It concludes by discussing how China and the other nuclear-armed states can better fulfill their disarmament obligations by strengthening the existing NFU policy and promoting credible NFU policy more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of significant international events like the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s assertive diplomacy, the recently developed concept of strategic corruption has been increasingly employed to discuss how corruption infiltrates international affairs. Unlike traditional corruption, strategic corruption is commonly understood to be a sophisticated mechanism that states use to achieve geopolitical objectives, intertwining economic and security concerns. This paper explores this concept, analyzes its relationship with related phenomena, and proposes a theoretical framework to contextualize strategic corruption within national and international arenas. The framework depicts strategic corruption as a multifaceted process spanning three spheres: domestic (source), international, and domestic (target). Each sphere involves unique pathways aimed at corrupting institutions in the target domain. This approach contributes to our understanding of the complex dynamics between corruption, national security, and foreign affairs, offering a coherent tool to address these challenges within the fields of international relations and anti-corruption studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies articles about terrorism in the representative Chinese newspaper People's Daily in order to analyze how traditional Chinese political culture, in particular Confucianism, permeates contemporary Chinese geopolitical discourse. Specific attention is paid to articles on terrorism and the U.S. "war on terror." The author argues that, instead of interpreting terrorist actions and U.S. counter-terrorism politics as binary opposites, using a lens of a Confucianism-style morality, the Chinese newspaper observes connections between them. The author considers how these discourses affect China's perception of itself in the realm of international security politics. The representative Chinese newspaper articles on terrorism, in addition to China's repositioning on the global stage, reveal a geopolitical fault-line with strong moral undertones. The paper sheds light on the historic and often implicit political impact of Confucianism within present day Chinese geopolitical discourse and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, the world was in a process of transition from the unipolar system which had ruled the world since the end of the Cold War to an increasingly multilateral order. With this regard, there was a kind of consensus between academics, decision-makers and other interested actors in the international arena in the sense that the world was transitioning towards a much more multipolar order in which the US would lose gradually its status of the only superpower for the benefit of mainly China but also for other Asian-Pacific states. The aim of this paper is to examine the extent of the consequences of the COVID-19 at the geopolitical level in the framework of global power redistribution. In this sense, this paper will analyse if the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly altered the US and Chinese social, economic and political scenarios in the framework of the great power competition and also if the pandemic will substantially shift the geopolitical balance of the world. This study will try to answer which have been the effects of the pandemic in terms of geopolitics and the prospects of its impact on the global power redistribution and international leadership competition at the short and medium term. In this sense, the main question to be answered in this research is: Has the COVID-19 pandemic lead to a faster than previously expected Western loss of economic and political power able to lead to new world order transition dynamics with significant consequences for the international security architecture? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ordnance Industry Automation is the property of Editorial Board for Ordnance Industry Automation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Tensions in the EU-China relationship have hampered cooperation in various sectors, including a set of transnational security issues where engagement with China is unavoidable but nevertheless profoundly challenging. The EU maintains a "tripartite" strategy, originally outlined in its 2019 Strategic Outlook, seeing China as a "partner", but also as an economic "competitor" and a "systemic rival". China's former State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has described the European approach as suffering from "cognitive dissonance". As a result, and as demonstrated by the failure of the 2022 EU-China Summit, the two parties are now operating within two different frameworks, and constructive cooperation has become increasingly difficult. By working with Qin Yaqing's concept of "relationality", this article aims to contribute to a better conceptualisation of the ways in which the EU and China can work with each other to tackle global issues. Challenging the literature that tries to explain the shift in EU-China relations by focusing on individual actors, this research's approach focuses on the relations between actors. Adopting this ontology of relations, this research paper analyses how, in the EU-China relationship, relations between the two parties contribute to creating their own identities and motivate their actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore the new dynamics of U.S.-Vietnam security relations from 2011 to 2017. It begins with a review of the attempts before 2011 to establish a foundation for a normal security relationship between the United States and Vietnam, and progresses in the scope and pace of the bilateral relationship in this field. The paper then examines the process of a deepening security relationship between the two countries from 2011 to 2017, focusing on the motivations for increased security cooperation and the developments in five main areas of cooperation, namely maritime security, high-level dialogues, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations. Finally, this paper looks at the potential and limits of the U.S.-Vietnam security relationship, analyzing the possibilities for building a more balanced and effective security relationship and the limitations of U.S.-Vietnam security cooperation. In conclusion, the authors argue that the years from 2011 to 2017 witnessed new and positive moves in the U.S.-Vietnam security relationship. This is a highly significant development for Vietnam and the United States and an illustration of the fast geostrategic change underway in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important questions about China's rising military and economic power is whether this trend will eventually lead to confrontation with the United States in the future or if China will become even more deeply integrated into the contemporary world order. John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism claims that great powers relentlessly maximize their power in a highly competitive anarchical world in order to assure their survival by trying to achieve regional hegemony at the expense of other powerful actors. Unlike many other contemporary liberal and realist thinkers, Mearsheimer predicts that China will try to become regional hegemon in Asia, which will inevitably lead to counterbalancing moves by today's sole regional hegemon – the United States. For Mearsheimer, significant change in China's material capabilities will unescapably lead it to a conflict with an American‐led counter‐balancing coalition, similar to the situation during the Cold War superpower competition. In this paper, I argue that the theory of offensive realism is lacking both in theoretical accuracy and in interpretation of empirical cases chosen by its author. That is especially true of contemporary offensive realism's analysis of China's rise to become a true global power. Understanding the deficiencies of offensive realism is crucial for avoiding foreign policy prescriptions that might lead to further deterioration of future Sino–American relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the geopolitical and geostrategic policy of the EU, the US and China in the Caucasus. It says that the foreign policy of these countries in the Caucasus is different. This article includes events that occurred in the previous century. The research paper also illustrates the changing priorities of foreign policy towards the CIS countries and the Caucasus. It covers the exploration and transportation of energy resources from this region along with the national security of the CIS countries. The article also refers to quotations of world–renowned scientists, politicians and analysts who emphasize the similarities and differences in political decision– making in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme, China is unwilling to join the partially harsh anti-Iran rhetoric of the US and the EU3. China has averted the imposition of sanctions and only abstained from its veto power as a permanent UNSC member after considerable diplomatic persuasion by 'the West'. Beijing was cautious not to spoil its image as a 'responsible Great Power', walking a diplomatic tightrope in balancing a pragmatic-commercial approach to business in Iran and mollifying Western security concerns related to the Iranian nuclear programme, following the tradition of Deng Xiaoping's doctrine of 'maintaining a low profile'. Increasingly, however, China is conveying a more assertive foreign policy and is no longer hiding its strategic interests. This paper argues that with the EU3 being at the forefront of nuclear diplomacy with Iran, disagreements with China over the EU's recent sanctions policy against Iran can, but need not, be a step in the direction of EU-China strategic alienation in the search for long-term solutions to the Iranian nuclear stalemate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1997, the Chinese Party-state has engaged in a campaign of transnational repression against the Uyghur diaspora. This campaign has grown in severity since the 2014 declaration of the People's War on Terror and Strike Hard campaigns, which, taken together, involved a program of mass incarceration for the Turkic peoples of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). This article examines the everyday impacts of extraterritorial persecution on the Uyghur diaspora and their ability to successfully integrate into their new host societies and exercise their political and cultural agency. The article draws from nineteen in-depth interviews with Uyghurs living around the world and a dataset of over 7,000 incidents of China's targeting of Uyghurs globally since 1997. We examine how Chinese practices and the everyday effects of transnational repression vary between different regime types. We argue that Uyghurs experience both marginalization in their host country and the threat of transnational repression from China, a particularly precarious situation that we term double precarity. This double precarity is felt most acutely in more authoritarian contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Medunarodni Problemi is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article evaluates whether the threat posed to international security by a rising China has been overstated. The literature analyzed during the research reveals that China's rise does most definitely pose a threat to international security, a threat widely interpreted as being of an economic, military, and ideological nature. The article argues that claims of a China threat have not been overstated, but they have been misguided. There has been an overfocus upon China's military build-up, as well as focusing upon the events of the economic development of China, as opposed to concentrating on the consequences of this economic development. It is fundamental that the appropriate factors of the threat are focused upon and considered, in order for the international community to adapt and respond in a manner that minimizes the impact upon international security, as the threat is likely to grow in significance over future decades, as China's phenomenal rise continues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) first came into being as a result of border negotiations between Russia and China, but evolved shortly thereafter into more than this. It is a regional organization comprised of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with its mandate now encompassing trade and security. Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan have been granted observer status, which increased the world's attention to the SCO. However, none of the observer states were upgraded to full membership, despite their willingness to do so. Such circumstances may cause misunderstanding between existing observer states and other nominated countries planning to apply to the SCO. In addition to that, the failure of a rational decision on expansion of the Organization raises doubts about the concordance and harmony within the SCO. Although it has six full member states, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization identifies itself as an organization in which decision-making is dominated by China and Russia. These two main actors, with their giant markets, make the Shanghai Region attractive, as well as politically independent of the West. Iran is one of the five observer states that applied for full membership during President Ahmadinejad's administration in early 2005. However, even though almost a decade has passed since this intention was expressed, Iran continues to cooperate with the SCO. Newly elected President Hassan Rouhani's pragmatic approach has almost resolved the country's conflict with the West after the six plus one meeting achievements in November 2013, when Iran agreed to decrease uranium enrichment in return for lighter sanctions by the EU and other states. The Iranian president paid his first international visit to Bishkek in September 2013, where he participated in the annual Shanghai Meeting. Iran still considers this region to be important, and it is no doubt a country that could strengthen the role of the Organization. Meanwhile, Iran remains an observer state and this research paper will focus on the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, more precisely on Iran's intention to join, and the implications of this for Russia's academic and political circles. What do Russians expect of Iran, and what do they think are the pros and cons of Iran's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese aircraft carrier program has been developing for more than two decades and still has no combat capability. Analysts often argue that this lengthy process is due to the formidable obstacles in developing carriers, and that China is developing carriers for real combat requirements as a high priority but as yet just cannot realize the goal. There are three supposed combat missions calling for carriers. First, after the Chinese economic reform, China's foreign trade became crucial and the oil consumption surged. Both requires sea lines of communication (SLOC) which are largely unprotected. Second, China also has several maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. Finally, China wants to build a robust nuclear deterrence capability. This paper puts forward an alternative perspective. Carriers are not excessively challenging, and China had already acquired all the necessary elements in the late 1990s. The real reason of this lengthy development is the lack of urgency and necessity. Carriers are actually of little use for China in real combat. China develops carriers for prestige, and this is a low priority under the overall Chinese strategy of "Peaceful Development." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Security Strategies Journal / Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi is the property of Strategic Research Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As a rising power, China has become actively involved in regional bilateral/multilateral arrangements in the post-Cold War, especially post-crisis (1997– 98 financial crises) era, and this has attracted much attention from within and outside East Asia. Diverse understandings of China's regional ambition have appeared, especially since the launch of the China-ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA). Aiming at deciphering the ideas behind China's regional thinking, this paper argues that China's perspective on regionalism is a broadened economic regionalism, which is basically economic-centered, because economic performance is vital both to its long-term strategic target and to its internal social stability. This economic regionalism will last for some time because China will be a developing country at least in the mid-term, which means China will have to focus more on its economic performance. In practice, China will engage bilaterally or multilaterally with others through its FTA strategy. Thus, China cannot be a main contributor to East Asian integration as expected, owing to the inward-looking nature of its economic regionalism. Also, the institutional integration of East Asia needs the effort of all the players in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The East Asian 'tribute system' from 1368 to 1841 comprised an enduring, stable, and hierarchic system, with China clearly the hegemon, in which cultural achievement was as important as economic or military prowess. Most significant is the recognition that the Chinese tributary order was in fact a viable and recognized international system with military, cultural, and economic dimensions that all intersected to create a very interesting and stable security system. Recently it has become fashionable in historical circles to question the viability of the tributary system in part because scholars have become increasingly aware of the realties behind Chinese rhetoric. However, more nuanced studies and new interpretations only serve to underscore the centrality of the system for its participants. This paper demonstrates that there is a hierarchical relationship-generated by a common culture defined by a Confucian worldview-in place in the context of China and the East Asian states and helps clarify the distinction between an international system based on polarity and an international society based on culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contemporary East Asia, political rivalry between China and Japan is often discussed. However, little has been done to systematically analyze the bilateral relationship and possible conflict escalation. In this paper, I employ the multiple-hierarchy model of regional politics offered by power transition theorists, in order to examine the recent Sino–Japanese relationship. After examining the effect of the factors suggested by the theory, I conclude that China's rise does not pose immediate destabilizing effects on regional security because the relative rise of China's capability is at best moderate. I also argue that the dyadic relationship has been pacified by several factors such as interest similarity and defense-dominant geography, in spite of China's overall rise. Finally, I offer some policy recommendations suggested by the theory-driven analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China–Japan relations are frequently analyzed either in the light of disputes about different interpretations of history, the consequence of a strategic power shift in the Asia-Pacific resulting from the rise of China or as a conflict between Chinese and Japanese national identities. This paper argues that bilateral relations should be assessed on the basis of a comprehensive approach. It concludes that the current state of bilateral relations can be understood as the result of identity crises of the political systems in Beijing and Tokyo. Owing to the rapidly changing environment in East Asia and their inherent conservative natures, both political systems' perceptions and policies lag behind present realities. This renders it difficult for them to effectively address important domestic and international problems and consequently affects bilateral relations negatively as it complicates the accurate redefinition of the representation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ with regard to foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Improved India-Vietnam relations are guided both by their common historical experiences and their mutual concerns in the post-cold war context. Both have suffered aggression from China in the past and had good relations with the former Soviet Union. In fact, India was the only noncommunist country to recognize the unified Vietnam and, ever since, they have had a friendly relationship, one that has stood the test of time. However, in the post-cold war context the shadow of China looms large for this relationship. As India's 'Look East' policy matures, New Delhi is now seeking to engage countries in the Chinese periphery. The changing geostrategic dynamics have also forced Vietnam to forge greater strategic cooperation with India. This paper argues that India has to identified potential additional areas of cooperation and proactively engage Vietnam to further strengthen this relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of its 40th anniversary, this article analyses how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sought to deal with the problem of drug production, trafficking and consumption in Southeast Asia. Reviewing more than three decades of cooperation, it asks whether an international regime against the illicit trafficking and abuse of drugs has been established in the region under the auspices of ASEAN. In particular, the paper discusses the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) as an attempt to create a framework of multilateral cooperation. It argues however that it is still premature today to characterise existing regional consultations as a working anti-drug regime. The existing cooperative structure has remained a loose forum for information sharing despite the strong Chinese involvement that has deepened consultations since the late 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the lens of securitization theory, this article looks at the significant impact that non-traditional security has had over Chinese foreign policy. Over time, non-traditional security has changed from being understood as an opportunity to boost China's international standing, to being seen as an important category within security threats. China's security and diplomatic behavior has changed accordingly. In particular, China has become more confident in using and authorizing force. This article pinpoints this process started in the 1990s by looking at the debate within the government and the legal, institutional and military response against those new threats. It also prompts important considerations about the drivers and the direction of Chinese foreign policy, and the general approach of studying the same subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]