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In this article I (re)think An Essay on Man with respect to the history of philosophy, by reading Pope's poem comparatively with Spinoza's Ethics , a method suggested by Jean-Pierre de Crousaz's contemporary critiques of the Essay , which accused Pope of Spinozism. I also consider the Essay in the light of Fredric Jameson's assertion that there exist perennial problems that "philosophy," "theory," indeed "thinking" itself cannot solve, but which must continue to be posed anyway, not set aside or abandoned. I thus suggest a new approach to the Essay , focused on several such problems, which have often vexed previous criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the development of the "Confucian Contingency Model," which challenges individualistic notions of persons, agency, and morality prevalent in contemporary discourse. Topics include three commonly recognized orientations in understanding persons, agency, and morality, namely "Non-Contingent Autonomy," "Contingency-Influenced Agency," and "Determinism."

We present a new puzzle about logical truth, necessity, and moral responsibility. We defend one solution to the puzzle. A corollary of our preferred solution is that prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility are invalid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study's major goal is to establish the foundation for the relationship between Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, two significant figures of the Enlightenment period, and the notion that Kant owes a lot to Rousseau in ethics, one of the fields where Rousseauist influences are most overt. Although the similarities between perspectives of Rousseau and Kant and Rousseau's influence on Kant are frequently discussed in the previous scholarship, these similarities and effects are primarily discussed in the contexts of education and politics. This is likely because Rousseau stands out in these two fields rather than ethics. We can say that alternative studies are required in this sense. This resemblance and influence essentially equate to a fundamental human concept that includes ethics, politics, and education because the most fundamental question in all philosophies is "What is a human being?". In addition, Rousseau, who, as the representative of the Romantic, naturalist movement, resorted to a deeper emotion and conscience instead of reason, and Kant as the most important name of the Enlightenment, stood on the same side in the conflict between the mechanism and determinism in the Enlightenment philosophy and human freedom, responsibility and morality against philosophy, gave priority to practical reason over theoretical reason. This constitutes the justification for such an assertation. In this context, in this study, the effect of Rousseau on Kant's ethics has been tried to be revealed based on certain concepts of the ethics of both names. Naturalcivilized human distinction, freedom, will, general will, categorical imperative, the kingdom of purposes, human dignity and equality are the prominent concepts in this connection. Some of these concepts, especially those which are associated with Kant, are evaluated in the context of his contributions to the ethical debates in Western philosophy. Despite such an evaluation, it is important to express Rousseau's contribution to the emergence of these concepts through Kant's ethics. The key ideas in this context are the contrast between natural and civilised humans, freedom, will, general will, categorical imperative, the kingdom of purposes, human dignity, and equality. Some of these ideas are assessed in the light of Kant's contributions to the ethical discussions in Western philosophy, especially those which are associated with him. Despite this assessment, it's vital to highlight Rousseau's role in the development of these ideas through Kant's ethics. In this regard, the first part of the study attempts to ascertain the degree to which Kant's ideas on morality are influenced by the theories of the English moralists and Rousseau's teachings, which are viewed as the two major ethical movements in Europe at the outset. Freedom, will, perfection, human dignity, and equality are fundamental components of human nature that define the line between nature and civilization. The problem of evil, which is a crucial issue in the ethics of the two names, and a similarity between Rousseau and Kant that is a little more challenging to discern have been attempted to be examined in the context of the Rousseauian effect in the third section of the study. It is noted that evil is seen as a result of freedom as in Rousseau according to whom started out from natural man with a synthetic attitude, besides touching upon the fact that civilization both corresponds to the fall of the natural man and is given as an explanation of evil, and that evil, like morality, is connected to the development of reason and sociality while Kant showed a progressive approach with an analytical attitude. It is highlighted that Kant agreed with Rousseau when he argued that by imposing the law onto ourselves, we become free and so develop morality. Additionally, while the writings of Kant and Rousseau are regarded as a primary source throughout the study, an effort has been made to draw on secondary works that discuss these two figures and highlight the relationship between these two names. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consciousness has an important role in ethics: when a being consciously experiences the frustration or satisfaction of its interests, those interests deserve higher moral priority than those of a behaviourally similar but non-conscious being. I consider the relationship between this ethical role and an a posteriori (or 'type-B') materialist solution to the mind-body problem. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, if type-B materialism is correct, then the reference of the concept Phenomenal Consciousness is radically indeterminate between a neuronal-level property that is distinctive to mammals and a high-level functional property that is much more widely shared. This would leave many non-mammalian animals (such as birds, fish, insects and octopuses) with indeterminate moral status. There are ways to manage this radical moral indeterminacy, but all of these ways lead to profoundly troubling consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conrad's fiction often focuses on luck, particularly on moral luck—those happenings that exceed our control but affect our standing in the world nonetheless. Such luck has a key bearing on the moral intelligibility of plot and character in Lord Jim. This is a novel that supports two sides of a paradox: morality should and should not be influenced by the vagaries of luck. There is no obvious resolution to this double vision in Conrad and it leads him to question the coherence of morality as a general system. He also doubts—however paradoxically—its basic fairness. If luck is all-pervasive, then justice itself is unjust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein's early conception of ethics and the good ethical life. Initially, it critically examines the widespread view according to which Wittgenstein's early conception of ethics and the good ethical life involves having a certain ethical attitude to the world. It points out that this reading incurs in some mistakes and shortcomings, thereby suggesting the need for an alternative reading that avoids and amends these inadequacies. Subsequently, it sets out to offer said reading. Specifically, it is argued that the good ethical life is predicated on a good exercise of the ethical will and solving the riddle of life, both of which demand a certain view of, and not an attitude to, the world. This view is the view of the world sub specie aeterni. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human Rights are the result of a search to create a system where legal protection to the individual is given based on their quality of human being. Hence, this article, the result of a theoretical reflection, is presented with the aim of verifying the universality of Human Rights, based on five arguments. On the one hand, Human Rights are an expression of a morality applicable to every person by virtue of being moral agents. In addition, the categorization of Human Rights as principles due to their indeterminacy, allows their application in different contexts. In this sense, Human Rights do not belong to a specific territory, rather are generally available and allow a friendly dialogue with non-Western schools. Aligned with this, the applicability of Human Rights is extraterritorial, giving the concept of jurisdiction a greater scope than that normally attributed to it. Finally, there is an important international theory according to which Human Rights are norms of jus cogens, international jurisprudence supports this thesis whose natural consequence is the binding nature of Human Rights to all state activities. It is inevitably concluded that Human Rights are an instrument that seeks to ensure guarantees to the individual, regardless of his nationality but on the basis of his humanity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a 2017 article, Suzanne Choo suggests that the literature classroom should eschew insular aesthetic concerns in favour of a cosmopolitan ethical approach. In response to Choo, Liam Gearon believes that a prescribed and predetermined hermeneutic undermines the freedom of the pedagogue and the pupils. In this paper, I side with Gearon against moving the literature classroom solely towards ethical ends. Using William Desmond's idea of the fourfold sense of being as an analogy for the process of reading and experiencing texts, I suggest that complications arise from establishing a univocal, or determinate, end to literary hermeneutics. I will further explore the indeterminacies extant in the reading process. While these indeterminacies do not preclude communicability, they make impossible a singular, codified purpose to literary studies or interpretive frameworks. I use Plato's Timaeus and Critias as a model for the metaxological and, finally, offer ways to open up a metaxological hermeneutic in the classroom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers review of the "Freedom and Resentment," by P. F. Strawson as a contribution to modern moral philosophy. It states that the principal aim of the book is refute or discredit the claim, as "pessimist." The thesis of determinism is true and the attitudes and practices associated with moral responsibility is unjustified.

Stoic concepts of ekpyrosis and diacosmesis are examined in light of later Platonic, Aristotelian and Epicurean critiques of Stoic determinism. Questions emerge out of this debate centered on the problem of evil. A series of theodicies are proposed ending in a later Stoic interpretation of the cosmic cycle that equates each phase of the cosmic cycle with an ethical one allegorized as periods of Satiety (Koros) and Dearth (Chresmosyne). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The current state of technology and law allows for creating children, called 'savior siblings' for the purpose of transplanting their stem cells to cure an existing, sick sibling. If both parents agree, court oversight is unnecessary--even though the procedure is risky for both children. Ethical paradigms evaluating the legitimacy of the procedure focus only on the process of savior sibling creation and ignore considerations incident to later organ transplantation, i.e., issues of consent, autonomy, dignity, and best interests of the savior child. Legal analysis, which focuses on the best interest rule, leads to counter-normative results. Recent data, e.g., that 95% of such instances require invasive bone marrow transplantation, and technological advances such as gene-editing, further confound the analysis. This essay details the contradictions and conflicts in legal and ethical paradigms in light of recent data and technological advance and proposes that societal and biological input is necessary before the law or bioethics can provide consistent guidelines. It also puts us on notice of ethical conundrums sure to arise--even with existing technology--that we have failed to address, a sure harbinger of things to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Insight, an essay on human understanding, (1957, 1st edition) Lonergan presents a heuristic model of emerging probability in order to define, explain and extract norms from the dynamism common to all nature, including human nature, a dynamism that mirrors the reality of intellection. Continuity between different levels of nature discloses a directed, upward, but indeterminate dynamism of the emerging generalized probability. In addition to the ethical consequences that he elaborates, Lonergan remains in an open hermeneutic framework, beyond being proportionate to discursive reason; he opens the way for a surprising final manifestation of this universal dynamism through what he calls transcendent conjugated forms of generalized probability emerging -- faith, hope and charity -- that are proposed to human freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I defend a version of compatibilism (about determinism and moral responsibility) against luck-related objections. After introducing the types of luck that some take to be problematic for moral responsibility, I consider and respond to two recent attempts to show that compatibilism faces the same problem of luck that libertarianism faces—present (or cross-world) luck. I then consider a different type of luck—constitutive luck—and provide a new solution to this problem. One upshot of the present discussion is a reason to prefer a history-sensitive compatibilist account over a purely nonhistorical structuralist account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's opinions regarding the article "The Moral Nature of Man in Organizations: A Comparative Analysis," by William G. Scott and David K. Hart, published in the June 1971 issue. According to the author, some of the statements made by Hart and Scott regarding scientific management are inaccurate. The author goes on to contest Hart and Scotts' use of the concept of determinism in an organizational setting.

A prominent philosophical debate concerns whether we should accept causal decision theory (CDT) or evidential decision theory (EDT) as our best theory of rational choice. However, instead of accepting one of these theories at the expense of the other, an alternative would be to accept that both theories play a partial role in the true account of rational choice. In this paper, I defend a pluralist account of this sort. In particular, I argue that rational permissibility is an indeterminate notion, with EDT and CDT each corresponding to one sharpening of this notion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often argued that the requirement that moral obligations be ‘action guiding’ motivates the claim that one can be obligated to φ only if one can φ. I argue that even on its most plausible interpretation, this argument fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses human free will from the perspective of three Jewish thinkers of the Middle-ages: Maimonides, Gersonides and Solomon Ben Adret. We commence with understanding the parameters of free will in Jewish thought and then discuss the theological problem of all religionists in the middle -ages, namely, God's prescience and the possibility of human free will. We discuss as well the idea of Divine knowledge of the present and the future from the perspective of the rationalist and kabbalist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the range of subjects tackled by affective and emotional geographers, laughter has received relatively little attention. Those who do discuss laughter, do so for the most part in terms of the “humorous” moments that precede it. This paper proposes a distinctly different approach: shifting focus away from humour to foreground laughter as an analytical category. Through this, I argue that we can understand laughter as a phenomenon in its own right, without reducing it to humorous intentionality (even when there is humour present). This allows further analytical precision within discussions of laughter particularly around the ways in which it affects bodies and spaces. The paper first discusses laughter as more-than-representational; as having transpersonal and atmospheric spatialities, capable of affecting and being affected beyond its relationship with humour. The refrain is then deployed as a conceptual means through which we can grasp laughter’s indeterminate capacities to generate spaces, atmospheres and subjectivities. Drawing on insights from three months of ethnographic research spent working in nursing care homes, I illustrate these conceptions of laughter in terms of the ways it can enact, disrupt, and reconfigure different relationships between bodies and space. This case study thus prompts discussion of the ethical implications of thinking laughter in this manner, particularly the need to develop an ethos for laughter that remains open to its potential for multiple (and often unexpected) outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responsibility is a trait constitutive of personliood. A mature person is someone who can be held responsible for their actions. In the prevailing moral tradition, responsibility is dependent on freedom, understood in the strong Kantian sense. The aim of this paper is to disentangle responsibility from freedom in that Kantian sense without weakening the concept of personhood. Therefore, this paper aims to show that responsibility can be understood in naturalistic and immanent terms, i.e. in consonance with the spirit of much of contemporary science, especially the neurosciences. It begins by rejecting freedom as a form of transcendent causality and by placing the debate beyond the dichotomy of compatibilism and incompatibilism. It goes on to describe the evolutionary roots of the human brain's ability to take norms into account in the decisionmaking process. I finish by applying a naturalistic concept of responsibility to some borderline cases. The main thesis of this paper is that persons are responsible if they can respond in accordance with the social demands, a trait which also constitutes one of the central burdens of personhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sometimes it is indeterminate what an agent morally ought do. This generates a Decision Ought Challenge-to give moral guidance to agents in such a scenario. This article is a field guide to the options for a theory of the decision ought for cases of indeterminacy. Three categories of view are evaluated, and the best representative for each is identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ‘Measuring the Consequences of Rules’, Holly Smith presents two problems involving the indeterminacy of compliance, which she takes to be fatal for all forms of rule-utilitarianism. In this reply, I attempt to dispel both problems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article, the author reflects on a lecture by law and philosophy professor Arthur Ripstein in which he emphasized on reclaiming proportionality in the framework of rights in the context of interpersonal law and morality. Topics discussed include Ripstein's views against vigilantes and public officials, the conflicts involving moral indeterminacy, and the problems faced by authorities tasked with protection of people's rights.

According to the Dilemma Defense, it is question-begging against the incompatibilist defender of the principle of alternative possibilities ( PAP) to assume that the agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case ( FSC) cannot do otherwise in light of causal determinism, but is nevertheless morally responsible. As a result, Fischer (Philos Rev 119:315-336, 2010; Analysis 73:489-496, 2013) attempts to undermine PAP in a different manner via a deterministic FSC. More specifically, Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent's moral responsibility, it is not in virtue of its eliminating the agent's alternative possibilities. I contend that, once we focus upon the distinction between entailment and explanation, the incompatibilist defender of PAP can successfully rebut Fischer's argument. I argue for this claim while granting Fischer a number of assumptions that only render a defense of PAP more difficult. Additionally, I cast doubt upon Palmer's (Synthese 191:3847-3864, 2014) critique of Fischer's argument, which in turn renders my defense of PAP all the more critical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how God's will is the foundation for quietness and peace within the heart in all circumstances. The believer has the promise that all God intends to do and will do contradictory his ways may seem will be for the best advantage of his church, of the elect, and of himself in particular.

Arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility sometimes make use of various transfer of non-responsibility principles. These principles purport to specify conditions in which lack of moral responsibility is transmitted to the consequences of things for which people are not morally responsible. In this paper, after developing what I take to be the most serious objections to extant principles of this sort, I identify and defend a new transfer of non-responsibility principle that is immune to these and other objections. This new principle says, roughly, that if you are not morally responsible for any of the circumstances that led to a particular outcome, and if you are not morally responsible for those circumstances leading to that outcome, then you are not morally responsible for the outcome either. After defending this principle against a number of objections, I use it to argue for the conclusion that no one is even partly morally responsible for anything, if determinism is true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's insights on the direct argument (DA) of philosopher Peter van Inwagen for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility which is structurally analogous to the consequence argument. Topics discussed include the defense Rule (B) of van Inwagen, the first line of defense by writers Ira M. Schnall and David Widerker against the objection of professor Michael McKenna, and the DA and burden of proof.

In a recent paper in this journal, “How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?” Christopher Evan Franklin critically examines my libertarian view of free will and attempts to improve upon it. He says that while Kane's influential [view] offers many important advances in the development of a defensible libertarian theory of free will and moral responsibility … [he made] “two crucial mistakes in formulating libertarianism” – one about the location of indeterminism, the other about its role – “both of which have helped fan the flame of the luck argument”. In this paper, I respond to Franklin's criticisms, arguing that, so far from making it significantly more difficult to answer objections about luck and control, as he claims, giving indeterminism the location and role I do makes it possible to answer such objections and many other related objections to libertarian free will. A central theme of this paper will emerge in my responses: In order to make sense of freedom of will in general and to do justice to the complex historical debates about it, one must distinguish different kinds of control agents may have over events and correspondingly different kinds of freedom they may possess. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A notorious debate in the ethics of healthcare rationing concerns whether to address rationing decisions with substantial principles or with a procedural approach. One major argument in favour of procedural approaches is that substantial principles are indeterminate so that we can reasonably disagree about how to apply them. To deal with indeterminacy, we need a just decision process. In this paper I argue that it is a mistake to abandon substantial principles just because they are indeterminate. It is true that reasonable substantial principles designed to deal with healthcare rationing can be expected to be indeterminate. Yet, the indeterminacy is only partial. In some situations we can fully determine what to do in light of the principles, in some situations we cannot. The conclusion to draw from this fact is not that we need to develop procedural approaches to healthcare rationing, but rather that we need a more complex theory in which both substantial principles and procedural approaches are needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proposition 28 of Part One of Spinoza's Ethics is considered to be one of the most central propositions of this magnum opus primarily because it is key to establishing the determinism pervading Spinoza's universe. Commentators have taken for granted that what is being described here is an infinite regress of efficient causation among bodies or events. I propose an alternative reading of this fundamental feature of Spinoza's philosophy, which, given its centrality, has far-reaching implications. I claim that the relation between finite things expressed in 1P28 must be understood as constitutive of the individuation of finite modes rather than describing the interaction between already established finite singular things. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for our actions in those circumstances. We argue that such situationist moral luck, as a variety of circumstantial moral luck, exemplifies a distinct and interesting type of moral luck. Further, there is a case to be made that situationist moral luck is perhaps more worrying than some other well-discussed cases of (supposed) moral luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In "Doing Without Morality" Richard Kraut argues that Aristotle does not work with moral concepts such as moral rightness and duty. One of his arguments is that Aristotle treats wit as a virtue of character but not a moral virtue in Nicomachean Ethics IV.8 and that this treatment should be extended to all the virtues of character. Though sympathetic to his conclusion, I offer three reasons for thinking that wit is ill-suited to play the role in which Kraut casts it: first, what Aristotle says about wit elsewhere in the NE calls its status as a character virtue into question; second, the taxonomy of virtue and vice implicit in NE IV suggests that wit is not a full-fledged character virtue; and third, in Eudemian Ethics III.7 Aristotle holds that wit is not a virtue of character. Along the way I discuss some intriguing complexities in Aristotle's taxonomy of virtues and vices and suggest that Aristotle has the resources to make a principled distinction between personality and character traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the function and scope of incompatibilist or transcendental freedom in Kant's moral philosophy. The prevailing view among scholars, most notably Allison, is that the function of transcendental freedom is to enable us to articulate a first-person conception of ourselves as rational agents involved in deliberation and choice. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is rational agency in general. In order to perform this function, freedom has to be merely conceivable. Pace Allison, I argue that our first-person conception is neutral with respect to causal determinism, and that the function of transcendental freedom is to provide the metaphysical conditions of the possibility of genuine moral responsibility and perfect justice, and to get rid of moral luck. In order to perform this function, transcendental freedom has to be not just conceivable, but metaphysically real. My view suggests that we only have reason to attribute freedom to ourselves in situations in which we are aware that the moral law commands us categorically. We do not have a similar reason to believe we are free in purely prudential choices. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is not rational agency in general, but only moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an apparent tension in Laozi 老子 between his denial of the adequacy of positive theoretical formulations and his concomitant endorsement of certain kinds of practical action over others. Laozi writes, for example, 'Where they all know the good as good, there is evil, Therefore Being and non-being produce each other' ( Laozi 2.3-5), which suggests that good and evil produce each other the way being and non-being produce each other; in which case to do good will lead to evil and to do evil will lead to good. The result threatens to become moral paralysis. I argue that this destabilization of moral concepts does not amount to a moral relativism, but leaves us with a consistent moral point of view in its own way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roy Hobbs was born to be a Great Man. In addition to the physical gifts of a natural athlete, Roy possesses the traits of a moral hero: empathy, reflectivity, and autonomy. Yet he fails both as baseball hero and moral hero. Why? In The Natural, Malamud tackles the age-old philosophical problem of free will versus determinism. Through narrative, he presents the novel argument that though there is no free will, there is the possibility of a moral will through determinism, in particular through the example of the moral hero who has been nurtured to be strong enough to be good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rejection of siting controversial facilities in urban areas periodically resurrects the discussion regarding site-specific technologies that pose risks characterised by severe impacts and extremely low probabilities. This article discusses this topic from an ethics perspective, focusing on the problematic evaluation of minimum safe distances that should be established between potential accidents and exposed residents. Two different approaches to the assessment of such ‘spatial safety’ measures – namely, the probabilistic and deterministic approaches – are compared. The scope of this article is to unveil these approaches’ implicit ethical assumptions and – more generally – facilitate a considered choice between different approaches towards planning ‘risky’ land uses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents a lecture on ethics, criminal law and the problem of free will, delivered at the Lvov University in Poland in 1904-1905. Topics discussed are the notion of the freedom of will and its influence on ethics and criminal law, the distinction between determinism and indeterminism and their consequences in the context of practical ethics or practical life and based on the various directions of religious views or faith.

The article presents a lecture on ethical skepticism, delivered at the Lvov University in Poland in 1923-1924. Topics discussed are the various forms of skepticism including religious, metaphysical and epistemological, difference between general, radical and moderate kinds of skepticism, concepts of epistemological relativism and subjectivism, relation between absolute truth or true judgment and determinism, principles of ethical relativism, and good and bad as source of ethical skepticism.

A critique presented by David Widerker on Frankfurt-counterexamples and known as the "W-defense" has persisted for years and has been considered one of the most difficult challenges these counterexamples have to face. This paper aims to defend Frankfurt counterexamples against Widerker's attack. For doing this, the paper presents a dilemma addressed to the main premise of Widerker's attack: The Principle of Alternative Expectations. The dilemma states: either this principle rests on the Kant's maxim, "ought" implies "can", and then this makes redundant and unnecessary the principle and Widerker's whole argument; or the principle does not rest on such maxim and then there is no good reason to accept it as valid [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of oikeiōsis is the characteristic of Stoic ethics. The ontological foundation of the oikeiōsis is based on its pantheistic material monism. The cosmos is constituted by god (gods), humans and natural world as a complete divine substance. The whole cosmos is controlled and directed by the divine logos. For the stoics, matter is the only true reality. Man is joined by soul and body as a structured wholistic self. The oikeiōsis is in developing processes. Living in accordance with nature and making all those belong to oneself as one's own is the first stage of oikeiōsis at the moment of the birth of all the animals, including humans. At this stage animals attain their oikeiōsis by their instincts. At the beginning of its birth, a baby lives in agreement with its nature just as the way animals do. When it grows up, as its reason develops, living in accordance with nature turns out to be living in accordance with reason. The second stage of oikeiōsis is then to attain summum bonum, leading a virtuous life, since man as rational being is capable of recognizing what his constitution is. Because all men possess the same reason and belong to the same human family, oikeiōsis by nature has social dimension. At the third stage, a man should take into account of his fellow's well-being as his own oikeiōsis. A man should love the others as he loves himself. This paper tries to argue why the Stoics' oikeiōsis concept based on its pantheistic material monism. The reason is its objection to any forms of dualism, especially the Platonic dualism; the dualistic opposition between the immaterial and material worlds, that of the psyche and body, and even that of rational and irrational. The Stoics' oikeiōsis is not only based on its idea of the wholistic cosmos, but also found on that of the structured wholistic self; i.e. the psychophysical whole and the relations between a human being with itself, with the others, and with the natural world. This kind of wholistic ideas of the cosmos and of humans are what Plato denied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the ideological vacillation that Mihail Sebastian (Iosef Hechter's pen-name) underwent in his volatile -- and versatile -- positioning at the right or left end of the political continuum. Not only is Sebastian's volatility political, but it is also one of indeterminate ethnic identity; indeed, the writer oscillates between his Jewishness, as ethnic determinism, and his Romanianness as his adopted nationality. Critical references by Calinescu, Noica, Iovanel, Petreu, Stoenescu are tackled in order to shed light on the intricate configurations of the ethnic and political identity of this author at an ideological crossroads. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective We used the FAD-Plus to investigate the association of free will belief ( FWB) with political orientation, moral attitudes, and punitiveness. Other goals included (a) confirming the independence of believing in free will and determinism and (b) contrasting scientific determinism with fatalistic determinism. Method Three studies were conducted via online questionnaires. Studies 1 and 3 recruited undergraduate students: Study 1, N = 220, Mage = 20.96; Study 3, N = 161, Mage = 20.2. Study 2 participants were recruited from a broader community sample: N = 253, Mage = 34.29. Results Studies 1 and 2 found that FWB is associated with traditional conservative attitudes, including authoritarianism, religiosity, and belief in a just world. Study 2 replicated this pattern but narrowed the religiosity link to the intrinsic style. In Study 3, FWB was associated with binding moral foundations and retributive punishment of hypothetical criminals. Conclusions Belief in free will is associated with a conservative worldview, including such facets as authoritarianism, religiosity, punitiveness, and moralistic standards for judging self and others. The common element appears to be a strong sense of personal responsibility. Evidence for distinct correlates of scientific and fatalistic determinism reinforces the need for treating them separately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the context of biodiversity loss, this paper asks the question: What is response? In asking how responsibility is raised as a sensible question, I argue there is a need to address the insensible, immaterial, and untimely dimensions of matter and relations. I suggest that thinking along the cusp of the insensible offers a way into an expanded realm of relationality that queries the exclusions that govern the sphere of intelligibility, and help us think between natures to promote a noncontemporaneous ethics of apprehension. Taking up Jean-Luc Nancy's concept of sense and specifically his ideas around the direction of sense, I argue that the insensible is a realm of possibility within the praxis of social and affective norms of sense that may release other modes of being into being. This is a paper about sense as matter forming, as cohabitation, and as an exclusionary tactic that bears on the cohabitation of worlds. I argue that an understanding of how sense is enrolled into our habits of thought and theories of materialities is crucial if we are to create new practices of sensations and new sensibilities around such diffuse, recalcitrant, and dislocated issues as biodiversity loss, new forms of biotechnological life, and climate change. I conclude that if the insensible alerts us to the work of sense in securing the bringing into relation, its configurations, and its a priori orientations, then it also points towards modes of exclusion and forms of resistance in our thinking with nonhuman others that are before and beyond relationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review discusses the text "On clouds and Clocks" by Karl Popper, in which the author presents his views on the issue of determinism and indeterminism. First, a discussion on determinism and indeterminism is presented from three analysis categories: ontological, methodological and ethical. Then, Popper's evolutionist approach regarding the issue of determinism is analyzed. Finally, some of the epistemological and ethical consequences of determinism on the field of health are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays, the majority of the discussions with regards to moral responsibility are focused towards the debate between freedom and determinism. However, it is common that the same debate presupposes at least the possibility of attributing responsibility to the agent in terms of the result occurred. In fact, it is rare the discussion about the validity of the ends of the relation studied, these are: on one side, the volitional aspect of the agent (will, dolus, etc.); and on the other, the result occurred in the "exterior world" (reality, context, society, etc.). With this paper, the purpose is also to study the debate between determinism and indeterminism in the light of moral responsibility of the agent. Nevertheless, the focus is very sharp and will be given in a vast part by the debate between moral responsibility of actions or results. Basically, it is pretended to revaluate the discussion regarding determinism, when faced to the incongruence in the judge of imputation of results. It will defend the thesis according to which, be as it may the position adopted in the debate between determinism and indeterminism, the question for moral responsibility must be referred to the action, never to the result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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