Entre el (in)determinismo "físico" y el "psicológico": ¿Responsabilidad moral por acciones o por resultados?

Nowadays, the majority of the discussions with regards to moral responsibility are focused towards the debate between freedom and determinism. However, it is common that the same debate presupposes at least the possibility of attributing responsibility to the agent in terms of the result occurred. In fact, it is rare the discussion about the validity of the ends of the relation studied, these are: on one side, the volitional aspect of the agent (will, dolus, etc.); and on the other, the result occurred in the "exterior world" (reality, context, society, etc.). With this paper, the purpose is also to study the debate between determinism and indeterminism in the light of moral responsibility of the agent. Nevertheless, the focus is very sharp and will be given in a vast part by the debate between moral responsibility of actions or results. Basically, it is pretended to revaluate the discussion regarding determinism, when faced to the incongruence in the judge of imputation of results. It will defend the thesis according to which, be as it may the position adopted in the debate between determinism and indeterminism, the question for moral responsibility must be referred to the action, never to the result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]