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Using pilot survey data collected in Britain, Spain, and Germany, we explore the relationships between levels of transnationalism, assimilation and the political attitudes, identities and behaviors of immigrants in these countries. Recently, scholars of immigration have begun to examine the growing phenomenon of transnationalism-or activities that occur on a recurrent basis across national borders (Portes 1999, Foner 2005). These researchers discuss various transnational linkages that immigrants maintain, such as sending remittances, immigrant alliances with home organizations, and attainment of dual nationality. Theories of transnationalism, in contrast to those of assimilation, do not necessarily see civic engagement of immigrants as a zero-sum process in which individuals must choose political allegiance to one country, although there has been little empirical evidence to support this argument. Furthermore, the work on transnationalism does not consider adequately political science theories to understand immigrant political behavior. Political science studies of immigrant participation in the U.S. (Cho 1999, Jones-Correa 1998a, 1998b) have extended the traditional SES model of participation to include indicators of assimilation-e.g. length of time in host country and linguistic skills-but have not considered the role that transnational links might play in levels of political engagement. One implication of assimilation theory is that sociopolitical engagement in the host country comes at the cost of linkages with the home country, but neglects to explore empirically whether this is the case. Thus, we use a cross-national dataset to address the extent to which transnationalism is associated with levels of assimilation, and the relationship between transnationalism and political attitudes, identities, and behaviors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I propose to analyze recent immigration legislation in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in regards to the legislations? focus on attracting the ?best and the brightest? or the high-skilled to these countries? labor markets. I plan on answering three questions:1. Are immigration laws that focus on attracting the high-skilled simply the reverse side of restrictive immigration practices that severely narrow the rights of asylum-seekers, refugees, and illegal immigrants? In other words, has a new ?first world? (high-skilled from developed world), ?second world? (high-skilled from less developed world), and ?third world? (everyone else) been created with selective migration practices?2. Does competition for the highly-skilled immigrants among EU member states (specifically Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) create divisions which negatively affect the single market? In other words, does this competition make a charade out of the idea of a European single market and effect the future integration of the European Union?3. What is the probability of these selective migration policies being effective? (A short comparison with similar policies applied for longer periods of time in Australia and Canada may be helpful in this section). Can these European states effectively control who gains residency and entry into their country? What does this bifurcation (restrictive for low-skilled, open for high-skilled) of migration mean for the future integration of Europe? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]