Search

The subject of the study is the financial system and monetary regulation of the economy during the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. The purpose of the article is to investigate the monetary policy pursued by the national Central banks of developed countries in the context of the economic crisis caused by pandemic. The paper uses comparative analysis, a systematic approach to the study of information, as well as graphical and tabular methods. The author considers monetary policy instruments used by national Central banks of developed countries to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the real sector of the economy. The study reveals distinctive features of anti-crisis measures of monetary regulation bodies.

Whether or not inflation targeting adoption leads to increased volatility of exchange rates is controversial. The volatility increases with inflation targeting as a result of the flexible exchange rate regime. Others argue that inflation targeting delivers the best outcomes in terms of lower exchange rate volatility. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether interest rate policy in inflation targeting frameworks – that is subjected to control inflation rate – may reduce the volatility of exchange rates. To test the hypothesis, we use monthly data in the case of Indonesia over the period 2005(7)-2016(7). Several control variables are introduced in the regressions. The result of the autoregressive distributed lag model proves the interest rate policy and foreign exchange intervention fail to reduce the exchange rates volatility. It seems inflation targeting in Indonesia puts too much emphasis on stabilizing the domestic currency thus leading to benign neglect of stabilizing its external value, ultimately resulting in increased exchange rate volatility. These findings suggest that central bank credibility plays an important role in conducting inflation targeting policy which operates primarily through a signalling effect.

The approaches of various authors to the assessment of the impact of monetary policy on the development of the economy have been considered. The main factors of positive and negative influence of interest rate monetary policy on economic development have been established. Features of influence of monetary policy on development of the developed and developing States have been revealed. It has been defined, that the strength of the influence of individual factors on the effectiveness of monetary policy in individual countries varies, and the appropriateness of using monetary policy to support economic growth is determined by the ratio of the total positive and total negative impact. Recommendations on the construction of monetary policy taking into account its positive and negative impact on the development of the economy have been given. They aim at a gradual transition to the use of monetary policy to support growth, to take into account all the factors of influence and the integrated use of all instruments of monetary and fiscal policy to stimulate growth, the achievement of other strategic objectives.

The paper presents the opinion of the FinancialUniversityexperts on the problems of the single state monetary policy for the upcoming three-year period (2019–2021).The relevanceof paper stems from the increasing role of the monetary sphere and the monetary policy in achieving financial stability and ensuring Russia’s economic growth in the modern context of the economy financialization.The subject of the researchis the current monetary policy of Russia set out in the program document of the Bank of Russia for the medium term.The purpose of the researchwas to identify the pros and cons of the single state monetary policy. In the course of the research, the Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy for 2019 and the Period of 2020 to 2021 adopted by the Bank of Russia were analyzed. Based on the research findings,it is concludedthat the state monetary policy should pay more attention to the credit channel of the transmission mechanism in the context of its interaction with the interest rate channel to achieve the operational goal of the monetary policy and for further use of special refinancing instruments in view of the fact that financial sanctions against the Russian economy will continue over the whole forecast horizon. Along with that, measures should be taken to develop incentive regulation of the banking sector in order to support the creation of favorable conditions for boosting investment and economic activities. In general, as a result of the research, it was established that the monetary policy guidelines developed by the Bank of Russia in cooperation with the Russian Federation Government for the next three years meet modern requirements but have to be supplemented and refined with account for new phenomena and circumstances emerging in the recent time.

The article reveals the goals and mechanisms of the interest rate policy of the central bank. The role of the discount rate in ensuring financial and macroeconomic stability is shown. The Taylor rule is presented and justified in a modified form, by including the money supply parameter in it. The phenomenon of negative interest rates is revealed.

We use randomized interest rates, offered across eighty geographically distinct regions for twenty-nine months by Mexico’s largest microlender, to sketch the adjustment from a price change to a new equilibrium. Demand is elastic, and more so over the longer run; e.g. the dollars-borrowed elasticity increases from $-$1.1 in Year one to $-$2.9 in Year three. Credit bureau data do not show evidence of crowd-out, although this and other null results are imprecisely estimated. The lender’s profits increase, albeit noisily, starting in Year two. But competitors do not respond by reducing rates. These findings, together with other results, suggest that informational frictions are important, and that cutting rates furthered Compartamos Banco’s “double bottom line” of improving social welfare subject to a profitability constraint.

The federal funds rate is one of the most important monetary policy instruments of Federal Reserve Bank of America. In this study, we analyze the effectiveness of Fed interest rate policy on different markets in the period between 1976 and 2016 through Markov regime-switching regression analysis. Results indicate that Federal funds’ rate affects labor and housing markets with a few months’ lag. However, the influence of Federal funds rate on inflation rate is quite limited. It is most probable that Fed employs alternative monetary instruments to regulate inflation. The most interesting results are obtained in the domain of personal savings. The interaction of personal savings and Federal funds rate is significant during both expansion and recession regimes.

Previous literature in experimental finance finds little support for the effectiveness of interest rate policy in stabilizing asset price bubbles. We run a learning to forecast experiment with an interest rate policy that is strongly responsive to deviation of asset prices from the fundamental. Our result shows that the average price deviation is significantly lower in the treatments with the interest rate policy than in the baseline treatment without the policy. Our result also suggests that the policy is effective irrespective of whether or not the purpose of it is announced/explained to the participants.

In recent years, various "unconventional" views have been advanced that promise to offer new analytical insights and policy approaches that are suited to control the value of money, particularly in a constellation of low growth and unemployment. Whereas Forward Guidance attempts to decrease the real interest rate by low nominal rates and by creating excessive inflationary expectations, the Neo-Fisherian approach suggests to increase nominal rates immediately to the long-run equilibrium value that corresponds to the inflation target. The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level believes that goods prices jump to a level that validates the long-run sustainability condition of government debt. All three views are criticized for analytical and empirical reasons.

Among the triggers of the Arab Spring are the declining living standards of the middle and lower income groups. Undoubtedly, the global financial crisis (GFC) is to be partially blamed for weakening the economies of these nations. But was monetary policy ineffective in combating inflation and reducing the meltdown? This paper employs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to assess the effectiveness of the monetary policy in the wake of the GFC. Egypt is selected as a case study due to its overdependence on imported food, the prices of which are relentlessly soaring. The results of the study reveal that the ideal operating targets for the Central Bank of Egypt are the overnight rate and legal reserve requirements. Interest rates are more suitable for long-run impact on the ultimate goals of growth, price stability and job creation. The study culminates in designing a framework to enhance central bankers’ political independence and transparency, which is imperative for nations with high levels of corruption. The study is not only informative to the new Egyptian policymakers, but also to other developing and emerging economies that suffer from symptoms of chronic inflation and looming socio-political turmoil.

This paper investigates how monetary policy can help ward off a protracted deflationary slump when policy rates are near the zero bound by studying the experience of Japan during the "Lost Decade" which followed the asset-price bubble collapse in the early 1990s. Estimation results based on a structural model suggest that the Bank of Japan's interest-rate policy fits a conventional forward-looking reaction function with an inflation target of about 1 percent. The disappointing economic performance thus seems primarily due to a series of adverse economic shocks rather than an extraordinary policy error. In addition, counterfactual policy simulations based on the estimated structural model suggest that simply raising the inflation target would not have yielded a lasting improvement in performance. However, a price-targeting rule or a policy rule that combined a higher inflation target with a more aggressive response to output would have achieved superior stabilization results.

In this article, time-series models are developed to represent three alternative, potential monetary policy regimes as monetary policy returns to normal. The first regime is a return to the high and volatile inflation rate of the 1970s. The second regime, the one expected by most Federal Reserve officials and business economists, is a return to the credible low inflation policy that characterized the U.S. economy from 1983 to 2007, a period known as the Great Moderation. The third regime is one in which policymakers keep policy interest rates at or near zero for the foreseeable future; Japanese data are used to estimate this regime. These time-series models include four variables: per capita gross domestic product growth, consumer price index inflation, the policy rate, and the 10-year government bond rate. These models are used to forecast the U.S. economy from 2008 through 2013 and represent the possible outcomes for interest rates that may follow the return of monetary policy to normal. Here, “normal” depends on the policy regime that follows the liftoff of the federal funds rate target expected in mid-2015.

Unconventional monetary policy is often assumed to benefit banks. However, we find little supporting evidence. Rather, we find some evidence for heightened medium-term risks. First, in an event study using a novel instrument for monetary policy surprises, we do not detect clear effects of monetary easing on bank stock valuation but find a deterioration of medium-term bank credit risk in the United States, the euro area, and the United Kingdom. Second, in panel regressions using U.S. banks’ balance sheet information, we show that bank profitability and risk taking are ambiguously affected, while balance sheet repair is delayed.

This paper asks why modern finance theory and the efficient market hypothesis have failed to explain long-term carry trades; persistent asset bubbles or zero lower bounds; and financial crises. It extends Keen (Solving the Paradox of Monetary Profits, 2010) and the Theory of the Monetary Circuit to give a mathematical representation of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis. In the extended model, the central bank rate is not neutral and the path is non-ergodic. The extended circuit has survival constraints that include a living wage, a zero interest rate and an upper interest rate. Inflation is everywhere. The possibility of a high interest rate, hedge economy emerges, where powerful banks invest surplus loan interest. With speculation, banks lobby to enter investment markets and the system is precariously liquid/illiquid. The paradox of a Ponzi economy, where loans never get repaid, is that private banks must speculate to increase reserves and rely on systemic crises to rebuild their balance sheets. Estimating model parameters for the US gives a scissor-graph like the The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011) with other nuances, namely i) a 'heart attack' in 1973-1974 that corresponds to the collapse of Bretton Woods ii) an accelerated decoupling of household wages and loans after the repeal of Glass-Steagall. Simulating bank bailouts, household bailouts and a Keynesian boost suggests that bank bailouts are the least effective intervention, with downward pressure on wages and household spending. Bailing out hedge households is a form of monetary contraction, and boosting hedge business loans is a form of monetary expansion. The appropriate policy choice would seem to depend on the external balance and inflation concerns. The paper concludes that, with international Ponzi sectors, viable resolution mechanisms include reparations (dL < 0), turning Ponzi debt into equity or 'junk' debt (dL → ∞), household bailouts and a Keynesian boost.

We assess the conditions under which an interest rate rule granting an explicit response to stock prices can shield the economy against endogenous aggregate instability in the form of fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling beliefs, and fundamental equilibria that are not learnable in the Expectational Stability sense of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). To do so, we use a New-Keynesian DSGE model populated by Blanchard-Yaari non-Ricardian households. The constant turnover between long-time traders (holding assets) and newcomers (entering the market with no wealth at all) implies that the wedge between current and expected future aggregate consumption is affected by the market value of financial wealth, making stock prices non-redundant for the business cycle. We find that such policy is prone to generate non-fundamental fluctuations or fundamental fluctuations that are not learnable, unless both the turnover rate in markets and average profitability from investing in risky equity are significantly large. However, this appears to be the exception for most reasonable model calibrations, implying that, absent additional frictions, a systematic response to stock prices by monetary policy remains a bad idea in the New-Keynesian paradigm.

The Bank of England's current "quantitative easing" strategy has given rise to a controversial debate about the effects and risks of unconventional monetary policy. The present paper makes two contributions to this debate. First, it provides a systematic overview of unconventional policy options, drawing from existing theoretical and empirical studies. Against this backdrop, it then analyzes the BoE's specific policies, discussing their effectiveness so far and putting them into a cross-country context. Tentative evidence on the BoE's quantitative easing is moderately encouraging, although the strategy is neither guaranteed to succeed nor as perilous as some of its detractors claim.

We develop a optimal rules-based interpretation of the 'three pillars macroeconomic policy framework': a combination of a freely floating exchange rate, an explicit target for inflation, and a mechanism than ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio around a specified long run. We show how such monetary-fiscal rules need to be adjusted to accommodate specific features of emerging market economies. The model takes the form of two-blocs, a DSGE emerging small open economy interacting with the rest of the world and features, in particular, financial frictions It is calibrated using Chile and US data. Alongside the optimal Ramsey policy benchmark, we model the three pillars as simple monetary and fiscal rules including and both domestic and CPI inflation targeting interest rate rules alongside a 'Structural Surplus Fiscal Rule' as followed recently in Chile. A comparison with a fixed exchange rate regime is made. We find that domestic inflation targeting is superior to partially or implicitly (through a CPI inflation target) or fully attempting to stabilizing the exchange rate. Financial frictions require fiscal policy to play a bigger role and lead to an increase in the costs associated with simple rules as opposed to the fully optimal policy.

We examine the interest rate elasticity of housing prices, advancingthe empirical literature in two directions. First, we take a commonly used cross-country panel dataset and evaluate the housing price equation using a consistent estimator in the presence of endogenous explanatory variables and a lagged dependent variable. Second, we carry-out a novel analysis of determinants of residential housing prices in a cross-section of countries. Our results show that the short-term interest rate, and hence monetary policy, has a sizable impact on residential housing prices.

We explore monetary policy transmission by estimating VAR impulse response functions to illustrate the Belarusian economy's response to unexpected changes in policy and exogenous variables. We find a significant exchange rate pass-through to prices, and interest rate policy following, rather than leading, financial market developments. Our estimated monetary policy reaction function shows the central bank striking a balance between real exchange rate stability and containing inflation. We discuss dollarization, administrative interventions, and other features complicating monetary policy transmission, review specific constraints and vulnerabilities, and conclude with observations on possible measures that could raise the effectiveness of monetary policy in Belarus.

Under a flexible inflation targeting regime, should policymakers avoid any reaction to movements in the foreign exchange market? Using data for six advanced open economies explicitly targeting inflation, the paper examines empirically whether real exchange rate disequilibria systematically affect the conduct of monetary policy. Estimates indicate that monetary policy responses in inflation–targeting, open economies have changed significantly, as the institutional framework for the conduct of monetary policy has evolved. In particular, an explicit target for core inflation and a greater use of the expectation channel of monetary policy appear to be key features of the newest policy framework. In this context, central banks are unlikely to react to regular fluctuations in the exchange rate.

This paper tests for uncovered interest parity (UIP) using daily data for 23 developing and developed countries through the crisis-strewn 1990s. We find that UIP works better on average in the 1990s than in previous eras in the sense that the slope coefficient from a regression of exchange rate changes on interest differentials yields a positive coefficient (which is sometimes insignificantly different from unity). UIP works systematically worse for fixed and flexible exchange rate countries than for crisis countries, but we find no significant differences between rich and poor countries.

This paper uncovers Taylor rules from estimated monetary policy reactions using a structural VAR on U.S. data from 1959 to 2009. These Taylor rules reveal the dynamic nature of policy responses to different structural shocks. We find that U.S. monetary policy has been far more responsive over time to demand shocks than to supply shocks, and more aggressive toward inflation than output growth. Our estimated dynamic policy coefficients characterize the style of policy as a "bang-bang" control for the pre-1979 period and as a gradual control for the post 1979 period.

This paper analyzes the Czechoslovak reform program which was launched on January 1, 1991. Under this program, Czechoslovakia has taken decisive steps to establish a market economy, while achieving price stability and a viable external position through restrictive financial policies. But there has been a sharp decline in output. The eventual output recovery is predicated on completing structural market reforms, such as the development of financial markets and the safeguard of their stability, privatization of large enterprises, minimizing government interference with economic signals, and the imposition of the “hard” budget constraint.

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical aspects of the relationship between macroeconomic policies and the long-run rate of growth of GNP. The macroeconomic policies examined include fiscal policies, monetary and interest rate policies, external policies, and policies to reform the goods and labor markets, including adjustments of producer prices and wages. In general, the effects of these policies on growth operate directly or indirectly through their influence on investment in physical and human capital, and on factor productivity. The available empirical evidence confirms the effects of specific macroeconomic and financial policies on long-run growth.

According to Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973), the most important element of economic development is financial liberalization. This action will eliminate the distortion, as what the government of Indonesia did on June 1, 1983 through deregulation of banking. The government eliminated the ceiling of credit and gave a full authority to each bank to determine their interest rates. This study looks up to Fry (1995) model to test McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. The models were regressed with dummy variable. This effort will give illustration or conclusion of the structural change, that happened specifically caused by environmental or policy changes.Generally, insignificant in the relationship between interest rates in national saving and investment in Indonesia could be caused by financial mechanisms those very long and complex channels. That is why real interest rates could not give effect to national saving directly. Export, especially from oil and gas and foreign debt were growth-stimulating factors. Meanwhile, money supply, which supported by tight money policy and balance budget policy caused Indonesian inflation along those periods. The periodically analysis shows that deregulation of June 1983(PAKJUN) were success to mobilize public fund, encourage investment on real sector, and increase the economic growth, but failed to control the inflation rate. The implementation of October 1988 deregulation (PAKTO) had flourished the establishment of new banks and created good competition among them. The competition had no longer on interest rate. Therefore, it can be said also the easy requirements of establishing banks become contra productive for PAKJUN policy, which had laid to the market mechanism.Basically, either PAKJUN or PAKTO was not policies in which urgently implemented in Indonesia. Those financial deregulations were not supported by the existence of deregulation on real sectors, so that the financial deregulations were not effective to achieve their goals.