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Using the frequency-domain spillover index method, we investigate time-frequency spillovers and their underlying drivers among fossil energy, clean energy and metal markets. We find that short-term spillovers are stronger than long-term spillovers. Global clean energy markets are powerful spillover transmitters that can have strong impacts on fossil energy and metal markets. Rare earth metals are most vulnerable to spillover effects from clean energy and base metal markets, particularly in the long term. Different clean energy sources and metal markets have heterogeneous connectedness, e.g., the impact of wind energy on rare earth market is greater than that of solar energy. The short-term spillovers are mainly driven by policy changes, while the long-term spillovers are mainly affected by stock market uncertainty and economic fundamentals. Our findings have important implications for the construction of optimal diversification strategies and the design of policy incentives to promote clean energy investments across different time horizons. Keywords: Clean energy, Metals, Spillovers, Time-frequency, Spillover drivers, 1. INTRODUCTION Metals are an energy-consuming resource that require fossil energy for their extraction, production, smelting and recycling processes; therefore, fossil energy is an important input for the operation of [...]

Almost 100 years ago, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek argued that a socialist state could not determine marginal cost prices and therefore could not allocate resources rationally. Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner responded with the market socialist model. Subsequent scholars have refined the model (Leeman, Roemer). Views on market socialism for an entire economy are mixed (Phelps, S h lei fer and Vishny, Roemer). We briefly review the debate. We argue that a form of market socialism exists and is especially important in education, health care, and health insurance. In these sectors, prices are often set or restricted centrally, while many providers are state-owned, nonprofit, or mutual firms. We argue in favor of applying market socialist principles to health care and to health insurance policy. In particular, we show that these principles imply that community rating of health insurance is a source of major inefficiencies and harmful regulatory pressure. We suggest moving in the market socialist direction --toward marginal cost pricing and therefore away from community rating. The desire for universal or expanded coverage can be fulfilled by explicit, politically transparent subsidies paid to consumers who are both poor and high risk. Comparative Economic Studies (2017) 59, 405-427. doi: 10.1057/s41294-0170027-3; published online 9 June 2017 Keywords: health insurance, market socialism, quasi-markets, pricing, community rating, new public management, corporatization JEL Classification: 113, P51, P27, 118, D47, B24, D02, L31, INTRODUCTION The socialist calculation debate began almost 100 years ago when Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek argued that a socialist state could not determine marginal cost prices and therefore [...]

The U.S. recovery from the Great Recession has proceeded at a slow pace. Brady Lavender and Nicolas Parent (2012-13) show that the economy has been rebounding more slowly than from [...]

We study tacit collusion in price-setting duopoly games with strategic complements and substitutes. While this problem has been considered by several studies, this article sheds new light on the comparison by focusing on the relationship between dynamic stability of equilibrium and tacit collusion. We find when controlling for the absolute slope of the reaction functions, there are no robust differences in either the convergence properties or tacit collusion between complements and substitutes treatments. JEL Classification: D43, LI3, L40, 1. Introduction This article concerns the determinants of tacit collusion in duopoly markets. While factors such as group size and communication are well-known ingredients for cooperation, a growing body of [...]

Over the last thirty years in Australia and elsewhere, there has been a substantial marketisation of human services (1) funded by government. A major justification used for this process has [...]

The hegemony of neoliberalism has seen the market virtually canonised and mainstream neoclassical economics successfully shaping an understanding of the market as being synonymous with the economy and capitalism more [...]

One of the most basic lessons any student of mainstream economics learns is that markets allocate scarce goods and services efficiently on the basis of price. More critical political economy [...]

Small business activity in Australia is perennially dogged by market structures operating to the benefit of larger corporations. Unfortunately, the small business-corporate interaction is little understood because it is little [...]

There is a story that has been told by both the physicist Stephen Hawking and the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. They report that a famous scientist was lecturing on the structure [...]

Markets are an efficient way of producing and distributing a very large number of mundane items. Market incentives are a dependable way of getting our bread baked. Markets allow us [...]

Repugnance and its consequences in market transactions are discussed. The selling of tissue, lending money for interest, slavery, gambling, adoption and other examples of markets wherein repugnance has been established as a constraint on the market are presented.

The definition of markets should be de-emphasized in horizontal merges and exclusionary practices of tying and bundling agreements. Antitrust laws should be adjusted to facilitate balance between innovation and hindering intellectual property. The impact of antitrust laws on market competition is analyzed.

The effects of the organization of an asset market on liquidity are studied using a model of financial intermediation. Findings reveal that a reform that lowers the market power of the dealers may result to reduced trading costs, dealers' net entry, and an increased trade volume. The model also indicates that markets of similar structures may post different liquidity results.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the relation between scientific knowledge in the form of theories and the world that such theories are about. The focus is on market theories. I argue that everyday knowledge, conceptualized using the notion of 'lifeworld,' is the bedrock of scientific knowledge. I also make two distinctions, one between types of markets and one between principles of order in markets. There are two different types of markets, fixed-role markets and switch-role markets, and no existing theory can be used to explain both of them. In fixed-role markets, such as a producer market of garments, actors are identified as either sellers or buyers. In switch-role markets, such as the stock exchange market or currency market, actors are not identified with one role. The other distinction is between standard and status markets. In a status market, order is maintained because the identities of actors on both sides of the market are ranked according to status, which is a more entrenched social construction than the commodity traded in the market. In a market characterized by standards, the situation is reversed: the commodity is a more entrenched social construction than the social status of actors in the market. These distinctions are the backdrop of my analysis of the idea that markets are performed. It is concluded that the performativity approach is useful today for analyzing switch-role markets. A further conclusion is that neoclassical economic theory can be used in understanding switch-role markets, but not fixed-role markets.

A study on the financial limitations on attaining arbitrage profits in a market with no liquidity is presented.

The degree of market integration across individual country equity indices using modern cointegration techniques is analyzed.

I study pricing and commitment by platforms in two-sided markets with the following characteristics: (i) platforms are essential bottleneck inputs for buyers and sellers transacting with each other; (ii) sellers [...]

We utilize a randommatching model to examine the relationships between market frictions and international trade. In our setting, an individual may choose to search abroad where she may have a cost advantage, but is less likely to meet potential trading partners, owing to higher market frictions. Interestingly, we find that international trade may be associated with lower welfare than autarky. We show how this is due to price distortions resulting from bargaining when there are opportunities for exchange across countries.

Linear programming is applied to analyze effective securities in a market characteristic of no arbitrage with bid ask prices at bankruptcy.

The impact of market structure on beer supply, in Germany and the United States, is examined.

A framework in which establishing and managing a regulatory institution calls for an unchanging cost is advanced and the different facets of this model are analyzed. It is shown that, in the model, supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market.

Clarifications relating various criticisms by David Colander, John Cullis, and Aaron Levine on a model for behavior of individuals and firms in rational economic and competitive markets duly integrating moral, ethical and altruistic conduct are presented.

The model presented by Morris Altman for behavior of individuals and firms in rational economic and competitive markets duly integrating moral, ethical and altruistic conduct is examined for its efficiency and the role that government can play for improving the ethical behavior.

An analysis of a study conducted by Morris Altman on the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented.

Critical review of a study conducted by Morris Altman on the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented.

A study examining the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented. Based on the study a behavior model duly incorporating the moral and altruistic behavior for individuals and firms is developed.

A study is conducted to design a socially optimal market structure to control excessive entry of firms in to product market, which effects the social cost of public funds.

A study examining the extent to which costs can be minimized on public debt, in a scenario where short-term interest rates are dictated by monetary policy and there are risks and market impact constraints, is presented.

The market dynamics of a neoclassical production economy with heterogenous agents, convex technologies and idiosyncratic production risks are analyzed. The effects of endogenous fluctuations, precautionary savings, investment risks etc., on such an economy are examined.

The effects of economic liberalization on the domestic markets and economy of Bulgaria and Poland are discussed and analyzed. The impact of foreign exchange rate fluctuations during transition phase is examined.

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists--despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium--as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented. JEL classification: C73; D43; L13 Keywords: Dynamic competition; Oligopolistic competition; Stochastic games; Monopoly.

The impact of consumer bargaining on seller's offer price from the study of wholesale fruit and vegetable market in Marseille is examined.

The significance of Internet for economists to understand the operations of markets is examined.

The soft budgets of economies in transition from socialistic system to capitalistic system are discussed. The need to provide social goods along with private goods and the political need to bail out firms with financial problems are also discussed. The presence of soft budget prevents efficiency in private goods market. However, greater competition is likely to make matters even worse.

This paper presents an experiment to investigate the impact of information externalities in a search model. The model implies that information spillovers create an initial delay in action by agents, followed by a flurry of activity once some public information is revealed. Conversely, this experiment reveals a shorter delay prior to the first subject moving than the model suggests. Furthermore, the subsequent increase in activity is greater than predicted. However, as the sessions progress, the subjects exhibit a degree of learning in each treatment. They prolong their search for higher payouts and, hence, their behaviour approaches that of the model's optimal strategy.

An analysis of the effects of human capital and market imperfections on the labor employment and labor reallocation in the transition countries is discussed.

There is a well identified empirical connection between the intensity of competition in product markets and better productivity performance (OECD, 2002a). In general, economy-wide competitive pressures appear to be relatively [...]

The home market effect and bilateral trade patternsIndustry characteristics like transportation costs and differentiated products and their impact on home market are analyzed using monopolistic competition model in large countries.

The economic tools are used to understand psychological phenomenon of cognitive errors in market. The impact of mistaken beliefs on errors in market is analyzed.

The role of microeconomic complementarities in economies with production externalities and demand spillovers is discussed. The transparency of public information in reducing common uncertainty in market place is emphasized.

A market for pollution permits in which one firm has market power and one or more firms is noncompliant is examined. It is shown that the firm with market power may choose to hold more permits than it needs, and the one that is noncompliant may be socially desirable because it can mitigate the distortion caused by market power.

This paper extends the theory of multinational corporations, identifying three distinct influences of internal trade liberalization by a group of countries on the level and pattern of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). First, the tariff jumping motive encourages plant consolidation. Second, the export platform motive favours FDI with only a single union plant relative to exporting, and may induce a firm which has never exported to invest. Finally, reduced internal tariffs increase competition from domestic firms, which dilutes the other motives and may induce a `Fortress Europe' outcome of multinationals leaving union markets even though external tariffs are unchanged.

We compare first-price auctions to an exchange process that we term 'multilateral negotiations.' In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers with privately known [...]

A model is presented that depicts potential impacts of market integration programs on rural Latin American subsistence and cottage industries, focusing on mitigation of deforestation activities for agriculture.

We analyze a dynamic version of the Akerlof-Wilson 'lemons' market in a competitive durable good setting. There is a fixed set of sellers with private information about the quality of their wares. The price mechanism sorts sellers of different qualities into different time periods--prices and average quality of goods traded increase over time. Goods of all qualities are traded in finite time. Market failure arises because of the waiting involved--particularly for sellers of better quality. The equilibrium path may exhibit intermediate breaks in trading.

In this paper we suggest an improved methodology for comparing the intensity of trade across and within national and provincial boundaries. Earlier efforts to assess border effects for provinces or for countries without internal trade statistics made fairly arbitrary assumptions about average distances for internal trade flows. We improve on earlier efforts by taking more complete account of the distribution of population within each province or country. Internal distance is estimated as a population-weighted average of intra-city and intercity distances as well as distances to and within rural areas. We find higher estimates of internal distances, and hence border effects, than found in previous studies.

Contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting. If the informed party's reservation value does not depend on its private information (its type), it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers 'low' types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to 'high' types. We challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment. We consider a market where players meet pairwise and where, in each match, either side may be chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. As frictions become sufficiently low, we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information. In particular, all contracts are free of distortions.

Byline: Harold L. Cole (1), George J. Mailath (3), Andrew Postlewaite (3) Abstract: Economists typically analyze individuals' market behavior in isolation from their nonmarket decisions. While this research strategy has generally been successful, it can lead to systematic errors when agents' nonmarket behavior affects their market choices. In this paper we analyze how individuals' investment behavior changes as a result of nonmarket behavior. Specifically, we analyze a model in which individuals must decide how to allocate their initial endowment between two random investments, where the returns are perfectly correlated across individuals for the first investment but independent across individuals for the second. We consider an environment in which men and women match, with wealthier individuals more successful in matching. We show how individuals' concern about relative wealth can affect their investment decisions, and we provide conditions under which individuals bias their investments either toward or away from the investment with correlated returns. A modification of the model is used to explain why agents' investments might exhibit a home country bias. Author Affiliation: (1) Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 250 Marquette Ave., Minneapolis, MN 55480, USA , US (2) Department of Economics, Bunche Hall 9377, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477, USA (e-mail: hlcole@econ.ucla.edu) , US (3) Department of Economics, 3718 Locust Walk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297, USA (e-mail: {gmailath apostlew}&amp commat econ.sas.upenn.edu) , US