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This paper studies the trade effects of COVID‐19 using monthly disaggregated trade data for 28 countries and multiple trading partners from the beginning of the pandemic to June 2020. Regression results based on a sector‐level gravity model show that the negative trade effects induced by COVID‐19 shocks varied widely across sectors. Sectors more amenable to remote work contracted less throughout the pandemic. Importantly, participation in global value chains increased traders’ vulnerability to shocks suffered by trading partners, but it also reduced their vulnerability to domestic shocks.

This paper attempts to quantify the impact of economic policy uncertainty on overall trade and trade linked to global value chains. Using new data on policy uncertainty for 18 countries and 24 years, it finds a statistically significant negative impact of policy uncertainty on overall trade growth. A 1 percent increase in uncertainty is associated with a 0.02 percentage point reduction in the growth of goods and services trade, implying that the increase in policy uncertainty since mid-2018 may have caused a 1 percentage point decline in world trade growth. The paper also finds that the impact of policy uncertainty on trade linked to global value chains is similar to overall trade. This is likely to be the result of two opposing forces: global value chains are more dependent on relation-specific investments that are sensitive to policy uncertainty, but these investments also make trade patterns sticky. More research and better data are needed to disentangle these different effects empirically.

This paper investigates the impact of global value chain participation on productivity, using data on trade in value added from the World Input-Output Database. The results based on a panel estimation covering 13 sectors in 40 countries over 15 years suggest that participation in global value chains is a significant driver of labor productivity. Backward participation in global value chains, that is, the use of imported inputs to produce for exports, emerges as particularly important. An increase by 10 percent in the level of global value chain participation increased average productivity by close to 1.7 percent.

Should the China-U.S. trade agreement prompt relief because it averts a damaging trade war or concern because selective preferential access for the United States to China's markets breaks multilateral rules against discrimination? The answer depends on how China implements the agreement. Simulations from a computable general equilibrium model suggest that the United States and China would be better off under this"managed trade"agreement than if the trade war had escalated. However, compared with the policy status quo, the deal will make everyone worse off except the United States and its input-supplying neighbor, Mexico. Real incomes in the rest of world would decline by 0.16 percent and in China by 0.38 percent because of trade diversion. China can reverse those losses if, instead of granting the United States privileged entry, it opens its market for all trading partners. Global income would be 0.6 percent higher than under the managed trade scenario, and China's income would be nearly 0.5 percent higher. By creating a stronger incentive for China to open its markets to all, an exercise in bilateral mercantilism has the potential to become an instrument for multilateral liberalization.

East Asia, for long the epitome of successful engagement in trade, faces serious challenges: technological change that may threaten the very model of labor intensive industrialization and a backlash against globalization that may reduce access to important markets. A detailed analysis of the evolution of East Asia's trade and trade policy in goods and services leads to the conclusion that how East Asia copes with these global challenges will depend on how it addresses three more proximate national and regional challenges. The first is the emergence of one East Asian country, China, as a global trade giant—accounting for nearly one-seventh of global exports and one-tenth of global imports -- which is fundamentally altering the trading patterns and opportunities of its neighbors. The second is the asymmetric implementation of national reform -- remarkable openness to goods trade and investment coexists with relative restrictiveness of services policies -- which is affecting the evolution of comparative advantage and productivity in each country. The third is the divergence between the relatively shallow and fragmented agreements that regulate the region’s trade and investment and the growing importance of regional and global value chains as crucial drivers of productivity growth.

SUMMARYHow should economists interpret current trade wars and the recent US trade actions that have initiated them? In this paper, we offer an interpretation of current US trade actions that are at once more charitable and less forgiving than that typically offered by economic commentators. More charitable, because we argue that it is possible to see a logic to these actions: the United States is initiating a change from ‘rules-based’ to ‘power-based’ tariff bargaining and is selecting countries with which it runs bilateral trade deficits as the most suitable targets of its bargaining tariffs. Less forgiving, because the main costs of these trade tactics cannot be avoided even if they happen to ‘work’ and deliver lower tariffs. Rather, we show that the main costs will arise from the use of the tactics themselves and from the damage done by those tactics to the rules-based multilateral trading system and the longer-term interests of the United States and the rest of the world. JEL codes: F02, F13

The costs of shipping containerized cargo on liner vessels play a pivotal role in determining a country's integration into international trade. We examine how policy governing the liner shipping sector affects maritime transport costs and seaborne trade flows. Using a novel data set of services trade policy information, we find that restrictions, particularly on foreign investment, significantly increase maritime transport costs. The cost-inflating effect ranges from 26% to 68%, and the resultant reduction in trade flows from 48% to 77%, depending on the level of restrictiveness. We estimate the elasticity of seaborne trade flows with respect to distance to be nearly unity, and are able to disentangle the direct effect of distance from the one that is operating indirectly through higher maritime transport costs. Since the bulk of global merchandise goods trade is seaborne, the magnitude of frictions identified in this paper and their spatial distribution have ramifications for connectivity and growth.

This paper attempts to quantify the impact of economic policy uncertainty on overall trade and trade linked to global value chains. Using new data on policy uncertainty for 18 countries and 24 years, it finds a statistically significant negative impact of policy uncertainty on overall trade growth. A 1 percent increase in uncertainty is associated with a 0.02 percentage point reduction in the growth of goods and services trade, implying that the increase in policy uncertainty since mid-2018 may have caused a 1 percentage point decline in world trade growth. The paper also finds that the impact of policy uncertainty on trade linked to global value chains is similar to overall trade. This is likely to be the result of two opposing forces: global value chains are more dependent on relation-specific investments that are sensitive to policy uncertainty, but these investments also make trade patterns sticky. More research and better data are needed to disentangle these different effects empirically.

Singapore’s inward and outward investments with industrialized countries in both manufacturing and service sectors were skill seeking while outward investments to developing countries were labor seeking. Applying the Knowledge-Capital model, it was found that services Foreign Direct Investment is sensitive to skill differences. A ten percent decline in skill differences with industrialized countries resulted in a 4.25 percent rise in inbound manufacturing and 1.48 percent rise in inbound services investments. Meanwhile, a ten-percent increase in skill differences with developing countries resulted in a 30 percent rise in outbound manufacturing and 0.38 percent rise in services investments. Furthermore, when services are distinguished by skill-intensity, the impact of relative skill endowments on inbound Foreign Direct Investment in skill-intensive services is significantly different from the impact on other services. However, when services are disaggregated by “proximity” needs, we do not find any significant difference in the impact of relative skill endowments on Foreign Direct Investment.

The labor force of each industrial country is being shaped by three forces: ageing, education and migration. Drawing on a new database for the OECD countries and a standard analytical framework, this paper focuses on the relative and aggregate effects of these three forces on wages across different skill and age groups over 2000 to 2010. The variation in the age and educational structure of the labor force emerges as the dominant influence on wage changes. The impact is uniform and egalitarian: in almost all countries, the changes in the age and skill structure favor the low-skilled and hurt the highly skilled across age groups. Immigration plays a relatively minor role, except in a handful of open countries, like Australia and Canada, where it accentuates the wage-equalizing impact of ageing and education. Emigration is the only inegalitarian influence, especially in Ireland and a few Eastern European countries which have seen significant outflows of high-skilled labor to Western European Union countries.

A structural gravity model is used to estimate barriers to services trade across many sectors, countries, and time. Since the disaggregated output data needed to infer border barriers flexibly are often missing for services, this paper derives a novel methodology for projecting output data. The empirical implementation sheds light on the role of institutions, geography, size, and digital infrastructure as determinants of border barriers. The paper finds that border barriers have generally fallen over time, but there are differences across sectors and countries. Notably, border effects for the smallest economies have remained stable, giving rise to a divergent pattern across countries.

World trade is increasingly ruled by preferential trade agreements (PTAs), but their precise nature remains relatively opaque. This paper assesses a central dimension of these agreements, the significance of tariff preferences, using a new data set on preferential and non-preferential or Most Favored Nation (MFN) applied tariffs, constructed by the International Trade Center and the World Bank. The data set covers 5,203 products, 199 reporters, and 239 partners, representing approximately 97 percent of world imports in 2016. There are three main findings. First, PTAs have significantly widened the scope of tariff-free trade. Whereas 42 percent of the total value of trade traded free under MFN rates in 2016, PTAs have fully liberalized an additional 28 percent of global trade. Second, the extent of preferential liberalization varies significantly across countries and sectors. Around 70 percent of countries have reduced trade-weighted average preferential tariffs to less than 5 percent, but PTAs have not been able to eliminate the high levels of protection in some low-income countries and in agricultural products, textiles, and footwear. Third, while the average preferential margin for trade covered by PTAs is low because one-fifth of world trade under preferential agreements is already duty free, more than a quarter of world trade is subject to an average preference margin of 7.4 percent. Considering competition from preferential and non-preferential sources, however, only 5.2 percent of global exports benefited from a preferential advantage of over 5 percent and only 3.3 percent of global exports suffered from a preferential disadvantage higher than 5 percent. Furthermore, data for a subsample of importers reveal that not all eligible imports take advantage of preferences, because of impediments such as restrictive rules of origin, and therefore actual preference margins are generally lower than potential margins.

Can regionalism do what multilateralism has so far failed to do—promote greater openness of services markets? Although previous research has pointed to the wider and deeper legal commitments under regional agreements as proof that it can, no previous study has assessed the impact of such agreements on applied policies. This paper focuses on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), where regional integration of services markets has been linked to thriving regional supply chains. Drawing on surveys conducted in 2008 and 2012 of applied policies in the key services sectors of ASEAN countries, the paper assesses the impact of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and the ambitious ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, which envisaged integrated services markets by 2015. The analysis finds that over this period, ASEAN did not integrate faster internally than vis-a-vis the rest of the world: policies applied to trade with other ASEAN countries were virtually the same as those applied to trade with rest of the world. Moreover, the recent commitments scheduled under AFAS did not produce significant liberalization and, in a few instances, services trade policy actually became more restrictive. The two exceptions are in areas that are not on the multilateral negotiating agenda: steps have been taken toward creating regional open skies in air transport, and a few mutual recognition agreements have been negotiated in professional services. These findings suggest that regional negotiations add the most value when they are focused on areas that are not being addressed multilaterally.

Poor connectivity is conventionally blamed on difficult geography and low income. But economic isolation could also result from policy choices in key ‘linking’ services such as air transportation and telecommunications. A new database on applied services trade policies reveals that many countries restrict trade in the very services that connect them with the rest of the world. We present evidence that restrictive policies lead to more concentrated market structures and limited access to services, even after taking into account the influence of geography and income. Moving from an intermediate level of restrictiveness to an open regime could lead to a 20 percentage point increase in cellular teledensity in the telecommunications sector and to a 25 per cent increase in flight connections per airline in the aviation sector, respectively.

The growth of India's manufacturing sector since 1991 has been attributed mostly to trade liberalization and more permissive industrial licensing. This paper demonstrates the significant impact of a neglected factor: India's policy reforms in services. The authors examine the link between those reforms and the productivity of manufacturing firms using panel data for about 4,000 Indian firms from1993 to 2005. They find that banking, telecommunications, insurance and transport reforms all had significant, positive effects on the productivity of manufacturing firms. Services reforms benefited both foreign and locally-owned manufacturing firms, but the effects on foreign firms tended to be stronger. A one-standard-deviation increase in the aggregate index of services liberalization resulted in a productivity increase of 11.7 percent for domestic firms and 13.2 percent for foreign enterprises.

This paper estimates the effect of China's exchange rate changes on exports of developing countries in third markets. The degree of competition between China and its developing country competitors in specific products and destinations plays a key role in the identification strategy. The strategy exploits variation across exporters, importers, products and time—afforded both by disaggregated trade data and bilateral exchange rates—to estimate this “competitor country effect.” There is robust evidence of a statistically and quantitatively significant effect. A 10 percent appreciation of China's real exchange rate boosts a developing country's exports at the product level on average by about 1.5–2.5 percent. (JEL F14, F31, F33, O19, O24, P33)

This paper investigates the impact of global value chain participation on productivity, using data on trade in value added from the World Input-Output Database. The results based on a panel estimation covering 13 sectors in 40 countries over 15 years suggest that participation in global value chains is a significant driver of labor productivity. Backward participation in global value chains, that is, the use of imported inputs to produce for exports, emerges as particularly important. An increase by 10 percent in the level of global value chain participation increased average productivity by close to 1.7 percent.

Studies on innovation and international trade have traditionally focused on manufacturing because neither was seen as important for services. Moreover, the few existing studies on services focus only on industrial countries, even though in many developing countries services are already the largest sector in the economy and an important determinant of overall productivity growth. Using a recent firm-level innovation survey for Chile to compare the manufacturing and ‘tradable’ services sector, this paper reveals some novel patterns. First, even though services firms have on average a much lower propensity to export than manufacturing firms, services exports are less dominated by large firms and tend to be more skill intensive than manufacturing exports. Second, services firms appear to be as innovative as – and in some cases more innovative than – manufacturing firms, in terms of both inputs and outputs of ‘technological’ innovative activity, even though services innovations more often take a ‘non-technological’ form. Third, services exporters (like manufacturing exporters) tend to be significantly more innovative than non-exporters, with a wider gap for innovations close to the global technological frontier. These findings suggest that the growing faith in services as a source of both trade and innovative dynamism may not be misplaced.

Singapore is an interesting example of how the pattern of foreign investment changes with economic development. The authors analyze inbound and outbound investment between Singapore and a sample of industrialized and developing countries over the period 1984-2003. They find that Singapore's two-way investment with industrialized nations has shifted into skill-seeking activities over the period, while Singapore's investments in developing countries have increased sharply and become concentrated in labor-seeking activities. Singapore's increasing skill abundance relative to all countries in the sample accounted for 41 percent of average inbound stocks during the period, that is, US$18 billion annually; the corresponding figure for outbound stocks was 40 percent, that is, US$5.51 billion annually.

Surprisingly little is known about policies that affect international trade in services. Previous analyses have focused on policy commitments made by countries in international agreements but these commitments do not in many cases reflect actual policy. This paper describes a new initiative to collect comparable information on services trade policies for 103 countries, across a range of service sectors and the relevant modes of service delivery. The resultant database reveals interesting patterns in policy. Across regions, some of the fastest growing countries in Asia and the oil-rich Gulf states have the most restrictive policies in services, whereas some of the poorest countries are remarkably open. Across sectors, professional and transportation services are among the most protected in both industrial and developing countries, while retail, telecommunications and even finance tend to be more open. An illustrative set of results suggests that trade policies matter for investment flows and access to services. In particular, restrictions on foreign acquisitions, discrimination in licensing, restrictions on the repatriation of earnings and lack of legal recourse all have a significant and sizable negative effect, reducing the expected value of sectoral foreign investment by $2.2 billion over a 7-year period, compared with"open"policy regimes. In terms of access to services, credit as a share of gross domestic product is on average 3.3 percentage points lower in countries with major restrictions on the establishment of foreign banks as compared with those that only impose operational restrictions.

In industrial countries contemplating emissions reductions, there have been calls for additional border taxes on imports from countries with lower carbon prices. A key factor affecting the impact of any border taxes is whether they are based on the carbon content of imports or the carbon content of domestic production. Our quantitative estimates suggest that the former action when applied to all merchandise imports would address competitiveness and environmental concerns in high-income countries but with serious consequences for trading partners. For example, China’s manufacturing exports would decline by one-fifth and those of all low- and middle-income countries by 15 %; the corresponding declines in real income would be 3.7 and 2.4 %. Border tax adjustment based on the carbon content in domestic production would broadly address the competitiveness concerns of producers in high-income countries and less adversely affect developing country trade.

Since the Global Financial Crisis, world trade growth has been subdued and lagging slightly behind growth of gross domestic product. Trade is growing more slowly not only because growth of global gross domestic product is lower, but also because trade itself has become less responsive to gross domestic product. This paper reviews the reasons behind the changing trade-income relationship, and then investigates its consequences for economic growth. On the demand side, sluggish world import growth may adversely affect individual countries' economic growth, as it limits opportunities for their exports. On the supply side, slower trade may diminish the scope for productivity growth through increasing specialization and diffusion of technologies. The paper finds preliminary evidence that the changing trade-income relationship matters, although the quantifiable effects do not appear to be large.

After sharply declining in the first half of 2015, world trade began to grow, albeit at a slow pace. Preliminary data indicate that merchandise import growth was 1.7 percent in 2015, down from 3 percent in 2014. Recent trade developments should be seen in the context of a deceleration in trade growth since the early 2000s, and particularly since the global financial crisis. These developments reflected a combination of old and new cyclical factors as well as enduring structural determinants, such as the maturation of global value chains and the slower pace of trade liberalization. In particular, trade developments in Latin America and Eastern Europe and Central Asia mostly reflected lower imports of recession hit commodity exporters such as Brazil and Russia. Latin America contributed 6 percent to the downward pull in global imports in 2015. Except for Japan, imports and exports of advanced economies did not show signs of a significant downturn, but were sluggish. Lower commodity prices have reduced real incomes in commodity producers and led to a contraction in their imports from all regions, including China. At the same time, the gradual shift from investment to consumption in China, and the more significant contraction in its industrial production seen in early 2015, have reduced its imports from other regions, including commodity producers.

While there is considerable empirical evidence on the impact of liberalizing trade in goods, the effects of services liberalization have not been empirically established. Using firm-level data from the Czech Republic for the period 1998-2003, this study examines the link between services sector reforms and the productivity of domestic firms in downstream manufacturing. Several aspects of services reform are considered and measured, namely, the increased presence of foreign providers, privatization, and enhanced competition. The manufacturing-services linkage is measured using information on the degree to which manufacturing firms in a particular industry rely on intermediate inputs from specific services sectors. The econometric results lead to two conclusions. First, the study finds that services policy matters for the productivity of manufacturing firms relying on services inputs. This finding is robust to several econometric specifications, including controlling for unobservable firm heterogeneity and for other aspects of openness. Second, it finds evidence that opening services sectors to foreign providers is a key channel through which services liberalization contributes to improved performance of downstream manufacturing sectors. This finding is robust to instrumenting for the extent of foreign presence in services industries. As most barriers to foreign investment today are not in goods but in services sectors, the findings may strengthen the argument for reform in this area.

Much attention has focused on the impact of the current crisis on goods trade; hardly any on its impact on services trade. Using new trade data from the United States, and more aggregate data from other OECD countries, the authors show that services trade is weathering the current crisis much better than goods trade. As of February 2009, the value of US goods imports had declined year-on-year by 33 percent and the value of goods exports by 21 percent; services imports and exports each had declined by less than 7 percent. Within services, interesting patterns are emerging. Trade in goods-related transport services and crisis-related financial services has shrunk, as has expenditure on tourism abroad. But trade in a range of business, professional, and technical services is still increasing, with US exports growing even faster (at 10 percent) than US imports (at 7 percent). Developing countries like India, which are relatively specialized in business process outsourcing and information technology services, have suffered much smaller declines in total exports to the United States than countries like Brazil and China and regions like Africa, which are specialized in exports of goods, transport services, or tourism services. On the basis of new evidence from Indian services exporters, the authors suggest that services trade is buoyant relative to goods trade for two reasons: demand for a range of traded services is less cyclical, and services trade and production are less dependent on external finance. Even though few explicitly protectionist measures have so far been taken in services, the changing political climate and the widening boundaries of the state in crisis countries may introduce a national bias in firms'procurement and location choices.

Changes in demographics and patterns of investment in human capital are creating increased scope for international trade in professional services. India, one of the largest exporters of skilled services, and the United States, one of the largest importers of skilled services, are two countries that mirror these broader global trends. The scope for mutually beneficial trade is today inhibited not only by quotas and discriminatory taxation, but also by a number of domestic regulatory requirements--including qualification and licensing requirements. To illustrate the nature and implications of these regulatory impediments, this article focuses on the regulatory requirements that Indian professionals face in the US market. It explores the consequences of regulatory discrimination and the economic cost of regulations, and presents some illustrative estimates. The article concludes by examining how the trade-inhibiting impact of regulatory requirements could be addressed through bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Oxford University Press 2009, all rights reserved, Oxford University Press.

The impact of international students in the United States on innovative activity is estimated using a model of idea generation. Results indicate that the presence of foreign graduate students has a significant and positive impact on both future patent applications and future patents awarded to university and non-university institutions. Our central estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the number of foreign graduate students would raise patent applications by 4.5%, university patent grants by 6.8% and non-university patent grants by 5.0%. Thus, reductions in foreign graduate students from visa restrictions could significantly reduce US innovative activity. Increases in skilled immigration also have a positive, but smaller, impact on patenting.

Regional agreements on standards have been largely ignored by economists and unconditionally blessed by multilateral trade rules. The authors find, theoretically and empirically, that such agreements increase trade between participating countries but not necessarily with the rest of the world. Adopting a common standard in a region-that is, harmonization-boosts exports of excluded industrial countries to the region. But it reduces exports of excluded developing countries, possibly because developing country firms are hurt more by an increase in the stringency of standards and benefit less from economies of scale in integrated markets. Mutual recognition agreements are more uniformly trade promoting unless they contain restrictive rules of origin, in which case intra-regional trade increases at the expense of trade with other, especially developing, countries. The authors propose a modification of international trade rules to strike a better balance between the interests of integrating and excluded countries.

This paper discusses what could be done to expand services trade and investment through a multilateral agreement in the WTO. A distinction is made between market access liberalization and the regulatory preconditions for benefiting from market opening. We argue that prospects for multilateral services liberalization would be enhanced by making national treatment the objective of WTO services negotiations. Moreover, if complemented by assistance to strengthen regulatory capacity in developing countries, the WTO could become more relevant in promoting not just services liberalization but, more importantly, domestic reforms of services policies.

Little progress has been made since the creation of the WTO on expanding and deepening the coverage of services liberalization commitments. This paper identifies and discusses five hypotheses that may explain the absence of dynamism: (i) technological changes allowing ever more services to be traded cross-border unaffected by policy; (ii) strong incentives to pursue liberalization on an autonomous basis (unilaterally); (iii) perceptions that bilateral or regional cooperation are a good substitute for the WTO; (iv) standard political-economy factors, such as adjustment costs and resistance by incumbents to erosion of rents; and (v) concerns that the WTO will affect the ability of regulators to enforce national norms. We argue that all of these explanations play a role, and that some of these factors significantly impede the scope for reciprocal exchanges of 'concessions' - the engine of WTO negotiations. Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.

The dynamism of air traffic markets in the Middle East obscures the persistence of restrictions on international competition. But how important are such restrictions for passenger traffic? This paper uses detailed data on worldwide passenger aviation to estimate the effect of air transport policy on international air traffic. The policy variable is a quantitative measure of the commitments under international agreements. The paper analyses, for the first time, not only bilateral agreements, but also plurilateral agreements such as the one among Arab states. The analysis finds that more liberal policy is associated with greater passenger traffic between countries. Higher traffic levels appear to be driven by larger numbers of city-pairs being served, as well as by more passengers traveling along given routes. To demonstrate the quantitative implication of the estimates, two liberalization scenarios in the Middle East are evaluated. Deepening the plurilateral agreement among Arab states would lead to a 30 per cent increase in intra-regional passenger traffic. Widening the agreement to include Turkey would generate significantly larger gains because current policy vis-à-vis Turkey is much more restrictive. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html

A range of health care services are tradable, in that consumers can travel abroad for treatment. In this paper we first estimate the gains from trade. An international price comparison of fifteen procedures reveals that there could be savings of around 1.4 billion dollars annually even if only one in ten U.S. patients choose to undergo treatment abroad. We then identify a key impediment to realizing these gains: the nature of existing health insurance plans, which discriminate explicitly or implicitly against treatment abroad. We propose that coverage should be neutral to provider location and that reimbursement should include travel costs.

Recent research suggests that trade costs influence the pattern of specialization and trade, but there is limited empirical research on the determinants of trade costs. The existing literature identifies a range of barriers that separate nations, but then typically focuses only on transport costs. Although communication costs figure prominently in intuitive explanations and casual observations, they have played little role in the formal analysis of trade costs. The authors seek to examine whether this neglect matters, and whether the inclusion of the magnitude and variation of communication costs across partner countries can add value to existing explanations of the pattern of trade. The authors develop a simple multi-sector model of"impeded"trade that generates hypotheses in a gravity-type estimation framework. The main proxies for bilateral communication costs are the per-minute country-to-country calling prices charged in the importing and exporting countries. The use of bilateral variations in prices yields estimates that are superior to the ones obtained from country-specific measures of communication infrastructure used in previous studies. The authors find that international variations in communication costs have a significant influence on bilateral trade flows, at the aggregate level and for most individual sectors disaggregated according to the 2-digit SITC classification. Since information and communication needs are likely to be much greater for differentiated goods, the authors test whether trade in these products is more sensitive to variations in the costs of communication. Using the Rauch classification of product heterogeneity, the estimates suggest that the impact of communication costs on trade in differentiated products is as much as one-third larger than on trade in homogenous products. Finally, the authors verify, to the extent possible, that the significance of communication costs is not driven by their endogeneity or by omitted variables.

Cross-border trade in services is growing rapidly, with both industrial and developing countries among the most dynamic exporters. Despite the substantial global benefits from such trade, the adjustment pressures created in importing countries could provoke a protectionist backlash-some signs of which are already visible in procurement and regulatory restrictions. The current negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda offer an opportunity to lock in current openness and preempt protectionism. This paper describes how a bold initiative under the General Agreement on Trade in Services can help secure openness.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), created under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, aims to regulate measures affecting international trade in services-including health services such as health insurance, hospital services, telemedicine, and acquisition of medical treatment abroad. The agreement has been the subject of great controversy, for it may affect the freedom with which countries can change the shape of their domestic health care systems. We explain the rationale behind the agreement and discuss its scope. We also address the major controversies surrounding the GATS and their implications for the U.S. health care system.

China's GATS commitments represent the most radical services reform program negotiated in the WTO. China has promised to eliminate over the next few years most restrictions on foreign entry and ownership, as well as most forms of discrimination against foreign firms. In general, these commitments promote good policy. But the persistence of restrictions on foreign ownership (temporary in most sectors but more durable in telecommunications and life insurance) may dampen the incentives for foreign investors to improve firm performance. And initial restrictions on the geographical scope of services liberalization could encourage the further agglomeration of economic activity in certain regions -- to an extent that is unlikely to be reversed completely by subsequent country-wide liberalization. Finally, realizing the gains from, and perhaps even the sustainability of, liberalization will require significant improvements in the regulatory framework and the appropriate sequencing of reforms. Copyright Oxford University Press 2003, Oxford University Press.

This paper focuses on the sluggish growth of world trade relative to income growth in recent years. The analysis uses an empirical strategy based on an error correction model to assess whether the global trade slowdown is structural or cyclical. An estimate of the relationship between trade and income in the past four decades reveals that the long-term trade elasticity rose sharply in the 1990s, but declined significantly in the 2000s even before the global financial crisis. These results suggest that trade is growing slowly not only because of slow growth of gross domestic product, but also because of a structural change in the trade-gross domestic product relationship in recent years. The available evidence suggests that the explanation may lie in the slowing pace of international vertical specialization rather than increasing protection or the changing composition of trade and gross domestic product.

This paper assesses the quantitative importance of electronic commerce in trade and tariff revenue, in light of the WTO decision on ‘duty-free cyberspace’. Electronic commerce is likely to boost international trade in software, digitizable media products (music, books) and many services sectors significantly. However, despite the growing importance of electronic commerce for trade, tariff revenue loss from duty-free electronic commerce is unlikely to be significant.

This paper shows that environmental, labour and other standards can be effective strategic policy instruments even when they are strictly non-discriminatory. This is because standards can be set which the low cost producer optimally chooses not to meet, allowing the high cost producer to monopolize the standardized segment of the market. Thus, it is important for policy to consider how much scope there should be for the imposition of unilaterally determined standards - which could impact negatively on trading partners even when they are non-discriminatory - rather than internationally negotiated standards.

This paper examines how the market structure is likely to evolve in a situation of multi-stage oligopolistic production. The decision to merge across or within stages of production is treated as endogenous. It is shown that when firms at a particular stage of production are relatively dominant, simultaneous merger decisions are conducive to competitive vertically integrated outcomes while sequential decisions are not. The persistence of non-integrated market structures may be explained by the existence of equally dominant firms which make merger decisions sequentially. The credible threat of retaliatory merger may deter both socially desirable and undesirable forms of merger. Inferences are drawn for the design of competition policy.

Developing countries need to ensure that multilateral rules and commitments on trade in services contribute to economically rational policy-making. This paper shows that their reluctant participation in past negotiations, and assumption of defensive positions, have not been conducive to the achievement of this goal. The next round of services negotiations requires a change in negotiating strategies. Rather than resist the liberalisation of domestic markets and seek a dilution of multilateral rules, they need to push aggressively for (i) liberalisation of domestic services markets, emphasising competition more than a change of ownership, (ii) development of improved rules for domestic regulations that encourage economic efficiency in remedying market failures and pursuing social goals, and (iii) effective liberalisation of foreign services markets by the elimination of both explicit restrictions and implicit regulatory barriers. At the same time, developed countries need to rise to the challenge of eliminating the barriers they maintain to exports from developing countries, so that we may witness not a bitter round of grudging concessions, but a virtuous cycle of mutually beneficial liberalisation. * This paper is a condensed version of Mattoo (1999), which has a more comprehensive discussion of developing country interests and references to the literature. Thanks go to Carsten Fink, Randeep Rathindran, and Arvind Subramanian for contributions to this paper, to Bernard Hoekman, Marcelo Olarreaga, Arvind Panagariya for insightful comments, and to Malina Savova for valuable research assistance. The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank.

World trade in services amounted to $2170 billion in 1997, of which 40 per cent was cross-border consumption. Though service trade liberalization is hard to model, sectoral and general equilibrium analyses indicate the scope for major welfare gains. Reforms in services will be driven by domestic agendas, but they can be supported and complemented by commitments to GATS disciplines. Developing country commitments in the GATS, as well as commitments in their areas of interest, are limited. Incentives are needed in the next WTO trade round to encourage commitment to a more balanced and comprehensive coverage. The trade inhibiting effect of domestic regulation requires particular attention. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A major challenge for the multilateral trading system is to secure the benefits of trade liberalization without infringing on the freedom of governments to pursue legitimate domestic objectives. The difficulty lies in distinguishing between two types of situations. In one, a non-protectionist government cannot prevent certain domestic policies from incidentally discriminating against foreign competitors. In the other, a protectionist government uses a legitimate objective as an excuse to design domestic policies which inhibit foreign competition. The challenge is to devise rules which are sensitive to the difference between these two situations, exonerating the former while preventing the latter. The approach suggested in this paper is to create a presumption in favour of the economically efficient policy measure, with departures inviting justification. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

The demand for accountability in aid-for-trade is increasing but monitoring has focused on case studies and impressionistic narratives. The paper reviews recent evidence from a wide range of studies, recognizing that a multiplicity of approaches is needed to learn what works and what does not. The review concludes that there is some support for the emphasis on reducing trade costs through investments in hard infrastructure (like ports and roads) and soft infrastructure (like customs). But failure to implement complementary reform -- especially the introduction of competition in transport services -- may erode the benefits of these investments. Direct support to exporters does seem to lead to diversification across products and destinations, but it is not yet clear that these benefits are durable. In general, it is difficult to rely on cross-country studies to direct aid-for-trade. More rigorous impact evaluation is an underutilized alternative, but situations of clinical interventions in trade are rare and adverse incentives (because of agency problems) and costs (because of the small size of project) are a hurdle in implementation.