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Indigenous Peoples in high-income countries experience higher burdens of food insecurity, obesity, and diet-related health conditions compared to national averages. The objective of this systematic scoping review is to synthesize information from the published literature on the methods/approaches, findings, and scope for research and interventions on the retail food sector servicing Indigenous Peoples in high-income countries. A structured literature search in two major international databases yielded 139 relevant peer-reviewed articles from nine countries. Most research was conducted in Oceania and North America, and in rural and remote regions. Several convergent issues were identified across global regions including limited grocery store availability/access, heightened exposure to unhealthy food environments, inadequate market food supplies (i.e., high prices, limited availability, and poor quality), and common underlying structural factors including socio-economic inequality and colonialism. A list of actions that can modify the nature and structure of retailing systems to enhance the availability, accessibility, and quality of healthful foods is identified. While continuing to (re)align research with community priorities, international collaboration may foster enhanced opportunities to strengthen the evidence base for policy and practice and contribute to the amelioration of diet quality and health at the population level.

Food production shocks can lead to food crises where access to appropriate quantities and quality of food become inadequate, unaffordable, or unreliable on a major scale. While the physical causes of food production shocks are well researched, the dynamics of responses to them are less well understood. This paper reviews those dynamics and includes evidence gathered via interviews of 44 expert practitioners sourced globally from academia, government, industry, think-tanks, and development/relief organizations. The paper confirms that policy interventions are often prioritised for national interests and poorly coordinated at regional and global scales. The paper acknowledges future compounding trends such as climate change and demographic shifts and suggests that while there are signs of incremental progress in better managing the impacts of shock events, coordinated responses at scale will require a paradigm shift involving major policy, market, and technological advancements, and a wide range of public and private sector stakeholders.

The rural economy in Bangladesh has been a powerful source of economic growth and has substantially reduced poverty, especially since 2000, but the remarkable transformation and unprecedented dynamism in rural Bangladesh are an underexplored, underappreciated, and largely untold story. The analysis identifies the key changes occurring in the rural economy, the principal drivers of rural incomes, the implications for policy, and related actions to foster future growth, further reduce poverty, and improve food security and nutrition. A substantial strength of this study is its empirical foundation, consisting of three sets of detailed data on rural households. Two of the datasets are unique in tracking the same set of households for more than two decades. These data make it possible to examine how change is occurring within and among rural households; they shed considerable light on trends that tend to be obscured at more aggregate levels of analysis. Nationally representative surveys and aggregate secondary data provide complementary and contextually rich insights into the household data.

There is no doubt that the poorest people are already and will continue to be most severely impacted by climatic changes, including shifting trends as well as more frequent and severe extreme events. Yet, new insights on the dynamics and distribution of poverty point to the need to comprehend where the poor and poorest are, how they are poor, and why their poverty constrains their abilities to cope with and adapt to occurring and predicted changes. This paper draws on a diverse and growing literature on climate change and poverty to argue that uneven power relations more so than exposure and sensitivity to climatic hazards make the poor and disadvantaged distinctly more vulnerable than more affluent, privileged, and powerful groups and individuals. Further, climatic stressors and climate change as well as climate policies, often entangled with social exclusion and institutional neglect, compound the issue of poverty and exacerbate human precariousness, hence acting as a threat multiplier. The paper compares different approaches to assessing poverty, and explores structural processes and power dynamics that drive or perpetuate inequalities. The paper also investigates how the currently nonpoor may become transient or chronic poor, how climate change may exacerbate poverty traps, and how interventions to curb emissions and multidimensional poverty may be tackled to pursue climate-resilient development pathways.

This paper provides evidence on the impacts of agricultural productivity on employment growth and structural transformation of non-farm activities. To guide the empirical work, this paper develops a general equilibrium model that emphasizes distinctions among non-farm activities in terms of tradable-non-tradable and the formal-informal characteristics. The model shows that when a significant portion of village income is spent on town/urban goods, restricting empirical analysis to the village sample leads to underestimation of agriculture's role in employment growth and transformation of non-farm activities. Using rainfall as an instrument for agricultural productivity, empirical analysis finds a significant positive effect of agricultural productivity growth on growth of informal (small-scale) manufacturing and skilled services employment, mainly in education and health services. For formal employment, the effect of agricultural productivity growth on employment is found to be largest in the samples that include urban areas and rural towns compared with rural areas alone. Agricultural productivity growth is found to induce structural transformation within the services sector with employment in formal/skilled services growing at a faster pace than that of low skilled services.

During 2015, and in the span of six-months, Nepal was hit by two major shocks. The first one was the April 2015 earthquakes that caused a huge loss of life and assets. The second shock has come in the form of a near complete disruption of external trade following the adoption of the new Constitution. Reflecting both the earthquake and trade related disruptions, inflation spiked to over 12 percent (y/ y) by mid-January rising 5 percentage points in just four months from mid-September 2015. This was the highest inflation level since FY2009, with increases in food and non-food prices contributing equally to the spike. As the trade disruptions ended, inflation has eased to back to single digits.

This Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) identifies the binding constraints to reducing extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity in Ethiopia. Achieving those goals requires a two pronged strategy of building on the strengths of past performance as well as introducing new elements. Progress in rural livelihoods drove poverty reduction in the past and will likely do so in the future. In addition, faster, and more inclusive, private sector-led structural change and ‘getting urbanization right’ are essential going forward. The report identifies two key challenges to sustainable progress: Ethiopia needs sustainably financed infrastructure that enables private investment to flourish and reduces reliance on public borrowing. It must also strengthen feedback mechanisms that inform policymakers of what works and what doesn’t so that the aspirations of a rapidly rising and better-educated working-age population can be met. The report is structured in two parts: Part A analyses the past and Part B identifies priorities for the future.

Iraq was plunged into two simultaneous crises in the second half of 2014, one driven by a sharp decline in oil prices, the other, by the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The severity and recurrent nature of these crises demand a fast understanding and quantification of their welfare impact, which is critical for policy makers. This paper employs an innovative extension of the micro-simulation methodology to provide an ex ante estimate and analysis of the complex and dynamic poverty and distributional impact of the twin crises. The results show an almost complete erosion of the welfare gains of the past, with poverty falling back to 2007 levels and a 20 percent increase in the number of the poor. While the incidence of poverty is higher among internally displaced persons than the rest of the population (except in the Islamic State–affected governorates, where poverty is higher), internally displaced persons make up only a small proportion of Iraq's eight million poor in 2014. The rest comprise of households who already lived below the poverty line, or those who have fallen below the poverty line in the face of the massive economic disruptions the country is facing. The welfare impact of the crises varies widely across space, with the largest increases in poverty headcount rates in Kurdistan and the Islamic State–affected governorates. Yet, the poorest regions in the 2014 crisis scenario are the same as in 2012, the currently Islamic State–affected, and the South, with poverty rates of 40 and 30 percent, respectively. Although the simulated results are not strictly comparable to ex post micro data estimates, because of survey coverage constraints, overall the results are very much in line, particularly in Kurdistan and the South.

Despite rapid economic growth, inequality is increasing in Indonesia. After recovering from the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, Indonesias real GDP per capita grew at an annual average of 5.4 percent between 2000 and 2014. This robust rate of growth helped to halve the poverty rate from 23.4 percent during the crisis down to 11.2 percent by 2015. However, between 2003 and 2010, consumption per person for the richest 10 percent of Indonesians grew at over 6 percent per year after adjusting for inflation, while for the poorest 40 percent it grew by less than 2 percent per year. This disparity in consumption between different income levels has, in turn, given rise to a sharp increase in the Gini coefficient over the past 15 years, increasing from 30 in 2000 to 41 in 2013.

The impacts of climate change on poverty depend on the magnitude of climate change, but also on demographic and socioeconomic trends. An analysis of hundreds of baseline scenarios for future economic development in the absence of climate change in 92 countries shows that the drivers of poverty eradication differ across countries. Two representative scenarios are selected from these hundreds. One scenario is optimistic regarding poverty and is labeled “prosperity;” the other scenario is pessimistic and labeled “poverty.” Results from sector analyses of climate change impacts—in agriculture, health, and natural disasters—are introduced in the two scenarios. By 2030, climate change is found to have a significant impact on poverty, especially through higher food prices and reduction of agricultural production in Africa and South Asia, and through health in all regions. But the magnitude of these impacts depends on development choices. In the prosperity scenario with rapid, inclusive, and climate-informed development, climate change increases poverty by between 3 million and 16 million in 2030. The increase in poverty reaches between 35 million and 122 million if development is delayed and less inclusive (the poverty scenario).

With 2015 marking the transition from the Millennium to the Sustainable Development Goals, the international community can celebrate many development successes since 2000. Three key challenges stand out: the depth of remaining poverty, the unevenness in shared prosperity, and the persistent disparities in non-income dimensions of development. First, the policy discourse needs to focus more directly on the poorest among the poor. While pockets of ultra-poverty exist around the world, Sub-Saharan Africa is home to most of the deeply poor. To make depth a more central element in policy formulation, easy-to-communicate measures are needed, and this note attempts a step in this direction with person-equivalent measures of poverty. Second, the eradication of poverty in all of its forms requires steady growth of the incomes of the bottom 40 percent. Yet, economic growth, a key driver of shared prosperity, may not be as buoyant as before the global financial crisis. Third, unequal progress in non-income dimensions of development requires addressing widespread inequality of opportunity, which transmits poverty across generations and erodes the pace and sustainability of progress for the bottom 40. To meet these challenges, three ingredients are core to the policy agenda: sustaining broad-based growth, investing in human development, and insuring the poor and vulnerable against emerging risks.

Poverty in Lao PDR declined from 33.5 percent to 23.2 percent over the 10 year period between 2002/3 and 2012/13. The number of poor people declined by about half a million to 1.35 million in 2013 and Lao PDR has met its MDG target of reducing poverty to below 24 percent by 2015. Improvements in welfare are evident in the changes in other socio-economic indicators such as the ownership of televisions and access to electricity, which doubled, and the number of households living in houses built with bricks or concrete, which nearly tripled, while the proportion of those without a toilet halved. Net secondary enrollment increased from 27 percent in 2002/3 to 50 percent in 2012/13 showing significant improvements in education.

This paper quantifies the contributions to poverty reduction observed in Sri Lanka between 2002 and 2012/13. The methods adopted for the analysis generate entire counterfactual distributions to account for the contributions of demographics, labor, and non-labor incomes in explaining poverty reduction. The findings show that the most important contributor to poverty reduction was growth in labor income, stemming from an increase in the returns to salaried nonfarm workers and higher returns to self-employed farm workers. Although some of this increase in earnings may point to improvements in productivity, defined as higher units of output per worker, some of it may simply reflect increases in food and commodity prices, which have increased the marginal revenue product of labor. To the extent that there have been no increases in the volumes being produced, the observed changes in poverty are vulnerable to reversals if commodity prices were to decline significantly. Finally, although private transfers (domestic and foreign) helped to reduce poverty over the period, public transfers were not as effective. In particular, the reduction in the real value of transfers of the Samurdhi program during 2002 to 2012/13 slowed down poverty reduction.

The 2014 release of a new set of purchasing power parity conversion factors (PPPs) for 2011 has prompted a revision of the international poverty line. In order to preserve the integrity of the goalposts for international targets such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the World Bank’s twin goals, the new poverty line was chosen so as to preserve the definition and real purchasing power of the earlier $1.25 line (in 2005 PPPs) in poor countries. Using the new 2011 PPPs, the new line equals $1.90 per person per day. The higher value of the line in US dollars reflects the fact that the new PPPs yield a relatively lower purchasing power of that currency vis-à-vis those of most poor countries. Because the line was designed to preserve real purchasing power in poor countries, the revisions lead to relatively small changes in global poverty incidence: from 14.5 percent in the old method to 14.1 percent in the new method for 2011. In 2012, the new reference year for the global count, we find 12.7 percent of the world’s population, or 897 million people, are living in extreme poverty. There are changes in the regional composition of poverty, but they are also relatively small. This paper documents the detailed methodological decisions taken in the process of updating both the poverty line and the consumption and income distributions at the country level, including issues of inter-temporal and spatial price adjustments. It also describes various caveats, limitations, perils and pitfalls of the approach taken.

This systematic country diagnosis (SCD) for Chad aims to identify how to achieve the twin goals of ending poverty and improving shared prosperity. It acknowledges both: (i) the need for selectivity in pro-poor interventions, and (ii) the inherent difficulty to do so given the many competing binding reasons for poverty. Selectivity means the identification of principal opportunities for sustainable poverty reduction in the next 15 years, as well as the identification of binding constraints to reaping such opportunities. Selectivity also implies making trade-offs between immediate and longer term objectives, with priority given to the identification of poverty reduction opportunities which will: (i) deliver the highest possible results before 2030, and (ii) not undermine prospects for poverty reduction and shared prosperity beyond 2030. The analysis presented in the SCD draws on a variety of information sources. These include domestic statistics and reports, evaluations by the country’s development partners, original research conducted by the World Bank team, and consultations held in N’Djamena with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector. Reaping poverty reduction opportunities will require addressing a selected number of binding constraints.

This paper discusses how catastrophe crop risk models can be used to assess food security needs at the sovereign level for the purpose of risk transfer. The rationale for a system to evaluate food security needs at the national level is discussed. The role of technology and remote sensing data availability as an enabler of catastrophe crop risk models is discussed followed by a description of the framework of catastrophe crop models for droughts, representing the peril for which catastrophe models have had the most success. The integration of the output of catastrophe crop models with a food security vulnerability assessment model is described next. Recent advances in analytical modeling of various types of shocks in assessing food security are described but the operational use of these analytical models in the development of food security assessment for risk transfer is seen to be limited for now because of the complexity of these analytical models. The food security vulnerability modeling in the African Risk Capacity, ARC, model is then described as showing a practical solution to the complex problem of assessing food security via a model. Lastly, the challenges faced in risk transfer of sovereign food security risks are discussed.

This document presents the Systematic Country Diagnosis (SCD) for Mali. The SCD was prepared following a consultative process within and outside the World Bank. It identifies constraints and opportunities for achieving the twin goals of ending poverty and improving shared prosperity by 2030 while acknowledging (i) the need for selectivity in pro-poor interventions, and (ii) the many competing ‘binding’ reasons for poverty in Mali. The objectives of the twin goals are similar for Mali as the incidence of dollar-a-day poverty exceeds 40 percent of the population. Selectivity means the identification of principal opportunities for poverty reduction in the next 15 years, as well as the identification of binding constraints to reaping such opportunities. In the search for selectivity, there is the risk of not identifying the correct set of opportunities and constraints. However, the risk of not being selective would probably have more serious implications as it could lead the government and its development partners to disperse their resources and attention too thinly over too many competing priorities. Selectivity also implies making trade-offs between immediate and longer term objectives. In this document priority is given to the identification of poverty reduction opportunities which could deliver results before 2030, while acknowledging that efforts should not undermine the prospects for poverty reduction and shared prosperity beyond 2030. In this regard, particular attention is paid to environmental and fiscal sustainability.

This paper provides new empirical insights on the joint distribution of consumption, income, and wealth in three of the poorest countries in the world — Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda — all located in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The first finding is that while income inequality is similar to that of the United States (US), wealth inequality is barely one-third that of the US. Similarly, while the top of the income distribution (1 and 10 percent) earns a similar share of total income in SSA as in the US, the share of total wealth accumulated by the income-rich in SSA is one-fifth of its US counterpart. The main contributions of the paper are to document: (i) this dwarfed transmission from income to wealth, which suggests that SSA households face a larger inability to save and accumulate wealth compared with US households; and (ii) a lower transmission from income to consumption inequality, which suggests the presence of powerful institutions that favor consumption insurance to the detriment of saving. These features are more relevant for rural areas, which represent roughly four-fifths of the total population. The paper identifies the few successful pockets of the SSA population that are able to accumulate wealth by exploring sources of inequality such as age, education, migration, borrowing ability, and societal systems.

Increasing the trade integration of developing countries can make a vital contribution to boosting shared prosperity, but it also exposes producers and consumers to exogenous shocks that alter relative prices, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively. This paper discusses the short-run effects of trade-related shocks on households to capture the potential welfare impact on the poor. The discussion explores the channels through which trade shocks are transmitted to households in the bottom of the income distribution, namely through consumption, household production, and market-based labor activities. The degree to which price shocks are passed through from borders to point of sale is a key determinant of the gains from trade and the ultimate welfare impact. Trade changes in agriculture directly affect households through their consumption basket. Lower agricultural prices reduce the cost of consumables, but these welfare gains may be offset by lower earnings for households that produce these same goods. Poorer households tend to be net consumers of agricultural products, suggesting a net welfare gain, but agricultural wage workers could suffer from wage cuts. Because poorer households tend to consume relatively fewer nonagricultural products, that is nonessentials, any trade-related shocks to prices of nonagricultural product are likely to be transmitted via labor channels. Despite significant evidence that nonagricultural trade reform ultimately leads to job creation and enhanced productivity, the short-run effects can be mixed. The costs incurred by workers to transition to new jobs slow the adjustment of the economy to a new steady state. Labor mobility costs, which tend to be higher in developing countries and for unskilled workers, reduce the potential gains to trade by diverting labor market adjustment from its most efficient path.

This study quantifies the relationship between Tanzanian and external maize markets while also accounting for domestic influences. It concludes that external influences on domestic prices originate from regional, rather than global, markets. It also shows that, compared to external factors, domestic factors exert a greater influence on Tanzanian maize markets. Further, the mechanisms through which trade policies influence maize markets involve interactions with both external market shocks and domestic weather shocks. Overall, it provides evidence that the intermittent imposition of export bans in Tanzania has had adverse impacts on its maize markets, and consequently, on the development of its agrarian economy.

This paper examines whether domestic output growth helps attract capital inflows and, in turn, capital inflows help boost output growth in a set of 38 Sub-Saharan African countries. Using a two-step approach to address reverse causality and omitted variable issues, the paper finds that output growth in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa does not attract capital inflows. However, aid and foreign direct investment inflows enhance growth, while sovereign debt inflows do not. A 1 percent increase in the level of real aid inflows raises growth of real output per capita by 0.022 percentage point. For foreign direct investment inflows, the figure is 0.002 percentage point.

Over the last decade, the Kyrgyz Republic experienced volatile but positive economic growth. Since the early 2000s, the share of working age population has been growing robustly and foreign labor markets have been an important source of employment. The Kyrgyz Republic has achieved large reductions in poverty over the past decade, but in recent years progress has diminished. During 2003-2012, the Kyrgyz Republic saw significant convergence between urban and rural poverty rates. Poverty reduction during 2003-2013 was driven mostly by growth rather than redistribution.

This report provides an analysis of food security in Moldova. It attempts to outline the specific characteristics of food insecurity found in Moldova and to identify its underlying causes. This report provides a basis on which sound public policy can be built. The understanding of food security as a concept has evolved in Moldova over time, but policy has remained focused on food availability as the primary attribute of food security. The report looks at how many people are food insecure in Moldova, where these people live, who they are, and why they face food security challenges. The report adopts the international food security concept and analytical framework based on the four key dimensions: (i) the availability of food; (ii) access to food; (iii) utilization of food; and (iv) the stability of these three dimensions over time. The report is divided into following parts. The part one outlines the methodology used and provides a brief overview of Moldovas agriculture sector. In part two the report focuses on overall food security outcomes by assessing how many people are food insecure in Moldova, where do they live, who they are, and when is food security most affecting them. Part three provides a comprehensive analysis of the four dimensions of food security (availability, access, utilization, and stability) and identifies bottlenecks. Part four introduces the institutional actors and the policy framework. The report concludes with policy recommendations.

Since the early 2000s, Tanzania has seen remarkable economic growth and strong resilience to external shocks. Yet these achievements were overshadowed by the slow response of poverty to the growing economy. Until 2007, the poverty rate in Tanzania remained stagnant at around 34 percent despite a robust growth at an annualized rate of approximately 7 percent. This apparent disconnect between growth and poverty reduction has raised concerns among policy makers and researchers, leading to a consensus that this mismatch needed to be addressed with a sense of urgency. Over the past few years, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) in Tanzania has given high priority to eradicating extreme poverty and promoting broad-based growth. Achieving pro-poor growth has also been widely recognized by the World Bank as a critical strategy for accelerating progress toward its twin goals of eliminating extreme poverty at the global level by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity by fostering income growth among the bottom 40 percent in every country. The official poverty figures announced by the government in November 2013 have revealed that the national strategy against poverty has begun to facilitate reductions. The basic needs poverty rate has declined from around 34 percent to 28.2 percent between 2007 and 2012, the first significant decline in the last 20 years. Identifying the policy mechanisms that have helped to increase the participation of the poor in the growth process and to speed pro-poor growth is therefore important for present and future decision-making in Tanzania on how best to eradicate poverty. Such task requires a rigorous analysis of the evolution of poverty and of the linkages between poverty, inequality, and economic growth. This report uses the availability of the new Tanzanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) for 2011 and 2012, as well as the new rebased GDP figures released in December 2014, as an opportunity to address these issues. More specifically, the report examines the recent trends in poverty and inequality and their determinants and explores how responsive poverty reduction was to economic growth and the obstacles to achieving it.

Since the early 2000s, Tanzania has seen remarkable economic growth and strong resilience to external shocks. Yet these achievements were overshadowed by the slow response of poverty to the growing economy. Until 2007, the poverty rate in Tanzania remained stagnant at around 34 percent despite a robust growth at an annualized rate of approximately 7 percent. This apparent disconnect between growth and poverty reduction has raised concerns among policy makers and researchers, leading to a consensus that this mismatch needed to be addressed with a sense of urgency. Over the past few years, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) in Tanzania has given high priority to eradicating extreme poverty and promoting broad-based growth. Achieving pro-poor growth has also been widely recognized by the World Bank as a critical strategy for accelerating progress toward its twin goals of eliminating extreme poverty at the global level by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity by fostering income growth among the bottom 40 percent in every country. The official poverty figures announced by the government in November 2013 have revealed that the national strategy against poverty has begun to facilitate reductions. The basic needs poverty rate has declined from around 34 percent to 28.2 percent between 2007 and 2012, the first significant decline in the last 20 years. Identifying the policy mechanisms that have helped to increase the participation of the poor in the growth process and to speed pro-poor growth is therefore important for present and future decision-making in Tanzania on how best to eradicate poverty. Such task requires a rigorous analysis of the evolution of poverty and of the linkages between poverty, inequality, and economic growth. This report uses the availability of the new Tanzanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) for 2011 and 2012, as well as the new rebased GDP figures released in December 2014, as an opportunity to address these issues. More specifically, the report examines the recent trends in poverty and inequality and their determinants and explores how responsive poverty reduction was to economic growth and the obstacles to achieving it.

This Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) is part of a broader dialogue on energy tax reform and strengthening social safety nets in Djibouti. As part of a possible reform of energy taxes in Djibouti, the government of Djibouti has sought the support of the World Bank to better understand how such a policy reform can be pro-poor. The study was designed and implemented by a multisectoral committee composed of various stakeholder institutions, including the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Budget, the Secretary of State responsible for National Solidarity (SESN), the Department of Statistics and Demographic Studies (DISED), the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Transport, with whom the teams of the Bank and the IMF collaborated throughout the process of preparation of the study. Technical meetings were held on January 30, February 2, May 25, May 28, and May 29, 2014, in Djibouti to discuss the various scenarios of reform, obtain additional information, and present preliminary quantitative results. Consultation meetings were held on July 2 and November 15, 2014, to present the findings and discuss possible reform options. This executive summary condenses the main findings of the study. The study is available as a separate report with more analyses and background information. The study is based on data from a representative household survey which includes detailed information on household expenditures and receipt of certain cash and in-kind benefits (EDAM 3-2012). The tables in this executive summary show 2014 prices, with inflation rates of 2.5 and 2.9 for 2013 and 2014, respectively.

The report starts with an overview of poverty and inequality estimates in chapter one, focusing on the trends in poverty and the distributional pattern of growth between 2002-3 and 2012-13. Chapter two then provides a description of the poverty profile by geographical and household characteristics, both in terms of the levels of poverty and its rate of change. Consumption patterns are presented in chapter three, and other socio-economic characteristics describing the living conditions of households are presented in chapter four, which is then followed by a chapter detailing the conclusions that can be drawn from this initial poverty profile analysis. The annexes provide additional detail. Annex one provides a detailed technical explanation of the methodology for measuring poverty while annex two presents sensitivity analysis for the poverty estimates including the confidence intervals of these estimates. Annex three provides additional tables and figures on poverty and inequality including other measures of poverty.

The Malaysian economy maintained a vigorous pace in the first nine months of 2012 despite external headwinds. Continuing a trend in the past two years, Malaysia's stronger-than-expected Gross Domestic Product, or GDP growth in the first nine months of 2012 was driven by rapid expansion of domestic demand while external demand (and export-oriented industries) stagnated due to continuing global uncertainty. Malaysia's low participation of women in labor markets is linked to a pattern whereby women do not return to work after marriage and childbearing. Education alone is not sufficient to close gender gaps as social norms and formal institutions continue to affect the choices of all women. In the long-term, norms need to evolve for gender gaps to be bridged; in the meantime measures can be put in place to help men and women balance responsibilities. Changing prevailing social norms takes time. In the medium-term, supportive measures at all stages of the life-cycle can be put in place, ranging from flexi-work arrangements and expanded childcare options, to incentives for more female participation in 'non-female' educational fields and job types. While current initiatives to leverage on women's talent are laudable, other policy options must be explored, evaluated, and tailored, to enable Malaysian women to fully contribute to Malaysia's transformation towards a high-income, inclusive and sustainable economy.

Since 2004 (Ethiopian Fiscal Year (EFY) 1997), Ethiopia has experienced strong and generally broad-based real economic growth of around 10.6 percent on average between then and 2011. Growth over the last nine years was far beyond the growth rates recorded in aggregate terms for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which on average only reached 5.2 percent, less than half of Ethiopia's average real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate during that period. Inspired by the East Asian experiences for a comparison of selected indicators and policies of Ethiopia and China/Korea), growth was induced through a mix of factors including agricultural modernization, the development of new export sectors, strong global commodity demand, and government-led development investments. The initial double digits growth rates have now manifested slightly lower but remain at high single-digit levels. The economy is expected to stabilize at around seven to eight percent in 2012, largely owing to improved performance in the agriculture sector. GDP growth is likely to stay around that margin up until 2016 (EFY 2008) driven by rising foreign investment and exports (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012). High inflation persists, but is on a slightly decreasing trend. Economic growth brought with it positive trends in reducing poverty, in both urban and rural areas. Ethiopia follows a strategy of increasing exports to facilitate growth. This is appropriate given the currently limited size of its domestic market and it is consistent with the development experience of some of the recently successful countries, particularly in East Asia. Export of goods growth is to a good extent driven by volume growth across a variety of product groups, which indicates that this growth is a result of recent efforts to increase and diversify the export base. Overall export and import developments result in a significantly increased trade deficit by 43 percent, up from US$5.5 billion in 2010/11 to US$7.9 billion.

Despite an unfavourable global economy, economic growth in Bangladesh is projected at close to 6 percent in fiscal 2013 (FY13). Adverse external demand and domestic supply constraints continue to be a drag on growth. Shortfalls in exports and investments due to a possible protracted crisis in the euro area and internal supply constraints may underpin the moderation of growth. Investment targets of the medium term budget framework 2013 to 2017 face major obstacles in shortage of electricity and gas supplies, and poorly functioning roads and ports. One positive prospect on the investment front is the increase in foreign direct investment in FY12, which surpassed the US$ 1 billion for the second time in Bangladesh's history. Fiscal policy is back on track. Fiscal performance in FY12 was favourable, notwithstanding increasing subsidies. The overall budget deficit in FY12 is estimated at 4.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Domestic financing of the deficit declined to 3.2 percent of GDP, from 3.5 percent in FY11. Lower government borrowing from the banking system in the second half of FY12 was a welcome reversal from worrying trends in the first half of the year. The FY13 budget deficit target 5 percent of GDP is modest, though higher than the estimated 4.5 percent of FY12, and is likely to be undershot primarily because of a shortfall in the implementation of the ambitious Tk 550 billion annual development programs, by now a familiar pattern. However, the financing of the deficit may be a challenge with a projected US$2.2 billion net external financing need, substantially more than the $1.4 billion of the revised FY12 budget. The rest of the deficit is projected to be financed from domestic sources, with a still heavy 69 percent reliance on bank borrowing. Bangladesh's economic outlook is subject to several near-term risks. Possible intensification of the euro area crisis may deepen Bangladesh's export slump of the last six months; escalation of global food prices may reverse the recent decline in food inflation; global oil price shock will place the balance of payments under pressure again and shrink fiscal space; banks are susceptible to credit and market risk and the global economic vulnerabilities; and increased political instability and labour unrest may depress investments further.

A new coalition government was formed in September 2012 following the collapse of the previous government at the end of August 2012. The Kyrgyz economy experienced a significant decline during the first half of 2012 caused by disrupted operations at the Kumtor gold mine. A decline in gold exports combined with a higher level of imports has increased the current account deficit. Expansionary fiscal policy during the first half of the year along with revenue weakness during the remainder of the year will widen the fiscal deficit to 6.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 from 4.8 percent of GDP a year ago. The medium-term growth outlook is favorable although there are significant downside risks. There are also exogenous shocks that will need to be mitigated, including rising food prices, spillover effects from the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis, and a weak global economy.

Afghanistan is in a state of transition which involves the handover of security responsibilities from international forces to the Afghan government. However, at present, Afghanistan's economy is growing strongly as a result of an exceptionally good harvest this year. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth will most likely close the calendar year at 10 percent, a significant increase from last year's 5.8 percent. The services and construction sectors continue to grow strongly, driven mostly by continued high military spending and external aid. The good harvest has also brought Afghanistan to near food self-sufficiency and slowed inflation to 4.6 percent in July 2012 (y-o-y). Progress in the mining sector is clouded by uncertainty about a new mineral law. While investor interest in the sector is encouraging, gaps in the legal and regulatory framework of the sector do not provide sufficient confidence to investors to start operations or make firm commitments. A new low is in preparation but has also been heavily debated. Afghanistan's economic growth prospects for 2012 give cause for optimism. Although real GDP growth slowed, to around 7 percent in 2011 (from 8 percent the year before), due mainly to unfavorable weather and a poor harvest, the agriculture sector rebounded strongly in 2012 and is expected to boost economic growth to over 10 percent. Agriculture is an important but volatile component of economic growth.

The Indonesia economic quarterly reports on and synthesizes the past three months' key developments in Indonesia's economy. It places them in a longer-term and global context, and assesses the implications of these developments and other changes in policy for the outlook for Indonesia's economic and social welfare. The near-term global economic outlook is fragile and emerging economies, including Indonesia, again face the risk of a potential crisis that is not of their making. The growth outlook for Indonesia's major trading partners (MTP), at 3.3 percent in 2012, remains relatively weak as increased Euro zone uncertainty adds to the ongoing drags on global growth from budget cutting and deleveraging in developed economies, and capacity constraints in some developing economies. Recent international financial market turbulence looks set to continue in the near-term and, while this baseline scenario remains the most likely outcome, capital flows to emerging economies and sentiment are likely to remain volatile. Further enhancing crisis preparedness is therefore a policy priority for economies such as Indonesia but, at the same time, it is important to push ahead with reforms and investments which can support medium-term growth in what is likely to be a weaker global economic environment. Indonesia's gross domestic product (GDP) growth remained a solid 6.3 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2012, down slightly from an average of 6.5 percent in 2011. Seasonally-adjusted growth overall came down off the highs of the final quarter of 2011 but consumption growth held up well. However, investment growth dipped and, reflecting the relative weakness of external demand, net exports again were a drag on growth. Inflation, although picking up somewhat, has remained relatively low and price expectations came down with the reduced likelihood of a subsidized fuel price increase in 2012, as oil prices declined. In the event of a major freezing of international financial markets which contributes to a drop in trading partner growth. In a scenario in which such a crisis was accompanied, or indeed precipitated, a severe, prolonged global downturn encompassing the major emerging economies, growth in Indonesia could drop to 3.8 percent, with the impact of the slowdown felt more sharply in domestic activity as commodity price falls reduce incomes and investment. In the event of a severe crisis, it is possible that domestic consumer and business sentiment drops sharply which, combined with any potential stresses in the financial sector, could result in further downside to the growth scenarios.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has moderated from 6.7 percent in FY11 to 6.3 percent in FY12 due to unfavorable external economics and internal supply constraints. Monetary policy remained accommodative for most of 2011 but gradual tightening is occurring. With the high fiscal deficit and domestic borrowing by Government, monetary policy is now bearing the brunt of macroeconomic policy adjustment. The balance of payments (BoP) is on a deteriorating track, with reserves falling to below three months of imports and export growth turning negative in March 2012. A coordinated policy response is required to ease macroeconomic pressures and improve growth prospects. Key actions include the need to create fiscal space, contain government borrowing to mitigate the risk of crowding out of credit to the private sector, better regulate the capital market, and stimulate investment and job growth in the export sector. Unlike in 2008, Bangladesh has insufficient policy space to avert the negative impact of a global slowdown through fiscal stimulus packages and monetary easing.

The Malaysian economy grew robustly in 2011, outperforming forecasts. Growth was driven by domestic demand. Public consumption picked up more than expected toward the end of the year and fixed investment was also buoyant on higher investments by public and private companies. Private consumption spending remained strong, sustained by solid consumer credit, civil service bonus payments, and firm commodity prices benefiting smallholders. Inventories were a drag on growth as post- financial crisis restocking was completed. There is momentum to the reform agenda, but implementation could be accelerated. The government's transformation programs registered notable progress, but the challenge now is to go beyond quick wins and accelerate the implementation of more difficult, but critical, structural reforms that lie at the core of transforming the economy into a high-income one. Implementation can be assisted by increasing the coordination of related reform efforts (such as safety nets and education), building capacity within the civil service to lead reforms, and working towards consensus in key areas such as educational reform, subsidy rationalization and broadening the tax base.

Political uncertainties in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continue to affect the short term economic prospects in the region, while major developments in the global economy over the past six months have put the region on a two-track growth path for 2012. These developments include a significant rise in crude oil prices on fears of oil supply disruptions and weak economic activity in the Eurozone. Economic growth of MENA's oil exporting countries will be strong as it rebounds from the average of 3.4 percent in 2011 to 5.4 percent in 2012. Overall growth in the region is expected to be 4.8 percent in 2012, surpassing the 3 percent growth achieved in 2011. Improvement in the growth prospects of oil exporters is due to strength in oil markets. The fiscal situation is expected to remain tenuous for oil importing countries, especially those going through transitions. Overall, inflation is expected to remain subdued in 2012, with the notable exceptions of Iran and Egypt. Subsidies are currently dampening currently dampening the effects of increased global food and energy prices in many MENA countries.

With this Cameroon economic update, the World Bank is pursuing a program of short, crisp and frequent country economic reports. These economic updates provide an analysis of the trends and constraints in Cameroon's economic development. Each issue, produced bi-annually, provides an update of recent economic developments as well as a special focus on a topical issue. The economic updates aim to share knowledge and stimulate debate among those interested in improving the economic management of Cameroon and unleashing its enormous potential. The notes thereby offer another voice on economic issues in Cameroon, and an additional platform for engagement, learning and change.

Malnutrition results from different combinations of immediate, underlying, and basic determinants. Inadequate dietary intake and disease are the immediate determinants of undernutrition. Underlying the immediate causes of undernutrition are three areas: (1) food security, (2) health services and health environment, and (3) care for women and children. Education is also critical. At the base of the framework are a host of interrelated causes including resources, economic structure, political and ideological structure, and formal and informal institutions.

Prospects for the global economy have become less certain in the second half of 2011, with significant increase in downside risks. Developing countries in East Asia are growing faster than developed countries, but they too are facing challenges due to a combination of reasons including: slower expansion in demand in developed countries; the impact of global uncertainty on investor sentiments; natural disasters; and the withdrawal of stimulus policies. Vietnam's growth slowed in 2011 compared to 2010, though it is still expected to reach around 5.8 percent. The external sector has remained relatively stable. The current account deficit declined in 2011, as export performance outpaced imports and remittances grew robustly. Both import and export values saw a dramatic rise, mostly because of higher commodities prices. External debt remains sustainable, as the current account deficit was more than covered through medium-term capital inflows that are largely non debt-creating (foreign direct investments) or contracted on concessional terms (official development aid). Foreign direct investment inflows continued at a steady pace, although new commitments declined. International reserves increased in the first half of the year while the Vietnamese dong benefitted from a period of relative calm. In the last quarter of the year, however, exchange rate fluctuations increased due to volatility in gold prices, deepening uncertainties and the seasonal increase in demand for foreign currency as the year end approaches. In the longer run, Vietnam's ambition to maintain high growth into the next decade will require as bold a set of reforms as the one adopted with Doi Moi. The challenge is arguably more difficult than the previous one, and few countries in the world have accomplished it. Vietnam is endowed with a young and hard-working labor force. This is a vital asset to meet the country's ambitious goals, if the country manages to equip itself with relevant skills, and match it with necessary capital. It also needs a level-playing field to maximize its potential. As people become more educated and production becomes more sophisticated, demands for predictability, trust and a level playing field will grow. Transparency is a critical element in this. Concentration of economic power in a small number of large firms undermines efforts at creating a level playing field. Large firms and industries that circumvent rules to their advantage are promoting corruption, and undermining efficiency, which damages the country's potential. The governance challenges are complex, but Vietnam's medium term outlook will be much better if they are addressed sooner rather than later.

Strong poverty reduction in Latin America resumed with the growth rebound in 2010, as both moderate and extreme poor households benefitted from the recovery, accelerating poverty reduction to rates similar to those witnessed between 2003-2006 despite a 2.8 percent decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, poverty levels in Latin America (LAC) remained basically static during the great recession, as the poor were shielded from the economic crisis in some countries and continued to benefit from growth in others. In 2010, poverty reduction resumed sharply in Latin America, as household incomes were once again closely linked to economic growth at rates similar to pre-crisis years. Moderate poverty declined by almost 2.5 percentage points to reach 28 percent in 2010, while extreme poverty fell by more than 2 percentage points to reach 14 percent. As 2011 comes to a close, once again the global economy and Latin America are facing risks of yet another economic slowdown. Using household survey data from 2010 and selected labor market indicators through the third quarter of 2011, this note identifies some basic facts on the impact of the crisis and the recovery on the poor and explores their implications for poverty reduction in the region going forward.

The Malaysian economy decelerated as solid domestic demand was not sufficient to offset a weakening external environment. Private consumption growth continued at a healthy pace. Favorable rubber and palm oil prices drove up incomes of smallholders while continued employment and wage growth supported urban incomes. In contrast, fixed investment was more volatile, with private investment showing signs of picking up while public investments lagged. Malaysia's overall balance of payments recorded a larger surplus in the first half of the year reflecting a widening current account surplus and substantial net financial inflows. Malaysia's open economy is expected to slow further in the remainder of 2011 and into early 2012 mainly due to the deterioration in the outlook for external demand. Cities are central to Malaysia's aspiration to become a high-income economy. Smart cities are skilled and innovative. They play a crucial role in catalyzing economic growth by generating productivity gains through agglomeration economies. Smart cities are green and sustainable. They ensure a high quality of life to all citizens and the sustainability of economic gains. Finally, smart cities are resilient.

The economic rebound in recent quarters has been stronger than expected and the economy is showing signs of overheating. These signs are show up in rising inflation, especially of those goods and services which are in strong demand, but cannot easily be imported or whose local supply cannot readily be increased to meet the growing demand. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth reached 20.8 percent year-on-year (yoy) in Q3, following an outturn of 17.3 percent in Q2. Growth for the year as a whole will likely hit 15 percent, if not more, up from 6.4 percent in 2010, and is being pushed by infrastructure spending as Mongolia develops its vast mineral wealth. Inflation continues its upward trend. The trade deficit is close to record levels (US$ 1.4 bn in September using 12-month rolling sums) driven by a surge in mining-related equipment and fuel imports. Exports are growing strongly too, driven by large coal shipments to China. The 2012 budget continues this fiscal expansion and targets a 74 percent increase in expenditures (mostly on wages and social transfers).