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Background: Shared decision-making is the gold standard for good clinical practice, and thus, psychometric instruments have been established to assess patients' generic preference for participation (e.g., the Autonomy Preference Index, API). However, patients' preferences may vary depending on the specific disease and with respect to the specific decision context. With a modified preference index (API-Uro), we assessed patients' specific participation preference in preference-sensitive decisions pertaining to urological cancer treatments and compared this with their generic participation preference., Methods: In Study 1, we recruited (N = 469) urological outpatients (43.1% urooncological) at a large university hospital. Participation preference was assessed with generic measures (API and API case vignettes) and with the disease-specific API-Uro (urooncological case vignettes describing medical decisions of variable difficulty). A polychoric exploratory factor analysis was used to establish factorial validity and reduce items. In Study 2, we collected data from N = 204 bladder cancer patients in a multicenter study to validate the factorial structure with confirmatory factor analysis. Differences between the participation preference for different decision contexts were analyzed., Results: Study 1: Scores on the specific urooncological case vignettes (API-Uro) correlated with the generic measure (r = .44) but also provided incremental information. Among the disease-specific vignettes of the API-Uro, there were two factors with good internal consistency (α ≥ .8): treatment versus diagnostic decisions. Patients desired more participation for treatment decisions (77.8%) than for diagnostic decisions (22%), χ 2 (1) = 245.1, p ≤ .001. Study 2: Replicated the correlation of the API-Uro with the API (r = .39) and its factorial structure (SRMR = .08; CFI = .974). Bladder cancer patients also desired more participation for treatment decisions (57.4%) than for diagnostic decisions (13.3%), χ²(1) =84, p ≤ .001., Conclusions: The desire to participate varies between treatment versus diagnostic decisions among urological patients. This underscores the importance of assessing participation preference for specific contexts. Overall, the new API-Uro has good psychometric properties and is well suited to assess patients' preferences. In routine care, measures of participation preference for specific decision contexts may provide incremental, allowing clinicians to better address their patients' individual needs., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

A classic phenomenon known as prototype preference effect (PPE) or beauty-in-averageness effect is that prototypical exemplars of a neutral category are preferred over atypical exemplars. This PPE has been explained in terms of deviance avoidance, hedonic fluency, or preference for certainty and familiarity. However, typicality also facilitates greater activation of category-related information. Thus, prototypes rather than atypical exemplars should be more associated with the valence of the category, either positive or negative. Hence, we hypothesize that the evaluation of a prototype depends on the valence of its category. Results from three experiments crossing a standard PPE paradigm with an evaluative conditioning procedure support our hypothesis. We show that for positive categories, greater typicality increases liking. Critically, for negative categories, greater typicality decreases liking. This pattern of results challenges dominant explanations of prototype evaluation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Preferences are often based on social information such as experiences and recommendations of other people. The reliance on social information is especially relevant in the case of online shopping, where buying decisions for products may often be based on online reviews by other customers. Recently, Powell, Yu, DeWolf, and Holyoak (2017, Psychological Science, 28, 1432-1442) showed that, when deciding between two products, people do not consider the number of product reviews in a statistically appropriate way as predicted by a Bayesian model but rather exhibit a bias for popular products (i.e., products with many reviews). In the present work, we propose a coherence model of the cognitive mechanism underlying this empirical phenomenon. The new model assumes that people strive for a coherent representation of the available information (i.e., the average review score and the number of reviews). To test this theoretical account, we reanalyzed the data of Powell and colleagues and ran an online study with 244 participants using a wider range of stimulus material than in the original study. Besides replicating the popularity bias, the study provided clear evidence for the predicted coherence effect, that is, decisions became more confident and faster when the available information about popularity and quality was congruent., (Copyright © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

IRTree models decompose observed rating responses into sequences of theory-based decision nodes, and they provide a flexible framework for analysing trait-related judgements and response styles. However, most previous applications of IRTree models have been limited to binary decision nodes that reflect qualitatively distinct and unidimensional judgement processes. The present research extends the family of IRTree models for the analysis of response styles to ordinal judgement processes for polytomous decisions and to multidimensional parametrizations of decision nodes. The integration of ordinal judgement processes overcomes the limitation to binary nodes, and it allows researchers to test whether decisions reflect qualitatively distinct response processes or gradual steps on a joint latent continuum. The extension to multidimensional node models enables researchers to specify multiple judgement processes that simultaneously affect the decision between competing response options. Empirical applications highlight the roles of extreme and midpoint response style in rating judgements and show that judgement processes are moderated by different response formats. Model applications with multidimensional decision nodes reveal that decisions among rating categories are jointly informed by trait-related processes and response styles., (© 2019 The British Psychological Society.)

A common assumption of many established models for decision making is that information is searched according to some prespecified search rule. While the content of the information influences the termination of search, usually specified as a stopping rule, the direction of search is viewed as being independent of the valence of the retrieved information. We propose an extension to the parallel constraint satisfaction network model (iCodes: integrated coherence-based decision and search), which assumes-in contrast to prespecified search rules-that the valence of available information influences search of concealed information. Specifically, the model predicts an attraction search effect in that information search is directed toward the more attractive alternative given the available information. In 3 studies with participants choosing between two options based on partially revealed probabilistic information, the attraction search effect was consistently observed for environments with varying costs for information search although the magnitude of the effect decreased with decreasing monetary search costs. We also find the effect in reanalyses of 5 published studies. With iCodes, we propose a fully specified formal model and discuss implications for theory development within competing modeling frameworks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Background and Objectives: The reduction of avoidance behavior is a central target in the treatment of anxiety disorders, but it has rarely been studied how approach of fear-relevant stimuli may be initiated. In two studies, the impact of hypothetical monetary and symbolic social incentives on approach-avoidance behavior was examined., Methods: In Study 1, individuals high or low on fear of spiders (N = 84) could choose to approach a fear-relevant versus a neutral stimulus, which were equally rewarded. In a subsequent micro-intervention, approaching the fear-relevant stimulus was differentially rewarded either by monetary or social incentives. In Study 2 (N = 76), initial incentives for approach were discontinued to investigate the stability of approach., Results: Hypothetical monetary and symbolic social incentives reduced or eliminated initial avoidance, even in highly fearful individuals. Approach resulted in a decrease of self-reported aversiveness towards the fear-relevant stimulus. However, even after successful approach, fearful individuals showed significant avoidance behavior when incentives for approach were discontinued., Limitations: Future research should investigate the long-term effects of prolonged approach incentives on multiple levels of fear (e.g., self-report, behavioral, physiological). It should also be tested if such an intervention actually improves compliance with exposure based interventions., Conclusions: The present findings highlight that incentives are useful to initiate initial approach towards a feared stimulus. Although incentive-based approach may neither fully eliminate avoidance nor negative feelings towards the feared stimulus, such operant interventions may set the stage for more extensive extinction training., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Confessing romantic feelings, asking for help, or taking responsibility for a mistake constitute just a few examples of situations that require showing one's vulnerability. Out of fear, many individuals decide against it. To explore whether these fears are reflected in the evaluation of others, we investigate self-other differences in evaluation of showing vulnerability. Drawing on construal level theory, we hypothesize that the mental representations of individuals who find themselves in a vulnerable situation are rather concrete, shifting the focus on the negative aspects of making oneself vulnerable and resulting in a relatively negative evaluation of showing vulnerability. By contrast, when depicting others in a vulnerable situation, individuals are expected to represent it more abstractly, focus more on the positive aspects of showing vulnerability, and, therefore, evaluate it more positively. A total of seven studies demonstrate the predicted self-other differences in the evaluation of showing vulnerability in various situations, such as confessing love, revealing imperfections of one's body, or asking for help, including evidence on the generalizability of the effect in a real-life situation. Moreover, we report empirical evidence on the crucial role of level of construal in the emergence of the observed self-other differences. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

The aims of this study are to assess patients' preferred and perceived decision-making roles and preference matching in a sample of German breast and colon cancer patients and to investigate how a shared decision-making (SDM) intervention for oncologists influences patients' preferred and perceived decision-making roles and the attainment of preference matches. This study is a post hoc analysis of a randomised controlled trial (RCT) on the effects of an SDM intervention. The SDM intervention was a 12-h SDM training program for physicians in combination with decision board use. For this study, we analysed a subgroup of 107 breast and colon cancer patients faced with serious treatment decisions who provided data on specific questionnaires with regard to their preferred and perceived decision-making roles (passive, SDM or active). Patients filled in questionnaires immediately following a decision-relevant consultation (t1) with their oncologist. Eleven of these patients' 27 treating oncologists had received the SDM intervention within the RCT. A majority of cancer patients (60%) preferred SDM. A match between preferred and perceived decision-making roles was reached for 72% of patients. The patients treated by SDM-trained physicians perceived greater autonomy in their decision making (p < 0.05) with more patients perceiving SDM or an active role, but their preference matching was not influenced. A SDM intervention for oncologists boosted patient autonomy but did not improve preference matching. This highlights the already well-known reluctance of physicians to engage in explicit role clarification., Trial Registration: German Clinical Trials Register DRKS00000539; Funding Source: German Cancer Aid.

In this study, we aimed to explore whether action execution is an inherent part of the decision-making process. According to the hypothesis of embodied choice, the decision-making process is bidirectional as action dynamics exert their backward influence on decision processes through changing the cost and value of the potential options. This influence takes place as moving toward one option increases the commitment to and, therefore, the likelihood of choosing that option. This commitment effect can be the result of either (a) the continuous act of getting closer to this option or (b) the increased movement cost associated with changing the movement direction to select a different option. To disentangle the potential influence of these two factors, we developed the Guided Movement Task, a choice task designed to bias participant's computer-mouse movements by constraining the allowed movement space by a corridor. Using this task, we created different conditions in which the participants' mouse cursor, after being guided toward one of the options, either had equal or unequal distances to the choice options. By this manipulation, we could test whether the continuous act of getting closer to an option in itself is sufficient to influence people's decisions-a claim of "strong embodiment." In two experiments, we found that the likelihood of choosing an option only increased when the distances between the two options were unequal after the initial movement but not when they were equal. These results disagree with the hypothesis that action execution is an inherent part of the decision-making process. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

The exact effect of different moods on choosing strategies in multi-attribute decision tasks is yet unknown since previous work has found apparently contradicting results. Furthermore, different theoretical accounts lead to opposite expectations. While the "mood-as-information" theory states that a positive mood leads to heuristic processing of information and application of non-compensatory strategies, the "broaden-and-build" theory expects more non-compensatory decision-making in a negative mood. To test the predictions of those two theories, we conducted two experimental studies, in which both the mood and the type of information search were manipulated. The results rather support "mood-as-information" theory, so participants in the positive mood made non-compensatory choices more often than participants in the negative mood. The effect was only present in the open information board, where the information was presented simultaneously, but not in the closed Mouselab, where the information had to be searched in a sequential manner., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Learners often allocate more study time to challenging items than to easier ones. Nevertheless, both predicted and actual memory performance are typically worse for difficult than for easier items. The resulting inverse relations between people's predictions of their memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) and self-paced study time (ST) are often explained by bottom-up, data-driven ST allocation that is based on fluency. However, we demonstrate robust inverted U-shaped relations between JOLs and ST that cannot be explained by data-driven ST allocation alone. Consequently, we explored how two models of top-down, strategic ST allocation account for curvilinear JOL-ST relations. First, according to the Region of Proximal Learning model, people stop quickly on items for which they experience too little progress in learning. Second, according to the Diminishing Criterion Model, people set a time limit and stop studying when this time limit is reached. In three experiments, we manipulated motivation with different methods and examined which model best described JOL-ST relations. Consistent with the Diminishing Criterion Model but not with the Region of Proximal Learning model, results revealed that curvilinearity was due to people setting a time limit.

Potential threat can prime defensive responding and avoidance behavior, which may result in the loss of rewards. When aversive consequences do not occur, avoidance should, thus, be quickly overcome in healthy individuals. This study examined the impact of threat anticipation on reward-based decisions. Sixty-five participants completed a decision-making task in which they had to choose between high- and low-reward options. To model an approach-avoidance conflict, the high-reward option was contingent with a threat-of-shock cue; the low-reward option was contingent with a safety cue. In control trials, decisions were made without threat/safety instructions. Overall, behavioral data documented a typical preference for the profitable option. Importantly, under threat-of-shock, participants initially avoided the profitable option (i.e., safe, but less profitable choices). However, when they experienced that shocks did actually not occur, participants overcame initial avoidance in favor of larger gains. Furthermore, autonomic arousal (skin conductance and heart rate responses) was elevated during threat cues compared to safety and non-threatening control cues. Taken together, threat-of-shock was associated with behavioral consequences: initially, participants avoided threat-related options but made more profitable decisions as they experienced no aversive consequences. Although socially acquired threat contingencies are typically stable, incentives for approach can help to overcome threat-related avoidance., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Decision strategies explain how people integrate multiple sources of information to make probabilistic inferences. In the past decade, increasingly sophisticated methods have been developed to determine which strategy explains decision behavior best. We extend these efforts to test psychologically more plausible models (i.e., strategies), including a new, probabilistic version of the take-the-best (TTB) heuristic that implements a rank order of error probabilities based on sequential processing. Within a coherent statistical framework, deterministic and probabilistic versions of TTB and other strategies can directly be compared using model selection by minimum description length or the Bayes factor. In an experiment with inferences from given information, only three of 104 participants were best described by the psychologically plausible, probabilistic version of TTB. Similar as in previous studies, most participants were classified as users of weighted-additive, a strategy that integrates all available information and approximates rational decisions., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

When making inferences about pairs of objects, one of which is recognized and the other is not, the recognition heuristic states that participants choose the recognized object in a noncompensatory way without considering any further knowledge. In contrast, information-integration theories such as parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) assume that recognition is merely one of many cues that is integrated with further knowledge in a compensatory way. To test both process models against each other without manipulating recognition or further knowledge, we include response times into the r-model, a popular multinomial processing tree model for memory-based decisions. Essentially, this response-time-extended r-model allows to test a crucial prediction of PCS, namely, that the integration of recognition-congruent knowledge leads to faster decisions compared to the consideration of recognition only-even though more information is processed. In contrast, decisions due to recognition-heuristic use are predicted to be faster than decisions affected by any further knowledge. Using the classical German-cities example, simulations show that the novel measurement model discriminates between both process models based on choices, decision times, and recognition judgments only. In a reanalysis of 29 data sets including more than 400,000 individual trials, noncompensatory choices of the recognized option were estimated to be slower than choices due to recognition-congruent knowledge. This corroborates the parallel information-integration account of memory-based decisions, according to which decisions become faster when the coherence of the available information increases. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

According to the recognition-heuristic theory, decision makers solve paired comparisons in which one object is recognized and the other not by recognition alone, inferring that recognized objects have higher criterion values than unrecognized ones. However, success-and thus usefulness-of this heuristic depends on the validity of recognition as a cue, and adaptive decision making, in turn, requires that decision makers are sensitive to it. To this end, decision makers could base their evaluation of the recognition validity either on the selected set of objects (the set's recognition validity), or on the underlying domain from which the objects were drawn (the domain's recognition validity). In two experiments, we manipulated the recognition validity both in the selected set of objects and between domains from which the sets were drawn. The results clearly show that use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain's recognition validity, not on the set's recognition validity. In other words, participants treat all sets as roughly representative of the underlying domain and adjust their decision strategy adaptively (only) with respect to the more general environment rather than the specific items they are faced with.

Research on the distractor response binding (DRB) effect (Frings, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2007) suggests that distractors are integrated with target responses into an event file or stimulus-response (SR) episode. The whole event file is retrieved when the distractor is repeated and as a consequence distractors can retrieve previous responses. Nett, Bröder, and Frings (2015) argued that even decisions under uncertainty are integrated into event files and can later on be retrieved by distractors. However, their paradigm did not allow disentangling the retrieval of decisions from the retrieval of motor programs. Here we disentangled the retrieval of decisions and motor programs by assuring that retrieved decisions were not confounded by the repetitions of motor programs. In particular, in two experiments using a sequential prime-probe distractor priming task participants used other keys or other effectors for prime and probe responses; nevertheless repeated task-irrelevant distractors increased the probability that participants repeated the prime decision irrespective of motor programs. Thus, decision features can become part of an event-file and directly be retrieved by irrelevant information suggesting that bindings have an even higher flexibility and ubiquity than previously assumed., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In paired comparisons based on which of two objects has the larger criterion value, decision makers could use the subjectively experienced difference in retrieval fluency of the objects as a cue. According to the fluency heuristic (FH) theory, decision makers use fluency-as indexed by recognition speed-as the only cue for pairs of recognized objects, and infer that the object retrieved more speedily has the larger criterion value (ignoring all other cues and information). Model-based analyses, however, have previously revealed that only a small portion of such inferences are indeed based on fluency alone. In the majority of cases, other information enters the decision process. However, due to the specific experimental procedures, the estimates of FH use are potentially biased: Some procedures may have led to an overestimated and others to an underestimated, or even to actually reduced, FH use. In the present article, we discuss and test the impacts of such procedural variations by reanalyzing 21 data sets. The results show noteworthy consistency across the procedural variations revealing low FH use. We discuss potential explanations and implications of this finding.

The success of bootstrapping or replacing a human judge with a model (e.g., an equation) has been demonstrated in Paul Meehl's (1954) seminal work and bolstered by the results of several meta-analyses. To date, however, analyses considering different types of meta-analyses as well as the potential dependence of bootstrapping success on the decision domain, the level of expertise of the human judge, and the criterion for what constitutes an accurate decision have been missing from the literature. In this study, we addressed these research gaps by conducting a meta-analysis of lens model studies. We compared the results of a traditional (bare-bones) meta-analysis with findings of a meta-analysis of the success of bootstrap models corrected for various methodological artifacts. In line with previous studies, we found that bootstrapping was more successful than human judgment. Furthermore, bootstrapping was more successful in studies with an objective decision criterion than in studies with subjective or test score criteria. We did not find clear evidence that the success of bootstrapping depended on the decision domain (e.g., education or medicine) or on the judge's level of expertise (novice or expert). Correction of methodological artifacts increased the estimated success of bootstrapping, suggesting that previous analyses without artifact correction (i.e., traditional meta-analyses) may have underestimated the value of bootstrapping models.

Objective: To test the influence of physician empathy (PE), shared decision making (SDM), and the match between patients' preferred and perceived decision-making styles on patients' decision regret., Methods: Patients with breast or colon cancer (n=71) completed questionnaires immediately following (T1) and three months after a consultation (T2). Path analysis was used to examine the relationships among patient demographics, patient reports of PE, SDM, the match between preferred and perceived decision-making styles, and patient decision regret at T2., Results: After controlling for clinician clusters, higher PE was directly associated with more SDM (β=0.43, p<0.01) and lower decision regret (β=-0.28, p<0.01). The match between patients' preferred and perceived roles was negatively associated with decision regret (β=-0.33, p<0.01). Patients who participated less than desired reported more decision regret at T2. There was no significant association between SDM and decision regret (β=0.03, p=0.74)., Conclusion: PE and the match between patients' preferred and perceived roles in medical decision making are essential for patient-centered cancer consultations and treatment decisions., Practice Implications: Ways to enhance PE and matching the consultation style to patients' expectations should be encouraged., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.)

For multiattribute decision tasks, different metaphors exist that describe the process of decision making and its adaptation to diverse problems and situations. Multiple strategy models (MSMs) assume that decision makers choose adaptively from a set of different strategies (toolbox metaphor), whereas evidence accumulation models (EAMs) hold that a uniform mechanism is employed but is adapted to the environmental change (adjustable spanner metaphor). Despite recent claims that the frameworks are hard to disentangle empirically, both metaphors make distinct predictions concerning the information acquisition behavior, namely, that search is terminated according to the selected strategy (MSMs) or that information is acquired until an evidence threshold is passed (EAMs). In 3 experiments, we contrasted these predictions by providing participants with different degrees of evidence in a half-open/half-closed information board. For the majority of participants, we find that their stopping behavior is well captured by the notion of an evidence threshold that is either undercut or passed by the given evidence., ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

According to distractor-based response retrieval (Frings, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2007), irrelevant information will be integrated with the response to the relevant stimuli and further, the immediate repetition of irrelevant information can retrieve the previously executed response thereby influencing responding to the current target (leading either to benefits or costs if the retrieved response is compatible or incompatible, respectively, to the currently demanded response). We analyzed whether this effect also holds for decisions rather than simple motoric reactions. The hypothesis was tested in 4 experiments in which participants had to decide as fast as possible which disease an imagined patient suffered from. The decisions were based on 2 cues; 1 did not give any hint for a disease (the irrelevant cue), whereas the other did (the relevant cue). We found a significant influence of repeating the irrelevant cue on decision behavior. That is, participants tended to repeat their decision if the irrelevant cue was repeated in the following decision situation. Thus, stimulus-response binding which typically is discussed in basic processes of perception and action has also implications for arguably more deliberative cognitive processes in decision making under uncertainty., ((c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).)

Recent studies on reward-based decision-making in the presence of anxiety-related stimuli demonstrated that approach-avoidance conflicts can be assessed under controlled laboratory conditions. However, the clinical relevance of these decision conflicts has not been demonstrated. To this end, the present study investigated avoidant decisions in treatment-seeking individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD). In a gambling task, advantageous choices to maximize gains were associated with task-irrelevant angry faces and disadvantageous choices with happy faces. The clinical relevance of avoidant decisions for in vivo anxiety in a social stress situation (public speaking) were examined (n = 44). In a subsample (n = 20), the predictive value for a reduction of avoidance following behavioral therapy was also evaluated. Results indicated a close link between more frequent avoidant decisions and elevated in vivo anxiety. Moreover, individuals who showed a deficit in the goal-directed adjustment of their decisions also showed higher and sustained distress during the social stressor and reported less decrease of avoidance following treatment. The findings highlight the importance of an avoidant decision-making style for the experience of acute distress and the maintenance of avoidance in SAD. Assessing avoidant decision-making may help to predict the response to behavioral treatments., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

In research on multiattribute decisions, information is typically preorganized in a well-structured manner (e.g., in attributes-by-options matrices). Participants can therefore conveniently identify the information needed for the decision strategy they are using. However, in everyday decision situations, we often face information that is not well-structured; that is, we not only have to search for, but we also need to organize the information. This latter aspect--subjective information organization--has so far largely been neglected in decision research. The few exceptions used crude experimental manipulations, and the assessment of subjective organization suffered from laborious methodology and a lack of objectiveness. We introduce a new task format to overcome these methodological issues, and we provide an organization index (OI) to assess subjective organization of information objectively and automatically. The OI makes it possible to assess information organization on the same scale as the strategy index (SI) typically used for assessing information search behavior. A simulation study shows that the OI has a similar distribution as the SI but that the two indices are a priori largely independent. In a validation experiment with instructed strategy use, we demonstrate the usefulness of the task to trace decision processes in multicue inference situations.

Adaptive strategy selection implies that a decision strategy is chosen based on its fit to the task and situation. However, other aspects, such as the way information is presented, can determine information search behavior; especially when the application of certain strategies over others is facilitated. But are such display effects on multi-attribute decisions also at work when the manipulation does not entail differential costs for different decision strategies? Three Mouselab experiments with hidden information and one eye tracking experiment with an open information board revealed that decision behavior is unaffected by purely perceptual manipulations of the display based on Gestalt principles; that is, based on manipulations that induce no noteworthy processing costs for different information search patterns. We discuss our results in the context of previous findings on display effects; specifically, how the combination of these findings and our results reveal the crucial role of differential processing costs for different strategies for the emergence of display effects. This finding describes a boundary condition of the commonly acknowledged influence of information displays and is in line with the ideas of adaptive strategy selection and cost-benefit tradeoffs., (Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

Does it matter if you speak with a regional accent? Speaking immediately reveals something of one's own social and cultural identity, be it consciously or unconsciously. Perceiving accents involves not only reconstructing such imprints but also augmenting them with particular attitudes and stereotypes. Even though we know much about attitudes and stereotypes that are transmitted by, e.g. skin color, names or physical attractiveness, we do not yet have satisfactory answers how accent perception affects human behavior. How do people act in economically relevant contexts when they are confronted with regional accents? This paper reports a laboratory experiment where we address this question. Participants in our experiment conduct cognitive tests where they can choose to either cooperate or compete with a randomly matched male opponent identified only via his rendering of a standardized text in either a regional accent or standard accent. We find a strong connection between the linguistic performance and the cognitive rating of the opponent. When matched with an opponent who speaks the accent of the participant's home region--the in-group opponent--, individuals tend to cooperate significantly more often. By contrast, they are more likely to compete when matched with an accent speaker from outside their home region, the out-group opponent. Our findings demonstrate, firstly, that the perception of an out-group accent leads not only to social discrimination but also influences economic decisions. Secondly, they suggest that this economic behavior is not necessarily attributable to the perception of a regional accent per se, but rather to the social rating of linguistic distance and the in-group/out-group perception it evokes.

Model comparisons are a vital tool for disentangling which of several strategies a decision maker may have used--that is, which cognitive processes may have governed observable choice behavior. However, previous methodological approaches have been limited to models (i.e., decision strategies) with deterministic choice rules. As such, psychologically plausible choice models--such as evidence-accumulation and connectionist models--that entail probabilistic choice predictions could not be considered appropriately. To overcome this limitation, we propose a generalization of Bröder and Schiffer's (Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 361-380, 2003) choice-based classification method, relying on (1) parametric order constraints in the multinomial processing tree framework to implement probabilistic models and (2) minimum description length for model comparison. The advantages of the generalized approach are demonstrated through recovery simulations and an experiment. In explaining previous methods and our generalization, we maintain a nontechnical focus--so as to provide a practical guide for comparing both deterministic and probabilistic choice models.

There is broad consensus that human cognition is adaptive. However, the vital question of how exactly this adaptivity is achieved has remained largely open. Herein, we contrast two frameworks which account for adaptive decision making, namely broad and general single-mechanism accounts vs. multi-strategy accounts. We propose and fully specify a single-mechanism model for decision making based on parallel constraint satisfaction processes (PCS-DM) and contrast it theoretically and empirically against a multi-strategy account. To achieve sufficiently sensitive tests, we rely on a multiple-measure methodology including choice, reaction time, and confidence data as well as eye-tracking. Results show that manipulating the environmental structure produces clear adaptive shifts in choice patterns - as both frameworks would predict. However, results on the process level (reaction time, confidence), in information acquisition (eye-tracking), and from cross-predicting choice consistently corroborate single-mechanisms accounts in general, and the proposed parallel constraint satisfaction model for decision making in particular., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Decision situations are typically characterized by uncertainty: Individuals do not know the values of different options on a criterion dimension. For example, consumers do not know which is the healthiest of several products. To make a decision, individuals can use information about cues that are probabilistically related to the criterion dimension, such as sugar content or the concentration of natural vitamins. In two experiments, we investigated how the accessibility of cue information in memory affects which decision strategy individuals rely on. The accessibility of cue information was manipulated by means of a newly developed paradigm, the spatial-memory-cueing paradigm, which is based on a combination of the looking-at-nothing phenomenon and the spatial-cueing paradigm. The results indicated that people use different decision strategies, depending on the validity of easily accessible information. If the easily accessible information is valid, people stop information search and decide according to a simple take-the-best heuristic. If, however, information that comes to mind easily has a low predictive validity, people are more likely to integrate all available cue information in a compensatory manner.

Individuals avoid stimuli which are associated with aversive experience to preserve safety. However, behavioral avoidance also causes impairments and prevents the individual from attaining positive rewards. Little is known about the link between fear acquisition and the development of behavioral avoidance in the presence of potential rewards. Therefore, two experiments investigated the impact of fear conditioning on a subsequent gambling task. In an experimental group (n = 30) advantageous choices (higher reward probability) were linked to a fear-relevant stimulus that was associated with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US) during fear conditioning (conditioned stimulus, CS+). A disadvantageous choice (lower reward probability) was, however, linked to a safe stimulus that was never associated with the US (CS-). In a control group (n = 25), fear conditioning was followed by a similar gambling task with novel stimuli. A second experiment focused on individual predictors of avoidant decisions (n = 81). Compared with the control group, individuals in the experimental groups avoided the advantageous CS + choice despite fewer gains. The predictor analysis further clarified that avoidant decisions were pronounced in highly trait anxious participants who exhibited higher fear responses. On the other hand, findings also indicated a reduction in absolute avoidance across the task. Combined, these findings demonstrate that fear conditioning can lead to avoidant decision making, especially in vulnerable individuals. The resulting costs parallel impairments caused by behavioral avoidance. Such an emotional decision-making style may be a link between aversive experience and the development of habitual pathological avoidance. Introducing rewards for approach, however, may counteract avoidant decisions.

Individuals with anxiety disorders typically avoid fear-relevant stimuli even if they miss potential rewards. However, few studies have accounted for such costs of fear-related avoidance in doing so. In this study, 51 spider fearful and 49 non-fearful participants completed the Spider Gambling Task, our modification of the Iowa Gambling Task, to investigate whether fear-relevant stimuli trigger avoidant decisions in the presence of potential rewards. In one version, advantageous choices were associated with pictures of spiders, whereas the same pictures were associated with disadvantageous choices in another version. Fearful participants generally avoided choices associated with pictures of spiders, which resulted in lower overall gains in the version with advantageous spider decks. Although this relative avoidance was sustained, fearful participants progressively approach more advantageous spider choices. These findings demonstrate that phobic fear results in irrational avoidant decisions which can result in considerable cost. Potential long-term rewards for approach may, however, diminish absolute avoidance behavior., (Copyright © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

When decision makers are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as assumed by single-process models (SPMs) or do they choose adaptively from a set of available decision strategies as multiple-strategy models (MSMs) imply? Both frameworks of decision making have gathered a lot of support, but only rarely have they been contrasted with each other. Employing an information intrusion paradigm for multi-attribute decisions from givens, SPM and MSM predictions on information search, decision outcomes, attention, and confidence judgments were derived and tested against each other in two experiments. The results consistently support the SPM view: Participants seemingly using a "take-the-best" (TTB) strategy do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information as MSMs would predict, but adapt the amount of information searched, choose alternative choice options, and show varying confidence judgments contingent on the quality of the "irrelevant" information. The uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information intrusion paradigm and comprehensively promotes the notion of a uniform decision making mechanism as assumed by single-process models., (Copyright © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Achieving accurate judgment ('judgmental achievement') is of utmost importance in daily life across multiple domains. The lens model and the lens model equation provide useful frameworks for modeling components of judgmental achievement and for creating tools to help decision makers (e.g., physicians, teachers) reach better judgments (e.g., a correct diagnosis, an accurate estimation of intelligence). Previous meta-analyses of judgment and decision-making studies have attempted to evaluate overall judgmental achievement and have provided the basis for evaluating the success of bootstrapping (i.e., replacing judges by linear models that guide decision making). However, previous meta-analyses have failed to appropriately correct for a number of study design artifacts (e.g., measurement error, dichotomization), which may have potentially biased estimations (e.g., of the variability between studies) and led to erroneous interpretations (e.g., with regards to moderator variables). In the current study we therefore conduct the first psychometric meta-analysis of judgmental achievement studies that corrects for a number of study design artifacts. We identified 31 lens model studies (N = 1,151, k = 49) that met our inclusion criteria. We evaluated overall judgmental achievement as well as whether judgmental achievement depended on decision domain (e.g., medicine, education) and/or the level of expertise (expert vs. novice). We also evaluated whether using corrected estimates affected conclusions with regards to the success of bootstrapping with psychometrically-corrected models. Further, we introduce a new psychometric trim-and-fill method to estimate the effect sizes of potentially missing studies correct psychometric meta-analyses for effects of publication bias. Comparison of the results of the psychometric meta-analysis with the results of a traditional meta-analysis (which only corrected for sampling error) indicated that artifact correction leads to a) an increase in values of the lens model components, b) reduced heterogeneity between studies, and c) increases the success of bootstrapping. We argue that psychometric meta-analysis is useful for accurately evaluating human judgment and show the success of bootstrapping.

In two experiments, recent findings showing the detrimental role of regulatory depletion in decision making are extended to the field of deception detection. In both experiments, the state of ego depletion was induced by having judges inhibit versus non-inhibit a dominant response while transcribing a text. Subsequently they judged true or deceptive messages of different stimulus persons with regard to their truthfulness. In both experiments, ego-depleted judges scored significantly lower on detection accuracy than control judges. Signal detection measures showed that this effect was not due to differences in judgmental bias between the two conditions. In Experiment 2, it was shown that the lower detection accuracy in the state of ego depletion was due to a feeling of difficulty of relying on verbal content information. Practical implications of the current findings are discussed., (© 2012 The British Psychological Society.)

Various studies have shown that established decision routines may become detrimental in changing environments. Routines can be formed at the level of options or at the level of strategies which has been demonstrated in different lines of research. It is unclear, however, which routinization level is spontaneously preferred if both are possible and equally successful. The first experiment demonstrates that a typical multi-attribute decision task using the MouseLab procedure clearly invites strategy routinization. However, the second experiment shows that this level of routinization is massively context-dependent and will be shifted in line with subtle context cues that direct attention to different aspects of the feedback during learning. Theoretical implications for learning models of decision making are discussed., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In probabilistic inferences concerning which of two objects has the larger criterion value (e.g., which of two cities has more inhabitants), participants may recognize both objects, only one, or neither. According to the mental-toolbox approach, different decision strategies exist for each of these cases, utilizing different probabilistic cues. Possibly, however, participants use these cues to build a subjective rank order that involves all objects, irrespective of their recognition status. The decision process then simply utilizes the distance between two objects in one's subjective order. We tested the role of such linear orders in reanalyses of existing data and in a new experiment. Participants' choices and decision times were determined both by subjective rank-order distances and by the recognition status of the compared objects. To integrate these theoretically inconsistent findings, we discuss the role of the evidential difference (or the degree of conflict) between two objects.

The notion of adaptive decision making implies that strategy selection in both inferences and preferences is driven by a trade-off between accuracy and effort. A strategy for probabilistic inferences which is particularly attractive from this point of view is the recognition heuristic (RH). It proposes that judgments rely on recognition in isolation-ignoring any further information that might be available-and thereby allows for substantial effort-reduction. Consequently, it is herein hypothesized that and tested whether increased necessity of effort-reduction-as implemented via time pressure-fosters reliance on the RH. Two experiments corroborated that this was the case, even with relatively mild time pressure. In addition, this result held even when non-compliance with the response deadline did not yield negative monetary consequences. The current investigations are among the first to tackle the largely open question of whether effort-related factors influence the reliance on heuristics in memory-based decisions., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Former experimental studies have shown that decisions from memory tend to rely only on a few cues, following simple noncompensatory heuristics like "take the best." However, it has also repeatedly been demonstrated that a pictorial, as opposed to a verbal, representation of cue information fosters the inclusion of more cues in compensatory strategies, suggesting a facilitated retrieval of cue patterns. These studies did not properly control for visual salience of cues, however. In the experiment reported here, the cue salience hierarchy established in a pilot study was either congruent or incongruent with the validity order of the cues. Only the latter condition increased compensatory decision making, suggesting that the apparent representational format effect is, rather, a salience effect: Participants automatically retrieve and incorporate salient cues irrespective of their validity. Results are discussed with respect to reaction time data.

So far, decision makers have mostly been shown to treat small probabilities inappropriately in risky choice. For example, one of the cornerstone assumptions of Cumulative Prospect Theory is that small probabilities are overweighted and this has been repeatedly confirmed in decisions from descriptions. Recent findings in experience-based decision making, in contrast, show that active sequential sampling of outcomes can lead decision makers to make choices which imply underweighting of small probabilities. In light of these findings, we ask whether decision makers really are unable to treat rare events appropriately. In line with theoretical approaches assuming cognitive processes of sampling and accumulation, we conjectured that decision makers display appropriate probability weighting when given the chance to draw large representative samples in little time. Two experiments comprising an "open sampling" condition corroborated this conjecture, revealing that decision makers will neither over- nor underweight small probabilities when they can rely on fast information sampling processes., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In several recent reviews, authors have argued for the pervasive use of fast-and-frugal heuristics in human judgment. They have provided an overview of heuristics and have reiterated findings corroborating that such heuristics can be very valid strategies leading to high accuracy. They also have reviewed previous work that implies that simple heuristics are actually used by decision makers. Unfortunately, concerning the latter point, these reviews appear to be somewhat incomplete. More important, previous conclusions have been derived from investigations that bear some noteworthy methodological limitations. I demonstrate these by proposing a new heuristic and provide some novel critical findings. Also, I review some of the relevant literature often not-or only partially-considered. Overall, although some fast-and-frugal heuristics indeed seem to predict behavior at times, there is little to no evidence for others. More generally, the empirical evidence available does not warrant the conclusion that heuristics are pervasively used.

The fast-and-frugal recognition heuristic (RH) theory provides a precise process description of comparative judgments. It claims that, in suitable domains, judgments between pairs of objects are based on recognition alone, whereas further knowledge is ignored. However, due to the confound between recognition and further knowledge, previous research lacked an unbiased measure of RH use. Also, model comparisons have not been based on goodness-of-fit and model complexity as criteria. To overcome both limitations we introduce and test a multinomial processing tree model showing that it fits empirical data and provides an unbiased measure of RH use. Analyses of 8 data sets reveal that the RH alone cannot account for the data, not even when it is implemented in a probabilistic way. That is, information integration beyond recognition plays a vital role and cannot merely account for empirical data better due to model flexibility. Also, we present several validations of the central model parameter and provide demonstrations of how the model can be applied to study the less-is-more effect as well as determinants of (and individual differences in) RH use. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

According to part of the adaptive toolbox notion of decision making known as the recognition heuristic (RH), the decision process in comparative judgments-and its duration-is determined by whether recognition discriminates between objects. By contrast, some recently proposed alternative models predict that choices largely depend on the amount of evidence speaking for each of the objects and that decision times thus depend on the evidential difference between objects, or the degree of conflict between options. This article presents 3 experiments that tested predictions derived from the RH against those from alternative models. All experiments used naturally recognized objects without teaching participants any information and thus provided optimal conditions for application of the RH. However, results supported the alternative, evidence-based models and often conflicted with the RH. Recognition was not the key determinant of decision times, whereas differences between objects with respect to (both positive and negative) evidence predicted effects well. In sum, alternative models that allow for the integration of different pieces of information may well provide a better account of comparative judgments., ((c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved.)