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Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are more stressed. This covariance elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debtoverhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the interest paid on lines to credit-sensitive reference rates such as LIBOR. We show that transition to risk-free reference rates may exacerbate this friction. The adverse impact on credit supply is offset if drawdowns are expected to be left on deposit at the same bank, which happened at some of the largest banks during the COVID recession.

Using a novel quarterly dataset on debt financing of non-financial corporations, this paper provides the first empirical evaluation of the relative importance of loan and market-based finance (MBF) supply shocks on business cycles in the euro area as a whole and in its five largest countries. In a Bayesian VAR framework, the two credit supply shocks are identified via sign and inequality restrictions. The results suggest that both loan supply and MBF supply play an important role for business cycles. For the euro area, the explanatory power of the two credit supply shocks for GDP growth variations is comparable. However, there is heterogeneity across countries. In particular, in Germany and France, the explanatory power of MBF supply shocks exceeds that of loan supply shocks. Since MBF is mostly provided by non-bank financial intermediaries, the findings suggest that strengthening their resilience | such as through an enhanced macroprudential framework | would support GDP growth.

This paper examines whether urban leverage, defined by the bank loan-to-deposit ratio in a city, affects housing prices in China. Using a panel dataset of 236 cities and hedonic models, we find a depressing effect of urban leverage on housing price in first- and second-tier cities while leaving third- and fourth-tier cities unaffected. Urban leverage negatively affects housing prices by influencing credit supply. Moreover, the difference-in-differences analysis indicates that purchase restriction policies amplify the depressing effect of urban leverage on housing prices. Overall, we show that urban leverage is an important determinant of housing prices in China.

We quantify how banks' funding costs affect their lending behavior directly, and indirectly by feeding back to their net worth. For identification, we exploit banks' heterogeneous liability structure and the existence of regulated deposits in France whose rates are set by the government. Using administrative credit-registry and regulatory bank data, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in funding costs reduces credit by 17%. To insulate their profits, banks reach for yield and rebalance their lending towards smaller and riskier firms. These changes are not compensated for by less affected banks at the aggregate city level, with repercussions for firms' investment.

We propose a new methodology to identify aggregate demand and supply shocks in the bank loan market. We present a model of sticky bank-firm relationships, estimate its structural parameters in euro area credit register data, and infer aggregate shocks based on those estimates. To achieve credible identification, we leverage banks' exposure to various sectors' heterogeneous liquidity needs during the COVID-19 Pandemic. We find that developments in lending volumes following the pandemic were largely explained by demand shocks. Fluctuations in lending rates were instead mostly determined by bank- driven supply shocks and borrower risk. A by-product of our analysis is a structural interpretation of two-way fixed effects regressions in loan-level data: according to our framework, firm- and bank-time fixed effects only separate demand from supply under certain parametric assumptions. In the data, the conditions are satisfied for supply but not for demand: bank-time fixed effects identify true supply shocks up to a time constant, while firm-time fixed effects are contaminated by supply forces. Our methodology overcomes this limitation: we identify supply and demand shocks at the aggregate and individual levels.

How do banks respond to changes in capital requirements as a result of the stress tests? Does the disclosure of stress test results matter? To answer these questions, we study the impact of European stress tests on banks' lending, their corresponding risk-taking, the ensuing effect on their profitability and the respective publication effect. Exploiting the centralised European stress tests in conjunction with two unique confidential databases containing (i) stress test information for the 2016 and 2018 exercises covering a total of 93 and 87 banks, respectively; and (ii) quarterly supervisory information on approximately 1000 banks (stress-tested and non-tested), allow us to implement a dynamic differencein- differences strategy for a comparable sample of banks. We find that banks participating in the stress tests reallocate credit away from riskier borrowers and towards safer ones in the household sector, making them in general safer but also less profitable. This is especially the case for the set of banks part of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process with undisclosed stress tests, which were also not disclosing their Pillar 2 Requirements voluntarily. Our results confirm that the publication of capital requirements can have a disciplinary effect since banks publishing their requirements tend to have more robust capital ratios, which improves market discipline and financial stability.

Using supervisory data on small and mid-sized nonfinancial enterprises (SMEs), we find that those SMEs with higher leverage faced tighter constraints in accessing bank credit after the COVID-19 outbreak in spring 2020. Specifically, SMEs with higher pre-COVID leverage obtained a smaller volume of new loans and had to pay a higher spread on them during the pandemic period. Consistent with an inward shift in loan supply, these effects were concentrated in loans originated by banks with below-median capital buffers. Highly levered SMEs that relied on low-capital large banks for funding before the pandemic were not able to substitute to other sources of debt financing and thus experienced more of a reduction in total debt as well as a decline in investment and employment. On the other hand, the unprecedented public support, especially the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), mitigated the adverse real effect stemming from bank credit constraints.

We measure the impact of bank capital requirements on corporate borrowing and expansion. We use French loan-level data and take advantage of the transition from Basel I to Basel II. While under Basel I the capital charge was the same for all firms, under Basel II, it depends in a predictable way on both the bank's model and the firm's risk. We exploit this two-way variation to empirically estimate the sensitivity of bank lending to capital requirement. This rich identification allows us to control for firm-level credit demand shocks and bank-level credit supply shocks. We find very large effects of capital requirements on bank lending: A 1 percentage point decrease in capital requirement leads to an increase in loan size by about 5%. At the firm level, borrowing also responds strongly although a bit less, consistent with some limited between-bank substitutability. Investment and employment also increase strongly. Overall, because the transition to Basel II led to an average reduction by 2 percentage points of capital requirements, we estimate that the new regulation led, in France, to an increase in average loan size by 10%, an increase in aggregate corporate lending by 1.5%, an increase in aggregate investment by 0.5%, and the creation or preservation of 235,000 jobs.

The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) is widely considered a good indicator of banks' lending conditions. We use the change in corporate bond spreads on SLOOS release days to instrument changes in lending standards. A series of estimated IV local projections shows that lending standards have highly significant effects on macroeconomic and financial variables. A relaxation of standards expands economic activity and eases financial conditions. We then use the change in spreads and the change in the VIX index on release days to identify a pure credit supply shock and a risk-taking shock using sign restrictions in a Bayesian VAR model. We find that an easing in lending has different consequences for both types of shocks. While the VIX, the excess bond premium and stock prices decrease after a pure credit supply shock, they increase after a risk-taking shock.

We show that bank shocks originating in the fi nancial sector propagate upstream and downstream along the production network and triple the impact of direct bank shocks. Our identi fication relies on the universe of both supplier-customer transactions and bank loans in Spain, a standard operationalization of credit-supply shocks during the 2008-09 global crisis, and the proposed theoretical framework. The impact on real effects is strong, and similarly so, when considering: (i) direct bank shocks to firms versus fi rst-order inter firm contagion; (ii) first-order versus higher-order network effects; (iii) downstream versus upstream propagation; (iv) firm-speci fic versus economy-wide shocks. Market concentration ampli fies these effects.

When firms trade forward contracts with banks to protect foreign currency cash flows against exchange rate movements, foreign exchange risk migrates to the banking sector. We show how this migrated risk may induce systemic repercussions with severe implications for the real economy. For identification, we exploit the Brexit referendum in June 2016 as a quasi-natural experiment in combination with detailed microdata on forward contracts and the credit register in Germany. Before the referendum, firms substantially increased their use of derivatives in response to the heightened uncertainty; banks, in providing these contracts, did not fully intermediate the risk and retained a large share of it on their own books. The depreciation of the British pound in response to the referendum's outcome posed a shock to the capital of ex ante exposed banks. Banks, especially weakly capitalized ones, absorbed these losses by cutting back credit to all firms, including those unlikely to have had any exchange rate exposure to begin with. Firms that had ex ante borrowing relationships with banks facing losses experienced a larger reduction in credit and a greater decline in investment compared with their industry peers, thereby contributing to the aggregate investment contraction. We also find these effects to be more pronounced for small firms, which is consistent with credit market frictions being rooted in asymmetric information problems.

This paper shows that the supply side of credit is a major factor for the phenomenonof hampered interest rate pass-through in monopolistic banking markets. Our data,covering all 1,555 small and medium sized banks in Germany, provides a clear wayto partial out demand shocks; we are thus able to show that while market-powerbanks charge higher loan rates, they spare their borrowers a part of exogenousupward shifts in the yield curve and furthermore withhold a substantial part ofrising market rates from their depositors. Because high market-power banks inour sample are relatively more profitable, they seem to be able to insure theirrelationship-customers against adverse shocks.

We investigate the impact of macroprudential capital requirements on bank lending behaviour across economic sectors, focusing on their potentially heterogenous effects and transmission channel. By employing confidential loan-level data for the euro area over 2015-18, we find that the reaction of banks to structural capital surcharges depends on the level of the required capital buffer and the economic sector of the borrowing counterpart. Although tighter buffer requirements correspond to stronger lending contractions, targeted banks curtail their lending towards credit institutions the most, while leaving loan supply to non-financial corporations almost unchanged. We find that this lending is mitigated when banks resort to central bank funding. These results have important policy implications as they provide evidence on the impact of macroprudential policy frameworks and their interaction with unconventional monetary policies.

This paper identifies and quantifies –for the first time– the relative importance of borrower (credit demand) versus bank (supply) balance-sheet channels. We submit fictitious applications (varying households’ characteristics) to the major Italian online-mortgage platform. In this way we ensure that all banks receive exactly the same mortgage applications, and that –for each application– there are other identical ones except for one borrower-level characteristic. We find that: (i) Borrower and bank channels are equally strong in causing (and explaining) loan acceptance (each channel changes acceptance by 50 p.p. for the interquartile range and explains 29% of R-square). (ii) Differently, for pricing, borrower factors are much stronger. (iii) Banks supplying less credit accept riskier borrowers. Finally –exploiting administrative credit register data– we document borrower-lender assortative matching: safer banks have more credit relations with safer firms. Moreover, the measure of credit supply estimated in the experiment (differently from a very similar measure estimated from the observational mortgage data) determines bank credit supply to firms and risk-taking in administrative data.

This paper uses a unique dataset where credit rejections experienced by euro area firms are matched with firm and bank characteristics. This allows us to study simultaneously the role that bank and firm weakness had in the credit reduction observed in the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis, and in credit developments characterising the post-crisis recovery. Compared with the existing literature matching borrowers' and lenders' characteristics, our dataset provides a better representation of euro area firms of small and medium size. Our findings suggest that, while firm balance sheet factors have been strong determinants of credit rejections, in the crisis period bank weakness made it harder to obtain external finance for firms located in stressed countries of the euro area.

Following the crisis, macroprudential regulations targeting mortgage-market vulnerabilities were widely adopted, their success often depending on intermediaries' responses. We show that Canadian banks behaved strategically to limit the potency of recently implemented mortgage stress tests, requiring borrower qualification based on the mode of 5-year rates posted by the Big 6 banks rather than transaction rates. The government aimed to cool credit markets, but since many mortgages are government-insured, Big 6 interests were not aligned. Using DiD comparing changes in 5-year spreads with 3-year spreads, unaffected by the policy, we find rates were lowered encouraging continued borrowing, muting the tests' impact.

We use an expansive regulatory loan-level data set to analyze how the portfolios of the largest US banks have changed in response to the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) requirements. We find that the portfolios of the largest banks, which are subject to stress-testing, have become more similar to each other since DFAST was implemented in 2011. We also find that banks with poor stress-test results tend to adjust their portfolios in a way that makes them more similar to the portfolios of banks that performed well in the stress-testing. In general, stress-testing has resulted in more diversified bank portfolios in terms of sectoral and regional composition. However, we also find that all the large banks diversified in a similar way, creating a more concentrated systemic portfolio in the aggregate. Finally, we analyze the effects of stress-testing and portfolio sensitivity to macroeconomic scenarios on credit supply. Our findings indicate that banks that experience worse results in the stress tests cut lending relative to their peers and specifically in loans that are most sensitive to the stress-test scenarios. At the borrower level, firms that rely more on credit from banks with poor stress-test results are not able to substitute lost funding and therefore face a larger reduction in credit and cut back investment. These results highlight a macroprudential effect of stress-testing: Credit growth is curtailed during a credit expansion in those banks holding a portfolio that is more sensitive to stressful scenarios. Hence, these banks are expected to be in a more resilient position at the onset of a downturn.

This paper provides evidence that banks cut lending to US borrowers as a consequence of a trade shock. This adverse reaction is stronger for banks with higher ex-ante lending to US industries hit by the trade shock. Importantly, I document large heterogeneity in banks' reaction depending on their sectoral specialisation. Banks shield industries in which they are specialised in and at the same time reduce the availability of credit to industries they are not specialised in. The latter is driven by low-capital banks and lending to firms that are themselves hit by the trade shock. Banks' adjustments have adverse real effects.

We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data to estimate the effects of bank funding stress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of nonmortgage liabilities. This, however, only translates into lower levels of consumption for low income households. Hence, adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant heterogeneous effects.

We evaluate the role played by loan supply shocks in the decline of investment and industrial production during the Great Depression in Germany from 1927 to 1932. We identify loan supply shocks in the context of a time varying parameter vector autoregression with stochastic volatility. Our results indicate that credit constraints were a significant driver of industrial production between 1927 and 1932, supporting the view that a structurally weak banking sector was an important contributor to the German Great Depression. We find further that loan supply shocks were an important driver of investment in the early phase of the depression, between 1927 and 1929, but not between 1930 and 1932. We suggest possible explanations for this puzzle and directions for future research.

We study the impact of higher bank capital buffers, namely of the Other Systemically Important Institu- tions (O-SII) buffer, on banks' lending and risk-taking behaviour. The O-SII buffer is a macroprudential policy aiming to increase banks' resilience. However, higher capital requirements associated with the policy may likely constrain lending. While this may be a desired effect of the policy, it could, at least in the short-term, pose costs for economic activity. Moreover, by changing the relative attractiveness of different asset classes, a higher capital requirement could also lead to risk-shifting and therefore promote the build-up (or deleverage) of banks' risk-taking. Since the end of 2015, national authorities, under the EBA framework, started to identify banks as O-SII and impose additional capital buffers. The identifica- tion of the O-SII is mainly based on a cutoff rule, ie. banks whose score is above a certain threshold are automatically designated as systemically important. This feature allows studying the effects of higher capital requirements by comparing banks whose score was close to the threshold. Relying on confidential granular supervisory data, between 2014 and 2017, we find that banks identified as O-SII reduced, in the short-term, their credit supply to households and financial sectors and shifted their lending to less risky counterparts within the non-financial corporations. In the medium-term, the impact on credit supply is defused and banks shift their lending to less risky counterparts within the financial and household sectors. Our findings suggest that the discontinuous policy change had limited effects on the overall supply of credit although we find evidence of a reduction in the credit supply at the inception of the macropruden- tial policy. This result supports the hypothesis that the implementation of the O-SII's framework could have a positive disciplining effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having only a reduced adverse impact on the real economy through a temporary decrease in credit supply.

By the act of lending banks do not actually intermediate pre-accumulated real resources but rather create new financial resources in the form of deposits. Therefore, bank credit needs to be modelled as a monetary phenomenon, which directly fuels domestic demand and inflationary pressures. So far, there have been just a few attempts to model banks as monetary institutions in the DSGE model. In this paper we propose a simple DSGE model, which nevertheless accommodates banks as genuinely monetary institutions and captures banks' institutional ability to create money. Our model features a small open economy with nominal prices, savers and borrowers and a banking sector. Following an exogenously induced shock to banker's willingness to lend, the bank does not have to raise deposit rates or significantly increase borrowing from abroad as deposit dynamics closely resembles that of credit, which allows us to analyse real and nominal consequences of bank credit (and money) creation.

This paper examines the effect of the global financial crisis on corporate investment in Korea. Specifically, the crisis was considered to have possibly constrained firm-level investment as the negative shock to the credit supply dramatically unfolded. As Duchin et al. (2010) demonstrated, if a negative supply-side shock is evident during a crisis period, larger cash holdings before the crisis will lead to fewer constraints to corporate investment, or vice versa. In order to investigate the supply-side effect of the crisis, we use firm-level financial data, including firms listed on the Korean stock market as well as small and medium-sized enterprises. We find that corporate investment declined significantly after the crisis, even if we control for factors associated with the demand side, such as contemporaneous capital productivity and cash flow. More importantly, the decline is positively and significantly related to cash holdings before the crisis, implying the negative effect of a credit supply shock. Small and medium enterprises experienced relatively sharp investment declines compared to those of larger firms, and the relationship between pre-crisis cash amounts and the degree of investment decline is greater than that in large firms. Additionally, we examine whether the negative effect persists up to the present, finding evidence that the cash-investment relationship continues in small and medium-sized enterprises.

I study the effects of an increase in the supply of local mortgage credit on local house prices and employment by exploiting a natural experiment from Switzerland. In mid-2008, losses in U.S. security holdings triggered a migration of dissatisfied retail customers from a large, universal bank, UBS, to homogeneous local mortgage lenders. Mortgage lenders located close to UBS branches experienced larger inflows of deposits, regardless of their investment opportunities. Using variation in the geographic distance between UBS branches and local mortgage lenders as an instrument for deposit growth, I find that banks with an exogenous positive funding shock invest in strict accordance with their specialization (that is, local mortgage lending). Consequently, house price gains in neighborhoods around affected banks were more than 50 percent greater than those in neighborhoods around unaffected banks. I also find an increase in the number of employees at small firms, reliant on real estate collateral, in the former set of neighborhoods. My results show that local-mortgage-oriented banks affect house prices through the supply of credit and that bank specialization thereby plays an important role in the allocation of capital across sectors.

We observe significant heterogeneity in the correlation between changes in house prices and the growth of small firms across certain countries in Europe. We find that, overall, the correlation is far greater in Southern Europe than in Northern Europe. Using a simple model, we show that this heterogeneity may relate to financial frictions in a country. We confirm the model's propositions in a number of empirical analyses for the following countries in Northern and Southern Europe: the United Kingdom, Norway, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Small firms in countries with higher financial frictions (for example, places where bankruptcy resolution is more difficult and/or takes longer) see a greater dependence on "stable" real estate collateral. This is most pronounced for opaque (for example, very young) firms. Through an extension to our model and our choice of specification, we show that our findings are most consistent with a collateral-value-based credit supply channel and rule out a consumer-driven demand effect.

In order to enhance the understanding of credit cycle dynamics in Croatia, we explore the evolution of credit demand and credit supply of corporates and households in Croatia and identify their determinants based on the switching regression framework. These results are crosschecked by the insights from the bank lending survey. The conducted analysis shows there are both supply and demand-side factors that limit the possibility of intensifying household and corporate credit activity. However, a more pronounced drag seems to be coming from subdued demand, which is greatly influenced by the unfavourable domestic macroeconomic environment and, particularly, GDP developments. This suggests that it is not unusual that credit recovery is still missing but also confirms that the scope for monetary policy to stimulate lending is limited.

This paper develops a theoretical model as a foundation of empirical analysis of the transmission channel of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank cost of capital, credit and liquidity creation in the Eurozone. Empirical results confirm the model’s predictions and suggest that holding non-performing loans increases the cost of capital for banks in the short-term and the long-term. Moreover, the increased cost of capital reduces credit and liquidity creation, and the more so the less capitalized is the bank. This phenomenon is found to be economically more significant for European periphery country banks than for core country banks. The identification of the transmission channel is robust to the Granger predictability test.

Do borrowers demand less credit from banks with weak balance sheet positions? To answer this question we use novel bank-specific survey data matched with confidential balance sheet information on a large set of euro area banks. We find that, following a conventional monetary policy shock, bank balance sheet strength influences not only credit supply but also credit demand. The resilience of lenders plays an important role for firms when selecting whom to borrow from. We also assess the impact on credit origination of unconventional monetary policies using survey responses on the exposure of individual banks to quantitative easing and negative interest rate policies. We find that both policies do stimulate loan supply even after fully controlling for bank-specific demand, borrower quality, and balance sheet strength. JEL Classification: E51, G21

We analyze the causal effect of the credit supply shock to banks induced by interbank market disruptions in the recent financial crisis 2008/2009 on their business customers’ innovation activity. Using a matched bank-firm data set for Germany, we find that having relations with a more severely affected bank seriously hampers firms’ current innovation activities due to funding shortages. Furthermore, we find that firms with a relationship to a less severely affected bank are more likely to initiate new product and process innovations and to reallocate human resources to innovation during the financial crisis.

Monetary policy transmission may be impaired if banks rebalance their portfolios towards securities to pursue e.g. risk-shifting or liquidity hoarding. We identify the bank lending and risk-taking channels by exploiting – Italian’s unique – credit and security registers. In crisis times, with softer ECB’s monetary policy conditions, less capitalized banks increase securities over credit supply, with associated firm-level real effects. However, less capitalized banks buy securities with lower yield (haircuts), even within securities with identical regulatory risk weights, thus reaching-for-safety/liquidity. Results are only present in marked-to-market portfolios. The evidence suggests that liquidity and risk-bearing capacity – rather than riskshifting or regulatory arbitrage – are key drivers of banks’ behavior. Differently, in pre-crisis times, securities do not crowd-out loan application granting by less capitalized banks. Peydró acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant No. ECO2015-68182-P and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2015-0563) and from the European Research Council Grant (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant No. 648398).

This paper investigates the link between mortgage supply shocks at the banklevel and regional house price growth in the U.S. using micro-level data on mortgage markets from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for the 1990-2014 period. Our results suggest that bank-specific mortgage supply shocks indeed affect house price growth at the regional level. The larger the idiosyncratic shocks to newly issued mortgages, the stronger is house price growth. We show that the positive link between idiosyncratic mortgage shocks and regional house price growth is very robust and economically meaningful, however not very persistent since it fades out after two years.

We analyze the impact of balance-sheet strength on credit availability. Bank balance sheets are weak in crisis times, but so are those of firms, and credit demand is then also weak. For identification, we exploit an administrative dataset of loan applications matched with bank and firm variables covering Spain from 2002 to 2010. Bank balance-sheet strength determines the granting of loan applications only in crisis times, while firm balance-sheet strength – notably leverage – determines strongly this granting in both good and crisis times. Our findings underscore the importance of the strength of corporate balance sheets over credit supply for credit availability. Ongena acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council Advanced Grant (project 740272) and Peydró acknowledges financial support from ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and from the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

This paper finds that foreign banks can act as a buffer against negative credit supply shocks, in contexts where the domestic credit market is heavily hit by a country-specific adverse shock. A new dataset is constructed, which combines Belgian Credit Register data with firms and banks' balance sheets. After 2008, Belgian firms borrowing from domestic banks experienced a stronger credit contraction (minus 1.8 percentage points) than firms borrowing from foreign banks. Also, foreign banks "cherry-picked" new relationships with more profitable firms to a higher extent during the crisis, and turned down existing relationships more frequently than domestic banks. Results from this paper suggest that foreign banks can mitigate negative financial shocks in countries where domestic financial intermediaries unexpectedly experienced the consequences of the financial crisis to a higher extent.

Die Kreditversorgung war im Zuge der Finanzkrise von 2008/2009 insbesondere in Deutschland Gegenstand großer Besorgnis. Die Verknappung von Krediten, besonders von Geschäftskrediten, in Kombination mit der anhaltenden Rezession führte zu einer wachsenden Furcht vor einer Kreditklemme. Dieser Beitrag analysiert die mögliche Existenz einer Kreditklemme für den Zeitraum bis Ende 2009 unter Verwendung eines Ungleichgewichtsmodells. Einer Abschwächung des Kreditwachstums können sowohl eine, rezessionsbedingt, schwache Kreditnachfrage, als auch angebotsseitige Faktoren zugrunde liegen. In diesem Beitrag werden für den Zeitraum zwischen 1991 und 2009 Kreditangebot und -nachfrage entflochten und getrennt voneinander analysiert. Das Modell weist auf eine vorübergehende angebotsseitige Verknappung der Kreditvergabe zu Beginn des Jahres 2007 hin. Die Zuführung von Liquidität in das deutsche Bankensystem im Rahmen der geldpolitischen Stützungsmaßnahmen der EZB hat jedoch schließlich geholfen, die Kreditverknappung zum Ende des Jahres 2008 zu überwinden. Des Weiteren zeigt die Schätzung des Ungleichgewichtsmodells, dass sich die Kreditmärkte zum Ende des Jahres 2009 wieder im Gleichgewicht befanden, auch wenn dieses Gleichgewicht fragil blieb. So hätte zu diesem Zeitpunkt eine weitere Verringerung des Eigenkapitals der deutschen Banken eine Kreditklemme mit entsprechenden Folgen für die konjunkturelle Erholung nach sich ziehen können. The availability of credit has been an issue of particular concern in Germany during the financial meltdown of 2008-2009. The contraction of loans, especially business loans, together with an ongoing recession led to growing fears about an upcoming shortage in lending. This study analyses the existence of a possible "credit crunch" in Germany until the end of 2009 by utilizing a disequilibrium model. The downward course of credit growth might be due to both weak demand for loans stemming from recession and supply side factors. Hence, we attempt to disentangle credit supply from demand with a disequilibrium model using quarterly data from Q1 1991 to Q4 2009. At the beginning of 2007, we observe a significant supply dependent credit shortage. Liquidity injected in the German banking system has helped to overcome credit tightening, especially towards the end of 2008.There is evidence that credit markets returned to equilibrium in Germany at the end of 2009. However, this equilibrium was still fragile. Any further deterioration of the equity capital of banks could have resulted in a supply-driven credit crunch, which would have circumvented an economic recovery.

The surge in credit and house prices that preceded the Great Recession was particularly pronounced in ZIP codes with a higher fraction of subprime borrowers (Mian and Sufi 2009). We present a simple model of prime and subprime borrowers distributed across geographic locations, which can reproduce this stylized fact as a result of an expansion in the supply of credit. Owing to their low incomes, subprime households are constrained in their ability to meet interest payments and hence sustain debt. As a result, when the supply of credit increases and interest rates fall, they take on disproportionately more debt than their prime counterparts, who are not subject to that constraint.

We study how a Net Stable Funding Ratio as defined by the Basel Committee in 2014 (NSFR (2014)) would affect the profitability of German banks and their capacity to lend. With a NSFR-model that is partially calibrated against reported NSFRs, we find that 9% of German banks do not comply with the NSFR (2014). This is a significant reduction compared to the 39% that we find for its prior definition, the NSFR (2010), for the same sample. Structurally, banks that do not comply with the NSFR (2014) hold less liquid assets, rely less on retail funding, but more on short-term market funding and are more highly leveraged. A microeconomic model applied to each of the 163 non-compliant banks suggests that they would engage in 70 different strategies to become compliant. All strategies are growth strategies and none of them cuts lending. On average, banks would see their Return on Assets dropping once by moderate 10 bps. Our conclusion is that an introduction of the NSFR (2014) as minimum standard is unlikely to exhibit adverse consequences for credit supply and bank profitability.

We identify the effects of the supply of mortgage credit on house prices, using the politicallydirected credit-targeting regime of Venezuela as quasi-natural experiment. We find a large effect of the supply of housing credit on time path of house prices (or housing Markups), with an elasticity of housing markups with respect to credit of about 0.23 under our baseline specification, and similar results under a set of alternative specifications. These estimates are close to previous panel estimates for the United States, which suggests that these estimates capture similar phenomena.

This paper exploits a novel bank-level monthly dataset to assess the effects of global liquidity on the global flows of euro area banks. The period associated with the European sovereign debt crisis has witnessed increased growth in euro area bank claims on extra-euro area residents, against a background of contracting euro area credit supply. Controlling for bank risk, global credit demand, and price effects such as interest rate differentials and exchange rates, empirical evidence supports a range of determinants of global liquidity - including global risk, global bank equity and unconventional monetary policy in the US, UK, Japan and euro area - as drivers of the global flows of euro area banks. Moreover, regression analysis indicates heterogeneity in the influence of global liquidity on global flows across euro area bank type, defined by their balance sheet composition and country of residence (stressed versus non-stressed euro area countries). The results highlight the importance of exogenous factors as drivers of global bank flows and the potential for international leakages of unconventional monetary policy.

We analyze securities trading by banks during the crisis and the associated spillovers to the supply of credit. We use a proprietary dataset that has the investments of banks at the security level for 2005-2012 in conjunction with the credit register from Germany. We find that - during the crisis - banks with higher trading expertise (trading banks) increase their investments in securities, especially in those that had a larger price drop, with the strongest impact in low-rated and long-term securities. Moreover, trading banks reduce their credit supply, and the credit crunch is binding at the firm level. All of the effects are more pronounced for trading banks with higher capital levels. Finally, banks use central bank liquidity and government subsidies like public recapitalization and implicit guarantees mainly to support trading of securities. Overall, our results suggest an externality arising from fire sales in securities markets on credit supply via the trading behavior of banks.

Using a lender cut-off rule that generates plausibly exogenous variation in credit supply, I analyze real effects of loan rejections in a sample of small and medium-sized enterprises. I find that loan rejections reduce asset growth, investments, and employment, and these effects are concentrated among low liquidity firms. Precautionary savings motives aggravate real effects: firms whose loan applications got rejected increase cash holdings and cut non-cash assets in excess of the requested loan amount. These results point to the amplifying effect of precautionary savings motives in the transmission of credit supply shocks.

We use bank-level information on lending practices from the euro area Bank Lending Survey to construct a new indicator of loans’ supply tightening controlling for both macroeconomic and bank-specific factors. Embedding this information as external instrument in a Bayesian vector autoregressive model (BVAR), we find that tighter bank loan supply to non-financial corporations leads to a protracted contraction in credit volumes and higher bank lending spreads. This fosters firms’ incentives to substitute bank loans with market finance, producing a significant increase in debt securities issuance and higher bond spreads. We also show that loans’ tightening shocks explain a large fraction of the contraction in real activity and the widening of credit spreads especially over the recession which followed the euro area sovereign debt crisis.

There is a consensus among the majority of economists that the credit supply is limited by current household saving. If governments or foreigners ran deficits, they would absorb this limited saving so that firms could not borrow any longer and had to reduce their investment. This is the "Loanable Funds" theory. Ben Bernanke's "Global Saving Glut" thesis is based on this view. According to Bernanke, the US depended on South East Asian and commodity exporting countries' scarce saving to finance the US real estate boom. Using simple accounting rules, the article shows however that credit is never limited by current saving. Often, the exact opposite is true: people can only save after others have taken on credit and paid incomes. This is also the case with the US and its trade partners and creditors: since non-Americans accept the US-Dollar as a means of payment - which only the US can produce - Americans give credit to themselves to finance their current account deficits. Each Dollar that non-Americans invest in the US has either been earned or borrowed in the US before. By their deficits, the US does not absorb scarce saving but allows other countries to increase their income and saving. Unter der Mehrheit der Ökonomen herrscht der Konsens, dass das Kreditangebot durch die laufende Haushaltsersparnis begrenzt sei. Wären Regierungen oder das Ausland im Defizit, würden sie diese begrenzte Ersparnis absorbieren, die dann nicht mehr als Kredite für Unternehmen zur Verfügung stünden. Diese müssten dann ihre Investitionen reduzieren. Dies ist die "Loanable Funds"-Theorie. Auch Ben Bernankes "Saving Glut"-Theorie basiert auf dieser Sicht. Nach Bernanke hingen die USA zur Finanzierung ihres Leistungsbilanzdefizits von den knappen Ersparnissen Südostasiens sowie rohstoffexportierender Länder ab. Unter Gebrauch einfacher Buchhaltungsregeln zeigt dieser Aufsatz allerdings, dass Kredite niemals durch laufende Ersparnis begrenzt sind. Oft ist das genaue Gegenteil wahr: Wirtschafter können nur sparen, wenn andere Wirtschafter einen Kredit aufgenommen und damit Einkommen gezahlt haben. Das ist auch der Fall für die USA und ihre Handelspartner und Gläubiger: Da Nicht-Amerikaner US-Dollar als Zahlungsmittel akzeptieren - die nur die USA selbst herstellen können - geben Amerikaner sich in letzter Instanz selbst Kredit, um ihre Leistungsbilanzdefizite zu finanzieren. Jeder Dollar, den ein Nicht-Amerikaner in den USA investiert, muss vorher in den USA geliehen oder verdient werden. Mit ihrem Defizit absorbieren die USA keine knappe Ersparnis, sondern erlauben erst dem Rest der Welt, überhaupt Ersparnis zu bilden.

To identify the credit channel we disentangle loan supply and demand shocks by using the answers from the confidential Euro area Bank Lending Survey and the U.S. Senior Loan Officer Survey. Embedding this information within a VAR model, we find that: (1) The credit channel of monetary policy is operational through the balancesheets of both banks and non-financial borrowers, and for business, mortgage, and consumer loans. (2) The impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP growth is higher through loan supply than through loan demand, whereas the latter affects more inflation. (3) The bank lending channel is stronger than the balance-sheet channel for firms, whereas the latter is stronger for households. (4) During the recent financial crisis, bank capital and liquidity problems had a strong negative impact on GDP growth by reducing loan supply to businesses. At the same time, the current expansionary monetary policy stance has reduced output decline in the Euro area.

We study the sensitivity of banks’ credit supply to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in the UK to banks’ financial condition before and during the financial crisis. Employing unique data on the geographical location of all bank branches in the UK, we connect firms’ access to bank credit to the financial condition (i.e., bank health and the use of core deposits) of all bank branches in the vicinity of the firm over the period 2004-2011. Before the crisis, banks’ local financial conditions did not influence credit availability irrespective of the functional distance (i.e., the distance between bank branch and bank headquarters). However, during the crisis, we find that SMEs with in their vicinity banks that have stronger financial condition face greater credit availability when the functional distance is low. Our results point to a “flight to headquarters” effect during the financial crisis.

The paper employs a unique identification strategy that links survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data in order to estimate the effects of bank financial distress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. Specifically, we show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report significantly lower levels of non-mortgage liabilities compared to a matched sample of households. The reduced access to credit, however, does not result in lower levels of consumption. Instead, we show that households compensate by drawing down liquid assets. Only households without the ability to draw on liquid assets reduce consumption. The results are consistent with consumption smoothing in the face of a temporary adverse lending supply shock. The results contrast with recent evidence on the real effects of finance on firms’ investment, where even temporary adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant real effects., Les auteurs font appel à une stratégie d’identification unique qui établit un lien entre des données d’enquête sur les dépenses de consommation des ménages et des données concernant les institutions financières, afin d’estimer l’incidence des difficultés financières des banques sur le crédit à la consommation et les dépenses de consommation. Plus précisément, ils montrent que les ménages dont l’institution a été davantage exposée à des chocs de financement font état de niveaux d’engagements non hypothécaires beaucoup moins élevés que les ménages d’un échantillon apparié. Les auteurs constatent néanmoins que le resserrement de l’accès au crédit n’entraîne pas de diminution de la consommation, les ménages compensant la baisse en puisant dans leurs avoirs liquides; les seuls qui réduisent leur consommation sont ceux qui n’ont pas la possibilité d’utiliser de tels avoirs. Ces résultats concordent avec le lissage observé lors d’un choc négatif temporaire de l’offre de crédit. Ils s’opposent toutefois aux conclusions d’études récentes sur les effets réels d’une crise de financement sur les investissements des entreprises, qui indiquent que même des chocs négatifs temporaires de l’offre de crédit ont des effets réels considérables à cet égard.

We explore the sources of household balance sheet adjustment following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use microdata from the Federal Reserve Board's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that banks cumulatively tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a house price boom in the mid-2000s than in non-boom counties. We then use the idea that renters, unlike homeowners, did not experience an adverse wealth shock when the housing market collapsed to examine the relative importance of two explanations for the observed deleveraging and the sluggish pickup in consumption after 2008. First, households may have optimally adjusted to lower wealth by reducing their demand for debt and implicitly, their demand for consumption. Alternatively, banks may have been more reluctant to lend in areas with pronounced real estate declines. Our evidence is consistent with the second explanation. Renters with low risk scores, compared to homeowners in the same markets, reduced their levels of nonmortgage debt and credit card debt more in counties where house prices fell more. The contrast suggests that the observed reductions in aggregate borrowing were more driven by cutbacks in the provision of credit than by a demand-based response to lower housing wealth.

We assess the credit market impact of allowing mortgage “strip-down” as a foreclosure-prevention measure, where strip-down reduces the principal of underwater residential mortgages to the current market value of the property for homeowners in Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Our identification is provided by a series of U.S. court decisions that introduced strip-down in parts of the U.S. and a Supreme Court ruling that abolished it. We find that the Supreme Court decision led to a small, short-term reduction in mortgage interest rates and a small, short-term increase in mortgage approval rates, but no long-term effects, and the circuit court decisions did not consistently affect mortgage terms. These results suggest that strip-down would be an effective foreclosure-prevention program, because it would have only small and transient effects on the supply of mortgage loans.

This paper investigates the risk channel of monetary policy on the asset side of banks' balance sheets. We use a factoraugmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model to show that aggregate lending standards of U.S. banks, such as their collateral requirements for firms, are significantly loosened in response to an unexpected decrease in the Federal Funds rate. Based on this evidence, we reformulate the costly state verification (CSV) contract to allow for an active financial intermediary, embed it in a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, and show that - consistent with our empirical findings - an expansionary monetary policy shock implies a temporary increase in bank lending relative to borrower collateral. In the model, this is accompanied by a higher default rate of borrowers.

How do aggregate quantities at the business cycle frequency respond to shocks to the spread between residential mortgage rates and government bonds? Using a structural VAR approach, we .nd that mortgage spread shocks impact the real economy by both economically and statistically signi.cant magnitudes: a 100 basis point decline in the spread causes a peak increase in consumption, residential investment and GDP by 1.6 percent, 6.2 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively. These e¤ects are magni.ed when the policy rate is held .xed, as was the case in the US during the recent implementation of unconventional monetary policy.