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Nearly a year after its formation, the Nation Alliance, consisting of six opposition par­ties ("Table of Six"), finally started to act like a full-fledged electoral alliance against the ruling bloc under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The six opposition leaders have long been criticised for failing to take concrete steps towards embodying a viable po­lit­ical alternative to the People’s Alliance of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) since they publicly signed the joint manifesto for Turkey’s transition into the "Strengthened Parliamentary System" in February 2022. Although the alliance has yet to announce its joint presidential can­didate, it has manifested an unprecedentedly comprehensive joint platform in nine policy areas, including the rule of law, public administration, social policy, economy, and foreign policy. The 200-page joint document provides a comprehensive overview of what changes Turkey can be expected to go through in the short and medium terms should the Nation Alliance manage to defeat President Erdoğan's ruling bloc in the up­coming elections, which will probably take place on 14 May 2023. Even though it would not immediately offer a solution to various issues in Turkey-EU relations, a pos­sible opposition victory could bring bilateral relations back to an institutional frame­work, whereby both parties can cooperate in a productive way to work out their problems and focus on common interests. (Autorenreferat)

In a remarkable development for Turkish politics, six opposition parties signed a joint manifesto at a public ceremony on 28 February. The document outlines plans to abolish the executive presidential system and restore rule of law and civil liberties under a "strengthened parliamentary system". The successive concentration of power in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s hands has culminated in a hyper-presidential system without meaningful institutional checks. The opposition parties are determined to reverse this process by offering the electorate an alternative political plat­form supported by a single presidential candidate. If their cooperation generates a pre-electoral alliance for the upcoming elections, the opposition camp dubbed the "Table of Six" has a reasonable chance of defeating Erdoğan and his governing bloc. (author's abstract)

Millions of Turkish voters are geared up for the twin (parliamentary and presidential) elections that are scheduled to take place in June 2023 at the latest. After nearly 20 years in power, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule may seem unassailable to many observers of Turkish politics. However, owing to the economic downturn and rifts in his ruling party, this will be the first election in which Erdoğan is not the clear favourite. Six oppo­sition parties of different ideological origins have come together to pick a joint presidential candidate to stand against Erdoğan and to offer a common platform for restoring parliamentary democracy. Although the opposition alliance has reasonable chances of defeating Erdoğan's ruling bloc, their victory would not guarantee a smooth process of transition to parliamentary democracy. If the opposition can defeat Erdoğan, the new government would need to undertake the arduous tasks of estab­lishing a meri­tocratic bureaucracy, restructuring Turkey's diplomatic course and economic policy, and switching back to parliamentary rule. Due to the opposition alliance's diverse com­position, accomplishing these goals may be as difficult as winning the elections.

Not long ago, the Kurdish question (KQ) topped the agenda of Turkish politics. Thanks mainly to what was called the Resolution Process between 2009 and 2015, there was a tense but lively political and public discussion on this colossal problem that the Turk­ish republic has long been tackling with since its foundation. In the past few years, however, the KQ ceased to be a priority issue in Turkish politics. So much so that the "terror question", a watchword for the KQ in the daily lexicon of mainstream Turkish politics, is no longer regarded by the Turkish public as being among the country’s top political problems. However, recently, there have appeared some new signs which in­dicate that the KQ will most likely return to the political agenda. Both Turkish Presi­dent Erdoğan and the leaders of the country's opposition parties have taken steps that reveal that they will revisit the KQ as the 2023 Turkish general election approaches. (author's abstract)

Ankara adopted notably toned-down language towards Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed's power grab and avoided calling it a coup, although it considers the course of events as a potential threat that could endanger its policies towards North Africa. In fact, Turkey revised its approach to Tunisia after secular parties became more prominent in Tunisian politics following the 2014 elections. This policy adjustment consists of developing a balanced network of relations by reaching out to secular parties on the one hand, but retaining close ties with the Islamist Ennahda party on the other hand. To this end, Ankara is giving weight to defence diplomacy and soft power. This tactful approach is in line with Turkey's efforts to strengthen its geo­strategic and geo-economic ties with the Maghreb countries and overlaps with on­going normalisation efforts between Ankara and Arab capitals. But this approach is limited to a pragmatic policy adjustment. Germany and other European states should see this as an opportunity to encourage regional de-escalation and contribute to a constructive regional dialogue. (author's abstract)

Turkey's new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population. Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail. Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system. Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting. The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader - the President. Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair. Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states. (author's abstract)

Istanbul's fiercely fought municipal election is over. The opposition candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, won a landslide victory over his rival. The governing Justice and Develop­ment Party (AK Party) has arguably suffered its most severe defeat since coming to power in 2002. The repercussions and reverberations of this election will be deeply felt across the political spectrum in Turkey. This election will have a formative impact on this new period of Turkish politics. Turkey has gained new political actors, for exam­ple İmamoğlu, as a result of this election. The same election has also further opened the way for contestations on the conservative end of the political spectrum. Former President Abdullah Gül, former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and former Minis­ter of Economy Ali Babacan are set to break away from the AK Party and form their own political movements. (Autorenreferat)

Tayyip Erdoğan’s management of the religious realm in Turkey relies on three dif­ferent but complementary components: i) using state institutions and resources to define and control the religious discourse and life, ii) incorporating religious com­munities and organisations into the party and state institutions, and iii) forming new religious organisations and communities through family-controlled religious foun­dations (vakıf).

"The movement led by the preacher Fethullah Gülen is regarded as the fastest-growing religious trend within Turkish Islam. This accounts also for citizens and denizens with Turkish backgrounds in Western European countries, including Germany, where approximately 300 organisations close to Gülen operate 24 state-approved private schools and around 150 extracurricular tuition centres. Against the background of the diaspora, Gülen's philosophy of adopting modern knowledge, modes of action and attitudes, climbing the social ladder and thus making an effective contribution to social moral reform assumes a new dimension. For one thing, in contrast to Turkey, personal social advancement cannot be linked with the undertaking regarding the conquest of the state. For another, and again in contrast to Turkey, to concentrate on the preservation of one's traditional religious (Muslim) and national (Turkish) identity does not automatically create harmony with the majority of the population, but is indeed at least partially opposed to the same. As a result, the Turkish-Muslim diaspora is under pressure to develop a new understanding of religious and national identity compatible with attitudes prevailing in European societies. For the movement's supporters, this is just as much a prerequisite for their individual advancement as the reconciliation of their religious world view with its scientific equivalent. Gülen's prompt that service to society constitutes a significant form of a lifestyle justifiable in the eyes of God could prove to be the key to resolving the principal conflict of interest between Islam and the West both within the European diaspora and in the USA, repeatedly emphasised by him with insistence in his early writings." (author's abstract)

Am 30. März 2014 fanden in der Türkei landesweit Kommunalwahlen statt, die sowohl von der Regierung als auch von der Opposition zu einem Referendum über Ministerpräsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan und seine Regierung hochgespielt wurden. Während der Premier sich als Opfer »dunkler ausländischer Mächte« und ihrer »inländischen Handlanger« stilisierte und von einem »neuen Unabhängigkeitskrieg« sprach, kaprizierte sich die Opposition fast ausschließlich auf Korruptionsvorwürfe gegen die Regierung. Trotz Stimmeneinbußen von rund fünf Prozentpunkten ist die AKP aus den Kommunalwahlen als eindeutige Siegerin hervorgegangen. Doch Erdoğan sitzt nicht so fest im Sattel, wie allgemein angenommen wird. Sowohl in der Innen- als auch in der Außenpolitik stehen ihm schwierige Zeiten bevor. (Autorenreferat)

In 79 von 81 Provinzhauptstädten der Türkei demonstrierten in den letzten Wochen insgesamt 2,5 Millionen Menschen gegen den türkischen Regierungschef Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Doch Erdogan ist auch der Ministerpräsident, der wie kein zweiter in der 90-jährigen Geschichte der Republik Türkei Rückhalt in der Bevölkerung genießt. Seit der Einführung des Mehrparteiensystems 1946 ist es seine Gerechtigkeits- und Entwicklungspartei (AKP), die das Land bisher am längsten ununterbrochen allein regiert hat, und sie kann sich begründete Hoffnungen machen, auch aus den nächsten Wahlen als stärkste politische Kraft hervorzugehen. Was verrät diese Konstellation von extremer Gegnerschaft zu Erdogan bei gleichzeitiger außergewöhnlich starker Unterstützung für ihn über die politische Struktur der Türkei? Und welche Folgen hat Erdogans unduldsame Reaktion auf die Proteste für seine Zukunft und die seiner Partei? (Autorenreferat)