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Many systems require frequent and regular updates of a certain information. These updates have to be transferred regularly from the source to the destination. We consider scenarios in which an old packet becomes completely obsolete, in the presence of a new packet. In this context, if a new packet arrives at the source while it is transferring a packet, one needs to decide the packet to be dropped. New packet has recent information, but might require more time to transfer. Thus it is not clear as to which packet to be dis- carded, and this is the main focus of the paper. Recently introduced performance metrics, called average age of information (AAoI) and peak age of information (PAoI) of the information available at the destination, are the relevant performance measures. These type of systems do not require storage buffers, of size more than one, at the source queue. We consider single source / multiple sources regularly updating information to a single destination possibly over wireless channels to derive optimal drop policies that optimize the AAoI. We showed that the state independent (static) policies like dropping always the old packets or dropping always the new packets is optimal in many scenarios, among an appropriate set of stationary Markov policies. We consider relevant games when multiple sources compete. In many scenarios, the non-cooperative solution almost minimizes the social objective, the sum of AAoIs of all the sources., Comment: 12 pages and 3 figures

Frequent variations in throughput make mobile networks a challenging environment for video streaming. Current video players deal with those variations by matching video quality to network throughput. However, this adaptation strategy results in frequent changes of video resolution and bitrate, which negatively impacts the users' streaming experience. Alternatively, keeping the video quality constant would improve the experience, but puts additional demand on the network. Downloading high quality content when channel quality is low requires additional resources, because data transfer efficiency is linked to channel quality. In this paper, we present a predictive Channel Quality based Buffering Strategy (CQBS) that lets the video buffer grow when channel quality is good, and relies on this buffer when channel quality decreases. Our strategy is the outcome of a Markov Decision Process. The underlying Markov chain is conditioned on 377 real-world LTE channel quality traces that we have collected using an Android mobile application. With our strategy, mobile network providers can deliver constant quality video streams, using less network resources.

Traditionally science is done using the reductionism paradigm. Artificial intelligence does not make an exception and it follows the same strategy. At the same time, network science tries to study complex systems as a whole. This synopsis presents my PhD thesis which takes an alternative approach to the reductionism strategy, with the aim to advance both fields, advocating that major breakthroughs can be made when these two are combined. The thesis illustrates this bidirectional relation by: (1) proposing a new method which uses artificial intelligence to improve network science algorithms (i.e. a new centrality metric which computes fully decentralized the nodes and links importance, on the polylogarithmic scale with respect to the number of nodes in the network); and (2) proposing two methods which take inspiration from network science to improve artificial intelligence algorithms (e.g. quadratic acceleration in terms of memory requirements and computational speed of artificial neural network fully connected layers during both, training and inference).

International audience; Adaptive video streaming improves users' quality of experience (QoE), while using the network efficiently. In the last few years, adaptive video streaming has seen widespread adoption and has attracted significant research effort. We study a dynamic system of random arrivals and departures for different classes of users using the adaptive streaming industry standard DASH (Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP). Using a Markov chain based analysis, we compute the user QoE metrics: probability of starvation, prefetching delay, average video quality and switching rate. We validate our model by simulations, which show a very close match. Our study of the playout buffer is based on client adaptation scheme, which makes efficient use of the network while improving users' QoE. We prove that for buffer-based variants, the average video bit-rate matches the average channel rate. Hence, we would see quality switches whenever the average channel rate does not match the available video bit rates. We give a sufficient condition for setting the playout buffer threshold to ensure that quality switches only between adjacent quality levels.

International audience; We consider the problem of 'fair' scheduling the resources to one of the many mobile stations by a centrally controlled base station (BS). The BS is the only entity taking decisions in this framework based on truthful information from the mobiles on their radio channel. We study the well-known family of parametric -fair scheduling problems from a gametheoretic perspective in which some of the mobiles may be noncooperative. We first show that if the BS is unaware of the noncooperative behavior from the mobiles, the noncooperative mobiles become successful in snatching the resources from the other cooperative mobiles, resulting in unfair allocations. If the BS is aware of the noncooperative mobiles, a new game arises with BS as an additional player. It can then do better by neglecting the signals from the noncooperative mobiles. The BS, however, becomes successful in eliciting the truthful signals from the mobiles only when it uses additional information (signal statistics). This new policy along with the truthful signals from mobiles forms a Nash Equilibrium (NE) which we call a Truth Revealing Equilibrium. Finally, we propose new iterative algorithms to implement fair scheduling policies that robustify the otherwise non-robust (in presence of noncooperation) fair scheduling algorithms.

Forming, in a decentralized fashion, an optimal network topology while balancing multiple, possibly conflicting objectives like cost, high performance, security and resiliency to viruses is a challenging endeavor. In this paper, we take a game-formation approach to network design where each player, for instance an autonomous system in the Internet, aims to collectively minimize the cost of installing links, of protecting against viruses, and of assuring connectivity. In the game, minimizing virus risk as well as connectivity costs results in sparse graphs. We show that the Nash Equilibria are trees that, according to the Price of Anarchy (PoA), are close to the global optimum, while the worst-case Nash Equilibrium and the global optimum may significantly differ for small infection rate and link installation cost. Moreover, the types of trees, in both the Nash Equilibria and the optimal solution, depend on the virus infection rate, which provides new insights into how viruses spread: for high infection rate τ, the path graph is the worst- and the star graph is the best-case Nash Equilibrium. However, for small and intermediate values of τ, trees different from the path and star graphs may be optimal.

International audience; The paper establishes a general approach for analyzing queueing models with repeated inhomogeneous vacations. The server goes on for a vacation if the inactivity prolongs more than the vacation trigger duration. Once the system enters in vacation mode, it may continue for several consecutive vacations, possibly with a {\em different} probability distribution. We study a simple $M/G/1$ queue, which has the advantage of being tractable analytically. The theoretical model is applied to the problem of power saving for mobile devices in which the sleep durations of a device correspond to the server vacations. Various system performance metrics such as the frame response time and the economy of energy are derived. A constrained optimization problem is formulated to maximize the economy of energy in power save mode with QoS constraints. An illustration of the proposed methods is shown with a WiMAX system scenario to obtain design parameters for better performance. Our analysis allows us not only to optimize the system parameters for a given traffic intensity but also to propose parameters that provide the best performance under worst case conditions.

A central scheduling problem in wireless communications is that of allocating resources to one of many mobile stations that have a common radio channel. Much attention has been given to the design of efficient and fair scheduling schemes that are centrally controlled by a base station (BS) whose decisions depend on the channel conditions of each mobile. The BS is the only entity taking decisions in this framework based on truthful information from the mobiles on their radio channel. In this paper, we study the scheduling problem from a game-theoretic perspective in which some of the mobiles may be noncooperative. We model this as a signaling game and study its equilibria. We then propose various approaches to enforce truthful signaling of the radio channel conditions: an approach based on some knowledge of the mobiles' policies, and an approach that replaces this knowledge by a stochastic approximations approach that combines estimation and control. We further identify other equilibria that involve non-truthful signaling.

The area of networking games has had a growing impact on wireless networks. This reflects the recognition in the important scaling advantages that the service providers can benefit from by increasing the autonomy of mobiles in decision making. This may however result in inefficiencies that are inherent to equilibria in non-cooperative games. Due to the concern for efficiency, centralized protocols keep being considered and compared to decentralized ones. From the point of view of the network architecture, this implies the co-existence of network-centric and terminal centric radio resource management schemes. Instead of taking part within the debate among the supporters of each solution, we propose in this paper hybrid schemes where the wireless users are assisted in their decisions by the network that broadcasts aggregated load information. We derive the utilities related to the Quality of Service (QoS) perceived by the users and develop a Bayesian framework to obtain the equilibria. Numerical results illustrate the advantages of using our hybrid game framework in an association problem in a network composed of HSDPA and 3G LTE systems., Comment: 5 pages, 4 figures, IEEE Infocom, San Diego, USA, March 2010.

Cache networks are one of the building blocks of information centric networks (ICNs). Most of the recent work on cache networks has focused on networks of request driven caches, which are populated based on users requests for content generated by publishers. However, user generated content still poses the most pressing challenges. For such content timelines are the de facto sharing solution. In this paper, we establish a connection between timelines and publisher-driven caches. We propose simple models and metrics to analyze publisher-driven caches, allowing for variable-sized objects. Then, we design two efficient algorithms for timeline workload shaping, leveraging admission and price control in order, for instance, to aid service providers to attain prescribed service level agreements.

International audience

Designing an optimal network topology while balancing multiple, possibly conflicting objectives like cost, performance, and resiliency to viruses is a challenging endeavor, let alone in the case of decentralized network formation. We therefore propose a game-formation technique where each player aims to minimize its cost in installing links, the probability of being infected by a virus and the sum of hopcounts on its shortest paths to all other nodes. In this article, we (1) determine the Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for our novel network formation game, (2) demonstrate that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is usually low, which suggests that (near-)optimal topologies can be formed in a decentralized way, and (3) give suggestions for practitioners for those cases where the PoA is high and some centralized control/incentives are advisable., accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems

International audience; The global Internet has enabled a massive access of internauts to content. At the same time it allowed individuals to use the Internet in order to distribute content. This introduced new types of competition between content over popularity, visibility, influence, reputation and user attention. The rules of these competitions are new with respect to those of traditional media, and they are determined by the way resources are allocated through network protocols (such as page rank in search engines and recommendation systems that are widely spread in social networks). In this paper we first present in the introduction an overview of some central competition issues both in the Internet as well as in other types of networks. We then describe the model of when to send content in order to maximize the exposure of the content. In the two last sections we finally describe research on two bio-inspired tools that have bben used to study various competition aspects.

International audience; We consider a scenario where an Internet Service Provider (ISP) serves users that choose digital content among M Content Providers (CP). In the status quo, these users pay both access fees to the ISP and content fees to each chosen CP; however, neither the ISP nor the CPs share their profit. We revisit this model by introducing a different business model where the ISP and the CP may have motivation to collaborate in the framework of caching. The key idea is that the ISP deploys a cache for a CP provided that they share both the deployment cost and the additional profit that arises due to caching. Under the prism of coalitional games, our contributions include the application of the Shap-ley value for a fair splitting of the profit, the stability analysis of the coalition and the derivation of closed-form formulas for the optimal caching policy. Our model captures not only the case of non-overlapping contents among the CPs, but also the more challenging case of overlapping contents; for the latter case, a non-cooperative game among the CPs is introduced and analyzed to capture the negative externality on the demand of a particular CP when caches for other CPs are deployed.

International audience; Recent papers studied the control of spectral centrality measures of a network by manipulating the topology of the network. We extend these works by focusing on a specific spectral centrality measure, the Katz-Bonacich centrality. The optimization of the Katz-Bonacich centrality using a topological control is called the Katz-Bonacich optimization problem. We first prove that this problem is equivalent to a linear optimization problem. Thus, in the context of large graphs, we can use state of the art algorithms. We provide a specific applications of the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem based on the minimization of gossip propagation and make some experiments on real networks.

An experimental study of the digital trust game in [2] is presented. The study consists of an initial survey followed by a four-part dynamic experiment investigating various aspects of digital trust decisions. Digital trust in online environments differs from its offline variants due to its unique characteristics such as near instantaneous communication, transient and impersonal nature of interactions, immediate access to opinions of others, and availability of high amount of (but often low quality) information. It is observed that while the game theory provides a suitable analytical framework for quantitative analysis of digital trust decisions, the model in [2] has its shortcomings. Firstly, the subjects do not seem to adopt an iterative best or gradient response strategy. They exhibit significant (mental) inertia and only respond to new information or significant situation changes. Secondly, they take into account signals from their social circle much more than aggregate signals such as average scores. Both of these results and additional insights gained have important implications for future game theoretic modeling efforts of digital trust.