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This article investigates how fashion and nationalism were expressed through two iconic dress styles worn by women, the qipao in Taiwan and the terno in the Philippines in the post-WWII era. We consider the positioning of women's bodies in the nation-building project and how sartorial practices reflected expectations around gendered performance in the public and private spheres. Both countries emerged from domination by major powers—Japan and the US—in the post-war era and ruling elites were keen to project an image of nation that was distinctively Asian and modern, while the first ladies of both nations championed their respective styles of national dress. In the Philippines, the terno was a fusion garment adapted over time that reflected the nation's earlier cultural links with Spain, whereas in Taiwan the qipao marked women's bodies as Chinese in the public sphere as Chinese nationalists consolidated their political control over the country. We argue that the relative success and longevity of the terno in the Philippines is due to a lengthy, organic process of internal cultural authentication prior to its take-up by former First Lady Imelda Marcos, as opposed to the top-down imposition of the qipao on Taiwanese women's bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although researchers have identified conditions for marital formation across and along ethnic lines, few efforts have been made to clarify factors behind in-group rejection. This article looks at one specific aspect of rejection within 'us' through the lens of long-distance nationalism. The data were collected from islander-origin first-generation Taiwanese Americans in a transnational community organization in the San Diego area, whose ancestors can be traced to provinces in southeast China. The long-term development of the islanders-led nationalist movement in Taiwan has made these immigrants long-distance nationalists by default. The article finds that although all immigrants identify 'us' with Taiwanese American, they have developed two types of transnational attachment (homeland and home) affecting their different ways of transforming 'us' into 'marriageable us.' While immigrants with homeland attachment have developed a Taiwan-first hyphenated identity that excludes Chinese people from the group of 'us' and 'marriageable us,' those who have a home attachment apply a symbolic approach to Taiwanese ethnicity resulting in the decoupling of 'us' and 'marriageable us.' By showing in-group heterogeneity in the transformation of 'us' into 'marriageable us' in the context of Taiwanese immigration to the United States, this article identifies community organizations as a mechanism for supporting the variance of transnational attachment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese Civil War split the Chinese into two politically conflicted states from 1949. The People's Republic of China and Republic of China both claimed to be the legitimate representative of China in the international community. "Chinese Taipei" has become the name of Republic of China in the international sport field and almost every international organization since 1981, after Kuomintang (The Chinese Nationalist Party) refused to play under the provincial name "Taiwan," which was suggested by the International Olympic Committee in the 1960s. However, the relationships between Taiwan and China and the nationalistic discourses have changed drastically in Taiwan in the past 40 years. "Chinese Taipei" became the compromised, shameful symbol of Republic of China. At the same time, "Taiwan" turned into the most progressive, resistant, and aspired but banned name and self-identity for many Taiwanese. In 2018, the "2020 Tokyo Olympics Taiwan Name Rectification Referendum" was launched. It requested to rectify the current "Chinese Taipei" to "Taiwan". This paper aims to build a contextualized and historical understanding of this interrelation of sport and nationalism in Taiwan via this name game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do citizens in authoritarian countries support democracy more than the status quo? Modernization theory, the theory of redistribution, and the culturalist approach all focus on state-level social structural changes or on historical legacies. However, in this article, we bring international factors into the discussion and suggest that the "democratic demonstration effect" of global democracies, in addition to the two mechanisms of "coercion" and "competition", is the key reason behind the strengthening of the wishes of the masses in autocracies to "imitate" democracies. Furthermore, due to greater "soft power" and successful "public diplomacy", we believe that democratic superpowers, as well as democracies in neighbouring states, will have a greater chance to stimulate the aspirations for democracy of the citizens in authoritarian countries through their own democratic practices. At the same time, however, we also believe that patriotism and nationalism will weaken the "democracy demonstration effect" on popular support for democracy. To illustrate our theory and test our hypothesis, we take Mainland China, the United States, and Taiwan as cases of authoritarian regimes, democratic powers, and democratic neighbours, and analyze three waves of public opinion data conducted in Mainland China in 2011, 2015, and 2019. We show that differences in democratic quality assessment between Mainland China and its democratic counterparts significantly raises people's liberal and democratic values, and reduces their preference for one-party regimes. In addition, we have found that the patriotic and nationalistic sentiments of the Chinese people tends to neutralize the demonstration effects of the United States and Taiwan on popular support for democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of "Chinese nation" has a close relationship with the rise, development and upsurge of modern Chinese nationalism from its proposition to establishment, and to universal identification among people of all ethnic groups. The period of the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic of China was the formation stage of modern Chinese nationalism and also the stage of the proposition and initial usage of the concept of "Chinese nation": Modern Chinese nationalism developed around the period of the May 4th Movement. Under the impetus of the establishment of national self-determination theory, especially the rise of a national self-determination movement, the concept of "Chinese nation" was accepted and adopted by more and more people and finally established and formed. After the September 18th Incident, especially after the North China Incident and the July 7th Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the worsening national crisis promoted the upsurge of modern Chinese nationalism, and this upsurge made the concept of "Chinese nation" more widely and deeply disseminated and accepted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employing national identity theories and survey data in Taiwan, this article explains national identity shift in Taiwan. Descriptively we find that most Taiwanese people reject being called ‘Chinese’ (zhongguoren) when asked about their national identity. However, they do not deny their ethnic and cultural Chinese identity. What they object to is being called Chinese nationals, especially this China which is internationally recognized as the People’s Republic of China. In other words, most Taiwanese people do not identify themselves with the mainland Chinese state even though they still associate themselves with the Chinese nation. It is also noted that there is no consensus with regard to national identity in Taiwan, since close to one third of the population still do not object to be called zhongguoren. The author’s analytical findings further confirm that external sovereignty-related factors are related to the Taiwanese national identity shift. Specifically, a changed state boundary, separation desire from mainland China, and recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, not the distinctive cultural reconstruction inside Taiwan, contribute to the national identity shift in Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author focuses on how China viewed Taiwan and the people of Taiwan between 1931, the year Japan invaded Manchuria, and 1941, the year the U.S. entered World War II. Some of the subjects considered include nationalism, Chinese identity, Chinese political thought, and the ideology of nation-building and cultural identity. An overview of the historiography of competing Chinese and Taiwanese national identity exemplified in the writings of historians Emma Jinhua Teng, Alan M. Wachman, and Steven E. Phillips, is presented.

The article tries to prove how SARS has exceeded mere health and humanitarian levels from the viewpoint of different political entities among the Chinese population. Examining the "SARS Diplomacy" between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China/Taiwan--that is, how each side of the Strait spoke to one another during the epidemic crisis--may enable us to gauge the potential for the formation of the Chinese orbit in the era of globalization. The greatest threat posed to the Chinese people from SARS Diplomacy is the stirred up populist sentiments on both sides of the Strait, with the agenda to hold a "preventive referendum" against the mainland threat on one side, and the escalated nationalism with an increasing level of distrust toward Taiwan on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]