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Copyright of Analyses de Population & Avenir is the property of Population & Avenir and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Moscow is actively using the conflict in Ukraine to advance its vision of a different international order. This vision emphasises a world fragmented into spheres of influence centred on a handful of 'civilisational states' embodying distinct political cultures not necessarily compatible with liberalism and democracy. Russia uses its own sphere of influence in Eurasia as the incubator of an alternative set of norms and institutions that it seeks to socialise globally. This Russian vision appeals to other revisionist powers, notably China and Iran, which support Russia's war in Ukraine largely out of a desire to diminish US influence and consolidate their own regional spheres. Elements of it also appeal across the Global South, now a key arena for competition over the future global order. The outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine is perhaps the most important determinant of what the coming world order will look like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As multi-polarity grows, there are some who see this as a new stage of non-alignment, and even the creation of an anti-imperialist bloc. But the economic and political elites of the Global South are too deeply tied to transnational capitalism to be truly independent. Instead, multi-polarity is a struggle within global capitalism for a larger share of markets, profits and political power. China has become the main proponent of a new world order based on 'win-win' relationships. But a 'common destiny for mankind' within global capitalism covers over the fundamental reality of capitalist competition and exploitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The fluctuations caused by the depreciation of the dollar along with the imposition of sanctions against countries using the power of the dollar have caused other countries to seek to reduce dependence on the dollar--a process known as de-dollarization. This is especially important for the People's Republic of China for two reasons: on the one hand, to counter the hegemony of the US dollar in international exchanges and transactions, and on the other hand, to deal with the increasing energy security risks due to sanctions on China's oil suppliers. The purpose of this study is to examine China's actions towards de-dollarization through the establishment of the trans-regional BRICS organization and then to analyze the reasons behind Saudi Arabia's interest in joining this organization. Method: The research method is trend analysis using time series and seeks to answer the question: What impact does BRICS membership have on the de-dollarization of trade between China and Saudi Arabia? The initial answer to the research question, which is the research hypothesis, is: the mechanisms designed in the BRICS by China will have a significant potential for Saudi Arabia to reduce dependence on the dollar. Results and Discussion: Findings indicate that China has become the most important partner of Saudi oil exports during the period under review . In contrast, the consequences of sanctions against Iran and Russia have caused Saudi Arabia to try to reduce its dependence on the dollar. The processes within BRICS, especially trading in yuan on par with gold, have created the necessary capacity for Saudi Arabia to reduce its dependence on the dollar. At the same time, it should be noted that the measures taken by Saudi Arabia to expand cooperation with China are overshadowed by its relationship with the United States. Since Saudi Arabia is deeply integrated into the US-led economic and security framework, it cannot easily reduce its dependence on the dollar. Additionally, There is no intention at this time to abandon currency ties or end the defense partnership with the United States. For this reason, Saudi Arabia's long-term strategy is to develop the ability to conduct transactions in both the dollarized and de-dollarized regions, and to reduce its dependence on the United States while maintaining its position in the world energy distribution. Conclusions: The most important point about the process of de-dollarization and the efforts of organizations like BRICS, led by China, to counter the hegemony of the dollar is that de-dollarization has never meant abandoning the dollar. Instead, it is an attempt to diversify countries' currency reserves and increase the maneuverability of central banks in international exchanges and transactions. This is why China remains one of the largest buyers of US Treasury bonds, despite its significant efforts to reduce the scope of the US dollar's power in international exchanges. In parallel, although it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will be able to abandon the US dollar in the short and even medium term, it is nevertheless developing a broader financial instrument to reduce its dependence. Saudi Arabia has taken important steps such as designing a central bank digital currency, which plays an important role in the exchanges of BRICS members. Despite being in their early stages, central bank digital currencies appear to be a promising new tool to reduce the dependence of the dollar on regional and trans-regional cross-border transactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la Unión Europea recordaban en la reunión de principios de octubre de 2023 en Kiev, que Rusia es una amenaza existencial y que la victoria de la guerra depende de la cooperación con Europa. Mientras que los antiguos integrantes del bloque soviético perciben la amenaza rusa como inmediata y existencial, los países mediterráneos, sienten que su foco inmediato de atención está en la Frontera Sur y en el llamado Sur Global. La necesidad de cambiar el enfoque de la Unión Europea hacia los países en desarrollo es fundamental para la supervivencia, como actor geopolítico, de una Europa que no logra superar la visión eurocéntrica y occidental del mundo, y que sigue considerando el reordenamiento global en curso como complicado, pero no imposible de manejar.

As an international issue entangled with geopolitical tensions, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has had significant media coverage in China and is reflected in the battle for global media supported by different powers. This study analyses the domestic context of news production to examine how this ongoing conflict is portrayed by leading news media in China with a special focus on the 'domestication' effect in global journalism, reflecting diverse frames in different countries. News coverage was selected from February 2022 to March 2023 from the online databases of Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily and China Daily. By employing the framing analysis, this study discusses the strategies used by the Chinese media in domesticating the global news for the audiences in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Este artículo identifica y explica los factores fundamentales del declive relativo de la hegemonía de los Estados Unidos de América en el sistema internacional de Estados: la agudización de las contradicciones inherentes del sistema capitalista; la polarización de su política doméstica; la pérdida de confianza en su gobierno; el decrecimiento económico; la pérdida de cuotas de influencia, incluido por el ascenso de potencias emergentes, como China, o de bloques como el BRICS; el rechazo abrumador al orden internacional actual y los intentos por contrarrestar la hegemonía del dólar. Se ejemplifican las áreas en las que se evidencia la disminución del poderío estadounidense. Se analiza como su impacto más visible, el ascenso de China en la región de América Latina y el Caribe. A modo de conclusión queda recogido que el declive relativo de la hegemonía de EE.UU. no significa que esta ha llegado a su fin. El ascenso de China y los BRICS como nuevos actores emergentes no amenaza la hegemonía de EE.UU. en la región. De lo que se trata, a largo plazo, es de un cambio más acentuado en la correlación internacional de fuerzas, que se expresará en una nueva distribución del poder en el hemisferio occidental.

The article offers an overview of China’s national cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions launched in July 2021. Although generally in line with the design of similar systems (e.g., EU ETS) at their early stages (focus on coal- and gasfired power plants, free allocation of allowances), China’s ETS features a few distinctions. Notably, regulations provide for an increase in allocated allowances in certain cases and a fixed fine on installations emitting in excess of 120% of their allowance, while gas-fired plants are not sanctioned at all. The article presents the bottom-up allowance calculation method used by the regulator for various types of installations and engages with the China Certified Emission Reductions scheme, suspended in 2017 and expected to be relaunched in the near future – if with a limited industry scope covering forestry, renewable energy and methane utilization projects. The prospects of China launching an international carbon exchange and granting access to foreign buyers and sellers are also discussed.

As a platform of cooperation among its member states, questions of whether or how the BRICS alliance can influence and shape the global governance system and improve their internal governance systems have often been raised. In the process of exploring the role that the law can play in this context, comparative studies on the laws of the BRICS member states, particularly in the defined areas of cooperation, are an important perspective to be addressed in order to be able to contribute to the improvement of their internal governance systems. However, much work remains to be done on this perspective. This article partially fills this gap by conducting a comparative study related to one of the BRICS areas of cooperation – sustainable development – between two of its members: China and Brazil. Specifically, it compares how both states, as stakeholders, use the legal regime of liability for environmental infractions to influence the green governance of companies. The article, therefore, uses comparative legal methodology, using as its objects of research relevant legal provisions on legal liability for environmental infractions gathered from the legal systems of China and Brazil. The adoption of strict civil liability, liability for environmental damages per se and the extension of criminal liability to legal persons are among the similarities found. As for the differences, it finds that, as a principle, Chinese law shields directors and senior officers from liability toward third parties, while Brazilian law fully extends such liability to these entities; additionally, in the Chinese legal system, the burden of disproving causality between the harm and the activity that caused it falls upon the actor, while the Brazilian legal system adopts a double-standard approach for collective suits and individual suits; and finally, the Chinese law imposes a legal obligation to adopt what, in effect, is close to a corporate environmental management system, while the Brazilian legal system lacks a similar mandate.

This paper analyses one of the most significant attempts since 1944 to rebalance the global powerbase in favour of emerging market economies. In January 2024, the BRICS group of emerging market economies undertook in the words of the Chinese President an 'historic' expansion and admitted five new member countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Adopting a revisionist approach, the new 'BRICS+' grouping seeks a more representative and fairer international order acting as a counterweight to Western economic and political dominance. The paper highlights that while enlargement has expanded the BRICS economic power and geostrategic reach, the BRICS face a number of domestic and geopolitical challenges, which will limit both deeper integration and ultimately the group's ability to shift the balance of global power in their favour. Ultimately, the expanded BRICS are economically strong(er), yet geopolitically weak(er). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article summarises the characteristics of the current platform for BRICS scientific research and cooperation in the Arctic. The BRICS countries’ activities for the development of the Arctic region are analysed. The Arctic cooperation platform is explored through an analysis of official documents, a review of ongoing official events. The BRICS countries are implementing relevant joint projects to develop and explore the Arctic, on the one hand realising their own needs, and on the other using the specific advantages of their economic systems. From time to time, they organise and hold multilateral meetings and conferences. However, most cooperation takes place in a bilateral format. It is based on the organisation of conferences, cooperation between research institutes and joint training. This helps the BRICS countries to expand their influence in the Arctic. Based on an analysis of the identified materials, including projects developed to date but not yet implemented, the author seeks to summarise the main characteristics and features of BRICS Arctic cooperation and to identify its strengths and weaknesses. The conclusions of the paper present relevant proposals for improving the effectiveness of the BRICS countries’ joint work on the Arctic agenda in the medium term.

One of the areas of cooperation among the BRICS countries is tackling the misuse of information and communication technologies for criminal activities. Each year, the number of cybercrimes continues to grow. Furthermore, the criminal regulation of cybercrimes in each country differs. This article aims to identify the features of criminal liability for cybercrimes in the BRICS countries and offer potential solutions for developing joint legislation initiatives. The primary focus of this discussion is on cybercrime provisions that can be found in the legal acts of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa. The main finding of this research is that the criminal law of each country contains different corpus delicti for dealing with crimes committed in cyberspace. There are also differing conceptions of what constitutes cybercrime. The author proposes the enactment of a common document for the BRICS countries that would contain a shared understanding of cybercrimes as well as the various types of cybercrimes. It is possible to divide cybercrimes into two categories: special cybercrimes committed in the field of computer information and general criminal cybercrimes executed using information technology to commit any other common criminal offences. The results of this research can be used to study the problems of criminal responsibility for cybercrimes in the BRICS countries as well as analyze the ways in which the rules under consideration are actually applied in practice.

This paper will put forward a number of economic considerations raised by the Russia-Ukraine conflict with the external strong participation, on the side of the latter, of the United States and its NATO allies. We begin with some observations regarding the United States, followed by the evaluation of the European context. The essay ends with a discussion of Eurasia, Russia included, in the framework of the dynamics opened up by the BRICS countries. Points of view rather than conclusions are offered, because the future cannot be predicted in any meaningful way.

In the BRICS Member States, serious attention is paid to Information Technology development in terms of both technology and law. These countries are at the forefront in the development of the digital economy and digital innovations. Cloud storage software is an important element in this sector and is intensively applied in civil law transactions. The processes of approval, storage and sorting of documents are being automated on the basis of the relevant computer programs. This helps companies and government agencies to systemize their operations. At present, the most pressing issues are those related to copyright and copyright holders of computer programs since software code may be copied, even illegally or unconscientiously, and used as the basis for another software product. Cloud storage software is copyright-protected, but, depending on the scope of its use, additional patent protection may be required. Given the rapid development of the IT sector, a software product may be one of the components in an invention subject to patenting. The article focuses on the relationship between copyright and patent protection of software and offers a comparison of the approaches taken by the BRICS countries. Approaches taken by Germany as a European Union Member State and the United States of America are shown in the all-out comparison. The article also analyzes the views of academics on the relationship between copyright and patent protection of software.

Industrial cooperation among BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has been mostly lacking to date, exacerbated by the absence of a memorandum of understanding or agreement on the subject. However, there have been discussions about forming an industrial intra-venture. According to the records of ministerial meetings, only China expressed an interest in industrial cooperation because it possesses the capability, including industrial technology, productive capital, and human resources, to establish a joint venture for manufacturing activities. Russia and India also possess these skills, but they lack the ability to lead or force member states to form an industrial cooperation. In short, the BRICS member states lack considerable industrial collaboration, either bilaterally or through multilateral accords. In contrast, ASEAN maintains an active industrial cooperation among its member states, despite the fact that some of their industrial ventures have failed due to a lack of technical know-how and technological development capacities, as well as productive and human capital. Nonetheless, investment amongst ASEAN countries has expanded due to the development of ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO). One of the primary components of industrial cooperation is cross-border, or intra-regional, investment. This article examines inward and outward investments among the BRICS member states, the feasibility of industrial collaboration among them, and China’s role in fostering this cooperation. ASEAN member states’ industrial cooperation experiences will be explored to determine what lessons BRICS can learn from ASEAN.

Brazil's evolution as a regional emerging power began under Lula's leadership and declined with Rousseff's dismissal and the domestic political, economic, and leadership crisis that led to its loss of regional relevance, the deterioration of its leadership in South America, and its failure to achieve a strategic international alliance of middle powers. This decline was expressed on the international level in the core-periphery bond developed with China within BRICS and on the level of South America in the loss of relevance of the regional governance institutions Lula once promoted. La evolución de Brasil como potencia emergente regional empezó bajo el gobierno de Lula y declinó con la destitución de Rousseff y la externalización de la crisis política, económica y de liderazgo interna y la consiguiente pérdida de relevancia regional, el deterioro de su liderazgo en Sudamérica y el fracaso de objetivos en su alianza internacional de potencias medias. Las manifestaciones de la declinación a nivel internacional se expresan en el vínculo de carácter centro-periferia desarrollado con China al interior de BRICS y a nivel sudamericano en la pérdida de relevancia de las instituciones de gobernabilidad regional que Lula había impulsado. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China actively participated in the BRICS initiative in recent years. China uses the BRICS membership to forge political-economic power and present its dissatisfaction with the distribution of power in international politics. This paper examines the process of China-led BRICS operation to redistribute power under certain conditions. The authors use a historical method and descriptive-analytical approach based on library resources to investigate the roots and logic of China's strategy in initiatives such as the BRICS in a US-dominated world. The findings show that China has pursued a Grand-pattern of balancing at the domestic and foreign levels; therefore, active participation in initiatives such as BRICS represents an aspect of external balance of the Chinese grand pattern To redistribute power through a soft balance strategy. The authors further identify the major soft balancing tactics that China employs through the BRICS, including Economic diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to build up a wielding core role in Asia-Pacific region, China with a high intention and purpose tries to approach her surrounding neighboring nations for closer economic alliance as well as provides an opportunity of "South-South cooperation" to gain geographic "win-win" performance and more amicable settlement. It further depicts that China plays an indispensable and irreplaceable role in regional institutionalized construction, which can be considered as the Chinese way for strategic application. Basically, there are three major Chinese approaches of development strategy utilized on regional economic activities in order to accelerate and ascend China's role on regional and trans-regional international organizations. Those are: (1) to play a role of promoter as booster/accelerator, such as for BRICS and RCEP; (2) to manage a role of active participator as communicator/supporter, such as for APEC and G20, and (3) to act a role of initiator as creator and chieftain, such as for OBORI, SCO, and BAF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compare China’s performance to the performances of Brazil, India, and South Africa over the 1985-2011 period. We look into several areas including patent applications by residents, scientific and technical journal articles, final consumption expenditure, exports, household consumption, government consumption, gross capital formation, gross domestic savings, age dependency ratio, foreign direct investment, energy production, and domestic credit to private sector. We find that, out of the twelve measures that we examine, China’s annual percentage improvement was significantly better than the other three BRICS countries in only three measures. These are patent applications by residents, scientific and technical journal articles, and energy production. These findings indicate that science and innovation had been very important for China’s development. Also, the country’s efforts in energy production including its partnerships in other countries had been key to its economic development.

Background: The leading emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) are increasingly shaping the landscape of the global health sector demand and supply for medical goods and services. BRICS' share of global health spending and future projections will play a prominent role during the 2020s. The purpose of the current research was to examine the decades-long underlying historical trends in BRICS countries' health spending and explore these data as the grounds for reliable forecasting of their health expenditures up to 2030. Methods: BRICS' health spending data spanning 1995–2017 were extracted from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) Financing Global Health 2019 database. Total health expenditure, government, prepaid private and out-of-pocket spending per capita and gross domestic product (GDP) share of total health spending were forecasted for 2018–2030. Autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models were used to obtain future projections based on time series analysis. Results: Per capita health spending in 2030 is projected to be as follows: Brazil, $1767 (95% prediction interval [PI] 1615, 1977); Russia, $1933 (95% PI 1549, 2317); India, $468 (95% PI 400.4, 535); China, $1707 (95% PI 1079, 2334); South Africa, $1379 (95% PI 755, 2004). Health spending as a percentage of GDP in 2030 is projected as follows: Brazil, 8.4% (95% PI 7.5, 9.4); Russia, 5.2% (95% PI 4.5, 5.9); India, 3.5% (95% PI 2.9%, 4.1%); China, 5.9% (95% PI 4.9, 7.0); South Africa, 10.4% (95% PI 5.5, 15.3). Conclusions: All BRICS countries show a long-term trend towards increasing their per capita spending in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). India and Russia are highly likely to maintain stable total health spending as a percentage of GDP until 2030. China, as a major driver of global economic growth, will be able to significantly expand its investment in the health sector across an array of indicators. Brazil is the only large nation whose health expenditure as a percentage of GDP is about to contract substantially during the third decade of the twenty-first century. The steepest curve of increased per capita spending until 2030 seems to be attributable to India, while Russia should achieve the highest values in absolute terms. Health policy implications of long-term trends in health spending indicate the need for health technology assessment dissemination among the BRICS ministries of health and national health insurance funds. Matters of cost-effective allocation of limited resources will remain a core challenge in 2030 as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering both the contrasting positions of the West and the East, as well as the increasingly complicated relationship between the US and China, which presents itself as an exponent of the emerging, multipolar or post-American world, this article aims to infer the meanings currently attributed to the concept of peaceful coexistence applied in China's foreign policy, how it has evolved, from the Sino-soviet dispute to present, and to what extend does this concept characterize China's policy towards Africa and the emerging states in general. The first part of the paper focuses on the Sino-Soviet dispute and the differences in the meanings attributed to the concept of peaceful coexistence, which, although foreign to the Western literature of international relations, still seems to constitute the central theme of the Chinese Communist Party, being present in most of the speeches and documents of foreign policy issued by the Chinese government. Moreover, I will analyze the extent to which China's involvement and relationship with the African states - and the other BRICS states - reflects the principles of the concept of peaceful coexistence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Historia Actual is the property of Asociacion de Historia Actual and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article contains an outline of evolution of so-called Russian return into Latin America. The author tries to analyze how Russian foreign policy towards the Latin American and Caribbean region over the last three decades pointing some its key features and trying to define existing obstacles for its implementation, and to make some conclusions about possible prospects for Russias position in the region facing new challenges. Based on a literature and media review and a survey of documents and available statistical data, as also on the analysis of official statements, the aim of this article is to contribute towards a more profound understanding of Russias policy in Latin America. The extension of the article doesnt permit to make a thorough research of all the details of Moscows return to the continent; however, the author will refer to Venezuelan case at the contemporary stage as one of the important issues for Russian policy. The crisis in Venezuela proves to be a test for Russia: is it able to maintain an influential actor in Latin America or not. To sum up, this case is important in the context of this article as it shows if Russian diplomacy in Latin America is really new or it is a re-edition of Soviet policy toward the region.

Analisando um panorama de mais de trezentas bienais internacionais de arte contemporânea em todo o globo alguns teóricos oferecem alternativas para entender o surgimento exponencial dessas megaexposições desde os anos 1990. Discuto, neste ensaio, as informações reunidas pelo periódico da Universidade de Zurique, OnCurating, face às proposições de classificação do historiador Anthony Gardner, para então sugerir que é preciso interpretar as bienais de arte com base em seus usos políticos, em vista dos recentes processos de globalização e do que o curador nigeriano Okwui Enwezor chamou de “vontade de globalidade”. Pretendo demonstrar que, ao se investigar as razões e os impactos das megaexposições de arte na contemporaneidade, os aspectos políticos que podem identificar cada uma delas devem ser apontados devido à genealogia ligada às relações internacionais. O argumento está apoiado inicialmente por quatro exemplos de bienais em diferentes partes do mundo, seguidos por um estudo sobre as edições de 2017 e 2019 da Bienal Internacional de Arte Contemporânea de Curitiba – duas exposições que homenagearam, respectivamente, a China e o grupo político BRICS. Por fim, concluo que os dois eventos realizados na capital paranaense foram pensados por seus organizadores como “agências de relações internacionais”, com propósito de favorecer a cooperação entre países no plano político e econômico, mas sobretudo de beneficiar a instituição promotora, ampliando tanto suas relações políticas quanto as diplomáticas, capazes de promover sua expansão espacial e financeira na busca por maior visibilidade global.

The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) were a landmark of the beginning of the 21st century and generated expectations of an alternative pole to the U.S-based world order. Although they have built different spaces for cooperation and common institutions in the last decade, the relationship among the BRICS countries is asymmetric, mainly due to China’s economic weight. This article aims to provide an overview of China’s investments in three other BRICS countries: Brazil, South Africa and India. Methodologically, we sought to show the main characteristics of Chinese investments by observing the following items: main companies and investment banks; investment volumes and main sectors; and participation of local government and private partner institutions. In addition, we have highlighted some programs and public policies that facilitate Chinese investment in each of these countries. Finally, we’ve tried to verify the existence or not of social, environmental and labor impacts that may be involved in these projects. In this sense, the article seeks to provide relevant aspects that allow us to identify similarities and differences in the economic relations of each of these countries with China. We present the synthesis of the results in the form of maps.

Relations with international multilateral institutions and regional organizations are an important issue affecting the prospects for the development of the BRICS cooperation mechanism (a group of countries from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Many large international organizations (economic groups / blocs) have more experience in establishing international cooperation, paying particular attention to relations with other multilateral institutions. Based on the application of this interactional format, international organizations integrate their results and decisions into global governance and the financial and economic system of the whole world.Such an approach can enhance international influence and recognition; increase the effectiveness of cooperation between member states of an organization. And as a platform for cooperation between developing countries, BRICS is an open international organization. There is currently no permanent establishment in BRICS (for example, an administrative apparatus or a functioning secretariat) for overall coordination. As expected, the space for expanding the powers and capabilities of the BRICS is quite large.Today, BRICS has created fundamental platforms for cooperation and dialogue — summit of BRICS leaders, permanent ministerial meetings, Business Forum, Business Council, BRICS Think Tank meeting, New Development Bank, BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, and the “BRICS+”. The “BRICS+” is considered one of the key ways to expand the international participation of the BRICS. Under the auspices of the “BRICS+”, leaders of countries and organizations of the region where the summit is held are invited to participate in the BRICS summit. This article discusses the theoretical foundations and practical significance of the efforts of the BRICS countries to expand the international influence of the organization through the development of “BRICS+”, “BRICS- Outreach” within the framework of creating an open platform for discussing the current international agenda and issues of regional socio-economic development, as well as for wider international recognition and prospects for the implementation of BRICS projects.

This article investigates a challenge that China will face in the coming years: the geoeconomic consequences of rebalancing its growth regime. On the demand side, Chinese investment and exports give room for consumption, reducing imports of capital goods and increasing imports of consumption goods. On the production side, manufacturing loses ground to services. Yet, each regime implies different streams of commercial and investment flows, and patterns of influence, cooperation, and partnership. Thus, the spatial distribution of international trade and FDI must change, modifying economic linkages between China and its partners, like BRICS, and their bargaining power in the world economy. This study evaluates the trajectory of Chinese imports of goods and FDIs from other BRICS countries. In terms of trade, we assess the competitiveness of each country’s exports in relation to Chinese output. Regarding FDI flows, we consider the sectoral distribution of investments carried out by the largest Multinational Corporations (MNCs) from BRICS to assess likely changes. Our research suggests that the impacts of rebalancing on each BRICS country are mostly negative and asymmetrical, depending on the position of the latter in the international division of labor, shaped by the very geoeconomic influence of China.

The article is devoted to the study of Russian-Chinese relations at the present stage. The relations under consideration are dynamic, which is expressed in regular contacts at the highest level, cooperation in the international arena, including within the framework of international and regional organizations, trade and economic, humanitarian relations, common projects in the fi eld of military cooperation, etc. In this regard, the study and analysis of external and internal factors that contributed to the emergence, development, cooling, resumption and, ultimately, the formation of strategic partnership relations are important for the possible consideration of the Russian Federation in building further foreign policy relations with China and preventing previous mistakes.The authors studied and analyzed the defi ning directions and features of Russian-Chinese foreign policy relations, both in the historical context and at the present stage of development. In particular, the main periods in the development of bilateral relations are identifi ed; the factors that infl uenced the change of foreign policy strategies of the Russian Federation and the people's Republic of China are analyzed; the author reveals the nature of Russian-Chinese cooperation at the present stage, characterizes its role and importance both for regional policy and in the light of ongoing international processes, including in the fi eld of international security; identifi es possible risks that may adversely affect the nature of foreign policy cooperation between Russia and China.In conclusion, an attempt was made to formulate a possible forecast for the development of Russian-Chinese foreign policy relations, taking into account the current geopolitical situation in the world, as well as taking into account factors that can lead to contradictions between the two countries.

The Global South nations and their statehoods have presented a driving force of economic and social development through most of the written history of humankind. China and India have been traditionally accounted as the economic powerhouses of the past. In recent decades, we have witnessed reestablishment of the traditional world economic structure as per Agnus Maddison Project data. These profound changes have led to accelerated real GDP growth across many LMICs and emerging countries of the Global South. This evolution had a profound impact on an evolving health financing landscape. This review revealed hidden patterns and explained the driving forces behind the political economy of health spending in these vast world regions. The medical device and pharmaceutical industry play a crucial role in addressing the unmet medical needs of rising middle class citizens across Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Domestic manufacturing has only been partially meeting this ever rising demand for medical services and medicines. The rest was complemented by the participation of multinational pharmaceutical industry, whose focus on investment into East Asia and ASEAN nations remains part of long-term market access strategies. Understanding of the past remains essential for the development of successful health strategies for the present. Political economy has been driving the evolution of health financing landscape since the establishment of early modern health systems in these countries. Fiscal gaps these governments face in diverse ways might be partially overcome with the spreading of cost-effectiveness based decision-making and health technology assessment capacities. The considerable remaining challenges ranging from insufficient reimbursement rates, large out-of-pocket spending, and lengthy lag in the introduction of cutting-edge technologies such as monoclonal antibodies, biosimilars, or targeted oncology agents, might be partially resolved only in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the pattern of engagement by China and India in terms of the G20 and BRICS. Both countries are torn between a self-identity as status-seeking 'rising' powers and as champions of solidarity with other countries of the Global South. In conceptual terms, primary reference is made to the notion of ambivalence inherent in the fundamental co-existence of the privileging of these two different identities. That these contrasting mindsets are held in tandem is highly salient for an examination of foreign policy in comparative perspective. Privileging ambivalence is different from ambiguity. Ambiguity conveys a lack of clarity, rather than the persistence of a dualistic mindset central to ambivalence. Although highlighting generalised commonalities, the means of managing ambivalence adopted by China and India are markedly differentiated. As illustrated by the pattern of engagement with the G20 and BRICS, what separates China from India is China's ability make up its mind in an instrumental manner if and when needed. By way of contrast, the projection of Indian foreign policy on the G20 and the BRICS highlights a more fundamental contradiction between the exceptionalistic and universalistic sides of self-identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Durante el gobierno de Donald Trump, el otrora incuestionado liderazgo de Estados Unidos en el sistema internacional se ha desdibujado. La capacidad de ee. uu. para encabezar los procesos de toma de decisio-nes acerca de los asuntos más relevantes de la agenda global ha decaído en medio de una crisis del multilateralismo que la administración Trump ha profundizado. El contexto de pandemia ha acentuado los interrogantes sobre la idoneidad de la institucionalidad creada por la Carta del Atlántico y la Confe rencia de Bretton Woods. Estos factores han contribuido a la consolidación de potencias emergentes que reclaman un creciente protagonismo en la conducción del sistema internacional. Una de ellas es China, que constituye un gran desafío para la hegemonía de ee. uu. por cuenta de su avasallante crecimiento económico y su poderío comercial a nivel global. En el marco de su estrategia de posicionamiento, Beijing ha establecido alianzas políticas y económicas con Estados de diferentes regiones del Sur Global a través de plataformas de integración como los Brics. En este artículo se analizan los procesos de transformación del sistema internacional suscitados por la pandemia, y se explica en qué medida constituyen oportunidades para la consolidación del liderazgo de los Brics (con énfasis en China). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]