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The impact of personal risk caused by controlling shareholders' equity pledges on the company's debt policy is an issue worth exploring. Using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2020, this paper studies the impact of ultimate owner equity pledges on firm debt size and debt maturity structure and explores the mechanism of ultimate owner personal leverage on firms. The results show that the increase in ultimate owner stock pledges leads to higher financial leverage and a longer debtmaturity structure for the company. In addition, the study reveals that the high personal leverage of the ultimate owner of the pledged equity is an influential mechanism driving the transfer of personal risk to the firm. In particular, even if a company's actual debt ratio is higher than its target debt ratio, equity pledges can prompt listed companies to increase their debt ratios and debt maturities, causing them to take on excessive debt risk and transfer the risk to creditors. It follows that the tunneling effect is a driving force of equity pledging and corporate debt policies. These results remain robust after the robustness test and endogenous test. The conclusions of this paper not only emphasize the impact of shareholders' personal risk on the firm but also provide a reference for investors' perception of firm risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research applies the dynamic slack-based measure (DSBM) model to evaluate the dynamic efficiency of manufacturing companies in the long run and uses the Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) model to analyze the effect of corporate governance on their overall efficiency and the efficiency of each input factor. We find the following main results. First, overall efficiency of the manufacturing industry listed companies is low. 2) Debt efficiency is lower than the efficiency of shareholders' equity and exhibits a downward trend. 3) Labor efficiency is the lowest among all inputs. 4) The efficiency of the medicine and bio-products industry is the highest, while the efficiency of the paper and printing industry (which causes serious pollution) is the lowest. 5) Companies with low export intensity and high capital intensity are the most efficient, while companies with high export intensity and low capital intensity are the least efficient. 6) Ownership concentration and efficiency have a significantly positive U-shape relationship. 7) Board size and efficiency have a significantly inverted U-shape relationship. 8) An actual controller with a state-owned nature has a significantly negative impact on efficiency. 9) Executive compensation, equity incentive, and institutional ownership have a significantly positive impact on efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Listed companies with a higher separation of two rights have less risk of control transfer of the ultimate controlling shareholder. The ultimate controlling shareholder's equity pledge ratio plays a remarkable mediating role in this process. At different pledge rates, the ultimate controlling shareholder's equity pledge exhibits an 'encroachment' or 'incentive' effect on corporate governance, respectively, resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship between equity pledge rate and the risk of control transfer. Company size has a heterogeneous effect on the risk of control transfer, while shareholding concentration has heterogeneous and single threshold impacts on this risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the source of stockholder gains in going private transactions. We find support for the hypothesis advanced by Jensen that a major source of these gains is the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash flow. Using a sample of 263 going private transactions from 1980 through 1987, our results indicate a significant relationship between undistributed cash flow and a firm's decision to go private. In addition, we find that premiums paid to stockholders are significantly related to undistributed cash flow. These results are especially strong for firms that went private between 1984 and 1987 and also for firms whose managers owned relatively little equity before the going private transaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sequential exchange opportunities are valued using the techniques of modern option-pricing theory. The vehicle for analysis is the concept of a compound exchange option. This security is shown to exist implicitly in several contractual settings. A valuation formula for this option is derived. The formula is shown to generalize much previous work in option pricing. Several applications of the formula are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a large sample of listed Chinese companies, we investigate how the equity ownership of business group insiders affects subsidiary cash holdings. We find that ownership by the largest shareholders and senior managers in the listed parent firm is negatively related to its subsidiaries’ cash holdings, whereas there is a positive relationship with minority equity in subsidiaries. We also find that the market places a more significant value discount on listed firms whose cash holdings are more located in the affiliated subsidiaries. Our evidence demonstrates how cash policy inside business groups is influenced by insider ownership, and it reveals to what extent cash allocated in subsidiaries may suffer from losses in efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using the data on related-party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their controlling shareholders in 2005, this article empirically examines the characteristics of related-party transactions and their impact on the firms’ performance. The results show that the companies that completed related-party transactions with their large shareholders possess a higher concentration of ownership structure and lower P/E ratios, and their performance is significantly improved after these transactions. The current related-party transaction is also not used to achieve the necessary requirements for refinancing and the tunneling behavior of large shareholders follows a significant declining trend. Further regression analysis shows that the size of related-party transactions is positively correlated with the large shareholders’ equity ratio, and is negatively related to the P/E ratio and the performance of listed companies prior to the transactions. Finally, the research reveals that Chinese listed company performance has a significant positive correlation with the size of related-party transactions and the large shareholders’ equity ratio. Since China launched the split share structure reform (SSSR) in 2005, we have attributed all the above results to the change in the environment caused by the SSSR and concluded that large shareholders prop up a listed company through related-party transactions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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The article offers information on the ability of Brazilian companies to distribute earnings to their shareholders in the form of dividends based on interest on net equity and mentions the deductible of amounts for corporate income tax and social contribution on net profits.

We analyse the changes in ownership concentration in firms included in two mass privatisation programmes in Poland and the Czech Republic. We find that despite important differences in the design of the two privatisation schemes and despite different quality of regulatory environments, the ownership structure emerging 4–5 years after the initial distribution of assets is remarkably similar in the two countries. Ownership concentration defined as the share of the largest equity holder has significantly increased. Exploring the determinants of ownership concentration, we check whether such revealed preference for higher participation in firm equity does not hide different motivations and behaviour of investors. Our results reveal interesting differences between the two countries: in the Czech Republic the increase in ownership concentration was less likely in poorly performing firms, while in Poland the quality of past performance did not affect investors' willingness to increase their holdings. This contrasting result may reflect the difference in the quality of laws and regulations in Poland and in the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic, where tunnelling was a common practice in the period covered by our study, shareholders increasing their stakes in a company could have been motivated by the objective of extracting value rather than by the willingness to impose a specific direction on the way the firm is managed. This might explain why they prefer to increase their control in those companies which perform well rather than those that perform poorly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The stock companies is the most complex and evolved form of company, able to gather the greatest funds and act in the most important areas of activity. Because of the important contribution to the constitution of registered capital and blurring the personal qualities of the stockholders, the stock is also known as joint stock company. This type of company is dedicated to the achievement of great business with great funds. The company is conceived in such a manner as to be able to drain the modest fund contributions for developing great funds, needed for realizing great investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors propose a chain of effects framework for understanding how customer lifetime value (CLV) affects shareholder value (SHV). In the chain of effects framework, the authors propose that CLV serves as an intermediary in the relationship between firm actions and SHV. They also introduce the notion of the ‘prescient’ value of CLV called CLV-P, which captures the impact on CLV from future modifications to a firm's business model as well as competitive reactions. Finally, they identify econometric and data-related challenges in establishing the link, which suggest directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using annual data from Chile since the beginning of the eighties, we show that an increase in the corporate tax reduces firm's investment. However the impact differs across firm size. In small and medium sized firms, investment as a fraction of the capital stock declines between 0.5% and 1.6% while on large corporations the impact is much less significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constructed portfolios according to the growth rates and their stability of firm's total stockholders' equity per share and net income per share, using all the firms' information of Shanghai A-share market, We found that the market exhibits some overreaction to the growth rate of firm's net income per share, and isn't sensitive to the stability of firm's growth rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We focus on how government roles moderate the impact of economic performance on sustainable operations in manufacturers. • Shareholders' equity and profitability improve sustainable operations, while the impact of R&D input is negative. • State-holding plays a significant positive moderating role, while such role of fiscal subsidy is minor. • Higher state-holding has a stronger moderating role, but fiscal subsidy at different levels does not show this disparity. • We suggest improving the role of government incentive for supporting firms' sustainability strategies. Following 3289 firm-year observations of China's manufacturing firms given their significant impacts on climate change, substantial contributions to industrial prosperity, and distinctive governance mode, we investigate the moderation effect of government involvement in linking firms' economic performance and sustainable operations. We clarify the role of government involvement with elements of government stake (state-holding) and government incentive (fiscal subsidy), together with economic performance indicators divided into shareholder equity, R&D intensity, and profitability. Our empirical findings witness that both shareholder equity and profitability significantly improve sustainable operations, while R&D intensity has a significantly negative effect on sustainable operations. State-holding exercises a significant moderation effect between economic performance and sustainable operations, while the positive moderation effect of fiscal subsidy is minor. Moreover, there is a difference in the roles of high and low state-holding with higher state-holding having a stronger moderation effect, while fiscal subsidy at different levels does not generate such difference. Overall, our findings agree with the positive role of state-holding in linking economic and sustainability outcomes, while further analysis is required to improve the role of government incentive for supporting manufacturers' sustainability strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]