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The origin and purpose of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution seem shrouded in secrecy. This paper places Article 9 in the context of the UN Charter and peace constitutions which were emerging globally that aimed to limit state sovereignty in favor of international organization and the renunciation of war in the aftermath of WWII (Schlichtmann 2009b). It is a provision the Japanese people have upheld for more than seventy years. With the gradual return of block confrontation during the 1990s and the revival of the 'balance of power' concept, however, Japan came under pressure to change its Constitution and participate in military defense alliances. This has led to a noticeable shift in policy. Although Shidehara Kijūrō (1872–1951) had been well-known and respected for his peace diplomacy as foreign minister during the interwar period, it soon became expedient to deny him any direct involvement in the drafting of Article 9 when he was Prime Minister after the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper investigates the evolving defense cooperation between India and Japan in the context of the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly considering China's rise. The existing literature recognizes China's increasing influence as a significant factor in India-Japanese security cooperation, but tends to overlook the dynamics behind India's shifting stance. The study reveals that India initially hesitated to actively engage in anti-China security cooperation with Japan until the mid-2010s, but later adopted a more proactive partnership. An analysis of policy documents, political speeches, and government records attributes India's initial reluctance to its commitment to non-alignment and strategic autonomy, its desire to balance relations with both China and Japan, and its domestic political priorities favoring economic development over military expansion or strategic alliances. However, growing concerns over China's assertiveness, military modernization, a change in political leadership, and the Quad's development as a regional security platform have prompted India's attitude shift. The research's recommendations not only offer a roadmap for India, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific countries with deep economic ties to China, but also help combat China's military threats to contribute to regional stability and security, address common challenges, and foster a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has emerged as a critical strategic actor in East Asia amidst intensifying US-China structural competition since 2010. Southeast Asia/ASEAN is an important dimension of Japan's foreign policy expansion. This paper argues that Japan's foreign policy is driven by the aim of becoming an alternative source of strategic stability in Southeast Asia/ASEAN as opposed to the United States and China. This is explained by analysing Japan's foreign policy in regional balance of power and ASEAN-led multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since in the early seventies after the Japanese economy had been rebuilt from the destruction of WWII and had become competitive based on preeminent manufacturing and infrastructure, high technological advancement, networked production and distribution networks, Japan has been considered the leading power base in Asia from the early 1970’s. After an initial competitive phase with the US, Japan and the U.S. have maintained a long standing economic and political relationship. However, the continued outsourcing of US manufacturing to low cost countries, specifically to China, an evolving balance of power can be clearly observed since China’s opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free-market reforms in 1979. This article examines the economic developments over the last two decades (2000-2019), coincident with China’s joining the World Trade Organization (as well as the dot.com bubble and the 2008 Recession) and its rise in economic and political might to determine how Japan’s role may develop in the future. The article begins with an examination of political power theory and moves to specific economic indicators over the time period in question (2000-2019) as well as drawing on current political and economic developments from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the lackluster Japanese economic growth and development and increase in debt/GDP. The text contrasts the US theoretical model (Kindleberger, Krasner & Gilpin), which represents a field balanced by hegemonic stability, as opposed to the UK model (Cohen, Strange) which is based more on a framework of cooperation and a more theoretical examination of power. It is posited that national power has increasingly ceded to global corporate power (Stopford, Henley, Strange). Against this theoretical background the economic indicators of the region are examined from 2000-2019. The analysis carried out in the study is based on several research methods: a critical analysis of the literature, a descriptive method, and a method of inference based on statistical data. Trade and FDI flows in the region are presented and examined to make assumptions on the waxing or waning influence of the players. It was found that there is neither specific evidence that Japan will recede in relative importance nor garner increased relevance. Finally, there is an ensuing discussion of geopolitical factor which are analyzed within the current developmental context, which have the potential to greatly influence future economic and political power in the region, and beyond. Specific policy measures are beyond the scope of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural realists might reasonably predict that foreign policy elites in countries like Japan and Australia would view China's economic and military rise as a potential threat and seek to balance against it. However, the actual policy behaviour of Japanese and Australian policy elites has been quite complex—pushing forward at times, hesitating at others and generally uncertain if an explicit counter-coalition against China through bilateral security cooperation is the right policy path. Why is this? This paper explains the puzzle by focusing on the perceptions of policy-makers regarding the risk of provoking China; entrapment with the other; and entrapment with the United States. The paper demonstrates how policy-makers' concerns regarding entrapment or abandonment related to their mutual US ally—as well as concerns about potentially provoking China—have had an instrumental effect on the degree to which Japan and Australia have strengthened their security commitments to each other. While the rise of China—and the relative decline of US power—has shaped the overall direction of Japan–Australia security ties, such structural imperatives are of course also complicated by how domestic actors think about the tactical aspects of understanding and surviving these structural features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indo-Pacific region is vital to the emerging countries' geostrategic and geo-maritime strategic competition. It is crucial for Japan's economic, political, and security interests. For the last few years, Japan has been promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy to protect the region free from other countries' dominance and make a balance of power by countering China's hegemony. Despite the growing strategic involvement of Japan in the Indo-Pacific region, some literature focused on the people's perception of Japan. Thus, this study explores the public perception regarding Japan's strategic rise in the Indo-Pacific to fill the knowledge gap. Using a snowball sampling method, we conducted a descriptive cross-national study with 365 individuals in Bangladesh and Thailand. Most participants (88%) agreed that the strategic rise of Japan would promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Besides, they agreed (69.1%) that the FOIP could be the alternative to the Chinese BRI in this region. However, around 52.6% of respondents moderately supported Japan's FOIP and QUAD in the region not to provoke China. Participants in this multi-country research generally expressed optimism about Japan's strategic ascent and its implications for a balanced Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the findings of this study can assist policymakers in gaining a better understanding of public attitudes and preparing for future policy formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores Japan's relative decline and its responses to the changing global balance of power through a case study of one symptom of this shift: the rise of the G20 as the 'premier forum for international economic co-operation' at the expense of the G8. The G8 has traditionally held a significant position in Japan's international relations that appears to be undermined by the rise of the G20. Japan's responses to these developments reveal it to be a status quo power that is still committed to internationalism and multilateralism and looking for a constituency to lead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's constitutional revision and resultant remilitarization can affect the balance of power in the international system beyond its national borders. This paper critically analyzes the constitutional revision debate in contemporary Japan and the implications for Japan's foreign relations if or when it becomes constitutional for the island nation to possess military forces. It argues that justification for constitutional revision is based on political myth rather than historical reality and rational analysis, and also that a militarized Japan will not enhance its independence or international prestige. Rather, there is the great fear that a new Japan will be further subordinated to the United States as a critical part of the latter's global strategy and defense mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An armed conflict between Taiwan and China is not unthinkable in the future. For historical, geographical, economic, and diplomatic reasons, Japan would not be able to stand on the sidelines. Relying on three major concepts—national interests, path dependence and balance of power, this paper explores Japan's three possible roles in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. First, Japan could pass the buck, staying out of the conflict as much as possible and providing at most logistical and intelligence support for an American military operation. Second, it could balance power, throwing its weight behind Washington against Beijing. Finally, it could play peacemaker. At the end of the article, the author discusses several key factors that would shape Tokyo's decision-making in the event of a cross-Strait conflict and assesses the relative probability of each option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing India-Japan engagements are not only focused on economic issues, but also cover a wide range of interests, including regional security, political, and maritime security concerns. Both countries are consolidating strategic partnerships to address the risks and vulnerabilities posed by the evolving regional balance of power. Through their embeddedness with China, both India and Japan form an intrinsic part of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical security architecture. The key transformation of relations between these two states in the region is in response to the geopolitical change brought about by China's rapid ascension. In this regard, the article further explains how both countries are systematically strengthening a strategic partnership and gradually reinforcing economic, political, security, and strategic cooperation against China. This article seeks to address how both states would restrain rising China's strategic maneuvering in the Indo-Pacific region through an analysis of the India-Japan alignment, with the main focus of this study being on analyzing how both India and Japan are now investing in a long-term strategy to balance China's hegemonic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For electric power suppliers, the stability of power supply is a most important and keen issue. Regarding this, a power grid generally becomes more stable with an increase in size. In addition, a grid is more robust when it takes the form of a circle than when it is one-directional. On this point, Japan is not a good country to maintain a stable power grid for many reasons. First, Japan is a small but long archipelago. While its length reaches about 3500 km, its width is only 300 km at the widest point. Secondly, two different commercial power frequencies are used; western Japan uses 60 Hz, while the eastern half uses 50 Hz. Thirdly, Japan is an isolated country surrounded by the Pacific Ocean, Japan Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, East China Sea, and Philippine Sea. Fourthly, building a large international circular power grid is also difficult because of geopolitical situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan, and its alliance with the USA, is central to the unfolding politics of the new space race. This essay draws attention to the ways the Japanese state has positioned its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests related to space in the context of the US–Japan alliance. It probes the material and ideational elements that are driving the Japanese state to closer alignment with its formal ally in the military, civilian, and commercial space domains. But while all these realities bode well for alliance collaboration, there are reasons to be cautious. While the Japanese state has proactively aligned its space policy and postures with the USA, it is not forever caught in the US orbit. Given the uncertain fate of US domestic politics that bears on great power competition, Japan is also prudently positioning for how the status of its ally may evolve. This is what complicates straightforward projections about alliance cooperation and balance of power politics in the unfolding international space order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature suggests that voters have a self-centered incentive to call for the de-escalation of conflicts that inflict economic costs on them, which explains why economic sanctions and trade wars often lose popular support when the resulting cost for the domestic economy rises. It is thus puzzling why some costly disputes between two advanced democracies are prolonged. Taking a psychological approach, we argue that nonviolent yet costly disputes between international rivals can fail to de-escalate because the perception of loss invokes anger and risk-taking attitudes. We test our argument using a paired conjoint experiment involving Japan and South Korea. We find that, in both countries, the public becomes more defiant and less supportive of de-escalating an ongoing dispute when informed about (1) the high cost of the trade restrictions on domestic firms, (2) international (i.e. World Trade Organization) support for the rival country, and (3) the rival public's hardline stance on the dispute. These findings lend support to our psychological explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic links between Japan and Europe during the Cold War were limited. During this period the IISS helped bridge the gap between the two, exposing its membership base to the international affairs of Asia and Japan and providing Japanses scholars, strategists and diplomats with a platform from which to amplify their voices in the West. Analyses by these experts often appeared in IISS publications, but the Institute also gained key insights through its well-established conferences and lecture series. These initiatives illuminated Japanese strategic thinking and perspectives on contemporary critical issues in Japan's and Asia's foreign, security and defence policy. This Adelphi book, through its collection of earlier analysis, helps the reader to understand the evolution of Japanese strategic thought from the 1960s until today, and shines a light on the continuities and changes in this thinking. New, original analysis of the material seeks to identify areas where such thinking was prescient and remains relevant to the contemporary strategic environment, and other areas where predictions failed or assumptions were proved wrong. These new essays were also informed by interviews of Japanese senior scholars and diplomats who spent time with the IISS. This book seeks to frame, educate and guide strategic thinking on the most pressing issues of today, both in and outside Japan and Asia, and will be of great interest to analysts, practitioners and students of international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the new (2013) Japan's National Security Strategy and its relationship with the actual changes in the regional and global strategic landscape. The connections between the new Japanese perspectives on the subject and the recent U.S decision to focus its military Power in the Asia Pacific region will be specially stressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan-China relations in the 2000s have seen both significant tensions, notably during the term of Koizumi Junichiro, and marked improvement in the post-Koizumi period. This article analyzes the way external and domestic factors in both countries have influenced the political and security dimension of the bilateral relationship. It also assesses the extent of the underlying tensions and the prospects of long-term stability in Sino-Japanese relations. The article argues that structural changes and a shifting balance of power in East Asia have led to strategic divergences and security dilemma dynamics in the bilateral relations. Additionally, the rise of conservatism in Japan under Koizumi and China's use of the 'history card' exacerbated mutual distrust and contributed to souring ties in the first half of the 2000s. While the bilateral relations have stabilized in the post-Koizumi era, with the political leaders of both countries emphasizing mutual engagement and alleviation of the security dilemma, this 'cooling-off period' is unlikely to lead to long-term stability in ties between Tokyo and Beijing. Lacking strategic trust on both sides, as well as the significance of the US factor for the bilateral security interactions, suggest that the present stability in Japan-China relations remains fragile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the ways in which various risks, threats and opportunities posed to Japan by the 'rise of China' have been articulated and managed in post-Cold War Japan. It focuses in particular on the period since 2001, and more narrowly on the nature of threat perceptions and risk assessments that emerged during Koizumi Junichirō's prime ministership, but also considers some of the continuities in Japanese perceptions of China since Koizumi's departure. It shows how the discourse in Japan on the 'China threat' has evolved since the 1990s to include assessments of a rising China which go beyond the traditional indicators of capabilities and intentions and which attempt to measure the risks (seen as both opportunities and dangers) posed by new challenges. It suggests, therefore, that the concept of risk helps to explain the multiple strategies adopted by the Japanese government as a means of 'managing' the rise of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maritime affairs have been experiencing a state of flux in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly since the beginning of the present decade, attributable to the policies of an assertive China, consequently evoking proportional responses from regional state actors. Amid this transforming scenario, regional states such as India, Japan and Australia have devised policies towards ensuring uninterrupted freedom of navigation and overflight of the Indo-Pacific waterways, given their strategic and commercial sensitivity as sea lanes of communication. The compulsion of sustaining the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region has necessitated responsible states like India and Japan to forge and bolster bilateral defence cooperation, in keeping with their respective national interests, policies and guidelines. Against this backdrop, this article analyses the impulses, dynamics and challenges of maritime cooperation between India and Japan, particularly in the defence-industrial realm. It underscores the imperative of sustaining and further strengthening the dynamics of bilateral defence-industrial cooperation and optimally exploring the opportunities unveiled by policies like "Make in India", in sync with Japan's quest for defence modernisation and development, towards securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a countermeasure for supply and demand imbalance in case of high penetration of photovoltaic systems, wide‐area supply and demand control is considered. This is performed by adjusting the supply and demand balance by power exchange from areas with surplus reserve capacity to areas with insufficient reserve capacity using cross‐regional interconnection lines. By using our supply and demand control model considering the adjustable range that can respond to a fluctuation after 10 min (10‐min spinning reserve, SR10), we quantitatively evaluate the margin of SR10 (SR10_margin) by subtracting the 10‐min residual load fluctuation from SR10 in the local area. By calculating SR10_margin for each time period (month and time of day) and for different targets for reserve capacity (reserve margin and SR10), we investigate the possibility of wide‐area supply and demand control. We find that SR10_margin can be secured by changing the reserve capacity within the local area, which demonstrates the feasibility of wide‐area supply and demand control in terms of supply and demand balance. © 2020 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's primary objective of the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called 'tactical hedging'. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India–Japan security cooperation is a critical component in the evolving security mechanism of the Indo-Pacific region. Both states are secondary states in the international system that opposes one country's emergence as a regional hegemon. China's rise and her ambition to dominate the Indo-Pacific would affect the security interests of India and Japan. The U.S., the current preponderant power in the region, seems unable to contain China by itself. So it is looking for strategic partnerships with regional countries who are militarily capable of challenging China, and persuading them to balance China. In this regard, the two powerful states in China's own backyard – Japan in the western Pacific and India in the Indian Ocean – have come together to counter the Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. In this effort, they have gradually built up naval cooperation sans a formal military alliance. They follow soft balancing strategies over hard balancing ones because neither wants to antagonise China. Similarly both countries seek to expand their presence through mutual cooperation beyond South-east Asia. This article explains the nature and context of soft power balancing strategies and the manner in which the India–Japan maritime security cooperation has evolved over the last two decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that Japan's threat perception has evolved in response to the balance of power and perceived intent. Russia, North Korea, and China are all nuclear powers with sizable conventional forces, but the level of threat varies over time, with Japan's response pattern changing from Russia to North Korea to China in recent years. Japan remains a quiet member of the war on terror, but it faces little direct threat from global terrorism and groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Japan's threat response is unique; it skews toward weapons acquisition and enhanced logistics, limiting to a minimum constitutional reform and changes in national security institutions. The well-known antimilitarist norm of the postwar era may be eroding, but it still puts a heavy brake on many "revisionist" projects, including constitutional amendment of Article 9. As a result, Japan's response to the threats has been modest, doing little to prevent China's rise, while growing more dependent on the United States. Resumen : En este artículo, afirmo que la percepción de amenazas de Japón ha evolucionado en respuesta al equilibrio de poder y a las intenciones percibidas. Rusia, Corea del Norte y China son potencias nucleares que cuentan con fuerzas convencionales considerables, pero el nivel de amenaza varía con el tiempo. Así, en los últimos años el patrón de respuesta de Japón ha pasado de Rusia a Corea del Norte y luego a China. Japón mantiene una postura neutra en la guerra contra el terrorismo, pero recibe pocas amenazas directas del terrorismo global y de grupos como Al Qaeda y el Estado Islámico. La respuesta del país nipón a las amenazas es única, puesto que tiende a la adquisición de armas y logística avanzada, y se limita a una reforma constitucional reducida y cambios mínimos en las instituciones de seguridad nacional. La conocida norma antimilitarista de la posguerra puede estar desgastándose, pero sigue poniéndole un alto a muchos proyectos «revisionistas», incluida la enmienda constitucional del Artículo 9. Como resultado, la respuesta de Japón a las amenazas ha sido modesta. Este país no se esforzó por detener el ascenso de China y desarrolló una mayor dependencia de Estados Unidos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Japanese government has spent considerably more diplomatic energy on national security and foreign economic policy initiatives beyond north-east Asia over the last decade. Recognizing that its capacity and resolve are limited in ways that restrain its role in maritime deterrence outside north-east Asia, the Japanese government has focused on deploying 'soft security infrastructure' to advance its grand strategic designs. The government is also seeking to position Japanese businesses—and ultimately the Japanese economy—to take economic advantage of emerging production networks and the growing consumer base in 'emerging Asia'—as well as, increasingly, in east Africa, in order to reduce its economic dependence on China and the West. The Japanese government anticipates that promoting the development of horizontally integrated economic corridors throughout subregions in emerging Asia and east Africa will be advantageous to Japanese commercial interests as well as enhance Japan's capacity, and others', to resist Chinese economic and military coercion. Japan's grand strategy and pivot within Asia thus goes beyond reactive, short-term balancing behaviour. It is focused, in the long term, on drawing the centre of regional economic gravity away from China to enable Japan and other regional nations to exist and prosper on the outer rim of Chinese hegemony—and to actively contest it if necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores on the role of the U.S. in shaping the East Asian order around American military and economic dominance. It states that the U.S. system provides security, political partnerships, underwriting stability and alliances with Japan, South Korea and other partners across Asia. It stresses the rise of Chinese economic and military capabilities with explicit balance of power dynamic in multilateral trade and cooperation. It also notes that the American-led alliance system deepened the economic and security ties with the regions.

Saltzman, Ilai Z. (2011) Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy: Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00146.x In an attempt to increase the legitimacy and traction of soft balancing in contemporary International Relations (IR) scholarship, and in order to rebuff critiques of its applicability, the concept is further clarified and applied to examine American foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan in the interwar period. Analysis reveals that soft balancing is not only a legitimate explanation, but also explains a major historical and theoretical puzzle-American grand strategy vis-à-vis Japan in interwar period-it shows that the concept is also applicable to account for patterns in non-unipolar systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been the primary security concern for Japan since the mid-1990s. By examining the content of debates revealed in the political, security and intellectual communities in Japan between 2006 and 2009, this article analyses Japan's views on the North Korean nuclear crises. It argues that Japan is still engaged in a vigorous domestic debate on its North Korea policy that centres around three options: constructive engagement, hard hedging with comprehensive engagement, and containment. Tokyo currently adopts a mixed strategy of hedging and engagement to cope with the perceived threat from the North. Domestic emotional pressure, symbolized by the victimized consciousness rooted in the Japanese kidnapping issue and the conservative desire of seeking Japan's autonomy, still significantly constrains Japan's North Korea policy from choosing any moderate option. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents an overview on how the Japanese portrayed China in their histories written in the decade after World War II. The author asserts that a group of Marxist, or radical left, historians sought to represent China's Communist revolution as an Asian symbol of power and identity which should inspire Japan's politics and culture and would also help the Japanese distance themselves from American and Western hegemony. The article also considers Japanese nationalistic attitudes, their sense of Asia's balance of power, modernization, imperialism, and social Darwinism.

Japan's self-defining foreign policy role has been evolving on the basis of alliance with the United States since 1945. The author argues that depending on the changing terms of alliance with the United States, Japan has been adjusting its role roughly every 15 years: domestic contestation over alliance (1945 - 1960), free rider or Yoshida doctrine in practice (1960 - 1975), systemic supporter (1975 - 1990), global civilian power (1990 - 2005) and global ordinary power (2005 - 2020). In this article the author argues that the three key conditions for global hegemony, military, currency and demographic hegemony, will be met by the United States to varying degrees until the second quarter of this century. The author speculates that Japan's foreign policy role will evolve on the assumption of a continuing United States leadership role, albeit with far more dependence on market conditions and power calculations abroad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea is a middle power in a region where its scope of action can rise and fall quickly and diplomatic flexibility is needed. Neither realist responses to threats nor idealist trust in integration meet its needs for adjusting triangular ties with China and Japan, as their relations become the principal great power divide in Northeast Asia. Its optimal choice is as a facilitator biding its time when tensions over both security and national identity clashes are intense, while preparing for opportunities. Four conditions would give it a favorable environment: forward-looking foreign leadership; security challenges brought under some control; subsiding preoccupation with national identities; and its own strategic planning with care not to overreach. Multiple possibilities emerge if it can rebuild ties with Japan as part of a triangle with China as well as one with the United States and also synchronize ties with China to other ties. Even amidst recurrent tensions, the core East Asian triangle offers Seoul a chance to take advantage of changing dynamics in the world's most ascendant region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we argue that since 1945 Japanese foreign policy has evolved through five phases, which will culminate in Japan's re-emergence as a global ordinary power. We then discuss three potential models of ordinary power that are ideal-typical in nature, but which share some qualities with the respective political circumstances of France, Germany, and Britain. We also consider the legitimacy and capacity deficits that Japan possesses, and the way in which recent electoral developments may contribute to the addressing of these deficits. We argue that Japan is using the British model as a foundation for the acquisition of ordinary power status. In doing so it is increasingly binding itself to the United States. But such a move can also provide a platform from which to develop the possibilities that lie beyond bilateralism (plus), in the realm of the German model, and wider regional cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes three models that explain for the peace in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. Discussion on the notion of geographic balance of power in the region; Examination on the notion of complexity of national interests in the post-Cold War era in the region; Nuclear deterrence in asymmetric power structure; Power relations between China and Russia and Japan and the U.S.; Regional security policy adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The article discusses Japan's nuclear strategy and their desire for tactical freedom. Kenneth N. Waltz and Christopher Layne, two eminent authors, have made predictions that after the cold war, Japan would develop nuclear weapons and seek strategic independence. However, these predictions have been proving wrong till date. During and after the cold war, Japan has imposed restrictions on the use of military force and shown heavy dependence on the U.S. for Japanese security. Japan's outlier footing poses a challenge to the theory of balance of power.

The article provides information on the survey concerning the compelling surrender of Japan to the U.S. It has been noted that the counterfactual analysis of Japan's surrender has led to warranted speculative analysis on the credible various courses that events might have taken in 1945. Furthermore, before Japan's offer on August 10, 1945 of conditional surrender, top U.S. officials did not anticipate the fast response from the Japanese. In addition, some members of the Truman administration would wonder, and often suggested developments regarding the U.S. Junes commitment.