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The study is conducted to assess the impact of corporate governance on the firm performance and to study the mediating role of agency cost in the association between corporate governance and firm performance. 74 non-financial companies are selected as a sample for the study. The data from 2017 to 2022 is assessed in the study. Regression analysis is used to assess the direct impact of corporate governance on agency cost and firm performance. Mediation is assessed using Sobel Test. The finding of the study revealed that better corporate governance leads to better firm performance. Results also showed that stronger governance decreases agency cost which in turn leads to better firm performance. This study is unique in a way that it studied the mediating role of agency cost in the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The study will help the companies to recognize the importance of strong governance structure in order to increase financial performance. The study will also help to identify the role of agency cost on financial performance and to recognize that agency cost can be reduced via better corporate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Road network requires timely maintenance to keep pavement surface in good condition for reduction of fuel consumption with the limited budget. This study focused on development of pavement preservation strategies in the road network considering multi-objective optimization of agency cost and environmental impact (in terms of CO2 emission). Field data from long-term pavment performance (LTPP) database were used to quantify the impact of pavement preservation treatments (crack seal, chip seal, and thin overlay) on the changes of surface roughness. The emission rate functions of vehicles with respect to speed and pavement surface condition were developed using Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES) with the updated tire rolling resistance coefficients. The multi-objective optimization problem was solved using the Simulated Constraint Boundary Model (SCBM) method. The final solution was recommended based on the minimized distance from the utopia point to the Pareto front. The results show that the optimization solutions are affected by the available budget, existing pavement condition, truck traffic, and unacceptable level of pavement roughness. For multi-objective optimization of minimizing both agency cost and CO2 emission, the recommended preservation treatments among different segments is a combination of crack seal and thin overlay in most cases. These findings can be used by highway agencies to make road maintenance decisions considering the tradeoff between agency cost and environmental impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agency cost is a behavioral corporate finance problem that has an important place in finance literature. While it is often discussed in the current literature, Turkey oriented relative literature is quite limited. In this study, the agency costs before, during, and in the post-2001 financial crisis era are examined between companies with foreign owners and others by using cross-section regression analyzes and marginal effects based on these analyzes. The obtained findings show that there is a significant difference between the two firm groups in terms of agency costs during the 2001 financial crisis, before and after the crisis. The findings obtained do not show any change in different robustness checks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The life of Family Businesses is largely limited to the generational transition (on average 30% of these survive the second generation, 15% of these to a third, and 1% to the fourth). Objective: to analyze success and failure factors in successions from the literature. Method: to developed said analysis from a descriptive approach. The document review process completed the following stages: definition of the objective, bibliographic search, consultation of databases, establishment of search strategy and selection criteria, organization of information, and writing. Results and conclusions: the succession problem starts from the conflict of interests between the family business systems (company, family, and property), arising situations such as: informality, loose discipline, assumptions of permanence, nepotism, grasp, among others. Finally, a succession plan was developed considering the factors that influence the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Many farm producer organizations pursue growth and complexity in response to price volatility, industry consolidation and other external developments. Consequently, as ownership is dispersed and control is delegated, members may face increasing agency cost. In spite of the potential to impact performance and even survival, empirical attention to agency problems in farm producer organizations is limited. The purpose of this paper is to address the gap in the literature with an empirical study. Design/methodology/approach: With survey responses from 365 farm producer organizations in the USA, the author uses a two-limit tobit model to estimate the relationships of six ownership and governance characteristics (i.e. board size, management size, director independence, manager independence, CEO independence and non-member ownership) to agency cost, which is proxied by the operating expense ratio. Findings: While controlling for heterogeneity in scale and technology, the author finds positive relationships of board size, management size and CEO independence to agency cost. The novel result illustrates there is a significant cost to the adoption of non-traditional ownership and governance characteristics by farm producer organizations. Practical implications: The presence of agency cost serves as motivation to farm producer organizations to implement new or adapt old agency mechanisms. One recommendation is to reconsider the payment structure of non-member CEOs. There may not be enough incentive to inspire an upstream bias, which is perhaps possible by linking CEO performance to price, patronage and member-oriented performance measurements. Originality/value: Agency cost is rarely studied in relation to farm producer organizations. Recent contributions in the empirical literature lacked an explicit connection of ownership and governance characteristics to agency cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, we establish a panel threshold model which the threshold variable is internal control, and analyse the nonlinearity relationship between dividend and agency cost. The result shows:There exist threshold effects between dividend and agency cost based on internal control. Cash dividend can reduce agency cost when internal control quality is higher than the threshold, otherwise, cash dividend will no longer have any effect. That means, a valid internal control is the foundation of dividend governance function. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics result implies that, companies with higher internal control quality than threshold are popular. This paper proofs that agency theory is effective in Chinese market, and higher internal control quality higher propensity to pay. So we disagree with the previous hypothesis of "result" and "substitution" between internal control and dividend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, it is aimed to reveal the relationship between the agency cost and board structure of 18 manufacturing industry within the BİST corporate governance index firms between 2006 and 2016. Agency cost is represented with free cash flow and growth opportunity ratio, the board size, number of independent members and CEO duality are represented board structure. According to the empirical results, there is a negative relationship between the board size and agency costs, a positive relationship between the number of independent members and agency costs. However, there is no significant relationship between the CEO duality and the agency costs. The results revealed that the board structure has a significant impact on firms' agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether firms' political connection affects their corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements and how the effects vary with different political ties, namely symbolic and material connections. These ties reflect different degrees of political embeddedness, interest alignment, network size, and monitoring with the government, and therefore impart divergent effects on managerial incentives for CSR practices. Our analysis indicates that CSR in firms with symbolic connection is much more associated with agency cost than CSR in firms with material connection. We also find that large firms with symbolic connection exhibit lower CSR performance than those with material connection, probably because the former group tends to substitute the prestige of their political capital for the goodwill associated with CSR engagement. These results show that accounting for the effects of different types of political connection on managerial incentives contributes some clarity to the debate about the compatibility of CSR with primary corporate mandates. • We examine whether a firm's political connection affects its CSR engagements • CSR engagement in firms with symbolic connection is associated with agency cost • CSR engagement in firms with material connection is associated with good governance • Large firms with symbolic connections exhibit lower CSR performance [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate strategy has a significant impact on capital structure. In the strategic behavior of enterprises in China, international diversification has become more and more important. Theory suggests that because the economic behavior between countries is not completely related to each other, international diversification is helpful to raise the enterprise's debt ratio. Based on 2009-2011 balanced panel data of Chinese listing corporations, the research on the relationship between international diversification strategy and capital structure shows, international diversification significantly reduced the enterprise financial leverage, contrast to industry diversification; and the reason mainly lies in that transnational management increases agency cost of debt, so international diversification reduced the company's debt ratio. At the same time, the relationship between the level of international diversification and corporate debt ratio is significantly positive for multinational corporations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the relationship between managers' private profit and agency cost using dynamic modelling methods. We conclude that the agency cost is a concave function of the managers' private profit and that the managers' private profit will lead to more investment cash outflow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]