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The article focuses on the precedent formed in the U.S. Supreme Court case New York Times Co. versus (v.) United States, also known as (aka) the Pentagon Papers. It states that the actions by Julian Assange in the unauthorized issuance of classified data are a ploy to earn notoriety for WikiLeaks, which is his website. It says that restrictions on free press and on free speech are not new. It says that the case hinges on two free speech established tests, such as imminent lawless action and a present and clear danger.

The article discusses digital evidence and the history pf private "papers" as special objects of search and seizure in America as of January 2013, focusing on the impact of technology on evidence law in the U.S., as well as information on general warrants and state search and seizure provisions prior to the establishment of the U.S. Constitution (USC). The Fourth Amendment to the USC is addressed, along with probable cause and the U.S. Supreme Court case Boyd v. United States. American common law and constitutional protections in the U.S. are examined.

One of the most interesting developments in patent law during the last century is the catastrophic collapse of the paper patent doctrine, which had authorized courts to discriminate against patents that were never successfully practiced by their patentees. The doctrine's demise opened the door for the dramatic and controversial rise in patent litigation by "nonpracticing entities" or "patent trolls "—entities that, in the words of President Obama, "don't actually produce anything themselves." This Article undertakes a comprehensive review of this lost doctrine and shows that the doctrine took a balanced approach, hurting patentees who never developed their technologies but helping those who had. The doctrine declined because it could not be reconciled with the theoretically impoverished views about information disclosure embraced by courts of the late twentieth century. With the advent of more sophisticated theories about the value of learning-by-doing and, more generally, about the problems associated with generating and disseminating information, the paper patent doctrine now has what it lacked in the past—a solid theory for favoring patents that were taught not just through paper disclosure but also by real-world practice. This Article concludes that the paper patent doctrine should be revived and that existing case law provides a sufficient foundation for a revival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, an SEC administrative judge suspended the Big Four accounting firms' China affiliates from practicing before the SEC for six months, citing the firms' refusal to turn over audit work papers requested by the SEC. This decision has since sparked a debate over the SEC's authority to access foreign audit work papers when those documents are stored in jurisdictions that restrict or prohibit their transfer without authorities' prior approval. In this Note, I trace the legislative history defining the SEC's everexpanding power to access foreign audit work papers with a focus on section 106(e) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. I also map out the development of the violation of non-U.S. laws defense that accounting firms frequently assert to counter the SEC's document requests. Against this background, I will argue that the administrative law judge's interpretation of section 106(e) is seriously flawed. It may lead to untenable results that could be contrary to Congress's intent and are certainly against the purposes of the SEC's own disciplinary proceedings. Drawing upon the federal courts' long-time jurisprudence in handling extraterritorial discovery disputes in civil litigations, I propose an alternative analytical framework that embraces a "good faith" defense to balance the SEC's need to access foreign audit work papers with a foreign country's authority to regulate its accounting profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the California's Supreme Court case Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach, wherein it was held that the City of Manhattan Beach acted within its discretion in order to approve the plastic bag ban on the basis of a Negative Declaration (ND), rather than a full Environmental Impact Report (EIR). The court sided with the plaintiff, Save the Plastic Bag Coalition, on the issue of corporate standing under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

The article discusses a court case of Womack v. Orchids Paper Products Co. 401(k) Savings Plan as decided by the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Oklahoma based on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The breach of fiduciary duty, regulation of financial markets and investor protection are discussed. The importance of trust relationships, issues related to suspicion in public and social capital are also discussed.

Reports the complexity of patent claim interpretation laws of the United States. Decisions of the Federal court on IMS Technology, Inc. versus Haas Automation, Inc.; Comments on the decision for Kemco Sales versus Control Papers; Discussion on a non-uniform standard for means-plus-function claims assessment.

Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to effectuate the ends of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. To effectuate those ends, Congress vested the EEOC with authority to not only receive, investigate, and conciliate charges of employment discrimination, but also to enforce Title VII against private employers who discriminate by initiating suit against them. After the EEOC receives a charge of employment discrimination, it must, after completing an investigation, attempt to conciliate the charge with a private employer accused of discrimination before initiating suit. The EEOC's "duty to conciliate is at the heart of Title VII," so a critical question arises when the EEOC appears to violate its duty by, for instance, making egregious demands of an employer: what is the proper standard for reviewing whether the agency has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate? The federal circuit courts of appeals are split between two standards of review-the deferential and the stringent standards of review. This Comment argues that the deferential standard of review is inadequate to protect private employers from the EEOC's potential abuse of its statutory duty. Rather, the stringent standard is the proper standard, and it is consistent with the text, purpose, legislative history, and jurisprudence of Title VII. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court's announcement that it would hear two personal jurisdiction cases last Term raised the hope that it would clarify an area of doctrine that has been unclear for 20 years. The Court's decision on general jurisdiction satisfied those expectations at least in part. The Court's specific personal jurisdiction decision, by contrast, only made things worse. This essay provides a critical analysis of the Nicastro decision on specific personal jurisdiction. Part Two surveys some of the history of personal jurisdiction doctrine, with an emphasis on the tension between rules and standards. Part Three grapples with Nicastro and its possible meanings and concludes that Nicastro undermines much of the understanding (such as it was) that shaped the last thirty-plus years of personal jurisdiction doctrine. Part Four suggests an approach to personal jurisdiction based in state interests and relative burdens--one that takes federalism seriously yet at the same time would uphold more assertions of jurisdiction. Part Five turns to a different topic: the rhetoric of Justice Kennedy's and Justice Breyer's opinions. Justice Kennedy repeatedly insisted that personal jurisdiction is about "submission " to sovereign (judicial) authority, and I consider some of the ramifications of this claim, particularly in relationship to Justice Kennedy's opinions in other cases. For his part, Justice Breyer provided examples of people over whom he thought personal jurisdiction would be inappropriate. These examples rest on a set of assumptions about national and regional characteristics, as well as a conception about jurisdiction that assumes a sharp distinction between periphery and metropole. His approach, in other words, rests on a different, more cosmopolitan, but perhaps also more disturbing, idea of sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents author's views on the corporate defense counsel and the requirement of protection for German and other foreign companies against trials in the U.S. courts. The lack of lis pendens rule in the global litigation landscape and the need of widening the declaratory judgment in judicial system are discussed. He also mentions about the traditional wisdom of American litigation in Europe.

The article focuses on copyright issues and the legal basis of scholarly publishers on copyright claims. It explores the Copyright Act, explains the copyright ownership of works created by university faculty members and cites cases resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court including the case of Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) non-profit organization and the case of Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance Inc. and Martha Graham School of Contemporary Dance Inc. It cites the application of the Copyright Act to faculty-created works analyzing policies such as those that are selectively disclaiming copyrights and those purporting transfer of copyrights. It also notes university copyright implications and recommends the exercise of university rights on public access to scholarly works.