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SUMMARY This article summarizes “How Do Auditors Respond to FCPA Risk?” (Lawson, Martin, Muriel, and Wilkins 2019), which investigates the pricing of audits for clients that violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). FCPA compliance has become a top priority for regulators who rely heavily on accountants as they combat illegal activity. We find that auditors charge higher fees for violators both before and during formal FCPA investigations. We also find that fees are more sensitive to accounts that are more susceptible to FCPA risk. Our findings are stronger (weaker) for clients with high (low) foreign sales. While this may seem intuitive from an audit materiality perspective, regulators are not required to prove materiality as they pursue FCPA violations (Ebright 2016). Our study should be of interest to practitioners and auditors, as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is considering whether updates should be made to PCAOB AS 2405

Regulators claim to reward firm cooperation in the enforcement process. However, critics question which actions constitute firm cooperation and contend that cooperation leads to “harsh” and “unfair” outcomes. Examining 1,162 enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice, we find that regulator-cited cooperation credit is best explained by remedial actions and self-reported law violations. Cooperation credit is negatively associated with firm monetary penalties assessed by regulators. Our estimates suggest that firms with cooperation credit realize an average penalty reduction of $23.8 million (49 percent). We also estimate that average reputation-related losses are $756 million (70 percent) lower for firms with cooperation credit. We find no association between cooperation credit and related private action outcomes. Our results provide important insight into what constitutes meaningful cooperation with regulators, and suggest that the benefits can be substantial for firms deemed to be cooperative. JEL Classifications: G38; K22; K42; M41.

Whistleblowers are ostensibly a valuable resource to regulators investigating securities violations, but whether there is a link between whistleblower involvement and the outcomes of enforcement actions is unclear. Using a dataset of employee whistleblowing allegations obtained from the U.S. government and the universe of enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation, we find that whistleblower involvement is associated with higher monetary penalties for targeted firms and employees and with longer prison sentences for culpable executives. We also find that regulators more quickly begin enforcement proceedings when whistleblowers are involved. Our findings suggest whistleblowers are a valuable source of information for regulators who investigate and prosecute financial misrepresentation. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

An extensive literature examines the causes and effects of financial misconduct based on samples drawn from four popular databases that identify restatements, securities class action lawsuits, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). We show that the results from empirical tests can depend on which database is accessed. To examine the causes of such discrepancies, we compare the information in each database to a detailed sample of 1,243 case histories in which regulators brought enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation. These comparisons allow us to identify, measure, and estimate the economic importance of four features of each database that affect inferences from empirical tests. We show the extent to which each database is subject to these concerns and offer suggestions for researchers using these databases. JEL Classifications: G38; K22; K42; M41.

Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, excluding misconduct firms, creating a short-term spillover that averages $92.7 billion losses per year. We examine an expansive set of channels under which this spillover to nontarget firms can occur, and find that it reflects the loss of the embedded value of monitoring by a common institutional owner, enforcement wave activity, and industry peer and business relationships. Institutional investors also experience a significant abnormal outflow of funds in the year following the misconduct event.

Whistleblowers are ostensibly a valuable resource to regulators investigating securities violations, but whether there is a link between whistleblower involvement and the outcomes of enforcement actions is unclear. Using a dataset of employee whistleblowing allegations obtained from the U.S. government and the universe of enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation, we find that whistleblower involvement is associated with significantly higher monetary penalties for targeted firms and employees, and with significantly longer prison sentences for culpable executives. We also find enforcement actions involving whistleblowers are associated with significantly longer regulatory proceedings. Our findings contribute empirical evidence on the role of whistleblowers in the enforcement process and inform managers and policymakers, and the regulators who utilize these programs in their enforcement efforts.

An extensive accounting and finance literature examines the causes and effects of financial misreporting or misconduct based on samples drawn from four popular databases that identify restatements, securities class action lawsuits, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). We show, however, that the results from empirical tests can depend on which database is accessed. To examine the causes of such discrepancies, we compare the information in each database to a detailed sample of 1,243 case histories in which the SEC brought enforcement action for financial misrepresentation. These comparisons allow us to identify, measure, and estimate the economic importance of four characteristics of each database that affect inferences from empirical tests. First, these databases contain information on only the event that is used to proxy for misconduct (e.g., restatements), so they omit other relevant announcements that affect a researcher’s interpretation and use of the events. Second, the initial public revelation of financial misconduct occurs, on average, months before the initial coverage in these databases, leading to discrepancies in event study measures and pre/post comparison tests. Third, most of the events captured by these databases are unrelated to financial fraud, and efforts to cull out non-fraud events yield heterogeneous results. Fourth, the databases omit large numbers of events they were designed to capture. We show the extent to which each database is subject to these concerns and offer suggestions for researchers seeking to use these databases.

We examine the stock market's reaction to 13F lings with the SEC. On the day an institution files its 13F, do the prices of stocks held by the institution change? We begin our analysis by examining price responses for initial public off erings of equity, given that the valuations of these stocks are typically more uncertain. We fi nd that the stock market values the news that a top institutional money manager holds a particular IPO. Specifi cally, on the day that an institution in the top 2.5% (based on prior performance) fi les its 13F, any recent IPO reported to be held by that institution enjoys a market-adjusted return of 1%. We plan to investigate other subsets of stocks as well as other subsets of 13F information. Also, we will assess the appropriateness of the market's reaction to the 13F news by examining the stock's performance over future holding periods. This study will shed light on how the market uses information in the 13F disclosures.

In this paper, we examine how stock option usage affects total corporate payout. Using fixed-effects panel data estimators on various samples of ExecuComp firms from 1993 to 2005, we find the higher the executive stock options, the lower the total payout, ceteris paribus. We also find some evidence that firms increase payouts through repurchases in order to offset earnings per share dilution that occurs due to usage of executive and non-executive stock options. However, incentives from not having dividend protection for options appear to dominate those from antidilution, resulting in lower total payout for firms with higher options usage.

We examine the penalties imposed on the 585 firms targeted by SEC enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978–2002, which we track through November 15, 2005. The penalties imposed on firms through the legal system average only $23.5 million per firm. The penalties imposed by the market, in contrast, are huge. Our point estimate of the reputational penalty—which we define as the expected loss in the present value of future cash flows due to lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs—is over 7.5 times the sum of all penalties imposed through the legal and regulatory system. For each dollar that a firm misleadingly inflates its market value, on average, it loses this dollar when its misconduct is revealed, plus an additional $3.08. Of this additional loss, $0.36 is due to expected legal penalties and $2.71 is due to lost reputation. In firms that survive the enforcement process, lost reputation is even greater at $3.83. In the cross section, the reputation loss is positively related to measures of the firm's reliance on implicit contracts. This evidence belies a widespread belief that financial misrepresentation is disciplined lightly. To the contrary, reputation losses impose substantial penalties for cooking the books.