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Delegated Monitoring, Institutional Ownership, and Corporate Misconduct Spillovers

Authors :
Ugur Lel
Gerald S. Martin
Zhongling Qin
Source :
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publication Year :
2019
Publisher :
Elsevier BV, 2019.

Abstract

Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, excluding misconduct firms, creating a short-term spillover that averages $92.7 billion losses per year. We examine an expansive set of channels under which this spillover to nontarget firms can occur, and find that it reflects the loss of the embedded value of monitoring by a common institutional owner, enforcement wave activity, and industry peer and business relationships. Institutional investors also experience a significant abnormal outflow of funds in the year following the misconduct event.

Details

ISSN :
15565068
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
SSRN Electronic Journal
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....b3739700fb3000ecc7579e8158f2180a
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3358068