Search

Using data from three sources (a laboratory experiment, a field study, and a large US supermarket chain), we document a surprising asymmetric behavior of 9-ending prices: they are more rigid upward, but not downward, in comparison to non 9-ending prices. The data from the lab experiment and the field study suggest that shoppers are less likely to notice higher prices when they end with 9, or price increases when the new prices end with 9, in comparison to other endings. The consumers' misperception seems to be caused by their use of 9-endings as a signal for low prices, which interferes with price information processing. The supermarket data suggest that retail price setters respond strategically to the consumer misperception by setting 9-ending prices more often after price increases than after price decreases. 9-ending prices, therefore, usually increase only if the new prices are also 9-ending. Consequently, 9-ending prices exhibit asymmetric rigidity: they are more rigid than non 9-ending prices upward but not downward.

We present a lab-field experiment designed to systematically assess the external validity of social preferences elicited in a variety of experimental games. We do this by comparing behavior in the different games with several behaviors elicited in the field and with self-reported behaviors exhibited in the past, using the same sample of participants. Our results show that the experimental social preference games do a poor job explaining both social behaviors in the field and social behaviors from the past. We also include a systematic review and meta-analysis of previous literature on the external validity of social preference games. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2908 . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

Affirmative action to promote women's employment is a intensely debated policy. Do affirmative action policies attract women and does it come at a cost of deterring high qualified men? In three field experiments in Colombia we compare characteristics of job-seekers who are told of the affirmative action selection criterion before they apply with those who are only told after applying. We find that the gains in attracting female applicants far outweigh the losses in male applicants. Affirmative action is more effective in areas with larger female discrimination and deters male job-seekers from areas with low discrimination.

The stability of many post-conflict societies rests on the successful reintegration of former soldiers. We use an experimental approach to study reintegration in Northern Uganda and examine behavior of former soldiers together with the behavior of receiving communities towards this group. We focus on trust-based interactions and find that individual trustworthiness increases with the length of time a person was with the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel group which forcibly recruited a large fraction of young people in the area. The effect is strongest among former soldiers who were abducted during childhood and is mute among those who soldiered during adulthood. These results are consistent with predictions of recent theories that highlight the importance of cooperation during war. Furthermore, members of receiving communities with an abductee son, who thus have better knowledge of former soldiers are aware of the behavioral difference. They believe former soldiers are more trustworthy than their peers and trust them more. Last, we find no evidence of preference-based discrimination, suggesting that anger is attenuated when communities do not attribute responsibility for committed violence to returning soldiers.

We present a new type of field experiment to investigate ethnic prejudice in the workplace. Our design allows us to study how potential discriminators respond to changes in the cost of discrimination. We find that ethnic discrimination is common but highly responsive to the “price of prejudice,” i.e., to the opportunity cost of choosing a less productive worker on ethnic grounds. Discriminators are on average willing to forego 8 percent of their earnings to avoid a coworker of the other ethnic type. The evidence suggests that animus rather than statistical discrimination explains observed behavior. (JEL C93, J15, J24, J31, J71)

This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information.We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives,but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment under taken across 151 villages in South India,local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme.Relative to flat pay,incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent,but not to households similar to the agent. public services,information constraints,incentive pay, social proximity,knowledge transmission

This paper reports the results of an experiment with secondary school students designed to improve their ability to reason, argument, and communicate using mathematics. These goals are at the core of many educational reforms. A structured pedagogical intervention was created that fostered a more active role of students in the classroom. The intervention was implemented with high fidelity and was internally valid. Students in the control group learned significantly more than those who received treatment. A framework to interpret this result is provided in which learning is the result of student-teacher interaction. The quality of such interaction deteriorated during the intervention.

Although many countries are aggressively implementing the One Laptop per Child (OLPC) program, there is a lack of empirical evidence on its effects. This paper presents the impact of the first large-scale randomized evaluation of the OLPC program, using data collected after 15 months of implementation in 319 primary schools in rural Peru. The results indicate that the program increased the ratio of computers per student from 0. 12 to 1. 18 in treatment schools. This expansion in access translated into substantial increases in use both at school and at home. No evidence is found of effects on enrollment and test scores in Math and Language. Some positive effects are found, however, in general cognitive skills as measured by Raven’s Progressive Matrices, a verbal fluency test and a Coding test.

Most experimental evidence of hyperbolic discounting is based on violations of either stationarity or time consistency. Stationarity is violated when intertemporal choices differ for trade-offs in the near versus the more distant future. Time consistency on the other hand is violated if the optimal allocation for specific dates changes over time. Both types of choice reversals may however also result from time-varying discount rates. Hyperbolic discounting is an unambiguous explanation for choice reversals only if individuals simultaneously violate both stationarity and time consistency. Our field experiment examines the extent to which this is the case. At different points in time, the same participants allocated a future gift over sooner-smaller and later-larger rewards with varying front-end delays. We find that most violations of time consistency do not coincide with violations of stationarity. Random noise in decision-making alone does not explain this finding. Instead, we find a significant association between individual violations and changes in household wealth, in particular for participants with less access to credit. We conclude that in a context of liquidity constraints, eliciting violations of either stationarity or time consistency alone is insufficient to identify hyperbolic discounting.

The use of directed giving – allowing donors to target their gifts to specific organizations or functions – is pervasive in fundraising, yet little is known about its effectiveness. We conduct a field experiment at a public university in which prospective donors are presented with either an opportunity to donate to the unrestricted Annual Fund, or an opportunity of donating to the Annual Fund and directing some or all of their donation towards the academic college from which they graduated. While there is no effect on the probability of giving, donations are significantly larger when there is the option of directing. However, the value of the option does not come directly from use, as very few donors choose to direct their gift.

A housing lottery in an Indian city provided winning slum dwellers the opportunity to move into improved housing on the city’s periphery. Fourteen years later, relative to lottery losers, winners report improved housing farther from the city center, but no change in family income or human capital. Winners also report increased isolation from family and caste networks and lower access to informal insurance. We observe significant program exit: 34% of winners never moved into the subsidized housing and 32% eventually exited. Our results point to the importance of considering social networks when designing housing programs for the poor.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

This paper presents the results of three …eld experiments in an online labor market designed to determine whether referred workers perform better than non-referred workers and, if so, why. We hired workers and asked them to refer others; we then hired all referred and non-referred applicants. Referred workers performed better and had less turnover than non-referred workers. We …nd that this is partially due to selection: referrals outperformed non-referred workers even without any on-the-job interactions with their referrers. We …nd also that team production is important: referrals performed particularly well when working with their referrers.

Research on behavioral economics has established the importance of factors such as reference dependent preferences, hyperbolic discounting, and the value placed on non-financial rewards. To date, these insights have had little impact on the way the educational system operates. Through a series of field experiments involving thousands of primary and secondary school students, we demonstrate the power of behavioral economics to influence educational performance. Several insights emerge. First, we find substantial incentive effects from both financial and non-financial incentives on test scores. Second, we find that non-financial incentives are considerably more cost-effective than financial incentives for younger students, but were less effective with older students. Third, and perhaps most importantly, consistent with hyperbolic discounting, all motivating power of the incentives vanishes when rewards are handed out with a delay. Since the rewards to educational investment virtually always come with a delay, our results suggest that the current set of incentives may lead to underinvestment. Fourth, in stark contrast to previous laboratory experiments, we do not see an increased response of effort when rewards are framed as losses. Our findings imply that in the absence of immediate incentives, many students put forth low effort on standardized tests, which may create biases in measures of student ability, teacher value added, school quality, and achievement gaps.

We show that grit, a non-cognitive skill that has been shown to be highly predictive of achievement, is malleable in the childhood period and can be fostered in the classroom environment. Our evidence comes from an evaluation of a randomized educational intervention implemented in elementary schools in Istanbul. Outcomes are measured via a novel incentivized real effort task and actual school grades on core subjects. We find that treated students are 1) more likely to choose to undertake a more challenging and more rewarding task against an easier but less rewarding alternative, 2) less likely to give up after failure, 3) more likely to exert effort to accumulate task-specific ability, and consequently, 4) more likely to succeed and collect higher payoffs. The intervention also has a significant impact on school grades: We find that treated students are about 3 percentage points more likely to receive top grades in core academic subjects.

Empirical social science relies heavily on self-reported data, but subjects may misreport behaviors, especially sensitive ones such as crime or drug abuse. If a treatment influences survey misreporting, it biases causal estimates. We develop a validation technique that uses intensive qualitative work to assess survey misreporting and pilot it in a field experiment where subjects were assigned to receive cash, therapy, both, or neither. According to survey responses, both treatments reduced crime and other sensitive behaviors. Local researchers spent several days with a random subsample of subjects after surveys, building trust and obtaining verbal confirmation of four sensitive behaviors and two expenditures. In this instance, validation showed survey underreporting of most sensitive behaviors was low and uncorrelated with treatment, while expenditures were under reported in the survey across all arms, but especially in the control group. We use these data to develop measurement error bounds on treatment effects estimated from surveys.

We conduct a field valuation experiment where we vary the valuation method (contingent valuation vs. inferred valuation) as well as the payment format (dichotomous choice vs. payment card). Willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay valuations are elicited in a within-subjects design for foods with climate neutral labels. We find a similar gap for valuations elicited with the contingent or the inferred valuation method. However, we also find that the gap can be muted by using a payment card elicitation format.

We investigate whether and how time pressure affects performance. We conducted a field experiment in which students from an Italian University are proposed to choose between two exam schemes: a standard scheme without time pressure and an alternative scheme consisting of two written intermediate tests, one of which to be taken under time pressure. Both exam schemes consist of a verbal and a numerical part, each carrying half of the total marks. Students deciding to sustain the alternative exam are randomly assigned to a "time pressure" and a "no time pressure" group. Students performing under time pressure at the first test perform in absence of time pressure at the second test and vice versa. We find that being exposed to time pressure exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on students' performance both at the verbal and at the numerical task. The effect is driven by a strong negative impact on females' performance, while there is no statistically significant effect on males. Gender differences in handling time pressure are relevant only when dealing with the verbal task. Using data on students' expectations, we also find that the effect produced by time pressure on performance was correctly perceived by students. Female students expect a lower grade when working under time pressure, while males do not.

Boys are doing worse in school than are girls, which has been dubbed “the Boy Crisis.” An analysis of the latest data on educational outcomes among boys and girls reveals extensive disparities in grades, reading and writing test scores, and other measurable educational outcomes, and these disparities exist across family resources and race. Focusing on disadvantaged schoolchildren, I then examine whether time investments made by boys and girls related to computer use contribute to the gender gap in academic achievement. Data from several sources indicate that boys are less likely to use computers for schoolwork and are more likely to use computers for playing games, but are less likely to use computers for social networking and email than are girls. Using data from a large field experiment randomly providing free personal computers to schoolchildren for home use, I also test whether these differential patterns of computer use displace homework time and ultimately translate into worse educational outcomes among boys. No evidence is found indicating that personal computers crowd out homework time and effort for disadvantaged boys relative to girls. Home computers also do not have negative effects on educational outcomes such as grades, test scores, courses completed, and tardies for disadvantaged boys relative to girls.

This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of unannounced, public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. Our results are consistent with workers having a preference for conformity and being reciprocal at the same time. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2291 . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

Fungibility of money is a central assumption in the theory of consumer choice: any unit of money is substitutable for another. This implies that the composition of income or wealth is irrelevant for consumption. We find that even in a simple, incentivized setup many subjects do not treat money as fungible. When a label is attached to a part of their budget, subjects change consumption according to the label. We first provide suggestive evidence from the field and then use a laboratory experiment to show this result in a tightly controlled environment. In the lab, subjects with lower cognitive abilities are more likely to violate fungibility. The findings lend support to behavioral models of narrow bracketing and mental accounting. One implication of our results is that in-kind benefits distort consumption more strongly than usually assumed. (JEL: C91, C93, D01, H31, I38)

In this study, we consider how gift-exchange and bonus systems function in a natural field setting by measuring the effort response of participants to non-monetary gifts over time. Our field experiment tests the difference in effort response to unconditional gifts delivered immediately, promised unconditional gifts delivered later, and conditional gifts linked to reaching a specific performance target. We find important benefits from promising to give an unconditional gift later: participants respond positively to a promised gift twice by increasing effort when the gift is promised and again when it is received. A promised gift outperforms both the unconditional gift delivered immediately, which leads to a single positive response, and the conditional gift based on performance, which does not trigger any significant behavioural change after the gift is delivered. The study lends insights into the relative effectiveness of gift-exchange and bonus systems and the temporal structure of reciprocal exchange.

Many people implicitly sell or give away their data when using online services and participating in loyalty programmes—despite growing concerns about company’s use of private data. Our paper studies potential reasons and co-variates that contribute to resolving this apparent paradox, which has not been studied previously. We ask customers of a bakery delivery service for their consent to disclose their personal data to a third party in exchange for a monetary rebate on their past orders. We study the role of implicitly and explicitly stated prices and add new determinants such as political orientation, income proxies and membership in loyalty programmes to the analysis of privacy decision. We document large heterogeneity in privacy valuations, and that the offered monetary benefits have less predictive power for data-disclosure decisions than expected. However, we find significant predictors of such decisions, such as political orientation towards liberal democrats (FDP) and membership in loyalty programmes. We also find suggestive evidence that loyalty programmes are successful in disguising their “money for data” exchange mechanism.

We conducted an experiment with middle and high school students to test the external validity of a common laboratory measure of cheating. Subjects performed several coin tosses and earned money depending on the outcomes they reported. Because the coin tosses were not monitored, subjects faced a financial incentive to misreport their outcomes without having to worry about getting caught. We linked the responses from the lab experiment with three measures of school misconduct (i.e., disruptiveness in class, failure to complete homework, and absenteeism). The findings show that cheating in the lab significantly predicts misbehavior in school, suggesting that the experimental measure of cheating generalizes qualitatively to naturally occurring environments. Revised version, February 2016

This article analyses the effectiveness of hiring credits. Using comprehensive administrative data, we show that the French hiring credit, implemented during the Great Recession, had significant positive employment effects and no effects on wages. Relying on the quasi-experimental variation in labour cost triggered by the hiring credit, we estimate a structural search and matching model. Simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three features: it was non-anticipated, temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages. We estimate that the cost per job created by permanent hiring credits, either countercyclical or time-invariant, in an environment with flexible wages would have been much higher.

How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2859 students to help at the ‘ESA Europe 2012’ conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply to help at the conference and, if so, also specify the working time they wanted to provide. Just asking subjects to volunteer or offering them a certificate turned out to be significantly more motivating than mentioning that the regular conference fee would be waived for helpers. By means of an online-survey experiment, we find that intrinsic motivation to help is likely to have been crowded out by mentioning the waived fee. Increasing monetary incentives by varying hourly wages of 1, 5, and 10 Euros shows positive effects on the number of applications and on the working time offered. However, when comparing these results with treatments without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.

This paper examines firms’ incentives to develop a new (green) product, which might compete against the pollutant (brown) good that they traditionally sell. We show that in equilibrium more than one firm might develop a green product, but such an equilibrium outcome is not necessarily efficient. In particular, we predict an excessive amount of green goods under certain conditions, namely, when the green product is extremely clean but both products are not sufficiently differentiated in their attributes, and when the green product is not significantly cleaner than the brown good. We finally provide policies that help regulatory authorities promote equilibrium outcomes yielding the highest social welfare.

This paper presents results from two large-scale natural field experiments that tested the effect of social norm messages on tax compliance. Using administrative data from > 200,000 individuals in the United Kingdom, we show that including social norm messages in standard reminder letters increases payment rates for overdue tax. This result offers a rare example of social norm messages affecting tax compliance behavior in a real world setting. We find no evidence that loss framing is more effective than gain framing. Descriptive norms appear to be more effective than injunctive norms. Messages referring to public services or financial information also significantly increased payment rates. The field experiments accelerated the collection of tax revenue at little cost.

On débat depuis longtemps, en économique et en sociologie, de l’effet des réseaux sociaux sur l’emploi, mais établir des liens de causalité reste toutefois un défi. Dans cet article, grâce à des données portant sur un projet d’intervention auquel les participants ont été choisis au hasard, nous analysons l’impact, sur l’emploi, de variations dans diverses mesures de la taille et de la composition des réseaux sociaux, au niveau des individus et d’une communauté. Nos résultats indiquent que le fait d’avoir participé au projet accroît de beaucoup la taille des réseaux sociaux, en particulier en ce qui a trait aux liens faibles. Toutefois, ce changement ne se traduit pas par une meilleure situation de l’emploi 18 mois après la fin de l’étude. Nous n’observons aucune hétérogénéité dans l’effet de l’intervention sur les participants sur la base de la taille initiale du réseau social d’un individu ; ceux qui ont vu leurs liens forts augmenter à un taux plus élevé durant le projet étaient plutôt plus susceptibles de ne pas avoir d’emploi à la fin de l’intervention. En résumé, nos résultats suggèrent que, si certains programmes peuvent influencer avec succès la taille du réseau social des individus, ces changements ont un effet limité sur la situation de ces derniers sur le marché de l’emploi à long terme ; toutefois, quand on considère les individus qui ont un emploi, la composition du groupe, elle, subit un changement.

Relying on a commonly used fixed-offer bargaining script we examine gender differences in bargaining outcomes in a highly competitive and frequently used market: the taxi market in Lima, Peru. Our bargaining script secures that only the seller can change prices and terminate negotiations, thus we are able to examine differences in the seller's entire path of negotiation and in the reservation price at which they are willing to trade. We find that male and female passengers who use the same bargaining script are not treated equally. Men face higher initial prices, final prices, and rejection rates. These differences are consistent with male drivers being more reluctant to give-in to demanding negotiations by male passengers, and with male passengers being perceived as having high valuations. To identify whether taste-based or statistical discrimination drives the inferior treatment of men we conduct an experiment where passengers send a signal on valuation before negotiating. The signal eliminates gender differences and the response is shown only to be consistent with statistical discrimination. Thus in the limiting case of a highly competitive market with experienced traders, we do not find evidence of taste-based discrimination, the differential observed is however consistent with statistical discrimination.

The welfare impact of expanding access to bank accounts depends on whether accounts crowd out pre-existing financial relationships, or whether private gains from accounts are shared within social networks. In this experiment, we provided free bank accounts to a random subset of 885 households. Across households, we document positive spillovers: treatment households become less reliant on grown children and siblings living outside their village, and become more supportive of neighbors and friends within their village. Within households, we randomized which spouse was offered an account and find no evidence of negative spillovers. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

We use a game-theoretical model and results from laboratory experiments to study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favorable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a political process. This process involves two referenda, one at the level of the country as a whole and one at the level of the subordinated region. If the political process succeeds, then the new autonomy level is implemented. If this process fails, then both regions engage in a costly political conflict in which both sides can spend resources to win the upper hand. We show that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of our game the voting process leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts so that the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe frequent fighting involving high material losses., The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The authors thank the Spanish Ministerio de Economı´a y Competitividad (Grant: ECO2011-29847-C02-01), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2009 SGR 820), the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa), Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (CSD2006-00016) and the British Academy and the University of Nottingham for their financial support.

The literature on pro-social behavior shows that older children are more generous than younger children; however, the level of individual generosity is heterogeneous even between children of the same age. This paper investigates whether a child’s popularity affects his/her generosity. Our participants – 231 children, six to twelve years old – decide how many of their four colored wristbands they want to share with another anonymous child. We manipulate the visibility of this decision: in treatment Public, the decisions are revealed to the entire class at the end of the game, whereas in treatment Private children’s decisions remain secret. In addition, we elicited each child’s network of friends using an innovative “seating map” mechanism. Our results reveal that more popular children are more generous in Public than Private decision environments, while less popular children behave similarly in both cases. Moreover, older children in Public display greater generosity than (i) older children in Private and (ii) younger children in either Public or Private. Finally, in Public, older and more popular children share more than less popular older children, and more than younger children regardless of popularity; whereas, in Private there is no effect of popularity on children of any age. Our findings point to another reason to adopt transparent decision making in teams and organizations: it may promote the generosity of some (perhaps especially popular leaders) without detrimentally impacting the pro-sociality of others.

This study presents a new field experimental approach for measuring age discrimination in hiring. In addition to the classical approach in which candidates ages are randomly assigned within pairs of fictitious résumés that are sent to real vacancies, we randomly assign between these pairs the activities undertaken by the older candidates during their additional post-educational years. When applying this design to the case of Belgium, we find that age discrimination depends fundamentally on the older candidates career patterns. Older age only robustly affects call-back if the older candidate was employed in an out-of-field job during his or her extra post-educational years.

Comprendre comment la cooperation emerge entre individus non apparentes offre une cle de comprehension de l’evolution des societes. L’analyse du role de l’heterogeneite des preferences sociales dans la decision de contribution aux biens publics revele que la cooperation conditionnelle explique le declin des contributions au cours du temps. Les regles morales peuvent cependant contrecarrer ce processus. Les comportements de sanction altruistes conduisent en effet a ce qu’un deuxieme probleme de passager clandestin s’avere finalement une source majeure de cooperation. Si, en l’absence d’institutions, une minorite d’egoistes pousse la majorite des individus dotes de preferences sociales a se comporter en passagers clandestins, l’introduction d’institutions appropriees conduit les egoistes a imiter les individus dotes de preferences sociales.

This paper uses data consisting of students' strategically reported preferences and their underlying true preferences to study the course allocation mechanism used at Harvard Business School. We show that the mechanism is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause meaningful welfare losses. However, we also find that ex-ante welfare is higher than under the strategyproof and ex-post efficient alternative, the Random Serial Dictatorship. We trace the poor ex-ante performance of RSD to a phenomenon specific to multi-unit assignment, "callousness'. We draw lessons for the design of multi-unit assignment mechanisms and for market design more broadly., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Using date from a field experiment conducted in seventy Colombian municipalities, we investigate who pools risk with whom when risk pooling arrangements are not formally enforced. We explore the roles played by risk attitudes and network connections both theoretically and empirically. We find that pairs of participants who share a bond of friendship or kinship are more likely to (1) join the same risk pooling group and to (2) group assortatively with respect to risk attitudes. Also, consistent with our theoretical finding that when there is a problem of trust the process of pooling assortativley with respect to risk preferences is perturbed, we find (3) only weak evidence of such assorting among unfamiliar individuals.

This paper provides the first experimental estimation of the effects of the supply of publicly financed urban infrastructure on property values. Using a pre- and post-intervention survey design along with random allocation of first-time street asphalting of residential streets located in peripheral neighborhoods in Mexico, we show that within two years of the intervention households are able to transform their increased property wealth into significantly larger rates of vehicle ownership, household appliances, and home improvements. Increased consumption is made possible via both credit use and less saving. A cost-benefit analysis indicates that the valuation of street asphalting as capitalized into property values is about as large as construction costs, suggesting efficient levels of public good provision.

Due to the mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants, beliefs have been at the centre of attention of research into preferences for income redistribution. We elicit preferences for income redistribution through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland and relate them to several behavioural determinants, in particular to religious beliefs. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those who do not belong to a religious denomination, and negative otherwise. However, the marginal WTP is shown to increase with a higher degree of religiosity. Moreover, those who state that luck or connections play a crucial role in determining economic success exhibit significantly higher WTP values than those who deem effort to be decisive. (JEL codes: C35, C93, D63, H29) Copyright The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

This study investigates loss aversion when the reference point is a state-dependent random variable. This case describes, for example, a money manager being evaluated relative to a risky benchmark index rather than a fixed target return level. Using a state-dependent structure, prospects are more (less) attractive if they depend positively (negatively) on the reference point. In addition, the structure avoids an inherent aversion to risky prospects and yields no losses when the prospect and the reference point are the same. Related to this, the optimal reference-dependent solution equals the optimal consumption solution (no loss aversion) when the reference point is selected completely endogenously. Given that loss aversion is widespread, we conclude that the reference point generally includes an important exogenously fixed component. For example, the typical investment benchmark index is externally fixed by the investment principal for the duration of the investment mandate. We develop a choice model where adjustment costs cause stickiness relative to an initial exogenous reference point.

Can one teach basic entrepreneurship skills, or are they fixed personal characteristics? Most academic and development policy discussions about microentrepreneurs focus on their access to credit, and assume their human capital to be fixed. The self-employed poor rarely have any formal training in business skills. However, a growing number of microfinance organizations are attempting to build the human capital of micro-entrepreneurs in order to improve the livelihood of their clients and help further their mission of poverty alleviation. Using a randomized control trial, we measure the marginal impact of adding business training to a Peruvian group lending program for female microentrepreneurs. Treatment groups received thirty to sixty minute entrepreneurship training sessions during their normal weekly or monthly banking meeting over a period of one to two years. Control groups remained as they were before, meeting at the same frequency but solely for making loan and savings payments. We find that the treatment led to improved business knowledge, practices and revenues. The program also improved repayment and client retention rates for the microfinance institution. Larger effects found for those that expressed less interest in training in a baseline survey. This has important implications for implementing similar market-based interventions with a goal of recovering costs.

The, often observed, positive correlation between incentive intensity and risk has been explained in two ways: the presence of transaction costs as determinants of contracts and the sorting of risk-tolerant individuals into firms using high-intensity incentive contracts. The empirical importance of sorting is perhaps best evaluated by directly measuring the risk tolerance of workers who have selected into incentive contracts under risky environments. We use experiments, conducted within a real firm, to measure the risk preferences of a sample of workers who are paid incentive contracts and face substantial daily income risk. Our experimental results indicate the presence of sorting; Workers in our sample are risk-tolerant. Moreover, their level of tolerance is considerably higher than levels observed for samples of individuals representing broader populations. Interestingly, the high level of risk tolerance suggests that both sorting and transaction costs are important determinants of contract choices when workers have heterogeneous preferences.

Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limari Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability were offered for sale by the research team. The auctions were supplemented by protocols to elicit risk and time preferences of bidders. We find that the right-to-choose auctions raise significantly more revenue than the benchmark sequential auction. Risk attitudes explain a substantial amount of the difference in bidding between auction institutions, consonant with received theory. The auction bidding revealed distinct preferences for water types, which has implications for market re-design.

We replicate three pricing tasks of Gneezy, List and Wu (2006) for which they document the so-called uncertainty effect, namely, that people value a binary lottery over non-monetary outcomes less than other people value the lottery’s worse outcome. While the authors implemented a verbal lottery description, we use a physical lottery format which makes misinterpretation of the lottery structure highly unlikely. We also provide subjects with complete information about the goods they are to value (book gift certificates and one-year deferred payments). Contrary to Gneezy et al. (2006), we observe for all three pricing tasks that subjects’ willingness to pay for the lottery is significantly higher than other subjects’ willingness to pay for the lottery’s worse outcome.

We study issues related to external validity for treatment effects using over 100 replications of the Angrist and Evans (1998) natural experiment on the effects of sibling sex composition on fertility and labor supply. The replications are based on census data from around the world going back to 1960. We decompose sources of error in predicting treatment effects in external contexts in terms of macro and micro sources of variation. In our empirical setting, we find that macro covariates dominate over micro covariates for reducing errors in predicting treatments, an issue that past studies of external validity have been unable to evaluate. We develop methods for two applications to evidence-based decision-making, including determining where to locate an experiment and whether policy-makers should commission new experiments or rely on an existing evidence base for making a policy decision., Comment: forthcoming at Journal of Business and Economic Statistics

We demonstrate the benefits and feasibility of using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit precise, individual-level willingness to pay and thereby enhance the information generated by randomized experiments. With a relatively small sample and minor modifications to a standard field experiment design, we can directly estimate demand, study the effect of prices on usage through screening and psychological (sunk-cost) effects, and compute heterogeneous marginal treatment effects. Applying the mechanism to a field experiment studying clean drinking water technology in northern Ghana, we show that even in an environment with low literacy and numeracy, BDM produces sensible results. We find that although willingness to pay for clean water technology is low relative to the cost, demand is surprisingly inelastic at low prices; prices do not generate significant sunk-cost effects; and treatment effects are heterogeneous with respect to valuation and consistent with outcomes being affected by effort expenditure.

States and aid agencies use employment programs to rehabilitate high-risk men in the belief that peaceful work opportunities will deter them from crime and violence. Rigorous evidence is rare. We experimentally evaluate a program of agricultural training, capital inputs, and counseling for Liberian ex-fighters who were illegally mining or occupying rubber plantations. Fourteen months after the program ended, men who accepted the program offer increased their farm employment and profits, and shifted work hours away from illicit activities. Men also reduced interest in mercenary work in a nearby war. Finally, some men did not receive their capital inputs but expected a future cash transfer instead, and they reduced illicit and mercenary activities most of all. The evidence suggests that illicit and mercenary labor supply responds to small changes in returns to peaceful work, especially future and ongoing incentives. But the impacts of training alone, without capital, appear to be low.

Worldwide, people are gaining access to a formal bank account, which allows account-based instead of cash payments. Based on a novel randomized control trial, we document that the payment method is an important determinant of savings behavior. In rural India, we study the effect on savings of allocating identical weekly payments on a bank account (treated) or in cash (control). The treatment impact is huge: savings increase by 110% within three months, and the effect is long-lasting. Villagers paid in cash do not save more in other assets, but increase consumption. Therefore, we infer that being paid on a bank account has a net positive impact on total savings. When we twist the design and start paying everyone in cash, savings and consumption patterns no longer differ between the treated and control. We interpret these findings as the outcome of the default option, and shed light on six plausible underlying mechanisms.

This natural field experiment tests the effects of purely symbolic awards on volunteer retention in a public goods context. The experiment is conducted at Wikipedia, which faces declining editor retention rates, particularly among newcomers. Randomization assures that award receipt is orthogonal to previous performance. The analysis reveals that awards have a sizeable effect on newcomer retention, which persists over the four quarters following the initial intervention. This is noteworthy for indicating that awards for volunteers can be effective even if they have no impact on the volunteers' future career opportunities. The awards are purely symbolic, and the status increment they produce is limited to the recipients' pseudonymous online identities in a community they have just recently joined. The results can be explained by enhanced self-identification with the community, but they are also in line with recent findings on the role of status and reputation, recognition, and evaluation potential in online communities.

The paper analyzes a new Honduran conditional cash transfer experiment (Bono 10,000) in which 150 poor villages (of 300) were treated. The transfers were much larger in size than an earlier experiment (Galiani & McEwan, 2013), but yielded smaller full-sample effects on school enrollment, child labor participation, and measures of health service use. One explanation is that Bono 10,000 did not apply conditions to children: only one child in eligible households was subject to the education condition, and young children and mothers were only subject to health conditions in the absence of older children. Consistent with this, we find a large effect on enrollment (and a nearly off-setting one on child labor) among only children, and smaller and insignificant effects on children in larger households. We only find significant effects on health service use among children and mothers in the absence of older children (despite a much smaller household transfer). The heterogeneity does not appear to be driven by correlated variables such as household size, child age, or poverty.

We present experimental evidence from a bilingual city in Northern Italy on whether the affiliation to a specific language group affects behavior in a prisoner's dilemma game and leads to discrimination. Running a framed field experiment with 828 six- to eleven-year old primary school children in the city of Meran, we find that cooperation generally increases with age, but that the gap between cooperation among in-group members and cooperation towards children speaking another language is considerable and develops with age. This gap is due to both in-group favoritism and language group discrimination. While the former is persistent across all age groups and both language groups and accounts for most of the discrimination observed, the latter only emerges in later years of primary school among children belonging to the German language group. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.