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This study examines the impact of private equity fund managers' (GPs') ESG disclosure on fundraising. To this end, a sample of global private equity and venture capital funds that completed fundraising between 2020 and 2022 is employed. Our findings indicate that an increase in ESG disclosure by GPs is associated with an increase in fundraising. This indicates that GPs' ESG disclosure diminishes information asymmetry and has a favorable impact on fundraising. Conversely, the level of ESG disclosure among limited partners (LPs) has no significant impact on the relationship between GPs' ESG disclosure level and fundraising. The findings of this study have significant implications for private equity stakeholders, including GPs, given the current context of declining investment demand due to rising interest rates, recessionary concerns, poor performance and tighter regulations on private equity management. In this environment, ESG disclosure is becoming increasingly challenging for private equity firms to utilize as a fundraising strategy.

This research paper examines the performance of leading private equity firms as compared to prominent companies within the S&P 500. By analyzing specific case studies, the paper illustrates the unique strategies employed by successful private equity firms and how these strategies yield varying performance levels compared to traditional public companies. The research highlights differences in operational management, financial leverage, and market dynamics that contribute to these outcomes. Furthermore, the paper reviews existing literature to contextualize the findings within broader trends in private equity and public markets, ultimately providing insights for investors and policymakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction Table of Contents I. The Problem of Private Equity in Health Care A. The Private Equity Model B. The History and Trends of Private Equity Investment in Health Care [...], Private equity has rapidly enlarged its presence in the health care sector, expanding its investment targets from hospitals and nursing facilities to physician practices. The incursion of private equity is the latest manifestation of a long trend toward the corporatization and financialization of medicine. Private equity pools investments from large private investors to buy controlling stakes in companies through leveraged buyouts or similar arrangements that use the companies' own assets to finance debt. These investors seek to earn handsome profits by rapidly increasing revenues before selling off the investment. Private equity's incursion into health care is especially concerning. The drive for quick revenue generation threatens to increase costs, lower health care quality, and contribute to physician burnout and moral distress. These harms stem from market consolidation, overutilization and upcoding, constraints on physicians' clinical autonomy, and compromises in patient care. Policymakers attempting to counter these threats can barely keep up. Like a cloud of locusts, private equity moves so quickly that by the time lawmakers become aware of the problem and researchers study the effects, private equity has moved on to other investment targets. While it remains unclear whether private equity investment is fundamentally more threatening to health policy than other forms of acquisition and financial investment--whether by publicly traded companies, conglomerate health systems, or health insurers--private equity presents a heightened threat of commercialization. Even if private equity is not uniquely harmful, it is extremely adept at identifying and exploiting market failures and payment loopholes. The emphasis on short-term returns and exit, the heavy reliance on debt, and the insulation from professional and ethical norms make private equity investors more avid to exploit revenue opportunities than institutional repeat players. Thus, this Article's central claim is that the influx of private equity into health care poses sufficient risks to warrant an immediate legal and policy response. Public policy should primarily target market failures and payment loopholes and only secondarily curb private equity investment per se. The good news is that we already have many tools under federal and state law with the potential to address the harms of commercialization. These can be used or sharpened to address the particular concerns raised by private equity's incursion into physician markets. Key tools include antitrust oversight, fraud and abuse enforcement, and state laws regulating the corporate practice of medicine and the terms of physician employment. In some instances, legislative or regulatory action may be needed to adapt existing laws. In other instances, new laws may be needed to close payment loopholes or correct market distortions. A leading example is the recent No Surprises Act, which curtails surprise out-of-network medical billing. While the Article lays out a roadmap for additional legal and policy actions to protect the health system from the acute risks of private equity, these are patches rather than systemic solutions. If these patches fail to stave off the incessant march toward commercialization of health care, we may see renewed calls to fundamentally rethink the market orientation of the U.S. health system.

This study explores the significance of contracts in private equity applications, particularly in addressing Shariah compliance concerns inherent in traditional private equity structures. Private equity plays a crucial role in funding and nurturing SMEs, aligning with equity-based activities that are conducive to Islamic finance principles. Using a qualitative Grounded Theory approach, the study involves interviews with various stakeholders in the financial industry. Grounded theory is an iterative and inductive method that systematically analyses data to uncover patterns and themes, generating hypotheses or theories derived directly from the data. The study identifies murabahah, ijarah, mudarabah, and musharakah as suitable contracts for private equity applications. These findings illuminate opportunities for financial industry participants, particularly SMEs, to innovate and access funding through private equity avenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I. Introduction Medicine in the United States is big business. (1) In 2022, spending on healthcare services totaled an estimated $4.5 trillion dollars--over 17% of the U.S. economy and growing. [...]

This cross-sectional study estimates the geographic penetration of private equity–owned outpatient mental health and substance use disorder practices across the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With spring in full swing, medtech business owners thinking about selling may be curious about the current buyer landscape. Lets begin by stating the obvious: Potential purchasers could include industry [...]

Under what conditions can the state discipline private equity firms into delivering the investment required to meet the coming needs of industrial transformation? States have sought to crowd in private capital to finance industrial development, but the results have so far been less than satisfactory. Prevailing accounts of financial industry power largely characterise an arms-length state-finance relationship that has unfolded in private-led markets where private equity firms have contributed to the secular growth in non-productive economic activity. This article problematises the assumption of private-led markets and argues that state-led markets present a counterfactual in which the disbursement of public money entails strict policy discipline and tight embedding between the state and private equity firms, which provides the conditions for them to emerge as unlikely champions of industrial policy. Two cases of co-investment between Chinese and European sovereign wealth funds demonstrate the power dynamics at play. Where PE firms in the Sino-Irish co-investment facilitated the international scaling of Irish firms in China, the PE firms operating in Europe failed to embed Chinese firms into regional supply chains in the Sino-Belgian co-investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While operationally most of the SAM and MOGI sectors, when developed, are lucrative, they also suffer from an array of uncertainties and disruptions. It becomes less acceptable for long term investors when the uncertainties continue to hog the market; as it is happening now. While globally, the governments are keeping away from the risky investments, the private equity investment can be a method for renewed investments in the SAM and MOGI sector, starting from exploration to the value chain investing while the fields are operational. In order to be rational to the investing as well as to protect investor interest, the governments must play an alert but flexible watchdog role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The corporatization of health care in the United States has forced us to confront society's moral expectations of the industry, which serves uniquely vulnerable consumers. Health care has become increasingly more lucrative, attracting private equity ("PE") investment, specifically in private physicians' practices. Physicians find PE transactions appealing because physicians have difficulty competing with large hospital systems and complying with expansive regulatory requirements. The attention given by PE to health care has raised concerns regarding the tension between the expected priorities of PE firms and health care. Additionally, the nature of PE investments through roll-ups of smaller companies has regulators worried that they cannot control PE's involvement in the industry. The Federal Trade Commission ('FTC') is one regulatory agency that has explicitly addressed PE investments through revisions to its Merger Guidelines to ensure PE does not slip through its grasp. As PE roll-ups are a type of health care consolidation, this Comment will compare the FTC's past efforts to regulate hospital mergers with its potential future efforts to regulate PE investment in health care under the 2023 Merger Guidelines. The Comment also states how the 2023 Merger Guidelines still fall short of effectively regulating PE investment in health care and how healthcare-specific guidelines could improve their effectiveness. It additionally argues that it may be best to let PE investment continue until the market self-corrects. The Comment provides supplementary methods to undermine the attractiveness of PE investment for physicians, which would decrease the frequency of these transactions and speed up the economic self-correcting process. The various paths forward further support the Comments overarching argument that, as it currently stands, the FTC's antitrust laws are not effective in regulating PE investment in health care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the risks associated with private equity involvement in the healthcare industry and its impact on patient safety. Private equity firms have been acquiring medical practices and healthcare infrastructure, using strategies like cost-cutting and price increases to increase the value of their assets. Studies have shown that private equity ownership is linked to poor safety records in nursing homes and hospitals, leading to more complications and reduced nursing staff. Physicians also face risks, such as reduced hours, pay cuts, and loss of autonomy. The article suggests that orthopaedic surgeons and policymakers should take measures to protect patients, including not referring them to private equity-owned institutions and advocating for stricter regulations on private equity in healthcare. It emphasizes the need for transparency in ownership structures and federal intervention to safeguard patients from safety concerns, quality degradation, and predatory pricing. The article also calls for enforcement actions against private equity-owned physicians' groups for anticompetitive behavior and warns about the potential negative consequences for healthcare professionals. [Extracted from the article]

These Are the Plunderers: How Private Equity Runs--and Wrecks-America By Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner 400 pp.; Simon and Schuster, 2023 A search of recent business headlines for the term [...]

This paper extends previous research to investigate the determinants of the operating performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) backed by private equity (PE). The paper is based on a sample of 208 unique private equity-backed firms operating at the European level. A multivariate linear regression model is estimated, in which the private equity-backed firms’ operating performance—as measured by ROA, Revenues/Total Assets, and EBIT/Total Assets—is a function of a variety of factors. These include whether or not the firm is an SME, the presence of family shareholders, and various features specific to the expertise of the private equity investor, as well as the industry, country, and years covered. The analysis is limited to private equity deals that occurred in the European Region between 2005 and 2017. According to the results, the effectiveness of private equity in improving the operating performance of target companies in the three years post-investment is impacted by whether or not the backed firm is an SME. This research paper aims to further existing publications on the link between the involvement of the private equity investor and the status of the backed firm as an SME. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Introduction Some worry that physician practices acquired by private equity may increase the use of services to maximize revenue. We assessed the effects of private equity acquisition on spending, use of treatment, and diagnostic testing in men with prostate cancer. Methods We used a 20% sample of national Medicare claims to perform a retrospective cohort study of men with prostate cancer diagnosed from 2014 through 2019. The primary outcome was prostate cancer spending in the first 12 months after diagnosis. Secondary outcomes included the use of treatment and a composite measure of diagnostic testing (e.g., imaging, genomics) in the first 12 months after diagnosis. Multilevel modeling was used to adjust for differences in patient and market characteristics. The effect of practice acquisition on each outcome was assessed using a difference‐in‐differences design. Results There were 409 and 4021 men with prostate cancer managed by urologists in acquired and nonacquired practices, respectively. After acquisition, prostate cancer spending was comparable between acquired and nonacquired practices (difference‐in‐differences estimate $1182, p = 0.36). Acquisition did not affect the use of treatment (difference‐in‐differences estimate 3.7%, p = 0.30) or the use of diagnostic testing in men who were treated (difference‐in‐differences −5.5%, p = 0.12) and those managed conservatively (difference‐in‐differences −2.0%, p = 0.82). Conclusions In the year following acquisition of urology practices, private equity did not increase prostate cancer spending, the use of treatment or diagnostic testing in men with prostate cancer. Future work should evaluate the effects of private equity acquisition on practice patterns and quality over a longer time horizon.

The article analyzes the process of financialization of soccer and its implications for the formation of club networks around the world, with an emphasis on the concept of Multi-Club Ownership (MCO). Through a bibliographical review, it addresses issues such as the concentration of investment in central European countries and its impact on national clubs. The text also discusses the role of new financial agents operating in the soccer arena, such as private equity investments, and how they are affecting the sport's business structure. Finally, private equity groups are strategically exploiting the media market through broadcasting rights, adapting to the new dynamics of distribution and consumption of sports content. The article concludes that the financialization of soccer has transformed the sport into an industry increasingly oriented towards maximizing financial returns. maximizing financial returns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

INTRODUCTION 1126 I. PRIVATE EQUITY'S CENTRAL ROLE IN INSOLVENCY 1130 A. The Relevance of Attorney Conflicts Has Increased with the Power of Private Equity 1132 II. CONSTRAINTS AND DUTIES OF [...], Private equity has become a dominant force in distressed investing and Chapter 11 corporate reorganization. As a result, three new types of attorney conflicts have emerged, each of which threatens to undermine the efficacy and credibility of the bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy judges, practitioners, and scholars must respond. This Comment provides those stakeholders with a doctrinal and normative framework to understand the conflicts that pervade the system. In particular, this Comment defines three types of conflicts, explains how each threatens the functionality of Chapter 11 corporate restructuring, lays the doctrinal groundwork for a new understanding of attorney disinterestedness, and provides solutions to mitigate the relevant conflicts. In doing so, this Comment provides much-needed guidance to bankruptcy stakeholders who are keen to ensure debtor estates receive competent, loyal, and zealous representation.

We employ, and build on, neo-institutional theory and strategic entrepreneurship thinking to explain the growing use of representations and warranty ("reps") insurance (RWI), an innovative product that mitigates the risks (costs) of legal disputes when private equity is involved on both the buy side and sell side of strategic transactions. Our analysis suggests that transaction risks and uncertainties motivate managers of private equity-sponsored leveraged buyouts and liability insurers to cooperate and change the "rules of the game" using creative customized contracts. The transformation of embedded institutional logics enables contracting parties not only to realize gains from collaboration but also from concessions that radically alter custom and practice. Our analysis suggests that the use of RWI in private equity transactions is both a determinant and consequence of institutional change in financial markets. We conclude that the private equity–RWI relation is a classic case of experimental institutionalism in action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This Article provides the first comprehensive examination of an emerging practice within the private equity sector: continuation funds. Continuation funds break from the traditional private equity model by allowing sponsors to hold on to assets beyond the typical fund term and, instead of selling the assets to third parties, sell them to their own newly established fund. Lauded by the private equity industry as providing “optionality” to investors by allowing them to cash out or roll over, continuation funds have grown to represent a major segment of investment activity in the United States. Despite their surging popularity among private equity sponsors, they are subject to investor resistance, and, puzzlingly, most existing investors in the original funds decline the option to roll over their stakes into a continuation fund, even though it is run by the same private equity firm with which they have cultivated relationships for years. This Article addresses this puzzle and makes three contributions to the literature. First, we highlight the labyrinth of concerns that cast a shadow on the growing prevalence of continuation funds. Specifically, we show that private equity managers have strong incentives to establish continuation funds and explore the web of conflicts of interest between sponsors and investors and among investors themselves. Second, employing in-depth interviews with market participants from both sides of the aisle–investors and sponsors––we examine the practical dynamics of continuation funds, exploring the cautionary tale they present to the conventional deference of law and economic theory to private contracting among sophisticated parties. Third, we present two alternative viewpoints regarding continuation funds—the market outcome view and the market failure view—and against this backdrop, we offer several policy recommendations that are particularly timely in light of the SEC’s recently adopted rules addressing the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private equity (PE) firms increasingly are acquiring ophthalmology practices; little is known of their influence on care use and spending. We studied changes in use and Medicare spending after PE acquisition. Retrospective cohort study. Seven hundred sixty-two clinicians in 123 practices acquired by PE between 2017 and 2018 and 34 807 clinicians in 20 549 never-acquired practices. We analyzed Medicare fee-for-service claims (2012–2019) combined with a novel national database of PE acquisitions of ophthalmology practices using a difference-in-differences method within an event study framework to compare changes after a practice was acquired with changes in practices that were not acquired. Numbers of beneficiaries seen; intravitreal injections and medications used for injections; and spending on ophthalmologist and optometrist services, ancillary services, and intravitreal injections. Comparing PE-acquired with nonacquired practices showed a 23.92% increase (n = 4.20 beneficiaries; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.73–6.67) in beneficiaries seen per PE optometrist per quarter and no change for ophthalmologists, while spending per beneficiary increased 5.06% ($9.66; 95% CI, –2.82 to 22.14). Spending on clinician services decreased 1.62% (–$2.37; 95% CI, –5.78 to 1.04), with ophthalmologist services increasing 5.46% ($17.70; 95% CI, –2.73 to 38.15) and optometrists decreasing 4.60% (–$5.76; 95% CI, –9.17 to –2.34) per beneficiary per quarter. Ancillary services decreased 7.56% (–$2.19; 95% CI, 4.19 to –0.22). Intravitreal injection costs increased 25.0% ($20.02; 95% CI, –1.38 to 41.41) with the number increasing 5.10% (1.83; 95% CI, –0.1 to 3.80). There was a 74.09% increase (8.38 injections; 95% CI, 0.01–16.74) in ranibizumab and a 12.91% decrease (–3.40 injections; 95% CI, –6.86 to 0.07) in bevacizumab after acquisition. The event study showed consistent and often statistically significant increases in ranibizumab injections and decreases in bevacizumab injections after acquisition. Although not all results reached statistical significance, this study suggested that PE acquisition of practices showed little or no overall effect on use or total spending, but increased the number of unique patients seen per optometrist and the use of expensive intravitreal injections. Proprietary or commercial disclosure may be found in the Footnotes and Disclosures at the end of this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

INTRODUCTION 2060 I. THE GREAT DIVIDE 2068 A. The Post-2008 Shifts in Capital Raising 2068 B. Dividing Investors 2073 II. RE-EXAMINING ECONOMIC RIGHTS 2075 A. Speculative Substitution 2075 B. A [...], Today, the law assumes that most households--comprised of so-called retail investors--are insufficiently sophisticated in their financial decisionmaking to invest in private equity funds. The law brackets investors according to their wealth and portfolio size, thereby restricting access to private fund investing to the retail category of investors. For some time now, scholars, policymakers, and asset managers have questioned the modern-day logic of using wealth as a proxy for investment acumen, yet legal reform has been slow to arrive. This Article explains that the rise of crypto investment options, and the speculative investment they attract, further undermines the logic of restricting retail investor access to private equity. Ultimately, the Article argues that in a crypto world--which is also hallmarked with considerable macro-economic volatility--maintaining these legal barriers to private equity investment restricts economic choice in a way that appears to be constitutionally unsupported. Ultimately, then, the Article urges broadened access to private fund investing and, in turn, an increase in the latitude of investor decisionmaking, autonomy, and choice.

Het maatschappelijk belang van private equity in Nederland is sterk gegroeid. Private equity heeft weliswaar maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen en ESG inmiddels omarmd maar er is nog voldoende ruimte voor verbeterig. Zeker als het gaat om private equity in de maatschappelijke dienstverlening (zorg en kinderopvang in het bijzonder).

Abstract Background Private-equity-owned nursing homes (PENH) represent the strongest form of profit orientation in the nursing care market. Private equity firms aim to increase the profitability of nursing care facilities, which often leads to cost-cutting measures and the use of less qualified staff. Our study aims to fill the existing knowledge gap by examining the association between private equity ownership and COVID-19 related infections and deaths among residents and staff during the COVID-19 pandemic. Methods We analyzed outbreak and mortality data for the period from 20/03/2020 to 05/01/2022 from 32 long-term care facilities in the Federal State of Hesse, Germany, which included 16 PENH that were propensity score matched on regional population density and number of beds with 16 non-PENH. We used logistic regression to determine the odds ratios (OR) for above-median values for the independent variables of PENH-status, number of beds, proportion of single rooms, registered nurses' ratio, and copayments. Results PENH had substantially fewer outbreaks in number, but longer and larger outbreaks among nursing home residents, as well as a markedly increased proportion of deceased residents. The odds of the outcome "infections & deaths" were 5.38 (p

Why do we tax? How do we tax? Who should we tax? While asked by almost all of us, these questions are usually answered by a select few. Economists who work in theoretical realities, lawyers full of jargon, and legislators with competing interests all have different answers to those questions. Some might even have different answers depending on who is asking. Beyond the theory and the jargon, however, lies an underlying base of equity and fairness that drives all citizens to ask these questions. This Note will attempt to answer one small piece of these enormous questions by focusing on the taxation of private equity managers in the United States compared with that of Chile, arguing that, while the Chilean government has complied with what little international guidance there is on tax policy, the United States is violating international law by offering preferential treatment for high net-worth private equity managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]