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This paper examines how international education (IE), as an important tool of public diplomacy (PD) and soft power (SP), faces unique challenges as issues of national security (NS) become more prominent in this era of new geopolitics. It presents a model to understand the relationship between PD, SP and NS and then applies this model to a comparative study. The contrasting histories, approaches and perspectives of IE as it operates as a component of foreign policy and at the nexus of PD, SP and NS in both the U.S. and Canada are analysed. The paper concludes with three challenges faced by IE in the contemporary context: first, the diminishing role of the university as a distinct and valued non-state actor; second, the weakening of foreign policy as an outward looking, distinctly international investment; and third, the problem with choosing isolation over engagement as a strategy.

This paper focuses on the recent political spars between Canada and Saudi Arabia as well as China and their impact on Canadian universities. It asks three questions: (1) What key issues did Canada's political strains with Saudi Arabia and China raise for Canadian universities' international education (IE) initiatives and what issues were absent? (2) What do these key issues suggest about Canada's approaches to IE in an era of new geopolitics? and (3) What implications can be drawn from these cases about Canadian university-government relations in the context of new geopolitics? Given the powerful role media plays in education policy, a systematic study was conducted across three main media sources to identify 74 articles and news releases between August 2018 and November 2019. Three dominant themes are identified and analyzed, each vividly illustrating the close ties between global politics, government foreign policy and IE within Canadian Universities. On the one hand, the narratives speak to concerns about IE as a risk to national security and, on the other, as a vehicle for Canada's economic prosperity. However, what the media has not achieved is a broader discussion on how Canada needs to revisit its IE objectives and approaches in light of broader geopolitical shifts. Using the theoretical framework of soft power, the paper speaks to the limitations and short-sightedness of Canada's approach to IE as soft power in this era of new geopolitics and concludes with three recommendations for Canada.

As immigration polices increasingly entangle with those of higher education (HE), institutions are being positioned as migrant surveillance actors. HE's participation in state-managed international student compliance regimes (ISCRs), for example, raises political and ethical questions, including those concerning the core mission of HE. This paper traces the Canadian ISCR context over the past decade, focusing on the introduction of the Designated Learning Institution (DLI) student compliance reporting requirement in 2014. It argues that Canadian HE's role in surveilling temporary residents on behalf of the state is a problematic bordering practice. It also posits that this new form of surveillance is not necessarily a novel compromise of HE's values, but rather connected to historical patterns of HE's involvement in border imperialism. It questions the benevolence of both Canada's immigration policies towards international students and, ultimately, higher education itself.

As the United States northern neighbor, Canada serves as a NATO ally and a strategic partner with Washington through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Canadian forces have fought honorably and bravely in concert with American forces in many wars. Canada's Government, however, has been less consistent in promoting a credible vision of Canadian national security policy and geopolitical interests in its defense white papers. These documents have often contained idealistic rhetoric about adhering to a rules-based international order and defending freedom. In reality, Canadian governments of varying political parties have consistently failed to provide the sustained funding and coherent national security strategy to make Ottawa an effective partner with the U.S. and the NATO alliance in addressing historical and emerging national security threats. This article examines Canadian defense white papers for several decades and recommends ways Canada can ensure its defense policy planning can have greater credibility in the national security policymaking corridors of its allies and with potential adversaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little research has examined public diplomacy as a comparative education issue, particularly regarding social-psychological, economic and political fears or personal and national insecurities. This paper discusses American public diplomacy as a mostly Cold War strategy adapted to post-9/11 national security interests, fears and desires. It further explores differences, similarities, and debates in Canadian media, policy documents and academia, in response to American political, economic and military pressures or demands for a "North American" (i.e. joint American-Canadian) security approach. From a critical pedagogy perspective the paper argues that modern public diplomacy has been a dubious, pseudo-educational, fear-mongering concept nurtured by academics, politicians and military leaders as part of an American foreign policy, military security and propaganda strategy. The paper further shows that post-9/11 Canada, problematically, adapted its own public diplomacy policies to serve American interests. Further research is needed to examine more closely public diplomacy's impacts on Canadian education. (Contains 1 note.)

This article argues that post-September 11 political debates and legislation around security necessitates a reconsideration of a right to privacy in Canada. It looks at the proposal for a Canadian Charter of Privacy Rights promoted by Senator Sheila Finestone in the late 1990s and the current challenges of emergent material technologies accelerated by digitization and political technologies of regulation and governance.

The article explores the political history of Canada during the administration of prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Emphasis is given to aspects of foreign policy such as procurement for the armed forces, Canada's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and collective defense against the Soviet Union.

This paper reviews the legislative history and application of the Criminal Code's definition of terrorist activity to trace how the "motive clause" reinforces systemic racism within Canada's criminal justice system. By outlining this process, this paper argues that the motive clause contributes to a dynamic that racializes terror offences as a specific type of criminal offence committed by racialized individuals--marking terrorism as a unique social characteristic of racialized communities. This occurs mainly due to the legislative requirement to prosecute the ideas of accused persons, which, in practice, has increased the likelihood of courts admitting otherwise prejudicial evidence against the accused and the problematic ways in which expert evidence has (or has not) been used in terrorism trials. Although discrimination may not be an inevitable or intended outcome of the drafted legislation, it creates a framework that encourages discriminatory prosecutorial strategies, facilitates bias in the admission and treatment of some evidence, and potentially contributes to the exclusive use of the provisions against racialized communities specifically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reprint of an address to the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture and Environment of the Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Washington, D.C., March 2, 1989 by Bruce Halliday, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada. Discusses national and global problems and the Canadian perspective. (LZ)

This research paper seeks to explain why investment‐recipient countries, like Australia and Canada, reject certain investments in strategic industries and shield some domestic business from foreign acquisitions. Existing studies suggest that the decision to restrict FDI is driven by national security concerns, which are often conceptualized as a catch‐all concept. This paper develops a novel theoretical construct – 'FDI acceptability threshold' (a maximum point of political tolerance for any given foreign investment) – to provide a more nuanced understanding of government decisions to reject FDI. This theoretical construct is based on four factors – nature of the domestic firm/industry, nature of the acquirer, external opposition, and domestic backlash. Drawing on two cases of Chinese SOEs' investment in the energy sector in Australia and Canada, this paper demonstrates that investment‐recipient countries are more likely to protect a domestic business where foreign ownership threatens domestic industry by exceeding FDI acceptability thresholds. Given that these thresholds are often not directly identified in the host country's policies, this paper proposes that host countries should clarify these conditions to ensure that they continue to attract FDI. The theory of 'FDI acceptability thresholds', developed in this paper, can be used to explain which companies or industries may be eligible for protection from the home government. In broader terms, these thresholds explain the theoretical link between national security concerns and FDI protectionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academic debate on the interplay between politics and intelligence is dominated by the U.S. experience. Our research, based on interviews with over sixty individuals in the Canadian intelligence and national security community and including political staffers, provides a new case study: that of Canada, a middle power with considerable access to intelligence through the Five Eyes partnership. We found that cases of hard politicization of intelligence analysis are virtually non-existent in Canada. The most important factor explaining this finding is Canada's structural position in the world, or how its geography shapes the broader context of interactions between intelligence and politics. Beyond this, six more specific factors at the domestic level also matter: the relative unimportance of foreign and security policy as political issues, few opportunities, a lack of political benefits, low intelligence literacy generally among policy makers, poor transparency in national security decision making, and a tradition of non-partisanship in the civil service. The paper concludes by reflecting on this assessment: while hard politicization remains a rarity in Canada, the shields that have prevented the emergence of politicization will likely be increasingly tested in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Periodic revelations about the workings of data interception, analysis and collection in Canada have each time prompted successive administrations to amend laws and regulations in order to calm public opinion. This has been referred to as “accountability through scandal” and has, for the most part, produced cosmetic changes rather than significant reform. Most of the practices and the ethos of the organizations have remained the same, setting the stage for the next scandal. This paper reviews the last scandal to befall the Canadian Security Establishment, caused by the Snowden revelations, and the subsequent political response. Approached with part of Foucault’s toolbox it becomes clear that the business of the state and state security requires a particular form of “management of illegalisms,” or differential treatment of rule-breaking, at the higher echelons of state power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting in 1967, with the issuance of an Order-in-Council by Canada’s Privy Council, the concept of providing Canadians access to their Federal Government Records was promulgated through their National Archives (now Library and Archives Canada - LAC). In the intervening decades, LAC has reviewed millions of pages of Security and Intelligence Records and, whenever possible, released them. Now, as the Canadian Federal Government examines changes to the Access to Information Act, as well as changes to Canada’s National Security systems, there is a new commitment to National Security Transparency. The intent of this paper is to examine the historic provision of archival access to the records of Canada’s Federal Security and Intelligence Records, in particular to the archival records of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Through a proper application of the terms of the Access to Information Act to the Canada’s Federal Security and Intelligence files, carried out in consultation with Canada’s intelligence community, Library and Archives Canada has embraced its responsibilities to Governmental Openness and the needs and requirements of National Security. In doing so, LAC has worked to balance  legislatively mandated commitment to chart a course between desirable accessibility and the operational needs of Canada’s Security/Intelligence community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Higher Education is the property of Canadian Society for the Study of Higher Education and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the electronic, peer-reviewed Occasional Papers on Public Policy series published by the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States (ACSUS). These papers are intended to highlight ongoing research in Canadian domestic and foreign policy at the federal, provincial and city levels. One of the research presented in this article concerns the marijuana issue in terms of the growing volume of the drug being smuggled into the U.S. from Canada, the increased potency of the strains of marijuana grown in Canada, and the differences in judicial deterrents adopted to penalize possession and cultivation.

Since McCallum's (1995) finding of surprisingly high border effects on trade between the US and Canada, there have been a number of studies on other parts of the world, and improvements made to the gravity model to measure this effect accurately. This paper suggests some other modifications to the model, and applies it to a region of the world that presents a distinctly interesting case. Changes in border effects of formerly socialist countries in Central and East Europe, and countries in the former Soviet Union are analyzed during 1976-2002 at country and sectoral levels, and also with respect to blocs of countries. A discussion on cross-country variations in border effects follows the computations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Syrian Civil War and the rise of the Islamic State have attracted thousands of foreign fighters from Western countries. One hundred and ninety of these individuals have a nexus to Canada, and approximately 60 have returned home. To date, despite concerns that these returning foreign fighters pose a national security threat in Canada, only three have been convicted of the Criminal Code's terrorism offences--a meager figure that exposes a legal and policy vacuum in Canada's approach to the foreign fighter phenomenon. Canada's terrorism offenses were designed to prosecute domestic offenders and are ill-equipped to effectively impose criminal sanctions on returning foreign fighters. Prosecutions are hamstrung by the inherent difficulty of extracting courtroom-worthy evidence from foreign war zones. As a result, Canada is left with an incomplete toolbox that is overly reliant on community de-radicalization programs, reintegration, and surveillance. While these are indispensable tools, exclusive reliance on this approach neglects the important deterrent and denunciatory effects of criminal sanctions, particularly for high-risk individuals who remain hostile and ideologically engaged. To address this legislative gap, this paper proposes two Criminal Code offences that prohibit (1) travelling to a declared conflict zone for non-legitimate purposes, and (2) engaging in "hostile activities" while in a foreign country. Both offences are designed to address the challenge of collecting war-zone evidence and facilitate effective prosecution of foreign fighters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) now appearing as if it has lost the ability to control territory and many of its members fleeing the region, the Canadian government must now address the possibility of citizens who have become "foreign fighters" returning home, radicalized and prepared to commit acts of terror. This compels officials from Public Safety Canada to ask important questions about who these radicals are, what they will do next, and what can be done to protect Canadians if they come home. This paper reviews the international and domestic legal framework as applied in Canada and discusses how authorities are seeking to apply the law to returning foreign fighters. The paper then inquiries into the legal implications of returning foreign fighters. It is contended that while Canada's legal system offers an adequate response for the time being, it does not guarantee security and may have significant loopholes which could constrain its application. To counter this, authorities must continue to develop and adapt broader policy approaches in order to deal with an undefined and emerging threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a reading of Iqbal Rammowalia’s novelWhat the Judges Wouldn’t See?[2005]. It is a fictional narrative of post-1984 events in a Canadian Sikh household, which, readers are invited to believe, bears closely upon the crashing of Air India plane in June 1985. The plot devised by Rammowalia turns out to be a caricature of gross distortion. Its tall claim of portraying a realistic scenario of a conspiracy is unconvincing – knowing Canada’s two national security agencies could not substantiate such a contention. As it stands, Rammowalia’s creative work only lends its weight to a shelf-load of prejudiced writings concerning the Canadian Sikhs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On the basis of a study of American, British and Canadian records, this article examines the relationship of France to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty from the perspective of the ‘ABC’ countries, particularly Canada. How did the perceived vulnerability of France influence the approach of the members of the ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ to the justification, timing and contents of the proposed pact? How did France's inclusion in Western Union and its exclusion from the preliminary talks in the Pentagon affect American, British and Canadian attitudes to the development of the draft alternatively known as the ‘Pentagon Paper’ or the ‘State Department Draft’? These questions are addressed, as well as the impact on the later ambassadorial talks of France's priority to immediate rearmament and its determination to include the departments of Algeria within the defensive perimeter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Finally, the article assesses the extent to which France and its requirements influenced the policies and actions of the Canadian government throughout the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Could a growing transatlantic rift regarding the use of military force outside Europe propel the political break-up of Canada? The first part of the paper argues that, in addition to its liberal-democratic values, Canada's bicultural national identity accounts for much of its Atlanticist international security policy. The second part of the paper examines the prevalence of this Atlanticist strategic culture in the face of two contemporary cases of transatlantic (dis)unity, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to assess the potentially disruptive nature of transatlantic discord on Canada's political unity. It finds, somewhat counter-intuitively, that transatlantic unity - rather than disunity - could more probably generate national unity crises in Canada in the event of continuing 'out-of-area' military operations undertaken by NATO allies. This is mainly because of a growing tendency among Quebec's sovereignist political elites' to mobilise Quebecers' distinct attitudes regarding overseas military expeditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to place the Canadian security certificate program in critical context. The program is a mechanism of arbitrary detention targeted to non-citizens the state has certified as 'threats' to national security. As a mechanism of arbitrary detention the program fully locates Canadian policies inside of, and not in some manner external to, the worst abuses and 'exceptional practices' associated with the 'global war on terror'. To place this program in critical context, the author draws upon the notion of 'exception'. Although the security certificate program does invoke an exceptional practice in the terms made legible in recent discussions in critical security studies, it also points to ways in which critical discussions of 'exception' might be deepened and complicated. To this end, the paper put forwards the notion of the 'legal complex' to highlight the mundane and often contested ways in which the exception is invoked to certify which racialized bodies might be governed as political citizens and which will be governed as 'bare life'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic culture remains a highly contested but potentially vital concept in the analysis of security policy. This paper contributes to the strategic culture debate by using the cases of Australia and Canada to assess the utility of strategic culture as an explanatory tool. Much of the debate over strategic culture hinges on the proper relationship between the ideational and material variables in analyzing a country's security policy, and the attendant difficulties of distinguishing between strategic culture and strategic behaviour. We argue that if strategic culture is defined in an inclusive way to include ideational factors, material factors, and strategic behaviour, one will develop a richer understanding of a country's strategic situation. Using this approach, this paper undertakes a long-range historical survey of strategic culture in these two countries. We show that in both countries, strategic culture remains relatively stable for extended periods of time, usually changing only when patterns of global power shift, and provides a better explanation for contemporary security policy in both countries than perspectives that focus on purely material or ideational factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002 was a watershed development in international politics. Deciding that the threat from rogue states outweighed concerns about how Russia (and the larger international community) would respond, the Bush administration revealed that in the post-September 11 environment, it was not prepared to give other states an effective veto over US security policy. However, the announcement had enormous repercussions for allies as well as adversaries. This paper will examine how two close US allies—Canada and the UK—have reacted to the missile defense program. It will demonstrate that, while both have moved progressively closer to formal participation, the two countries have resisted making specific commitments because of political considerations. With initial deployment of the missile shield scheduled for later this year, the paper reveals that the US can expect allies to continue to react with caution, but that wariness should not necessarily be confused with opposition and/or defiance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Public Administration is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since 2001, border security policy between Canada and the US has morphed from “smart borders” to the present “beyond the border” (perimeter security) agreement resulting in the expansion of new techniques of border surveillance including pre-emptive profiling of travellers and biometric data sharing. In this paper, we argue that these border agreements have increasingly resulted in a changing experience of sovereign power for those crossing the border. This is demonstrated through a discussion of: the major border policies between Canada and the US since 11 September 2001, developed under the influence of US hegemony; how these policies perpetrate a generalised state of exception; and how these policies affect refugees, migrants, and citizens. Reading Agamben’s insights from a sociological perspective, we argue that the presumption of security-through-surveillance erodes border crossers’ human rights, and that some people – those from disadvantaged race/class backgrounds – are more affected than others by the implementation of the evolving border regime. We also emphasise the contingencies and unintended consequences of the ongoing projects. The conclusion offers brief comments on the consequences of these developments on Canadian identity and points out the directions for future research in this domain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In northwestern Washington State, the United States Border Patrol expanded its operations inland from the international boundary with Canada in 2007. The expansion resulted in the frequent questioning and detention of community members who are Latino, non-timber forest workers, and people of color until such practices became less common by 2012. These tactics reflect a broader pattern of racial profiling through inland policing implemented across the US border with Canada. In this paper, I make the case for a critical race approach to understanding bordering practices in settings coded as 'peaceful' or without racial tensions. Towards this end, I analyze how racialized exclusions in northwestern Washington are articulated across scales, from local forest management, to federal policy. Further, I trace the relational construction of the western US borderlands with Canada and Mexico - spaces connected by a common heritage of conquest, although generally not conceptualized as such. My argument is that racial thinking is inherent to the production and maintenance of United States borders. A critical race approach is crucial at a time when practices carried out in the name of 'homeland security' threaten the wellbeing of borderland communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the use of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and the International Emergencies Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), in the US trade policy of the presidency of Donald Trump, towards its North American partners. From a political economy approach and from addressing case studies, the article argues that these laws have been transformed from tools to deal with rival countries, to resources of power to obtain concessions from Canada and Mexico both in the commercial and commercial sphere. in other areas of your relationship. Specifically, for Section 232, the case of steel and aluminum tariffs against Canada and Mexico is addressed. In the case of the IEEPA, reference is made to the tariff threats filed by the United States against Mexico in 2019. Based on this, the article identifies the ways in which the United States authorities have reinterpreted the provisions of the laws to use them as resources that assert their market power in regional negotiations. At the end, the article explains in a general way, a strategic course available for Canada and Mexico, to counteract the contemporary use that the United States has made of its national security laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]