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EPANET is widely employed to simulate water quality in water distribution systems. However, in general, the time-driven simulation approach used to determine concentrations of water-quality constituents provides accurate results only for short water-quality time steps. Overly long time steps can yield errors in concentration estimates and can result in situations in which constituent mass is not conserved. The use of a time step that is sufficiently short to avoid these problems may not always be feasible. The absence of EPANET errors or warnings does not ensure conservation of mass. This paper provides examples illustrating mass imbalances and explains how such imbalances can occur because of fundamental limitations in the water-quality routing algorithm used in EPANET. In general, these limitations cannot be overcome by the use of improved water-quality modeling practices. This paper also presents a preliminary event-driven approach that conserves mass with a water-quality time step that is as long as the hydraulic time step. Results obtained using the current approach converge, or tend to converge, toward those obtained using the preliminary event-driven approach as the water-quality time step decreases. Improving the water-quality routing algorithm used in EPANET could eliminate mass imbalances and related errors in estimated concentrations. The results presented in this paper should be of value to those who perform water-quality simulations using EPANET or use the results of such simulations, including utility managers and engineers.

When a water distribution system (WDS) is contaminated, short-term inhalation exposures to airborne contaminants could occur as the result of domestic water use. The most important domestic sources of such exposures are likely to be showering and the use of aerosol-producing humidifiers, i.e., ultrasonic and impeller (cool-mist) units. A framework is presented for assessing the potential effects of short-term, system-wide inhalation exposures that could result from such activities during a contamination event. This framework utilizes available statistical models for showering frequency and duration, available exposure models for showering and humidifier use, and experimental results on both aerosol generation and the volatilization of chemicals during showering. New models for the times when showering occurs are developed using time-use data for the United States. Given a lack of similar models for how humidifiers are used, or the information needed to develop them, an analysis of the sensitivity of results to assumptions concerning humidifier use is presented. The framework is applied using network models for three actual WDSs. Simple models are developed for estimating upper bounds on the potential effects of system-wide inhalation exposures associated with showering and humidifier use. From a system-wide, population perspective, showering could result in significant inhalation doses of volatile chemical contaminants, and humidifier use could result in significant inhalation doses of microbial contaminants during a contamination event. From a system-wide perspective, showering is unlikely to be associated with significant doses of microbial contaminants. Given the potential importance of humidifiers as a source of airborne contaminants during a contamination event, an improved understanding of the nature of humidifier use is warranted.

The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the lead federal agency for the security of drinking water in the United States. The agency is responsible for providing information and technical assistance to the more than 50,000 water utilities across the country. The distributed physical layout of drinking-water utilities makes them inherently vulnerable to contamination incidents caused by terrorists. To counter this threat, the EPA is using operations research to design, test, and deploy contamination warning systems (CWSs) that rapidly detect the presence of contaminants in drinking water. We developed a software tool to optimize the design process, published a decision-making process to assist utilities in applying the tool, pilot-tested the tool on nine large water utilities, and provided training and technical assistance to a larger group of utilities. We formed a collaborative team of industry, academia, and government to critique our approach and share CWS deployment experiences. Our work has demonstrated that a CWS is a cost-effective, timely, and capable method of detecting a broad range of contaminants. Widespread application of these new systems will significantly reduce the risks associated with catastrophic contamination incidents: the median estimated fatalities reduction for the nine utilities already studied is 48 percent; the corresponding economic-impact reduction is over $19 billion. Because of this operations research program, online monitoring programs, such as a CWS, are now the accepted technology for reducing contamination risks in drinking water.

The Water Security Toolkit (WST) is a suite of open source software tools that can be used by water utilities to create response strategies to reduce the impact of contamination in a water distribution network . WST includes hydraulic and water quality modeling software , optimizati on methodologies , and visualization tools to identify: (1) sensor locations to detect contamination, (2) locations in the network in which the contamination was introduced, (3) hydrants to remove contaminated water from the distribution system, (4) locations in the network to inject decontamination agents to inactivate, remove, or destroy contaminants, (5) locations in the network to take grab sample s to help identify the source of contamination and (6) valves to close in order to isolate contaminate d areas of the network. This user manual describes the different components of WST , along w ith examples and case studies. License Notice The Water Security Toolkit (WST) v.1.2 Copyright c 2012 Sandia Corporation. Under the terms of Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000, there is a non-exclusive license for use of this work by or on behalf of the U.S. government. This software is distributed under the Revised BSD License (see below). In addition, WST leverages a variety ofmore » third-party software packages, which have separate licensing policies: Acro Revised BSD License argparse Python Software Foundation License Boost Boost Software License Coopr Revised BSD License Coverage BSD License Distribute Python Software Foundation License / Zope Public License EPANET Public Domain EPANET-ERD Revised BSD License EPANET-MSX GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.3 gcovr Revised BSD License GRASP ATT includes randomsample and sideconstraints executable files LZMA SDK Public Domain nose GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.2.1 ordereddict MIT License pip MIT License PLY BSD License PyEPANET Revised BSD License Pyro MIT License PyUtilib Revised BSD License PyYAML MIT License runpy2 Python Software Foundation License setuptools Python Software Foundation License / Zope Public License six MIT License TinyXML zlib License unittest2 BSD License Utilib Revised BSD License virtualenv MIT License Vol Common Public License vpykit Revised BSD License Additionally, some precompiled WST binary distributions might bundle other third-party executables files: Coliny Revised BSD License (part of Acro project) Dakota GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.2.1 PICO Revised BSD License (part of Acro project) i Revised BSD License Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * Neither the name of Sandia National Laboratories nor Sandia Corporation nor the names of its con- tributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS %22AS IS%22 AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IM- PLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL SANDIA CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUD- ING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ii Acknowledgements This work was supported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development (Interagency Agreement %23 DW8992192801). The material in this document has been subject to technical and policy review by the U.S. EPA, and approved for publication. The views expressed by individual authors, however, are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Mention of trade names, products, or services does not convey official U.S. EPA approval, endorsement, or recommendation. The Water Security Toolkit is an extension of the Threat Ensemble Vulnerability Assessment-Sensor Place- ment Optimization Tool (TEVA-SPOT), which was also developed with funding from the U.S. Environ- mental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development (Interagency Agreement %23 DW8992192801). The authors acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions to the devel- opment of TEVA-SPOT: Jonathan Berry (Sandia National Laboratories), Erik Boman (Sandia National Laboratories), Lee Ann Riesen (Sandia National Laboratories), James Uber (University of Cincinnati), and Jean-Paul Watson (Sandia National Laboratories). iii Acronyms ATUS American Time-Use Survey BLAS Basic linear algebra sub-routines CFU Colony-forming unit CVAR Conditional value at risk CWS Contamination warning system EA Evolutionary algorithm EDS Event detection system EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EC Extent of Contamination ERD EPANET results database file GLPK GNU Linear Programming Kit GRASP Greedy randomized adaptive sampling process HEX Hexadecimal HTML HyperText markup language INP EPANET input file LP Linear program MC Mass consumed MILP Mixed integer linear program MIP Mixed integer program MSX Multi-species extension for EPANET NFD Number of failed detections NS Number of sensors NZD Non-zero demand PD Population dosed PE Population exposed PK Population killed TAI Threat assessment input file TCE Tailed-conditioned expectation TD Time to detection TEC Timed extent of contamination TEVA Threat ensemble vulnerability assessment TSB Tryptic soy broth TSG Threat scenario generation file TSI Threat simulation input file VAR Value at risk VC Volume consumed WST Water Security Toolkit YML YAML configuration file format for WST iv Symbols Notation Definition Example %7B , %7D set brackets %7B 1,2,3 %7D means a set containing the values 1,2, and 3. [?] is an element of s [?] S means that s is an element of the set S . [?] for all s = 1 [?] s [?] S means that the statement s = 1 is true for all s in set S . P summation P n i =1 s i means s 1 + s 2 + * * * + s n . %5C set minus S %5C T means the set that contains all those elements of S that are not in set T . %7C given %7C is used to define conditional probability. P ( s %7C t ) means the prob- ability of s occurring given that t occurs. %7C ... %7C cardinality Cardinality of a set is the number of elements of the set. If set S = %7B 2,4,6 %7D , then %7C S %7C = 3. v« less