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In due course, the fact that continuing faith in fixed Cold War models, terms, and metrics has stymied the Nuclear Posture Review's (NPR) implementation will be a historical footnote, one with possibly lasting effect. The important question to consider now, however, is not the fate of the 2001 NPR, but rather the fate of future reviews and efforts to better align U.S. strategic policy and requirements with the reality of multiple and diverse opponents, WMD proliferation, and dynamic threat conditions. Many of the basic contours of U.S. strategic policy goals taken into account by the NPR are likely to endure, particularly including the need to deter multiple threats, assure understandably nervous allies, and provide protection against various forms and sizes of attack, including limited nuclear and biological attacks. Future reviews of U.S. strategic policy will confront the same questions of how U.S. strategies and strategic forces can help support these goals in an unpredictable, dynamic threat environment. The continued application of Cold War strategic orthodoxy to those questions will prevent any plausibly useful set of answers. The balance-of-terror tenets, as applied, serve largely to buttress a political agenda of stasis that actually works against the very steps that could facilitate the realignment of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and policy with contemporary realities?including the potential for prudent, deep nuclear force reductions. It is time to move on from the enticing convenience and ease of the brilliant and innovative theoretical strategic framework of the Cold War. That framework is traceable to hubris, unwarranted expectations, and the need for convenience and comfort, however false. It is based on hopes that are beyond realization and conditions that no longer exist. Outside of the unique Cold War standoff that gave it a semblance of coherence, the balance-of-terror lodestar will be a continuing source of dangerous and confused policy guidance., See also ADA508642. Published in Strategic Studies Quarterly, v3 n1, p43-80, Spring 2009.

Purpose of Study: To address criticism of the Administration's publicly- announced position concerning the demarcation between theater and strategic ballistic missile defense systems. The current lack of an agreed demarcation line between theater and strategic missile defense is an issue of concern because both the United States and Russia are interested in deploying effective theater missile defenses (TMD), but do not want to undermine the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was intended to limit ballistic missile defenses (BMD) against long-range strategic offensive missiles. The Administration's publicly-announced position concerning demarcation is that a missile defense system will be considered strategic if it is tested against a target vehicle with a velocity of more than 5 km/second (modern strategic ballistic missiles have velocities of 7 km/sec or more). The proposed demarcation line is to be based on the demonstrated capabilities of the defensive system. Some members of the traditional arms control community (who fear erosion of the ABM Treaty) have advanced arguments in opposition to the Clinton Administration's TMD program and publicly-announced demarcation position. These arguments are addressed in the study as follows

Recently, a series of articles appeared in the Soviet press discussing new and, in some cases, "radical" proposals for changing the structure, mission, and forces of Soviet strategic defenses, including ballistic missile defense (BMD). Because of the potential impact of the Soviet position on BMD on the Strategic Defense Initiative program, the Strategic Red Team analyzed this discussion in light of traditional Soviet military thought and the on-going debate over defense sufficiency. Conclusion None of the proposed alternatives to official policy regarding BMD that are being debated in the USSR has garnered sufficient authoritative support to have caused an identifiable shift in Soviet policy. Based on the majority of recent articles and some statements by officials, it appears that if the Soviets decide to move toward expanded BMD capabilities, their preference will be for revision of the ABM Treaty to permit additional BMD sites and ground-based interceptors. The extent to which additional defensive capabilities and characteristics--such as space basing--might ultimately be negotiable cannot be determined from available evidence.

This report examines the sense in, and likely feasibility of, deep reductions in SALT III. The analysis stresses the interdependence that there should be between defense planning and arms control. Part I addresses Soviet and American strategic doctrinal issues, while Part 2 deals with the issues of strategic defense, theater nuclear forces, and verification. (Author)