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Copyright of Latin American Law Review is the property of Universidad de los Andes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The trend toward the "humanization" of international law reflects a greater emphasis on individuals rather than simply states as objects of concern. The advance of human rights law (HRL) has been an important impetus for this trend. Some observers suggest that humanization can be furthered even more by applying HRL rather than international humanitarian law (IHL) to hostilities between states and nonstate armed groups, unless a state explicitly declares that it is engaged in an armed conflict. This essay argues, however, that a court should not defer to a state's characterization of hostilities, but should base its analysis on whether hostilities meet the criteria for an armed conflict. Applying HRL to hostilities that effectively are an armed conflict but not acknowledged as such risks diluting the legitimacy and normative force of HRL. On the one hand, if a court applies conventional stringent HRL standards, this body of law may be seen as unrealistic and is likely to be ignored. On the other hand, a court that adapts HRL standards to armed conflict may need to take a consequentialist approach at odds with HRL's deontological foundations. Clearly differentiating between HRL and IHL may thus best promote the humanization of warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this iteration of the Review 's "Beyond the Literature" series, we have invited Ezequiel Heffes to introduce his recent book Detention by Non-State Armed Groups under International Law , before then posing a series of questions to Tilman Rodenhäuser, René Provost, Mariana Chacón Lozano and Katharine Fortin, who have agreed to serve as discussants of the book. Tilman Rodenhäuser is a Legal Adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with particular expertise in non-State armed groups (NSAGs) and detention. René Provost is the James McGill Professor of Law at McGill University and has written extensively on public international law, including his recent monograph Rebel Courts: The Administration of Justice by Armed Insurgents. Mariana Chacón Lozano has served as the Operational Legal Coordinator for the ICRC in Colombia since October 2020 and has worked for the ICRC since 2011. Katharine Fortin is Associate Professor at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights within the Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance of Utrecht University. The Review team is grateful to all four discussants, and to Ezequiel, for taking part in this engaging conversation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critiques the articulation of the legal framework applicable to Australian Defence Force operations in Afghanistan found in the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report (Brereton Report). In particular, using the Australian experience in Afghanistan as a case study, the article argues, on the basis of the rules of treaty interpretation, that where a foreign State party to Additional Protocol II (AP II) intervenes in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) to which AP II applies, that foreign State is bound by AP II, in addition to the host State and non-State armed actors that are parties to the NIAC. The article concludes by outlining the reasons why the Brereton Report's silence in relation to AP II matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual "war" against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas , while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The motivations of armed groups are widely considered to be irrelevant for the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL). As long as organized violence is of sufficient intensity, and armed groups have sufficient capacity to coordinate and carry out military operations, there is an armed conflict for purposes of international law. It follows that large-scale criminal organizations can, in principle, be treated legally on a par with political insurgent groups. Drug cartels in particular, if sufficiently armed and well organized, can constitute armed opposition groups in the legal sense when their confrontation with State forces is sufficiently intense. This article problematizes this interpretation. It corroborates standing legal doctrine in finding that subjective motives are not a sound basis to exclude the application of IHL, but it argues that a workable distinction can be made between the strategic logic and the organizational goals of criminal groups and those of political insurgents. Drawing on a growing body of empirical studies on the political economy of criminal violence, a strong presumption is defended against qualifying as armed conflict organized violence involving criminal organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article addresses the protection of the natural environment in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) by applying international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) in a transitional justice tribunal.  In December 2016, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) guerrilla group signed an agreement which established the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), a tribunal designed to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible for the most serious crimes committed during the Colombian Armed Conflict.  The agreement and the regulations of the JEP establish that this tribunal could directly apply IHL and ICL when examining crimes under investigation.  However, case law related to this subject matter is almost nonexistent.  Therefore, the JEP should create case law that can be studied and followed by other international and domestic criminal tribunals, while shedding light on the international standard on environmental protection emanating from IHL and ICL.In this Article, we demonstrate how the JEP can effectively use IHL and ICL when prosecuting war crimes which have harmful effects on the environment.  For this purpose, Part I presents background on the Colombian Armed Conflict.  Part II describes the JEP, the generalities of its legal framework and the specifics of the use of international law by this tribunal.  Part III examines relevant domestic and international sources to explain the insufficiency of domestic law and the ability of international law to surpass those limitations.  Part IV recalls the sources of ICL and IHL related to the protection of the natural environment in NIACs.  Finally, Part V discusses recent JEP decisions related to the protection of the natural environment and some possible conduct to be investigated in the future.  We conclude by describing the benefits of the JEP’s use of international law.

Unconstitutional change of power in Ukraine as a result of the "Maidan revolution" in February 2014, with the subsequent power grab by Ukrainian radicals of local authorities under nationalist slogans, led to the establishment of control over parts of the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions by Donbass militias, and then to the ongoing fighting between the armed formations of the latter with units of the regular armed forces of Ukraine. The purpose of this publication is to establish the form of the armed conflict and its legal consequences from the standpoint of current international law, which has not yet found proper legal analysis and coverage in either domestic or foreign (including Ukrainian) legal doctrinе. In official statements and legislative acts of Ukraine, this conflict is declared as a "state of war with Russia", "aggression of Russia", and the Ukrainian doctrine of international law almost unanimously declares the need to apply to the conflict the norms of international humanitarian law and qualifies it as an international armed conflict. In this publication, on the basis of the analysis of existing international legal norms and legal doctrine, the qualification of existing forms of armed conflicts is carried out: war, international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, internationalized armed conflict. This examines the legal consequences (or otherwise the obligations of the parties to the conflict) that are caused by each form of such armed conflict, that is concealed and ignored by the Ukrainian side. On the basis of the theoretical and legal analysis of the UN Charter, the relevant provisions of the Geneva conventions on the protection of victims of war of 1949 and Additional protocols I and II of 1977, the author qualifies the situation in the South-East of Ukraine as a non-international armed conflict and the obligation to comply with applicable legal norms by all parties to the conflict. At the same time, the author comes to the conclusion about the insolvency of the claims about the applicability of the rules governing other mentioned forms of armed conflicts.

Non-International armed conflicts in which different armed groups are involved is the dominant feature of contemporary armed conflicts. Considering the complex and changing alliances of these groups and the extension of their hostilities across borders, the problem that arises is whether an armed group is considered a party to a non-international armed conflict as defined under international humanitarian law. In this context, the concept of "organized armed groups" is of a fundamental importance, upon which depends the applicability of the international humanitarian law to a specific situation of violence. The research aims to determine the criteria for assessing the fulfilment of the "organization element" in any armed group to be considered a party to a non-international armed conflict. The research also provides an analysis of the link that must exist between the allied armed groups to be considered as a single party to such conflict.

Non-International armed conflicts in which different armed groups are involved is the dominant feature of contemporary armed conflicts. Considering the complex and changing alliances of these groups and the extension of their hostilities across borders, the problem that arises is whether an armed group is considered a party to a non-international armed conflict as defined under international humanitarian law. In this context, the concept of "organized armed groups" is of a fundamental importance, upon which depends the applicability of the international humanitarian law to a specific situation of violence. The research aims to determine the criteria for assessing the fulfilment of the "organization element" in any armed group to be considered a party to a non-international armed conflict. The research also provides an analysis of the link that must exist between the allied armed groups to be considered as a single party to such conflict.

Richard Baxter famously stated that "the first line of defence against international humanitarian law is to deny that it applies at all". While "under-classification" remains an issue today, a parallel trend needs to be acknowledged. This is the tendency to over-classify situations of violence, especially in relation to transnational terrorist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State group or Al-Qaeda. This tendency stems from practical difficulties inherent in the changing operational environment. The last few years have witnessed a proliferation of armed non-State actors that are labelled or designated as terrorists (e.g., in Iraq, Syria, Mali, Nigeria and Yemen). Terrorist groups are characterized by opaque, often volatile organizational structures and tend to operate in decentralized networks rather than clear hierarchies. The formation of splinter groups, changing alliances, temporary reunification and even open hostility among former allies are common phenomena. This complex factual situation has led to the proliferation of theories of conflict classification, many of them arguing in favour of more flexible classification via the loosening of existing standards. Because international humanitarian law is in many respects less protective than international human rights law, particularly regarding the rules on the use of force and detention, classifying a situation of violence as an armed conflict when the threshold has not been met is a problem that should not be underestimated. In this article, we revisit the criteria of intensity and organization, as well as the related matter of the role of motives in conflict classification, considering conflicts involving armed groups described as terrorists. Our goal is to identify minimum requirements that could diminish the risk of over-classification by various stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While armed conflicts are principally governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), activities of members of non-State armed groups and their affiliates may also qualify as terrorist offences. After explaining why the concurrent application of IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism causes friction, this article analyzes the chief mechanism for dissipating this friction: a clause excluding activities governed by IHL from the scope of criminal law instruments on terrorism. Such armed conflict exclusion clauses exist at the international, regional and national level. This article explains how an exclusion clause can best avoid friction between IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether and how non-State armed groups, as distinct entities, might be required to provide reparations for their violations of international humanitarian law. It shows that the possibility of holding armed groups to reparations is marked by uncertainty in international law. This complex question calls for clarification. In building on these observations, the article explores how the duty to provide reparations by armed groups could be operationalized as a matter of lex ferenda. This exercise involves examining how such a duty could be conceptualized and put into practice. From this discussion, a multi-faceted proposal emerges, which draws upon existing approaches in international law and responds to the particular challenges presented by armed groups. The article ends by considering the implications of the proposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent non-international armed conflicts in countries such as the Central African Republic, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, various non-State armed groups (NSAGs) have exercised control over territory and people living therein. In many cases, and for a variety of reasons, NSAGs perform some form of governance in these territories, which can include the maintenance of order or the provision of justice, health care, or social services. The significance of such measures became particularly apparent when in 2020 not only governments but also armed groups took steps to halt the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article examines key legal issues that arise in these contexts. First, it analyzes the extent to which international humanitarian law protects the life and dignity of persons living under the control of NSAGs, rebutting doubts as to whether this field of international law has a role in regulating what is sometimes called "rebel governance". Second, it provides a brief overview of aspects of the lives of people in armed group-controlled territory that are addressed by international humanitarian law and aspects that instead fall into the realm of human rights law. Third, the article discusses whether and to what extent human rights law can be said to bind NSAGs as a matter of law and flags issues that need further attention in current and future debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the notion of intensity in the context of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the Geneva Conventions in order to establish whether AP II demands a different intensity threshold from the minimum threshold of intensity contemplated in common Article 3. The paper considers the question of whether the inclusion of the term "sustained" in the phrase "sustained and concerted military operations" intrinsic to the threshold in Article 1(1) of AP II introduces a temporal requirement in addition to mere protracted armed violence. The paper argues that the inclusion of the term "sustained" in Article 1(1) of AP II potentially demands prolonged protracted armed violence. The research aims to contribute to the existing literature on the notion of intensity demanded by the scope of application inherent in AP II through an interrogation of the phrase "sustained" military operations by employing the rules of treaty interpretation and by examining relevant case law and scholarly debate. In this way, the author hopes to contribute towards filling a lacuna with regard to the minimum threshold for intensity in the context of treaty law concerned with the classification of non-international armed conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past, most armed conflicts were international, but today armed conflicts often are non-international and internal conflicts. However most of international armed conflicts rules are about international armed conflicts and some of them regulate non-international conflicts. Applicability of some of international humanitarian law rules to this kind of conflicts is doubtful. One of these rules is the principle of proportionality. This principle means that incidental and consequential damages resulting from an attack against civilians or civilian objects should not exceed the direct military advantage expected of the attack. 1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which deals with the rules governing non-international conflicts has not referred to this principle. However, in accordance with what is discussed in this paper, the principle of proportionality is applicable to these conflicts.

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflicts has gained increasing political momentum and visibility over the last two decades. Syria, Iraq and Mali, among others, have witnessed the intentional destruction of their cultural heritage by non-State armed groups (NSAGs) that have invoked Islamic law and principles to legitimize their actions. The response of the international community has predominantly focused on the material aspect, to the detriment of the significant impact on the associated intangible manifestation of cultural heritage in local communities. This article argues that several Islamic legal rules and principles may, more adequately than international humanitarian law, safeguard the intangible dimension of cultural heritage in certain contemporary armed conflicts in Muslim contexts. It aims to demonstrate the importance of drawing from multiple legal traditions in order to enhance the protection of intangible cultural heritage in armed conflicts and to strengthen engagement with the relevant NSAGs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decades have seen an increasing amount of intra-State wars unfold. The term ‘terrorism’ has increasingly become a license for States to unilaterally conduct their action. Because of that, determining the applicable legal norms that delimit the State’s military power and regulate the warring parties’ conducts is of ultimate importance. Although the legal test for the applicability of international humanitarian law in noninternational armed conflict has been largely settled – first found in the second Protocol additional to the Geneva Convention and second supplemented by international tribunals as declaratory of customary IHL – terrorism has caused much frustration in the course of such legal determination, not helped by the obscure facts on the ground. This article will argue that by subjectively classifying a situation as ‘terrorism’ the State has not displaced the applicability question. In fact, the impact that terrorism has on the legal assessment is minimal, if any.

Legal controversies and disagreements have arisen about the timing and duration of numerous contemporary armed conflicts, not least regarding how to discern precisely when those conflicts began and when they ended (if indeed they have ended). The existence of several long-running conflicts – some stretching across decades – and the corresponding suffering that they entail accentuate the stakes of these debates. To help shed light on some select aspects of the duration of contemporary wars, this article analyzes two sets of legal issues: first, the notion of "protracted armed conflict" as formulated in a war-crimes-related provision of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and second, the rules, principles and standards laid down in international humanitarian law and international criminal law pertaining to when armed conflicts have come to an end. The upshot of the analysis is that under existing international law, there is no general category of "protracted armed conflict"; that the question of whether to pursue such a category raises numerous challenges; and that several dimensions of the law concerning the end of armed conflict are unsettled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2002, an organization was established in Iraq which was later named as ISIS. By taking control of considerable parts of Iraq and Syria, this non-state actor has taken terrorist acts in occupied territories. DAESH, which has been recognized as a terrorist group, uses terrorist methods to achieve its goals. ISIS's acts in Iraq and Syria are not of those sporadic terrorist actions which can be dealt with through peaceful means and judicial mechanism stipulated in the anti-terrorism treaties. Given the definition set out in Article 1(2) of protocol II of 1977, the current situation in Iraq and Syria is categorized as non-international armed conflict which is governed by humanitarian rules provided in the Article 3 Common to 1949 Geneva Conventions and protocol II. Terrorism negates fundamental principles of humanity which underlie International Humanitarian Law (IHL). As such, the Article 3 Common to 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 4 (2) of protocol II prohibit terrorist acts in non-international armed conflicts. The parties engaged in the armed conflicts are obliged to observe humanitarian rules provided in Geneva Conventions and its protocols. Nevertheless, ISIS's inhuman acts in Iraq and Syria clearly show breach of IHL. Furthermore, ISIS which is alleging to establish Islamic state and to carry out Islamic rules in the occupied territory has taken actions which are against Islamic norms and rules.

International humanitarian law is applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts. Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol I of 1977, as well as all other rules of international humanitarian law, are applicable in international armed conflicts, while Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II of 1977 are applicable in non-international armed conflicts. The aim of these rules is to protect persons who are not involved in conflict or have ceased to actively participate in it. The paper will give an overview of protection enjoyed by specific categories of persons protected in both types of armed conflict.

This article considers which legal regimes apply in cases where a Danish citizen and/or resident returns from Syria or Iraq after having taken part in the armed conflict on behalf of the group known as Islamic State, and continues his/her affiliation with the armed group. The article argues that international humanitarian law currently applies to the Danish territory and that a Danish foreign fighter may continue to be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities after having returned from Iraq or Syria. The article then considers the application of Danish criminal law to returned foreign fighters and argues that Danish counterterrorism laws do not apply to members of the armed forces of an armed group that is party to an armed conflict with Denmark. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One key area in which international humanitarian law (IHL) needs strengthening is the protection of persons deprived of their liberty in relation to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). While the Geneva Conventions contain more than 175 rules regulating deprivation of liberty in relation to international armed conflicts in virtually all its aspects, no comparable legal regime applies in NIAC. Since 2011, States and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have worked jointly on ways to strengthen IHL protecting persons deprived of their liberty. Between 2011 and 2015, the ICRC facilitated consultations to identify options and recommendations to strengthen detainee protection in times of armed conflict; since 2015, the objective of the process has shifted towards work on one or more concrete and implementable outcomes. The present note recalls the legal need to strengthen detainee protection in times of NIAC and the main steps that have been taken over the past years to strengthen IHL. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La presente investigación busca estudiar el proceso de surgimiento y afianzamiento de la figura de la responsabilidad internacional individual por crímenes de guerra cometidos en el contexto de conflictos armados no internacionales, los cuales han caracterizado el Derecho internacional contemporáneo. Para tal efecto, se hace un estudio de la respectiva norma de Derecho internacional consuetudinario la cual se cristalizó en el Derecho internacional convencional, representado por el Estatuto de la Corte Penal InternacionalThe present research seeks to study the process of emergence and consolidation of the institution of international individual responsibility for war crimes committed in the context of non-international armed conflicts, which have characterized contemporary International law. In order to reach that purpose, it is studied the respective customary international humanitarian law rule which crystallized in the treaty international law, represented by the International Criminal Court Statute

The international community faced with non-international armed conflicts that threaten international peace and security in recent years more frequently. Hundreds of thousands civilians were forced to leave their homes and many of them were either killed or injured as a result of non-international armed conflicts in 1990s. The international community has been in search of a solution for such situations to provide security and humanitarian aid to civilians at risk. In this regard, safety zones may be one of the most effective measures available to the international community to alleviate human suffering in current conflict countries. The article scrutinizes past examples of safety zones and includes legal analysis of such zones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since their publication in the 1950s and 1980s respectively, the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 have become a major reference for the application and interpretation of those treaties. The International Committee of the Red Cross, together with a team of renowned experts, is currently updating these Commentaries in order to document developments and provide up-to-date interpretations of the treaty texts. Following a brief overview of the methodology and process of the update as well as a historical background to the Second Geneva Convention, this article addresses the scope of applicability of the Convention, the type of vessels it protects (in particular hospital ships and coastal rescue craft), and its relationship with other sources of international humanitarian law and international law conferring protection to persons in distress at sea. It also outlines differences and commonalities between the First and the Second Conventions, including how these have been reflected in the updated Commentary on the Second Convention. Finally, the article highlights certain substantive obligations under the Convention and how the updated Commentary addresses some of the interpretive questions they raise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since their publication in 1950s and 1980s, respectively, the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 have become a major reference for the application and interpretation of these treaties. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), together with a team of renowned experts, is currently updating these Commentaries in order to document developments and provide up-to-date interpretations. The work on the first updated Commentary, the Commentary on the First Geneva Convention relating to the protection of the wounded and sick in the armed forces, has already been finalized. This article provides an overview of the methodology and process of the update and summarizes the main evolutions in the interpretation of the treaty norms reflected in the updated Commentary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In war, individuals are vulnerable not only physically but also in terms of their cultural identity, and the obliteration of cultural heritage often becomes a central issue. This is particularly the case in armed conflicts with an ethnic, cultural or religious character. In some regions, cultural heritage consists more of monuments and objects; it is a “tangible” heritage, mostly protected by the law of armed conflict. Elsewhere, where structures are impermanent, cultural heritage is mainly expressed through orality, gestures, rituals, music and other forms of expression that individuals create using various media and instruments. Such heritage is mainly “intangible”. This essay aims to show that cultural heritage is both tangible and intangible, and that the law which protects such heritage is not limited to the law of armed conflict. Cultural heritage also benefits from the protection of other applicable instruments, such as human rights treaties and the UNESCO cultural heritage conventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article has the objective of analyzing if the bacrim groups can be considered as part of the non-international armed conflict in Colombia. To answer the abovementioned question, this article studies the norms, cases and doctrine applicable under IHL, in order to establish when does a non-international armed conflict exists and when the concept of direct participation in hostilities applies. Also, it analyses two cases of bacrim groups, in order to determine whether they fulfill the requirements of IHL. Having addressed this analysis, this article concludes that the bacrim groups can be recognized as part of the armed conflict, considering the intensity of the hostilities between these groups and the Colombian military forces and/or the farc; the internal organization of the groups and the threat they impose on civilians. As a consequence, this article recommends that the State should reconsider how to fight these groups, since the actual measures are not enough to end with the bacrim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The insistence of the Assad regime on treating members of non-State armed groups as terrorists that may receive grave sentences, and even the death penalty, upon capture may go some way in explaining the endemic disregard for the laws of war by all parties in the Syrian Civil War. It is broadly recognized that the threat of the death penalty for mere participation in hostilities greatly reduces the incentives for rebel groups to comply with the law of armed conflict. The central thesis of the present contribution is that, under certain conditions, non-State armed groups must be granted combatant-like status without this being conditioned on the ad hoc consent of the de jure government. Clearly this position raises a host of questions, several of which were also raised during the 1949 Geneva Conference. I f they were ultimately left unanswered at that time, the excesses of recent conflicts, such as that in Syria, stand as proof that the time is ripe to revisit the matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses some of the challenges related to the beginning of application of international humanitarian law (IHL). It concludes that IHL pertaining to international armed conflicts begins to apply as soon as one State employs force in the territory of another State without the latter's consent, provided that the violence is of a collective nature. In the case of non-international armed conflicts, this article acknowledges that it is now well settled that the two key criteria are the organization of the parties to the conflict and the level of intensity of the violence. This article shows however that some of the challenges inherent to the beginning of application of IHL make it almost impossible to identify a very single point in time at which it begins to become applicable, be it for international armed conflicts, including occupation, or non-international armed conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]