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Ocean acidification (OA) impacts the survival, fertilization, and community structure of marine organisms across the world. However, some populations or species are considered more resilient than others, such as those that are invasive, globally distributed, or biofouling. Here, we tested this assumption by investigating the effect of pH on the larval development of one such tunicate, Ciona robusta , which is currently exposed to a wide range of pH levels. Consistent with our hypothesis, C. robusta larvae developed and metamorphosed at a rate comparable to control (pH 8.0) at modest near-future conditions (pH 7.7) over a 58-hour period. However, development was stunted at the extreme low pH of 6.8 such that no embryo progressed beyond late cleavage after 58 hours. Interestingly, piecewise regression of the proportion of embryos at the most advanced stage at a given time point against pH identified a breakpoint with the highest pH (~pH 7.6) at around hatching. The variation in breakpoint pH throughout ontogeny highlighted that the sensitivity to decreasing pH differs significantly between developmental stages. More broadly, our results show that even a cosmopolitan, biofouling, invasive species could be negatively impacted by decreasing pH.

As the number of prescriptions, over-the-counter medications and drugs of abuse continue to increase, forensic laboratories are faced with the challenge of developing more comprehensive screening methods in order to detect them in whole blood samples. Another challenge faced by forensic laboratories is detecting and identifying novel synthetic compounds as they emerge and change. Traditional drug screening methods include enzyme immunoassay (EIA) and either gas or liquid chromatography paired with mass spectrometry (GC-MS or LC-MS-MS, respectively). While these methods are good, they have their disadvantages. For example, EIA requires special reagents for each drug class, GC-MS requires extensive sample preparation, and LC-MS-MS only detects drugs on a known inclusion lists of compounds of interest. Described here is the development of a robust and comprehensive screening method for drugs in whole blood samples that eliminates the aforementioned disadvantages of the traditional methods. Using a Q Exactive Focus™ liquid chromatography-high-resolution accurate mass spectrometer (LC-HRMS-MS), a method was developed that is capable of detecting ~200 drugs at a concentration of 2 μg/L for most analytes. This method also employs a more automated data processing feature which reduces processing time. Finally, it has the added benefit of retroactive data analysis, which allows it to be used for unknown drug analysis as well. Used as an initial screening method, the comprehensive drug screen using LC-HRMS-MS has the potential to take on two of the most important challenges faced by forensic laboratories today., (© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues., Competing Interests: Authors TM and HS are affiliated with Opencell. KM is affiliated with Biosecure Ltd. Arcadia provided support in the form of salaries for authors WS and CR. There are no patents, products in development or marketed products to declare. This does not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.

Horizon scanning is intended to identify the opportunities and threats associated with technological, regulatory and social change. In 2017 some of the present authors conducted a horizon scan for bioengineering (Wintle et al., 2017). Here we report the results of a new horizon scan that is based on inputs from a larger and more international group of 38 participants. The final list of 20 issues includes topics spanning from the political (the regulation of genomic data, increased philanthropic funding and malicious uses of neurochemicals) to the environmental (crops for changing climates and agricultural gene drives). The early identification of such issues is relevant to researchers, policy-makers and the wider public., Competing Interests: LK, LA, CB, RB, RC, MD, AD, RH, LH, AM, CN, SÓ, NP, WP, VR, CR, CR, AR, PS, CS, LS, ET, GU, BW, NZ, WS No competing interests declared, NE Has received funding in the past five years from the following organizations to conduct research and speak on issues related to this article: Greenwall Foundation; Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology; Davis Foundation; National Science Foundation. Has participated in the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGem) competition as a judge and a member of the Safety Committee several times over the past five years. KH Has participated in the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGem) competition as a judge and a member of the Safety Committee several times over the past five years; has accepted travel funding from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology. TK Holds a grant from the Open Philanthropy Foundation to study DIYbio, including gene drives; member of the IUCN task force on synthetic biology and gene drives; co-chair of the human practices committee of iGEM; member of the biosafety/security advisory board for MIT Broad Foundry; has been affiliated with the Genetic Biocontrol of Invasive Rodents consortium at NC State but has never received any salary or other compensation. PM Co-founder of Biosecure Ltd. JN Listed as an inventor on multiple patents; most relevant patent is US 2019/0323022 A1 and family. Acted as a consultant to BASF (2014-2019). AO Director of the Industrial Biotechnology Alliance, Norwich Research Park; trustee with the New Phytologist Trust. MP Recipient of a grant and a gift from the Open Philanthropy Foundation to study biosecurity at Stanford university; volunteer director of the human practices committee of the international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) Foundation; member of the board of directors of Revive & Restore. EP Holds shares in Celixir Ltd and Arkurity Ltd; has received payment from Deep Science Ventures Ltd, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Revive & Restore, Celixir Ltd, Arkurity Ltd, CSIRO, International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Biosecure. DS, RS Involved in a consultancy for the ERA-CoBioTech programme (an ERA-Net network funded by Horizon 2020)., (© 2020, Kemp et al.)

The use of liquid chromatography (LC) coupled with tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS) or single-stage mass spectrometry (MS) is making significant inroads in the analyst's compendium of instrumentation available for the analysis of drugs in biological fluids, tissues, and other specimens of interest. LC/MS(/MS) has the unique capability of analyzing substances frequently not analyzable by any other means. Furthermore, LC/MS(/MS), particularly LC/MS/MS instrumentation, has shown a precipitous drop in cost, making it more accessible to the smaller laboratories. As such, an increasing number of methods for the analysis of drugs of abuse have been published using LC/MS(/MS) - in particular, those methods associated with LC/MS/MS. However, these methods are not without certain endemic problems/limitations such as ion source selection, matrix effects, endogenous interferences, and interlibrary matching of spectra. This review seeks to show what progress is being made to circumvent the perceived limitations of LC/MS(/MS). It presents methodologies for selected drugs of abuse (opioids, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, and the amphetamines) that have been developed in recent years for analysis in blood, urine, hair, and oral fluids, as well as certain other specimens. Emphasis is primarily directed toward those methodologies that have been developed recently for LC/MS/MS, but LC/MS methods are also addressed where appropriate., (Copyright © 2008 Central Police University.)